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Abstract Prolegomena to a theory of spoken persuasion: A 
Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of Persuasion (SPIMP) 
Various disciplines such as rhetoric, marketing, and psychology have explored 
persuasion as a social and argumentative phenomenon. The present thesis is 
predominantly based in cognitive psychology and investigates the psychological 
processes the persuadee undergoes when faced with a persuasive attempt. The 
exploration concludes with the development of a concrete model for describing 
persuasion processing, namely The Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of 
Persuasion (SPIMP). In addition to cognitive psychology, the thesis relies on conceptual 
developments and empirical data from disciplines such as rhetoric, economics, and 
philosophy.  
 The core model of the SPIMP relies on two central persuasive elements: 
content strength and source credibility. These elements are approached from a 
subjective perspective in which the persuadee estimates the probabilistic likelihood of 
how strong the content and how credible the source is. The elements, however, are 
embedded in a larger psychological framework such that the subjective estimations are 
contextual and social rather than solipsistic. The psychological framework relies on 
internal and external influences, the scope of cognition, and the framework for 
cognition. The SPIMP departs significantly from previous models of persuasion in a 
number of ways. For instance, the latter are dual-processing models whereas the SPIMP 
is an integrated single-process approach. Further, the normative stances differ since the 
previous models seemingly rely on a logicist framework whereas SPIMP relies on a 
probabilistic.  
The development of a new core model of persuasion processing 
constitutes a novel contribution. Further, the theoretical and psychological framework 
surrounding the elements of the model provides a novel framework for conceptualising 
persuasion processing from the perspective of the persuadee. Finally, given the 
multitude of disciplines connected to persuasion, the thesis provides a definition for use 
in future studies, which differentiates persuasion from argumentation, communicated 
information updating, and influence.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   7 
Table of content 
 
Introduction                               13-32 
 
Part I: Definitions and central elements of the SPIMP model                     33-155 
 
Chapter 1: Defining persuasion                        34-73 
1.1. Approaching persuasion                              37-52 
1.2. Elements of persuasion                              52-56 
1.3. Persuasive intention                              56-59 
1.4. Aim and scope of persuasion                             59-62 
1.5 Alignment, consensus and persuasion                             62-64 
1.6. Persuasion and argumentation                              64-69 
1.7. Cognitive processing theories                             69-71 
1.8. Overview of the thesis                              71-73 
 
Chapter 2: Reasoning from uncertainty: Content strength                     74-117 
2.1. Reasoning in persuasion: A brief history                              76-80 
2.2. Logical reasoning and logicist cognition                              80-90 
2.3. Probabilistic reasoning                               90-98 
2.4. Bayesian reasoning                              98-106 
2.5. Limitations to Bayesian reasoning                            106-109 
2.6. Local and global consistency                            109-117 
 
Chapter 3: Interpreting the persuader: Source credibility                    118-156 
3.1. Persuader and persuadee: Vigilance toward misinformation                         122-131 
3.2. Mentalizing                            132-138 
3.3. Source credibility                            138-151 
3.4. Complex, causal networks                           151-156 
 
Part II: Psychological and theoretical framework                     157-262 
 
Chapter 4: Language comprehension                      158-201 
4.1. Traditional theories of language                           162-167 
4.2. Pragmatic enrichment                            167-180 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   8 
 
 
4.3 A probabilistic approach to communication                          180-186 
4.4. Distributed language                            186-192 
4.5 Beyond meaning: Style, sound, and mood                          192-201 
 
Chapter 5: Interaction                       202-228 
5.1. Influences from social factors                           205-220 
5.2. Joint action, common ground, and coordination                          220-225 
5.3 An interactive approach to persuasion processing                          225-228 
 
Chapter 6: Immersing the subjective in the contextual                    229-263 
6.1. The phenomenological tradition: immersing the subject                          232-244 
6.2. Subjectivity of beliefs revisited                           244-255 
6.3. Presence                            255-259 
6.4. The temporal: a flash in a flux                            259-263 
 
Part III: Integration of core model and psychological framework                 264-306 
 
Chapter 7: On persuasion processing via the SPIMP                    265-306 
7.1. General findings                            266-272 
7.2. A theory of persuasion                            272-283 
7.3. A model of persuasion: SPIMP                           283-287 
7.4. Coping with persuasive attempts                           287-296 
7.5. The current approach compared with other models of persuasion                         296-306 
                
Concluding remarks                       307-320 
 
Bibliography                                     321-385 
 
Appendix 1: Key figures and approaches to persuasion throughout  
history                                      386-387
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   9 
Illustrations and tables                                                 
 
Introduction 
Table 1: Comparisons with ELM and HSM    19 
Fig. 1: The SPIMP                          27 
Table 2: Main contributions of the thesis                             27 
 
Chapter 1 
Fig. 2: Conceptual relationships from disciplines to persuasion   38 
Fig. 3: Elements of beliefs     55 
Fig. 4: Toulmin’s model of argumentation     65 
 
Chapter 2 
Fig. 5: Semantic tree in logic     83 
Fig. 6: The probabilistic semantics for the quantifiers (AMFIEO)  87 
Fig. 7: Venn diagram of conditional reasoning      88 
Table 3: Truth table of conditional reasoning     88 
 
Chapter 3 
Table 4: Walton’s (1997) criteria for source credibility                           139 
Fig. 8: Appeal to expert opinion Including Qualifications as evidence of Expertise in a  
Bayesian network                             149 
Fig 9: Graphical representation of source credibility in the present model                           153 
 
Chapter 4 
Fig. 10: representation of traditional code-like philosophy of language                          163 
Fig. 11a: Active syntactic tree                            165 
Fig. 11b: Passive syntactic tree                            165 
Table 5: Gricean maxims and the principles of relevance                           169 
Fig. 12: Venn diagram of logical conjunction                              177 
Table 6: Truth table of logical conjunction                             177 
 
Chapter 5 
Fig. 13: Sharing representations                            223 
 
 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   10 
 
Chapter 6 
Fig. 14a: A Model of the folk concept of intentionality                           238 
Fig. 14b: The present placement of intentionality                           238 
Fig. 15: Radar diagram of moral differences between liberals and conservatives                       249 
Fig. 16: Aspects of beliefs                             250 
 
Chapter 7 
Table 7: The Psychological framework                             273 
Fig. 17: The SPIMP                              286 
Fig. 18: The SPIMP approach                             288 
Table 1: Comparisons with ELM and HSM (from introduction)                           298 
 
Concluding remarks 
Table 2: main contributions of the thesis (from introduction)                            309 
Fig. 19: Complex Bayesian network of multiple persuaders   316 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   11 
Monograph versus article-based thesis 
This thesis is a monograph that deals extensively and theoretically with the topic of 
persuasion and no peer-reviewed paper is re-printed in the thesis. However, my research 
has led to several publications during my PhD, which have naturally influenced the 
ideas in the thesis. These papers are cited on equal footing with papers from other 
academics. That is, I pay no special interest to these, but cite and quote them simply in 
the same way as if others had written them. Nonetheless, to provide an overview of the 
written work completed during the PhD, here is a list of the papers published, 
submitted, or in preparation that naturally form part of the background and motivation 
for the thesis. The papers are either available online or upon request if the committee 
needs them.  
 
Harris, A., Hsu, A. & Madsen, J. K. (2012) Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of 
Bayesian argumentation using Ad Hominem, Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3), 311-343 
 
Harris, A., Hsu, A., Madsen, J. K. & Hahn, U. (submitted) The Appeal to Expert 
Opinion: Quantitative support for a Bayesian Network Approach, Cognitive Science 
 
Madsen, J. K. (2012) ‘Overtalelse’ defineret i et retorisk perspektiv, Rhetorica 
Scandinavica 16 (2), 37-57 
 
Madsen, J. K. (2013) A Cognitive Supplement to Rhetorical Theory, in Belle, H. v., 
Gillaerts, P., Gorp, B. v., Mieroop, D. v. d. & Rutten, K. (Eds.) Verbal and Visual 
Rhetoric in a Media World, Leiden University Press: Mulder van Meurs: Amsterdam, 
95-116 
 
Madsen, J. K.  (submitted) Approaching Bayesian subjectivity in a temporal 
perspective, Cybernetics & Human Knowledge 
 
Madsen, J. K. (in prep. A) Persuasion: A review of definition, description, and analyses 
 
Madsen, J. K. (in prep. B) General Cluster: A Psychological Exploration and 
Theoretical Improvement of Cluster Criticism from a SPIMP approach 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   12 
 
Madsen, J. K. (in prep. C) Intentionality and attention in persuasion processing, 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 
 
Madsen, J. K.  & Chamberlain, R. (in prep) A Meta-Analysis of Participant Pools in 
Psychological Research: A Review of 10 Years 
 
Madsen, J. K.  & Chater, N. (in prep.) Persuasion: A puzzle for reasoning theories? 
Cognition 
 
Madsen, J. K., Pezzulo, G. & Chater, N. (in prep.) A mechanistic foundation for human 
communication: Grounding pragmatic enrichment in interactivity, Cognition 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   13 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Not brute force, but only persuasion and faith are the kings of this world  
Thomas Carlyle 
 
 
The object of oratory alone is not truth, but persuasion  
Thomas Macaulay 	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The study of persuasion 
Persuasive attempts, understood as a mutually acknowledged act to change the beliefs 
of the persuadee, permeate and penetrate society. In an obvious manner, politicians vie 
for our attention and vote, advertisers push and peddle products in a fiercely 
competitive market, and orators have debated and continue to debate the fundamental 
ideas of society such as economic policies, ethics, and public health. Central to these 
discussions is the fact that persuaders attempt to sway the persuadees one way of 
another by presenting arguments, appearing credible, and cracking jokes to make the 
audience more comfortable. In this uncertain marketplace of ideas, more or less 
malevolent and benevolent speakers navigate complex social situations to be as 
successful in persuading their audience as possible. Given the presence and general 
importance of the phenomenon, it is not surprising that persuasion has been studied 
throughout the millennia from the Ancient Greeks and Romans up until modern day 
psychologists, economist, and rhetoricians (to name a few, see appendix 1 for a brief 
historical illustration of some main authors and ideas in the history of persuasion).  
 Several disciplines have approached persuasion for a variety of reasons 
(see 1.1. for a more in-depth description of this). Rhetoric, described as the art of 
persuasion by Aristotle, remains the oldest discipline to deal with persuasion and 
provides the first attempt to formalise persuasive appeals. Rhetorical theory discusses 
the interrelation between content (logos), emotional appeals (pathos) and source 
credibility (ethos)1. As evident from the SPIMP approach developed throughout the 
thesis, content strength and source credibility remain central elements of the core model 
in the present approach. As such, the theoretical stance is in accordance with overall 
holistic approach of persuasion described by Aristotle and debated throughout millennia 
)with notable differences in terms of principles of reasoning, the qualification of source 
credibility, and other central elements). Economics – and especially behavioural 
economics – provides one of several fascinating perspectives on the principles of 
information updating and valuation of arguments and goods. Interestingly, given the 
fact that the principle of reasoning invoked in the thesis is probabilistic, economic 
theorists have described a possible Nash equilibrium for persuasion using Bayesian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The translations of Aristotle’s terms are approximations to indicate the relation between his terms and 
the concepts used in the thesis (content strength and source credibility) 
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probabilities2. As such, economic theory provides interesting empirical and theoretical 
support for developing a theory and model of persuasion processing.  Marketing and 
advertisement provide further empirical support concerning the effectiveness of 
persuasive attempts. These studies are predominantly concerned with the outcome of 
persuasion rather than the processes underlying the reception of acts of persuasion from 
a psychological point of view. However, studying the effect of certain attempts does 
provide an indicative and indirect leeway into eliciting the psychological processes 
given the fact that we cannot elicit these empirically in any direct way3. Finally, given 
the fact that the contribution of the thesis is psychological, naturally psychological 
literature – both social and cognitive – provides interesting findings in a number of 
ways. One of the central of these contributions is the exploration of previous models of 
persuasion and comparison with the model developed in the thesis. The two most 
prevalent psychological accounts of persuasion processing are the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) and the Heuristics-Systematic Model (HSM). These models 
rely on a dual-process model when describing persuasion processing such that the cues 
are processed either via a slow, effortful, and rule-based reasoning system (‘central’ in 
ELM; ‘systematic’ in HSM) or a fast, shallow, and heuristics-based system (‘peripheral’ 
in ELM; ‘heuristic’ in HSM). As will be evident throughout the thesis, the present 
approach differs on a number of issues (see table 1). Furthermore, the dynamic between 
the persuader and the persuadee may be approached from a mechanistic and 
psychological point of view, which indicates the complexity of the dynamics of the 
persuasive incident4. Taken together, the various disciplines provide a compelling 
interdisciplinary view of persuasion processing that may facilitate a strong theoretical 
foundation for the thesis.  
In order to flesh out a holistic theory of persuasion (both theoretically and in 
terms of modelling), the thesis draws extensively from each of the disciplines. 
However, the concrete contribution of the thesis remains predominantly within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As will be evident throughout the thesis, however, persuasion cannot be reduced to rational information 
updating, expressible via Bayes’ theorem.  
3 Even neuroscientific evidence is unfeasible to elicit these processes holistically given the complexity of 
the persuasive attempts in terms of linguistic comprehension, interactive dynamics between persuader and 
persuadee, and evaluation of the evidence.  
4 Note that throughout the thesis, I label the persuader as male and the persuadee as female. This is done 
to ease the reader experience and the roles of persuader and persuadee were assigned by chance (rolling 
of a dice, incidentally). 
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cognitive psychology by describing the elements of the core model (content strength 
and source credibility) as well as the psychological framework surrounding these. That 
is, the theory and model developed in the thesis aims at describing how the persuadee 
processes acts of persuasion from a cognitive psychological perspective. Despite this, 
the contribution should nonetheless be extendable to inform other disciplines such as 
rhetoric, advertising, and critical analyses.  
The thesis develops a core model of persuasion as well as a psychological 
framework based on the theoretical foundation as outlined above. This involves a 
critical assessment of previous models of persuasion as well as a discussion of 
important elements of persuasion and the main research questions addressed are thus 
1) How do humans process interpersonal, verbal acts of 
persuasion from a cognitive psychological point of view? 
2) How do humans reason from uncertainty? 
3) How do humans evaluate the strength of content evidence and 
source credibility in a persuasive situation? 
4) How does persuasion interact with the other interlocutor, the 
environmental, and the context in general? 
5) What are the benefits and limitations of the previous models 
and the current approach to persuasion? 
 
Previous models of persuasion: ELM and HSM 
Given the prevalence of persuasion in the everyday life, several psychological models 
of persuasion naturally already exist in the literature as mentioned in the above. The 
most influential model in cognitive psychology is the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM) and secondly the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM)5. The ELM, developed by 
Petty and colleagues, has been cited in numerous papers and remains the most prevalent 
model of persuasion analyses from psychological frameworks. Given the empirical 
success of the ELM, it is natural to consider the contribution of the SPIMP model, and 
this will be evident when presenting some limitations of the present models. Indeed, the 
SPIMP model and its theoretical background concerning persuasion further develops 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Intentionally, I keep the introduction clean and circumvent redundancy by avoiding references in the 
text as these are spread throughout the thesis as they become argumentatively relevant.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   17 
some of the notions presented in the ELM such as the importance of source credibility, 
heuristics, and reasoning, but in addition it presents a more precise definition of these in 
a integrated model rather than in a dual-processing framework. Despite some 
differences in assignments of heuristics, the ELM and the HSM are somewhat similar in 
their underpinning assumptions. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, I present some of the 
key features of the models here before presenting some limiting considerations that 
warrant the theoretical exploration of the thesis.  
 ELM and HSM Both models rely on a dual-processing framework such 
that persuasion processing may occur via a central (ELM) or systematic (HSM) route or 
via a peripheral (ELM) or heuristic (HSM) route. The central route is characterised by 
being cognitively effortful, slow, and stemming from systematic reasoning (such as 
logical enquiries). Conclusions derived via the effortful central route yield long-lasting 
effects such that the persuasive attempts processed through this route are regarded to be 
more firmly accepted and thus take more effort to subsequently change again. The main 
component processed via the central route is the evidence presented by the persuader. 
Conversely, the peripheral route is characterised by shallow thinking, which may be 
influenced by a host of non-relevant cues such as attractiveness of the persuader, the 
mood of the persuadee, and so on. The conclusions reached via this route are more 
volatile than from the central or systematic. That is, cues may function either via the 
central or via the peripheral during the persuasive attempt such that the content is 
processed in the central whilst attractiveness or other non-content cues are processed in 
the peripheral. Effortful thinking may diminish the influence of the peripheral cues such 
that the persuadee should be increasingly rational and reasonable given additional 
effort. Indeed, this has been supported by a range of studies conducted by proponents of 
the ELM and HSM such as Petty and colleagues as well as Chaiken and colleagues. 
Very positively, then, the ELM and the HSM provide tantalising findings and as such 
function as important steps toward a psychological appreciation of the cognitive 
process, which the persuadee undergoes when faced with an act of persuasion. 
However, as evident from the following, there are some limitations to consider.  
Limitations of the ELM and HSM Telling of the persuasion process as they may 
be, both the ELM and the HSM are faced with inherent limitations. These mainly 
cluster around the principle of reasoning invoked in the models, the potential interaction 
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between systems, and the assignment of cues as either central or peripheral. Firstly, 
despite describing the central route of persuasion as based on reasoning and rationality, 
the ELM does not develop this stance very clearly. However, from the analyses 
conducted with the model, it seems that the model of reasoning invoked in the model is 
derived from formal logic relying on mental modelling from logical connectors. That is, 
the normative stance seems to be connected with formal logic (this stance will be 
questioned in chapter 2). Secondly, proponents of the ELM seem undecided whether or 
not the two systems may interact and if so, how this process happens. Indeed, given the 
complexity of persuasive attempts, the model has to deal with multiple cues happening 
simultaneously concerning content strength of the argument, likeability, the relationship 
between the persuader and the persuadee, the attractiveness of the persuader and so 
forth. In other words, the plethora of cues stem from phenomena both thought of as 
central as well as peripheral. This begs the question of interactivity between systems. 
Furthermore, it may be questioned whether these dual-process accounts of persuasion 
are really dual if these systems influence one another in integration, but this depends on 
the definition of interaction, which proponents of the ELM have not fully specified in 
detail. Furthermore, it seems contextually ambiguous whether a cue is considered a 
central of a peripheral cue, which further blurs the distinction between the two systems 
even more. For example, if a person tries to persuade an agent that he should be a 
model, his beauty may very well be considered a central cue as this gains contextual and 
thematic salience. However, if a person tries to persuade an academic committee that 
she should pass the viva and become a doctor, her beauty matters less and becomes a 
peripheral cue. In other words, whether or not something is central or peripheral seems 
contextual and potentially ad hoc. This further calls into question the ELM and HSM 
dual distinction, as they need a mechanism to decide when a cure is central and when it 
is peripheral (which entails that something more fundamental than the two systems must 
be afoot).  
In sum, much can be learned from the ELM and the HSM in terms of persuasion 
processing and the influences on these processes from central and peripheral cues. 
However, the models are faced with potential limitations, which warrant the exploration 
of the thesis.  
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The SPIMP approach  
The current approach is labelled The Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of 
Persuasion (SPIMP). As evident from the ‘findings’ section below, this proposes a 
theoretically different model of persuasion compared with the ELM and the HSM. In 
particular, the underlying assumptions of SPIMP depart significantly from the ones 
underlying the previous models. The model does, however, make use of the insight of 
the ELM and HSM concerning the importance of peripheral cues such as qualities of the 
source (only, in the SPIMP approach, these are integrated in a holistic framework). 
Thus, to quote Proust, the exploration “…is not about travelling to new places, but to 
looking with different eyes”. The main differences between the SPIMP approach and 
the ELM and HSM are described in table 1.  
Table 1: Comparisons with ELM and HSM6 
 
From this table, several points should be made. Firstly, the SPIMP approach is a single 
process approach to persuasion rather than a dual-process approach. This is motivated 
by two main factors. One, the experimental data concerning source credibility cited in 
3.3 seems incompatible with the underlying assumptions of two separate systems since 
source credibility (a peripheral cue in the ELM and a heuristic in the HSM) integrates 
with content strength (a central cue in both the ELM and the HSM), which should not 
happen from a dual-process perspective. However, as pointed out in 1.7, a host of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This table is constructed via a reading of the ELM and the HSM. As O’Keefe (2008) remarks, neither 
the ELM nor the HSM are clear in terms of defining the principles of reasoning nor on interactivity. As a 
consequence of this, the description in the table stems from a reading of the theoretical presentations, 
their studies, and analyses conducted in various papers (see chapters 1 and 2 for references) 
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studies suggest dual-process accounts. Thus, despite suggesting a single-process model 
of persuasion processing, this is a fertile ground for additional research. Two, given the 
remarks in the above concerning whether a cue is considered central or peripheral and 
how the two systems interact, it seems warranted to explore the possibility of a holistic 
and integrated model in which the elements are present, but may be valuated differently 
depending on the cognitive effort. Secondly, the SPIMP approach is grounded on 
principles of reasoning derived from probabilistic (Bayesian) reasoning. That is, the 
persuadee is thought to deal with the persuasive content from the perspective of 
subjective probabilistic estimations rather than adherence to logical structures7. That is, 
the constraints concerning consistency are imposed on the degrees of beliefs rather than 
the logic of the structures. Furthermore, the model integrates source credibility 
(expressed as trustworthiness and expertise) in the persuasion processing model. As 
such, the normative predictions from the subjective probabilistic estimations of content 
strength and source credibility follow mathematically, which is easily testable. That is, 
given the priors and likelihood estimations, the SPIMP approach makes predictions 
concerning the persuasiveness of an act of persuasion. The ELM and HSM have less 
stringent predictions due to the lack of detail in describing the principles of reasoning 
and decision-making inherent in the models.  
 Despite the difference in reasoning and cognitive assumptions, the thesis 
naturally takes the empirical evidence supporting the ELM and HSM seriously and as 
such, the SPIMP need to be able to account for this data in some way. Indeed, from the 
data, it seems clear that a cue may either by construed as a central cue, which is 
processed an effortful and slow manner, or a peripheral cue, which is processed via fast, 
heuristic processes. In order to accommodate these findings, the present framework 
assumes a gradient scale of cognitive effort in which the persuadee may exert more or 
less cognitive effort in processing the persuasive attempt. According to this gradient 
hypothesis, this results in differences in conclusions given a more or less stringent 
consideration of the persuasive attempt. For instance, in an election, a voter might 
invest heavily in processing the evidence, resulting in less influence from extraneous 
variables (peripheral and heuristics). However, importantly, these variables still might 
potentially effect the processing outcome even in high effort situations given the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a description of logic, probability, and rational choice paradigms of normative systems, see Chater 
& Oaksford, 2012 
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that they are assumed to frame the cognition as discussed in chapters 5, 6, and in 7.4. 
This is a working hypothesis in order to account for the data in the ELM and the HSM, 
and the hypothesis needs to be explored further through empirical evidence. However, 
rather than assuming two separate cognitive systems, the present approach assumes 
difference in valence and valuation between cues such that the content of the persuasive 
message and the credibility of the source are important factors of persuasion processing 
from a reasoning perspective whereas the likeability and attractiveness of the persuader 
are less relevant from a reasoning perspective. However, both types of factors are 
assumed to always be present in the context of the SPIMP approach such that these 
modify and influence the subjective probabilistic estimations of the persuadee, which in 
turn influence the normative predictions of whether or not the persuadee will find a 
particular act of persuasion persuasive8. For example, attractiveness, likeability, the 
current emotional state of the persuadee, the physical context and other variables all 
contribute to shaping the subjective probabilistic estimations in the situation, but given 
more cognitive effort, the influence of these may be diminished. In this way, the SPIMP 
approach may account for the findings of previous models given the fact that the 
peripheral route may be thought of as low cognitive investment (indeed, this is in line 
with the proponents of the ELM and HSM who label the central route as effortful and 
the peripheral as shallow). However, despite being potentially diminished, these cues 
are not thought of as a separate system, but rather as the backdrop against which the 
subjective estimations are made, which reflects the single process approach to 
persuasion in the SPIMP. That is, the ‘peripheral’ and ‘contextual’ factors are involved 
in the probabilistic problem of inferring another’s mental state in non-communicative 
contexts (like normal sensory integration applied to humans), and inferring the 
communicative intention (as in persuasion) ought reasonably to be assumed to be 
similar.  
Alongside the integration of content strength and source credibility, the 
theoretical approach in the present framework acknowledges the potential detrimental 
consequences of deception and misinformation. Indeed, the persuasive incident is a 
complex social phenomenon in which the aims and desires of the persuader and the 
persuadee may differ wildly. Epistemic vigilance is the vigilance against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Content strength and source credibility are elements of the core model whereas the other factors belong 
to the psychological framework.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   22 
misinformation and constitutes the cognitive defence against deceptive persuasion. 
Indeed, the dynamics between the persuadee, the persuader, and the social context is 
seen as immensely important in the SPIMP approach such that the socio-cultural 
context may influence the probabilistic estimations and the dynamics between persuader 
and persuadee shape the potential for performative actions of language and reasoning. 
Consequently, the approach is described as interactive given the relationship between 
the interlocutors. In sum, the SPIMP approach may account for the data provided by the 
ELM and HSM given the inclusion of gradient cognitive effort, but constitutes an 
entirely different model given the single-process approach and clearly defined and 
integrated probabilistic information as well as the interactive dynamic between the 
interlocutors.  
 
Two types of normativity 
As will be evident throughout the thesis, I identify two separate and distinct notions of 
normativity that fulfil two separate purposes in the study of persuasion. The difference 
points to the variance in approach from a societal-desirable and an approximating point 
of view, and the different theoretical extrapolations regarding the type of normative 
evaluations fostered by such approaches. As argued in 2.2-2.4, the distinction between 
the types of normativity bears considerable consequences for argumentation, critical 
analyses, and persuasion processing. In general, the two types of norms considered here 
are social and functional norms where the latter is concerned with normative 
descriptions and predictions at a functional level (this includes probabilistic and logical 
norms since these are concerned with how humans, for instance, process evidence in 
persuasive situations) and where the former is concerned with what would be societally 
desirable. As will be evident, the thesis is concerned with the functional normativity 
whereas the societal might include what normatively should happen on a functional 
level, but which can be infused with other considerations as well.  
Societal-desirable normativity Certain actions may be more desirable than others 
from a societal and ethical perspective. For instance, if a politician lies or misuses 
argumentative tricks in order to sway an audience, he may readily be challenged and 
criticised due to the fact that deliberate misinformation is undesirable for the greater 
society. That is, the normative standard here is concerned with the correctness and 
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ethics of persuasive attempts and critical analyses of the potential consequences of this. 
Persuasion studies may be identified as belonging to either of two separate foci, namely 
a narrow focus dealing with how humans are persuaded in terms of processes and 
appeals and a broad focus dealing with the societal issues, which includes ethical 
concerns.  
Normative-functional approximation In the other hand, normative standards may 
be developed that disregard whether or not a particular action or psychological process 
is normatively desirable on a societal level. That is, a narrower focus. Such normative 
standards function at an entirely different epistemic, ethical, and critical level than the 
societal-desirable normativity. Rather than focussing on whether or not the particular 
persuasive attempt is societally desirable, the normative stance taken here is concerned 
with producing theories and analyses of the psychological processes the persuadee 
undergoes when faced with an act of persuasion regardless of ethics. That is, the 
normative stance approximates, describes, and potentially predicts how humans deal 
with particular persuasive incidents.  
The normative difference may be summed up by analogy. Consider the act of 
running. From a societal point of view, it is a perfectly viable normative stance to argue 
that people should run (or exercise) more as this would yield significant benefits in 
terms of individual health, lower healthcare costs, longevity, and so on. From this 
perspective, humans who do not exercise or take care of themselves may be blamed 
(fairly or unfairly). Compared with this moralistic and societal, a different normative 
stance comes from medical sciences that attempt to describe how the heart functions, 
the importance of blood flow and so forth during exercise. This normative stance yields 
different normative predictions such as ‘the heart rate should increase during exercise’ 
regardless of whether or not this is desirable. To reiterate, the thesis is concerned with 
the latter normative stance to persuasion. Importantly, the desirable norm might be 
derived from functional norms concerning the effects of running. As such, the 
functional will often inform the societal normativity, but it is paramount that the 
societal, desirable, and ethical norms do not influence the description of the functional 
normativity since this should be describable whether it is positive or not.  
The normative stance and the model presented and developed in the thesis are 
firmly lodged in the latter such that the model aims at approximating how humans 
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process persuasive attempts without considering whether or not this processing effort is 
societally beneficial or desirable. One clear difference between the two normative 
stances is how to deal with logical fallacies. These are argumentative structures that do 
not hold true logically, and from a desirable stance these should be shunned and 
disregarded. However, branching over both instances of real-life persuasion such as 
advertisements and political campaigns as well as empirical findings from 
argumentation theory, it seems to be the case that humans do not simply reject 
arguments despite logical fallaciousness. Consequently, in order to approximate the 
process that the persuadee undergoes as closely and faithfully as possible, whether or 
not a persuasive ploy is undesired should be irrelevant since the aim is to provide a 
psychological and not an ethical account of persuasion.  
 
The ethics of studying persuasion 
The study of persuasion is naturally marred by the popular reputation of the 
phenomenon as something deceptive, manipulative and propagandistic. Indeed, the 20th 
century saw demagoguery sway entire nations into terrible actions, and through and 
through history is awash with examples of manipulative rhetoric that misguides 
populations and entails horrendous consequences. It is easy, then, to be swept up in the 
pathos of the consequence and decry persuasion as a shallow and deceptive 
phenomenon that is best eradicated and should be challenged sternly whenever 
occurring. Indeed, much of rhetorical history has been somewhat apologetic because 
philosophers have decried the study of persuasion and description of the importance of 
emotional appeals as undesirable and something to be avoided (incidentally, this 
harkens back to the distinction between normative standards aimed at societal and 
desirable outcomes versus normative standards aimed at describing the state of affairs 
of a psychological and social phenomenon). Unsurprisingly, as a researcher in 
persuasion, I do not take this bleak view, but rather adopt the study of persuasion as 
something inherently interesting, as something that is telling of the human psyche, and 
as something potentially beneficial for the society if understood in greater detail. 
Furthermore, persuasion should be distinguished from malevolent misinformation and 
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deception such as propaganda9. Importantly, for the purpose of the thesis, persuasion is 
definitely not limited to actions that are designed to suppress rationality or judgement. 
Rather, as evident from chapter 1, persuasion is concerned with attempts to change the 
beliefs of the persuadee in situations where both (at least tacitly) recognize the 
persuasive intention and where motives can be benevolent or malevolent. As such, 
propaganda (as defined by Marlin) is a specialised case of persuasion.  
 Indeed, a greater awareness of the psychology of persuasion processing 
may yield beneficial insight on two separate and distinct levels related to the two 
normative stances described in the above. On an approximating level, it portrays the 
psychological mechanisms of an inherently interesting social phenomenon, namely the 
dynamic negotiation of uncertain beliefs in a complex situation in which there are 
potential asymmetric relations between the persuader and the persuadee on an epistemic 
level, in desires and aims, and in persuasive agency. Thus, studies in persuasion 
highlight a prevalent and important aspect of human interaction. Secondly, on a societal 
normative view, a more in-depth appreciation of the psychological processes may yield 
a more refined understanding of persuasive mechanisms in society. This, in turn, may 
facilitate more precise form of rhetorical and critical analysis such that the mechanisms 
of misuse may more readily be identified, discussed, and presented through scholarly 
work and journalistic effort. That is, the psychology of persuasion provides a foundation 
for in-depth criticism of practical use of persuasion.  
 Naturally, a greater insight into the psychological mechanisms of 
persuasion may yield greater insight into the mechanisms of manipulation, which may 
readily be misused by scrupulous individuals. However, regardless of any academic 
treatise on the matter, persuasion would still be studied (and misued). That is, without a 
proper academic understanding of persuasion, manipulation, and the psychology of 
both, scholars and critics would have a less developed standard against which to 
measure practical acts of persuasion. In sum, the study of persuasion is both necessary 
and warranted from an ethical point of view, as it provides valuable insight into a 
fascinating human phenomenon. Thus, a greater appreciation of the workings of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Marlin defines propaganda as “The organized attempt through communication to affect belief or action 
or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent or suppress an individual's adequately 
informed, rational, reflective judgment” (2002, p. 22). 
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persuasion processing provides the foundation for critical analyses on a societal level by 
grounding the investigations on a psychological level.  
 
Findings and future research 
The main contributions of the thesis are described in table 2. Firstly, by exploring 
contributions from a variety of literature from psychology, rhetoric, marketing, and 
economics, I provide a broad theoretical foundation for the development of the SPIMP 
as well as for a critical assessment of the underlying assumptions of previous models 
and approaches such as the ELM and HSM. This review warrants the exploration 
undertaken throughout the thesis as it indicates the likelihood that there are several 
elements of these models that are not developed as thoroughly as desired and that an 
alternative model may be warranted. This is a contribution in negative space, as it does 
not add any solutions, but merely points to some of the potential limitations of the 
previous models. However, in order to move forward with a theory and model of 
persuasion based on subjective, probabilistic estimations, source credibility, and 
interaction in an integrated manner, it is necessary to faithfully acknowledge previous 
models and critically assess these concerning benefits and limitations. Secondly, given 
the prevalence of persuasion in the social sphere and consequently the fact that 
persuasion has been investigated from a variety of disciplines, it is not surprising that a 
variety of definitions have arisen. Part of the contribution of the thesis, then, is a review 
of literature on persuasion from a range of disciplines and a discussion concerning 
elements, which are necessarily connected to persuasion and which merely are 
conjoined or follow from persuasion. From this review, I identify a definition of 
persuasion that spans across disciplines and seems philosophically defensible given the 
scope of the thesis (concerning the normative standard of approximation). Finally and 
most importantly, the thesis provides a concrete alternative model of persuasion, the 
Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of Persuasion (SPIMP). If the critical review 
of previous models exists in negative theoretical space, the production of a concrete 
model mirrors in the positive. The core model (fig. 1) posits the process the persuadee 
undergoes in the complex dynamic relationship from a probabilistic point of view in an 
integrated model describing how the persuadee approaches uncertain content strength 
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and source credibility10. The core model, however, is lodged within the interactive 
psychological framework described throughout the thesis.  
Fig. 1: The SPIMP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, the thesis provides a comprehensive definition of what is included in the 
persuasive situation, it provides a critical assessment of previous models, and it 
provides a concrete alternative model of persuasion processing based on extensive 
empirical work on reasoning, source credibility, language, and interactivity conducted 
in the past few decades. From this model, concrete predictions of persuasiveness may be 
tested.  
Table 2: main contributions of the thesis 
 
It is important to note the title of the thesis identifies the thesis as a prolegomena to a 
more in-depth exploration of persuasion processing. Although I cite numerous empirical 
reports (including a few I have published or produced myself in collaboration with 
others), the thesis is inherently theoretical, which includes an extensive literature review 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The model is presented in 7.3 whilst the psychological framework surrounding it is presented in 7.2.  
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throughout. However, the complexity of the persuasive situation is considerable given 
the fact that this includes, but is not limited to uncertain evidence, uncertain persuader 
aims, emotional content, source credibility, dynamics between persuader and persuadee, 
intonation, rhythm of spoken language, linguistic stylistics, division of the speech, a 
complex and dynamic temporal relationship, socio-cultural and contextual influences, 
and a gradient assertion of cognitive effort, to name a few of the factors involved in the 
holistic persuasive situation (in terms of the core model, fig. 1, and the psychological 
framework, table 7). Given this complexity, it is important to stress the initiating role of 
the thesis. I provide a theoretical framework and a concrete core model of persuasion to 
be further explored regarding the various elements just mentioned. As expected, it was 
not possible to test all of the mentioned elements and the relationship between these in 
the space of the PhD, but I intend to carry on researching persuasion and to test, qualify, 
and develop the SPIMP approach further.  
 The primary conceptual placement of the thesis resides in the discipline of 
cognitive psychology. The main novel contribution of the thesis is the SPIMP approach 
proposed in 7.3. The model is cognitive psychological since it is concerned with the 
cognitive processes the persuadee undergoes when faced with a persuasive attempt. 
However, key to the theoretical placement of the model, other factors are acknowledged 
as central to a theory of persuasion. Firstly, as discussed in 7.2, the psychological 
framework of the model include four components that underlie and influence the 
subjective probabilistic estimations of the elements in the SPIMP, namely internal and 
external influences, the scope of cognition, and the framework of cognition. The 
theoretical discussions throughout the thesis largely pertain to how the central elements 
of the model relate to these four influencing factors of the psychological framework. 
Secondly, persuasive intentionality is touched upon in the thesis (1.3 and 6.1). This is a 
fundamental philosophical issue that warrants further debate. Thus, the cognitive 
psychological contribution of the thesis, namely the development of the SPIMP, resides 
in a larger theoretical framework, which ranges from developmental and social 
psychology, phenomenological exploration of intentionality, and rhetorical theory (to 
name some of the most relevant disciplines that are touched upon by the model). As 
such, the model resides as explanatory psychology, and future work is needed to couple 
this with descriptive phenomenology and other relevant disciplines and critical 
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perspectives, in order to provide a richer psychological theory of persuasion processing 
as well as a more in-depth conceptual discussion.  
 
The thesis 
Alongside this introduction, the concluding remarks, the appendix, and the 
bibliography, the thesis falls in seven chapters, each of which contributes to the general 
theoretical picture needed to propose the SPIMP approach to persuasion in chapter 7. 
Overall, though, the thesis falls in three major parts. The first (definitions and central 
elements of the SPIMP model) is chapters 1-3. It is concerned with discussing the 
definition of persuasion as well as the identification of the two central elements in the 
core model (content strength and source credibility). The second part (psychological 
and theoretical framework) is chapters 4-6. It describes the conceptual framework 
surrounding the core model presented in part I. Finally, the third part (integration of 
core model and psychological framework) ties together the core model with the 
theoretical and psychological considerations from the second part.  
 The first chapter provides a foundational literature review from the 
various disciplines mentioned in the above such that a clear definition of persuasion 
may de ascertained. Given the fact that persuasion is a phenomenon spanning across a 
range of social situations, a definition of what is necessarily persuasion (an attempt to 
change the persuadee’s beliefs in a persuasive setting) and what is frequently conjoined 
with persuasion (such as the ethical considerations of a persuasive attempt) is 
warranted. Indeed, much of the literature that approaches persuasion seems to entail 
different definitions depending on the discipline and consequently, in order to keep the 
discussion theoretically clean, a definition of persuasion is developed. The definition 
identified through a critical review of relevant literature revolves around changes in 
beliefs between two people (the persuader and the persuadee) in a situation where both 
interlocutors acknowledge the persuasive intention. This differentiates persuasion from 
communication and information updating in general such that persuasion is a special 
case of communication, and it also identifies persuasion as a broader phenomenon than 
Marlin’s propaganda cited in the above. Finally, persuasion is different from 
argumentation as the latter is concerned with the production and evaluation of evidence 
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whereas the former also includes other elements such as source credibility, which makes 
the persuasive appeals and tools broader than the argumentative.  
 The second chapter is concerned with content strength (the first ot eht two 
central elements of the core model). It presents theories of reasoning in order to develop 
the framework for rationality in the persuasive situation. Initially, formal logic is 
considered as it forms the basis of many contemporary models of argumentation and 
persuasion such as the pragma-dialectical account and (supposedly) the ELM 11 . 
However, considering the epistemic limitations of formal logic in persuasive incidents, 
this framework is abandoned as the primary normative standard against which acts of 
persuasion are measured and evaluated by the persuadee. Rather, I argue, recent 
developments in probabilistic reasoning may provide a closer approximation of how 
human beings deal with uncertain information such as the one presented in persuasive 
attempts.  
 The third chapter presents source credibility (the second element of the 
core model) As such, it continues the line of thought set out in the chapter concerned 
with principles of reasoning. Following rhetorical theory, the credibility of the 
persuader is considered as a central element of persuasion processing. The role of 
source credibility in the ELM and the HSM is not entirely clear (whether it should be 
considered a central or a peripheral cue). For the SPIMP approach, source credibility is 
integrated in the model of persuasion processing developed in chapter 7. This 
distinguishes expertise and trustworthiness from Ad Verecundiam arguments and 
models source credibility from a Bayesian perspective, which falls in line with the 
principles of rationality presented in the second chapter. At the end of the third chapter, 
the two main elements of the SPIMP core model, content strength and source 
credibility, have been presented. This concludes part I. 
 In part II, having already presented the central elements, attention turns to 
language comprehension. The focus of the thesis is concerned with spoken, 
interpersonal persuasive attempts. Consequently, it becomes pivotal to consider the 
linguistic capability in the persuasive setting. As with the second chapter, formal logical 
models of linguistics are briefly considered before turning the theoretical attention to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As mentioned in the above, this is speculative, as the principles of rationality are not thoroughly 
developed in the ELM. However, from reading the various papers, it seems that Petty and colleagues hint 
at a formal logical principle of rationality as the normative standard for central route processing.  
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subjective interpretation processes stemming from pragmatic enrichment. However, as 
evident from the discussion, pragmatic enrichments are not sufficient for describing the 
foundations of language and consequently probabilistic models of language evolution, 
acquisition, and processing are presented. Alongside this, dynamic models of language 
argue the distributed nature of natural languages, which firmly places communication in 
a cooperative and interactive framework.  
 The latter linguistic framework indicates the importance of the interactive. 
This focus falls in line with a range of findings, ranging from reasoning studies to social 
psychology. Indeed, the focus of the thesis is interpersonal persuasion between two and 
only two interlocutors, and consequently the fifth chapter considers the importance of 
the social and interactive dynamics in the persuasive setting. This has significant 
theoretical consequences for language dynamics, social influences, and reasoning and 
thus for the development of a theoretical stance to persuasion. As such, the theoretical 
framework that envelops the SPIMP core model is inherently interactive and contextual. 
This lodges the persuadee-persuader relationship in a complex dynamic situation for 
which a detailed description is necessary if this is to be analysed and criticised (as is the 
case in social and rhetorical criticism).  
 To move toward a more in-depth understanding of this relationship and 
the immersion of the persuadee in the context, chapter 6 discusses key concepts 
concerning intentionality and presence from a philosophical perspective. As mentioned, 
the contribution of the thesis is predominantly the presentation of the SPIMP approach. 
However, the approach only provides a snippet of the complexity of the persuasive 
situation from a cognitive psychological perspective. As evident from the discussions 
throughout the thesis, a holistic approach to persuasion entails comprehensive 
interaction between cognitive and social psychology, descriptive phenomenology, and 
critical analyses such as the ones produced in rhetorical criticism. As such, the 
theoretical limitation of the model is acknowledged and highlighted.  
 Finally, the seventh chapter ties together the elements elements of the core 
model (chapter 2-3) and the psychological framework (chapter 4-6) in order to flesh out 
a prolegomena to a theory of verbal, interpersonal persuasion. This formulates the 
general SPIMP approach (fig. 18) and discusses how the persuadee may cope with 
persuasive attempts. Alongside the specific theoretical and model contributions to 
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persuasion theory, the differences between the SPIMP approach and the ELM and HSM 
are discussed. The thesis is a prolegomena because there are still considerable questions 
to be answered in order to elicit a complex theory and model of persuasion. For 
instance, the influence of emotional content is barely considered in the thesis despite 
being a obviously important element of persuasion processing. However, this is simply 
due to a lack of time and space. As such, the theoretical and model contributions of the 
thesis serve as indications of a future research program designed to test and further 
develop elements of persuasion.  
 
I hope you will find the theoretical discussions throughout the thesis as well as the 
proposed model interesting. Throughout my PhD, I certainly did12.  	  	  
Jens Koed Madsen 
 
 
Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences 
Division of Psychology 
University College London 
London, 25/9/2013 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 On a visual note, a word cloud introduces each chapter (http://www.wordle.net). These are illustrations 
created from the frequency with which words are used in the text. Thus, the word clouds of individual 
chapters provide a visual approximation of the terms discussed in the chapter. However, the word 
‘persuasion’ has been deleted from most of the word clouds as this term if mentioned so frequently in the 
thesis that it would distort the illustrations.  
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Definitions & central 
elements of the SPIMP 
model 
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Chapter 1: Defining persuasion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arguments are to be avoided: they are always vulgar and often convincing  
Oscar Wilde 
 
 
Nothing is so unbelievable that oratory cannot make it acceptable 
Marcus Tulius Cicero 
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We might entertain an intuitive appreciation of what constitutes persuasion and 
persuasive attempts. However, the phenomenon becomes increasingly murky and 
challenging when going beyond the obvious cases. For instance, a politician clearly 
engages in persuasive attempts when trying to get elected, advertisers when attempting 
to sell products, and lawyers when they argue in court. These scenarios are easily 
understood as being persuasive since they involve interlocutors who try to mould the 
minds of their audience by changing their beliefs and potentially their behaviour. 
However, considering less clear-cut cases, it becomes less obvious whether an act can 
be considered persuasive. Should we, for instance, label vernacular discussions 
pertaining to the choice of restaurants as acts of persuasion? Furthermore, some 
situations are clearly designed to change our beliefs by updating or presenting new 
information about the world (such as the news, telling someone it is raining outside, and 
so on). If persuasion is defined as changes in beliefs, these cases should also be 
persuasive. As will be evident from the discussion in 1.3, a finer definition is needed to 
distinguish persuasion from information updating and argumentation. In particular, I 
argue that persuasion requires a persuasive intention from both interlocutors (see also 
6.1 on intentionality). This chapter frames the academic setting of this central concept 
of the thesis so that the reader is clear as to what I define as persuasion and what 
elements are necessarily involved in processing persuasive attempts.  
 The thesis focuses on spoken persuasion between two and only two 
interlocutors in a physical environment in which they can see and act with one another. 
The scope is informed by two conceptual distinctions, which help limit the scope of the 
exploration. Firstly, there are differences between spoken and written or signed 
communication13. For instance, spoken and written communication differ in their 
temporal and linear nature and given they physical interaction written communication 
does not rely on the same immediate interpersonal cues as conversation between 
interlocutors of verbal communication (see e.g. Thibault, 2011, see also 6.4 for a 
discussion of the temporal aspects of verbal persuasion). The scope also departs from 
investigations concerning signed persuasion, as this too is different type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Indeed, some authors argue that spoken language functions as a dynamic relationship between 
interlocutors making use of linguistic traditions and conventions whereas written language should be seen 
more as a lexigraphic representation of spoken language and thus removed from the dynamics of spoken 
language.  
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communication compared with spoken language (although it seems likely that signed 
persuasion will share many of the properties described here). For instance, sign 
languages differ in temporal relations, they make use of more visually motivated 
communication (iconicity), and referentiality may be different as pronouns are used 
differently (see e.g. Sutton-Spence & Woll, 1999; Johnston & Schembri, 2007)14. 
Secondly, the thesis explores persuasion between two interlocutors. As will be evident 
from the interactive perspective on reasoning and communication (see especially 
chapter 5), the influences from the social and the interactive play a key conceptual part 
in defining persuasion processing. The focus further distinguishes interpersonal 
persuasion from self-persuasion in which people argue with themselves in order to 
change their minds about certain issues since different psychological mechanisms may 
be involved in persuading oneself compared to others. The scope, however, also limits 
the exploration to persuasion between two and only two people since the social and 
argumentative complexity of a plethora of persuaders and persuadees would necessitate 
a different and more socially directed discussion. Thus, the limited scope of the thesis is 
a theoretical account and a model of verbal persuasion between one persuader and one 
persuadee. That is, a theoretical background for and a model of the cognitive processes 
the persuadee undergoes when faced with a persuasive attempt.  
Persuasion research has been identified as belonging to either a narrow or 
a broad perspective (Madsen, 2012). The broad definition is concerned with how 
persuasion may influence societal matters, and which consequently entails discussions 
about the morality and ethics of persuasion15. There are two main stances in the debate 
in rhetorical circles. In the one hand, neo-Aristotelian critiques argue that rhetoric is 
concerned purely with practical effect on the persuadee, and that the more effective the 
speech is, the better it is. in the other, a wider assortment of rhetorical critiques, argue 
that rhetorical criticism and persuasion studies has an ethical obligation when analysing 
persuasive attempts16. The narrow definition is not, however, concerned with the ethical 
question. Rather, the focus here is to discuss the concept of persuasion and what this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I am grateful to Dr. Gerardo Ortega for discussing these issues with me and pointing me to relevant 
literature. The comments on sign language refer to British and Australian sign language.  
15 In other words, the broad perspective is concerned with the societal-desirable type of normativity 
mentioned in the introduction.  
16 See the famous discrepancies in analyses concerning the effectiveness and ethical desirability of 
Nixon’s Silent Majority (1969) speech; Hill (1972a, 1972b); Campbell (1972), see also Pontoppidan 
(2007); Madsen (2012) for a general discussion of the role of ethics in rhetorical theory and analysis.  
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entails. The thesis falls in the latter as a narrow focus on the psychological processes 
that the persuadee undergoes when faced with an act of persuasion, regardless of 
whether or not the outcome is ethically desirable.  
 
1.1. Approaching persuasion17 
Historically, a range of disciplines has approached persuasion. This section presents a 
brief review of the main trajectories identified the various disciplines in order to frame 
persuasion as a historical and an academic concept. The disciplines mainly concerned 
with persuasion (aside from various philosophers) have historically been rhetoric, 
economics, marketing, and psychology. Despite having different foci, the four 
disciplines have all been concerned with important aspects of persuasion. As will 
emerge from the review, rhetoric predominantly explores persuasive artefacts through 
rhetorical critical analysis (e.g. Foss, 2004) centred on the persuader. Economic theory 
describes ideal axioms of rational choice and information transmission (e.g. Crawford & 
Sobel, 1982) whereas behavioural economics investigate the differences in decision 
when choice set-up is altered in ways that do not affect the consequences of the decision 
(and hence which should be irrelevant according to conventional economic analysis). 
Marketing tends to focus on explorations of the effect of persuasive strategies in terms 
of persuasive effect (Stafford, 1999). Finally, psychology approaches persuasion both 
from a social perspective that explores the influence of others (Cialdini, 2007) and the 
environment (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) whereas cognitive psychology tends to focus on 
the psychological processes the persuadee undergoes when faced with a persuasive 
attempt (Petty et al., 1981; Chaiken, 1987)18. Naturally, these descriptions of the 
contribution of the disciplines are simplified since each discipline deals with other and 
often overlapping issues. However, the predominant foci are illustrated in fig. 2.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See appendix 1 for a visualisation of some of the key figures and approaches to persuasion throughout 
history 
18 From this perspective, the thesis mainly falls in the cognitive psychological camp, as it discusses the 
theoretical background necessary for postulating a novel model for describing persuasion processing (the 
SPIMP).  
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Fig. 2: Conceptual relationships from disciplines to persuasion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following, I provide a brief literature review of the four disciplines and how they 
relate to the concept of persuasion such that the review collectively helps frame the 
theoretical concept and the boundaries. Underlying these historical approaches to 
persuasion, epistemological philosophy can be seen as a driving force since it is 
concerned with the interactive creation, mediation, and social negotiation of uncertain 
knowledge19. The main purpose of this section is to introduce these four disciplines as 
the theoretical exploration of persuasion in the present thesis owes much to the 
developments carried out in each of these disciplines. Furthermore, a study of the 
psychology of persuasion processing would hardly be complete without acknowledging 
the theoretical and empirical contributions of other disciplines that historically have 
dealt with the issue.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 As discussed throughout the thesis, the epistemological ground from which persuasion springs is from 
uncertainty, rather than from certainty. In Antiquity, Gorgias expressed this sceptical stance toward 
absolute such that 1) nothing exists, 2) even if something exists, nothing can be known about it, 3) even it 
something can be known about it, no knowledge of it can be communicated to others, and 4) even if 
communicated, it cannot be understood (for a presentation of Gorgias, see Dillon & Gergel, 2003). The 
epistemological stance here is not quite so relative, but it does rely on subjective estimations of likelihood 
rather than objective truth-conditional dichotomies.  
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1.1.1. Rhetoric  
Historically, rhetoric has been closely tied to persuasion. Pre-Aristotelian philosophers 
and rhetoricians and logographers looked to practical examples of speeches to discern 
and develop a theory and practical grasp of persuasion (e.g, Protagoras, Gorgias, see 
Dillon & Gergel, 2003 for a presentation of the Greek sophists, as well as Lysias). 
Aristotle, father of the rhetorical discipline, provides the first systematic exploration of 
persuasion, and he defines rhetoric as the ability “…to discover the available means of 
persuasion” (Kennedy, 1980, 1.1.1355b25-6). That is, to investigate how persuasion 
(i.e. strategic attempts to change the beliefs of someone else) can be brought about from 
a practical as opposed to a logical point of view20. He highlights the practical aspect of 
persuasion in Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1995h) as a way of governing policies 
concerning uncertain knowledge since Aristotle seemingly believes that the strongest 
argument eventually would triumph c.f. Habermas, 2003). Departing further from 
Plato’s ideal of acquisition of perfect knowledge derived via the Socratic dialectical 
method, Aristotle introduces three persuasive appeals: reason (Gr. Logos), short, 
inflamed emotion (Gr. Pathos), and the character of the speaker (Gr. Ethos)21. Indeed, 
“The goal of rhetoric, in its traditional, rather than pejorative, sense, is to provide 
reasoned arguments why people should hold certain opinions, in areas where certain 
knowledge is impossible” (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 8). This difference between 
certain and uncertain knowledge is crucial and central to the present conceptualisation 
and modelling of persuasion processing. Thus, at the very onset of the study of 
persuasion, the concept entered as relational to logic and formal reasoning, debating the 
limitations of these as compared with practical reasoning, the persuasive potential of 
emotional appeals, and the character of the speaker. The theoretical influence of this 
discussion will be clear throughout this thesis22.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Aristotle compared these two modes of enquiry, labelling rhetoric the sister discipline of dialectics 
(Aristotle, 1995a, see also his six-part work Organon on philosophy of language and logic, 1995b-1995g) 
21 Despite having an initial hard stance towards rhetoric in dialogues such as The Republic, The Sophist, 
and Protagoras, he eventually lessened his attacks in Phaedrus and Gorgias.  
22 Historically, this discussion has continued throughout the centuries. Thus, on the one hand some 
philosophers argue for the superiority of logical reasoning (a tradition invoked by the likes of Plato, 2000 
and Descartes, 1996) and disown rhetoric as shallow manipulation and misguidance. On the other hand, 
other philosophers and rhetoricians have taken a kinder view on the complexity of human reasoning as 
involving emotional appeals as well (from the Ancient rhetoricians such as Cicero, 2003 to modern-day 
rhetorical theory such as Perelman, 2005). However, as the thesis is not a historical presentation of 
persuasion as a phenomenon, I will depart from this (but for a introduction to the history of rhetoric and 
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 Modern rhetorical theory has clear links with the historical traditions set 
out by the Greeks. In defining rhetoric in relation to persuasion, Burke argues that 
“…rhetoric [is] the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions 
in other human agents” (1969a, p. 41, for an introduction to Burke see Foss et al., 2002, 
chapter 7, see also Burke 1969b). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca claim that 
argumentation is “…the discursive means of obtaining the adherence of minds (1969, p. 
8, see also Perelman, 2005). Nichols defines rhetoric to mean “…the theory and practice 
of the verbal mode of presenting judgment and choice, knowledge and feeling… It is a 
means of so ordering discourse as to produce an effect on the listener or reader” (1963, 
pp. 7-8). Ehninger defines rhetoric as “…an organized, consistent coherent way of 
talking about the practical discourse in any of its forms or modes” (1968, p. 15), and 
Foss takes rhetoric to mean “…the use of symbols to influence thought and action…” 
(2004, p. 4)23. Exploring the richness of the discipline, it becomes evident that rhetoric 
is other and more than mere “discourse architecture and adornment” (Bender & 
Wellbery, 1990, p.4). 
In order to define persuasion, I have italicized some key elements above. 
Firstly, Ehniger notes that rhetoric and persuasion is concerned with practical 
discourse. As will be evident throughout the thesis, this stance is reflected theoretically 
and empirically in that the approach discussed here relies on uncertain, practical 
information based on probabilistic reasoning rather than formal logical reasoning 
adhering to logical rules of argumentation and information updating. Secondly, Nichols 
describes persuasion as producing an effect on the listener. Given the notion of 
interactivity discussed in chapter 5 and 6, this seems to indicate a classic sender-
receiver model of persuasion in which the persuader provides a message, which the 
listener will appreciate and assimilate. This somewhat static notion of persuasion is 
challenged in the thesis given a more interactive approach. Perelman and Olbrecht-
Tyteca’s notion about adherence (in the sense that the persuader brings the persuadee to 
adhere and agree with his beliefs) will be discussed in terms of alignment and 
agreement in 1.5 – however, I argue that epistemic alignment is not a necessary quality 
of persuasion, especially in deceptive cases. Finally, Burke (the veritable father of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the rhetorical discipline, see Fafner 1977, 1982; Conley 1990; Jørgensen & Villadsen, 2009). For an 
interesting empirical study of policy persuasion, see Jørgensen et al. (1994). 
23 All italics are mine, for a depiction of modern rhetorical theorists, see Foss et al. (2002) 
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modern rhetoric) and Foss argue that rhetoric and persuasion is concerned with 
influencing thought and action. As discussed in 1.2, action is not a necessary quality of 
persuasion. However, the approach developed in the thesis supports the claim that 
persuasion is concerned with modulation and alteration of thought in terms of 
probabilistic estimations of evidence strength (i.e. continuous probabilistic estimations 
between 0 and 1 rather than dichotomous truth-conditionals of 0 or 1) in a complex 
social and interactive context.  
 Rhetorical theory offers a wide range of concepts that centre persuasion as 
an act not exclusively concerned with argumentation and logic, but also with emotional 
content and the character of the speaker. This integrated understanding of persuasive 
appeals is highly influential in the present view of persuasion processing. Alongside 
ethos, pathos and logos mentioned in the above, rhetorical theory argues that the aim of 
rhetoric is not simply to inform (Lat. docere). Rather, the act of persuasion also 
encompasses delighting the audience (Lat. delectare) and to move these emotionally to 
action (Lat. movere). That is, the rhetorical discipline firmly places persuasion in 
relation to but going beyond pure argumentation and information transmission and as an 
act concerned not only with informing the persuadee, but also entertaining and moving 
her in order to change her beliefs. In this way, the rhetorical tradition provides the 
overall lens through which persuasion may be discussed. Whereas rhetoric importantly 
provides a general context in which persuasion can be appreciated, the following 
disciplines have dealt with persuasion in more specialized ways.  
 
1.1.2. Economic theory and Judgement and Decision Making  
One of the central contributions of the thesis is to develop a normative framework that 
approximates how the persuadee should relate to and process acts of persuasion (this 
leads to the development of a new model, the SPIMP). This facilitates discussions of 
good and bad persuasion since such standards should be included in persuasion research 
(Kock, 2011) due to the fact that intuitively there are better and worse forms of acts of 
persuasion24. Economic theory provides a foundation for such a framework via game 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In the period following the Second World War, authors were keen on describing the potential pitfalls of 
persuasive rhetoric due to the demagogic success of Hitler (e.g. Burke, 1973). The normative standard 
developed here, however, is not concerned with the ethics of persuasion (i.e. a desirable normativity as 
described in the introduction), but rather with how we may conceptualize and discuss the evidence 
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theory and information transmission theory (ITT)25, the former being a foundational 
element of the latter, as well as of judgement and decision-making theory (JDM). The 
mathematical framework of information transmission developed in ITT provides a 
significant attempt to frame some normative rules of how argumentation should be 
perceived by a listener. The normative standard is achieved by exploring rules of 
information updating from a purely rational, mathematical point of view (Crawford & 
Sobel, 1982; Jung, 2009), which may be derived from the axioms of probabilistic 
reasoning or formal logic, where the former is concerned with the content of the 
argument (i.e. how likely the argument is) whereas the latters is concerned with the 
structural framework for the argument (i.e. how valid the structure of the argument is). 
Given the axiomatic assumptions underlying these approaches (see chapter 2), ITT may 
deduce whether people process information in a rationally optimal manner, or if they 
fall short of the normative ideals of rationality.  
 Whereas ITT develops a normative standard for evaluating information 
processing, JDM investigates influences on decision-making from a rational point of 
view. For persuasion research, this is particularly interesting given the fact that humans 
processing persuasive attempts will have to do something with the evidence presented 
by the persuader. Such considerations inform the question of approximating 
normativity, since it becomes interesting to investigate whether humans depart from the 
strict normative standards developed in formal logic and ITT if these rely on objective 
utility functions. Indeed, empirical studies challenge the formal normative standards 
mentioned in the above by providing evidence to suggest the contextual and anchoring 
influences on decisions and reasoning (e.g. Stewart et al., 2006). I will return to this 
issue in chapter 2 and chapter 5 when discussing rationality and context.  
Taken together, ITT and JDM offer interesting points of view on the 
issues of reasoning both as a normative and a descriptive phenomenon. Given formal 
logic and ITT, we may provide one potential normative standard for processing acts of 
persuasion. However, theoretically and empirically we might challenge this approach by 
exploring situations in which human beings seem to fail to conform to such rigorous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
provided in spoken persuasion from a normative standard (i.e. an approximation of what people 
psychologically do).  
25 For references on the principles of game theory, see Nash (1951); Neuman & Morgenstern (1953); 
Gibbons (1992); Mas-Colell et al (1995). For references on the principles of information transmission 
theory, see Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Jung, 2009.  
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structural and objective standards. Throughout the thesis, I argue that this may be due to 
the possibility that human beings do not predominantly reason from formal, logical 
modes of thinking. Rather, in a flow of cultures and contested contexts, human beings 
make use of uncertain information conceptualized as subjective, probabilistic 
estimations of evidence strength. At this has not been previously explored in the 
psychology of persuasion, this approach developed in the thesis that offers a novel 
normative model of reasoning and persuasion.  
  
1.1.3. Marketing and advertising  
The field of marketing is related to economic theory as standard economic theory, ITT, 
and JDM provide foundational elements of conceptualizing the marketing of persuasion. 
However, research in consumer behaviour and advertisement are unique fields of study. 
Marketing and advertisement approach persuasion from the point of view of effect of 
particular cues and strategies, i.e. whether people and their direct behaviour are affected 
by specific types of persuasive attempts (for comments on the relationship between 
persuasion and marketing, see Stafford, 1999), which sometimes may resemble the field 
of rhetoric in scope and literature (McQuarrie & Mick, 1996; Phllips & McQuarrie, 
2004). Furthermore, the discipline studies are also turning towards psychological 
accounts of interaction such as mentalizing (the ability to infer different mental states 
and knowledge in other individuals, see 3.2) in order to account for phenomena within 
the field of marketing and management (e.g. Dietvorst et al., 2009)26.  
 Consumer and advertisement research has explored a range of topics 
relevant to persuasion (for an extensive review of advertisement, see Vakratsas & 
Ambler, 1999). Amongst these, we find for example effects on individual agents 
(Pedrick & Zyfryden, 1991; Deighton et al., 1994), the influence of rhetorical theory on 
advertisement (Scott, 2008), and a persuasive hierarchy paradigm (MacInnis & 
Jaworski, 1989; MacInnis et al., 1991). Central to much advertisement research is the 
investigation of persuasive effects by exploring the potential and measurable outcomes 
of persuasive attempts.  
In particular, the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) offers a specific 
marketing model of persuasion (Friedstad & Wright, 1994, 1995, but see also Campbell 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Indeed, all fields mentioned often overlap in terms of foci, theory, and evidence.  
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& Kirmani, 2000; Kirmani & Campbell, 2004; McAlister & Cornwell, 2009; Kachersky 
& Kim, 2010; Pelsmacker & Neijens, 2012). The PKM relies on a dynamic and 
temporal relationship between persuader and persuadee (or, ‘agent’ and ‘target’ in their 
terminology). The model focuses on three types of knowledge invoked as peruadee’s try 
to “cope” with persuasive attempts. These types are persuasion, topic and agent 
knowledge. The central element of the PKM is the recognition by the persuadee that she 
is being presented with a persuasive attempt by directing the attention of the persuadee 
to  
“…one’s own response goals and response options, supplies situational 
information relevant to selecting response tactics, predicts which strategies will 
best achieve one’s goal(s), evaluates the adequacy of one’s coping attempt, and 
retains useful information about how one interpreted and coped with this 
particular persuasive attempt” (Friestad & Wright, 1994, p. 3) 
Thus, from increased persuasion knowledge, the persuadee should be able to cope more 
effectively with persuasive attempt and consequently serve her own goals more 
efficiently. In comparison with the approach developed in this thesis, the PKM requires 
a considerable cognitive load and requires concrete consciousness and awareness of the 
three types despite the fact that Friestad and Wright (1994) emphasises that “the degree 
to which people access their persuasion knowledge may shift over the course of a 
particular persuasion episode” (p. 4). Indeed, the authors acknowledge that the 
characterization of the goals “…is not based on prior empirical research… It is purely a 
theoretical proposition…” (p. 6). Rather than a psychological model of the mechanisms 
of persuasion processing, the PKM is predominantly concerned with the success of 
coping mechanisms from greater or lesser knowledge of the persuasive attempt. I briefly 
discuss coping mechanisms in 7.4, but to unify the concepts of persuasion processing 
with coping strategies present a fertile ground for future research, as this would provide 
a more holistic and thorough theory of the psychology of persuasion. Rather than 
approximating persuasion processing with inherently complex cognitive tasks related to 
one’s own goal-oriented behaviour, future planning and revision, the approach 
developed here assumes a less strenuous effort in dealing with uncertain evidence at a 
more local level. However, this stance will become clearer as the thesis progresses. 
PKM also includes a temporal aspect of persuasion memory (see Schmidt & Sherman, 
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1984; Friestead & Thorson, 1993) in which memory of previous persuasive attempts 
becomes central to processing other persuasive attempts, which will be discussed in 1.4. 
As identified in rhetorical theory, the interpretation of the speaker central 
to persuasion processing since this mediates and modulates the perceived strength of a 
persuasive attempt and thus influences how human beings evaluate and process acts of 
persuasion. Interestingly, recent developments in marketing research have seen an 
interest in mentalizing (see e.g. Sujan, 1999; Dietvorst et al., 2009, for a discussion of 
mentalizing see 3,2)27. Marketing predominantly explores mentalizing as a management 
and negotiating tool, but it reflects on persuasion in that the focus on how mentalizing 
may be used practically is inherently relevant for defining persuasion since it informs us 
of how the persuadee relates to the other. Indeed, as will be evident throughout the 
thesis, the interaction between individuals is central to persuasion in that interactivity 
and the social mediate the context through which language, evidence and probabilities 
are negotiated.  
In sum, marketing and advertisement provide initial ways of approaching 
persuasion from an effect point of view. As discussed in 1.2, persuasion is difficult to 
measure given the definition that action is not a necessary entailment of persuasion. 
However, researching effects of advertisement campaigns provides tentative evidence 
for the apparent success and failings of particular persuasive strategies, which in turn 
provides indirect evidence for exploring and subsequently describing the psychological 
processes underlying persuasion. The evidence is indirect due to the fact that persuasion 
need not necessarily result in specific behaviour whereas (unobservable) belief changes 
are sufficient and necessary (see 1.2). Secondly, by exploring mentalizing, the field of 
marketing indicates the importance of interactivity and the understanding of others in 
acts of persuasion, which are central elements throughout the thesis.  
 
1.1.4. Psychology  
Finally, psychology has dealt with persuasion in mainly two ways that provide equally 
interesting perspectives on persuasion and influence, namely cognitive and social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 However, as will be evident from the discussion in chapter 3, mentalizing is a high-level cognitive 
process, which necessitates more fundamental accounts of interaction and common knowledge. Rather 
than assuming a sender-receiver relationship in mentalizing, the account developed here focuses more on 
the negotiated context and joint action of understanding one another in persuasive settings.  
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psychology. The cognitive psychological literature predominantly aims at describing the 
concept of persuasion in the sense of the psychological mechanisms involved in 
processing acts of persuasion whereas social psychology more focuses on the influence 
of others (Cialdini, 2007) and the environment (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) in shaping 
beliefs and behaviour. The theoretical contribution of the thesis mainly falls within 
cognitive psychology despite drawing extensively on theories and empirical work from 
other disciplines such as rhetoric, philosophy, economics, marketing, social psychology, 
and formal logic.  
Petty and colleagues developed the hitherto most influential model of 
persuasion processing in cognitive psychology. The model is called the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion (Petty et al., 1981, 1999; 2005 Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984, 1986, 1990; Petty & Wegener, 1999; Petty & Briñol, 2008; O’Keefe, 
2008). ELM is a dual-process theory of persuasion, which means that in the one hand it 
relies on fast, frugal heuristics at the unconscious level (labelled the peripheral route) 
and in the other on slow, effortful reasoning at the conscious level (labelled the central 
route)28. The model predicts that evidence processed and accepted via the central route 
has longer longevity, whereas persuasion via the peripheral route is less fundamental.  
In the central route, the persuadee elaborates on the message (act of 
persuasion) in two fundamental ways. The first way is concerned with deciding whether 
the advocated position is pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal for the persuadee, i.e. 
whether the persuasive attempt aims at reinforcing already held beliefs or aims at 
altering the beliefs of the persuadee in a different direction (regardless of whether or not 
the persuader is pro- or counter-attitudinal – the focus is on the proposition). The second 
is concerned with the quality of the argument. Here, the persuadee aims at evaluating 
the strength of the persuasive attempt. As already noted in the introduction (see also 
O’Keefe, 2008), the ELM does not provide a concrete framework for deciding whether 
a piece of evidence or an argument is strong or weak whereas the framework developed 
in this thesis introduces exactly this notion (see 2.3-2.4). In the central route, then, the 
persuadee evaluates the aptitude and strength/validity of the proposition. The peripheral 
route, on the other hand, relies on heuristic strategies for coping with the persuasive 
attempt. O’Keefe (2008) mentions three of the prevalent heuristics discussed in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For a discussion of dual-processing models of cognition, see 1.7 
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ELM: credibility, likability and consensus (p. 1477), which are taken to be implicit, fast 
and automatic without the control of the subject29. A central entailment of the ELM is 
that persuasive attempts processed thoroughly via the central route should be more 
fundamental and enduring whilst peripheral persuasion is shallower and less enduring. 
That is, persuasion can be processed through two inherently different systems (the 
interaction of which remains an open question, O’Keefe, 2008). 
The ELM has been criticised in a number of ways. Hamilton et al. (1993) 
argues that the ELM does not add anything significant to persuasion theory since “The 
current model of the peripheral route is logically inconsistent with the mode for the 
central route [due to its reliance on heuristics rather than rule-based reflection]” (p. 63). 
Hamilton and colleagues argue that information processing systems such as the ones 
presented in the economics section hold more merit due to logical consistency. As will 
be evidenced, the thesis agrees with neither position since the position advocated here is 
relies neither on dual-processing nor on a logical framework of reasoning. Rather, the 
model developed below, the SPIMP, assumes an integrated, interactive, and 
probabilistic understanding of persuasion processing.  
The Heuristic-Systematic Model is another influential model of persuasion 
from cognitive psychology, which also drawing on dual-processes (HSM, see Chaiken, 
1987; Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Kim & Paek, 2009). In the 
same manner as the ELM, the HSM assumes that when persuasive attempts appear 
inconsequential to the persuadee (Chaiken, 1980) or are constrained by mitigating 
factors that do not allow the persuadee to carefully consider the attempt, e.g. time 
constraints (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991), the heuristic (system 1) route will be used 
rather than the systematic (system 2) route30. The systematic system, according to 
Chaiken and colleagues, has the potential to “…suppress the occurrence of heuristic 
processing” (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994, p. 460), which conceptually entails a 
combative rather than a supplementary relationship between the systems in the HSM. 
Expert opinion and popular endorsement provide two concrete examples of heuristics 
since “…heuristic processing would lead people to expect messages to contain more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Indeed, the ELM has directly influenced research in implicit-explicit attitudes (e.g. Rydell et al., 2006) 
30 Note that Chaiken (1980) distinguishes between the use of source and message in persuasion 
processing. The current approach argues that the use source and message is always present in persuasion 
processing (see 3.3 on the conceptualisation of the interpretation of the speaker). 
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valid arguments when they stem from expert rather than nonexpert sources and to 
expect attitude objects or attitudinal positions to be more worthy when they are liked or 
endorsed by many rather than few people” (Ibid., p. 461). As evident from 3.3, the 
framework adopted in the thesis can integrate the notion of source credibility in a 
Causal Bayesian Network model.   
 Whilst the ELM and the HSM provide fascinating cognitive psychological 
models of persuasion processing, a range of studies in social psychology explore the 
importance of other peoples’ behaviour when we think and act (for a general review of 
these, see Cialdini, 2007)31. The assumption that human cognition and behaviour are 
influenced by the behaviour of others underlies the social psychology studies. For 
instance, the perception of authority may influence how we act (Milgram, 1963), the 
social act of others may also influence how we manage our choices (Bandura et al., 
1967; Phillips, 1974; 1983), and the outcome of congressional elections may be 
predicted with some certainty simply by eliciting from voters which of the candidates 
look the most competent (Toderov et al., 2005, for a discussion of the social importance 
of trust and facial expression, see Rezlescu et al., 2012). Thus, social norms and 
behaviour influence our perception of our immediate surroundings and how we can 
process the information available, which consequently influences how we approach, 
estimate and evaluate evidence provided in acts of persuasion32. Taken together, the 
importance of social influence and interaction shows that acts of persuasion can never 
be thought of in a vacuum and that analyses of persuasive attempts should not be 
divorced from the social context in which they are lodged (as, for instance, some de-
contextualised examples of Conversation Analysis). Indeed, the context in which people 
are immersed when they are subjugated to persuasive attempts may carry a lot of 
meaning and persuasive potential. The importance of the interaction with the 
interlocutor and the social aspects of persuasion are discussed in more detail in chapters 
5 and 6 where a discussion of how to conceptualize persuasion as an inherently social 
act relying on interaction between humans is carried out.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For a popular-scientific presentation of the social influences on persuasion, see Goldstein et al. (2009) 
32  Thaler & Sunstein (2008) further discusses how extraneous circumstances and the immediate 
surroundings may influence choice architecture – however, this is concerned with the choices people 
make, which is not necessarily persuasion (for a discussion of persuasion and action, see 1.2). 
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In review, some main points may be drawn forth to capture the initial 
complexity of persuasion. As clear from rhetorical theory, persuasion should not be 
limited to a study of formal, logical transmission of knowledge given the fact that other 
elements such as pathos and ethos also should be considered. Secondly, persuasion has 
been investigated both from a quantitative as well as a qualitative point of view to 
provide a foundation for appreciating acts of persuasion normatively and descriptively. 
Indeed, the theoretical contribution of the thesis relies on discussing persuasion from a 
quantitative and predictive point of view, which nonetheless requires qualitative 
descriptions in order to analyse specific acts of persuasion (see 7.2).  Thirdly, as evident 
from social psychology persuasion is necessarily social and interactive. Finally, as will 
be discussed further below, verbal interactive persuasion resides in an interesting 
position that draws on reasoning from uncertain evidence, interaction with others, how 
communication is managed interactively, and how the persuadee immerses herself in 
the context. This holistic approach to persuasion is reflected in chapters 5-6, which deal 
with these elements. As evident from the brief literature review, it clearly emerges that 
different disciplines primarily deal with different issues pertaining to the description, 
modelling, and analysis of persuasion. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, 
fig. 2 illustrates the main conceptual interest of the reviewed disciplines. Naturally, the 
illustration is approximating at best, as most, if not all, of the disciplines provide a more 
complex approach to persuasion. The illustration, then, is merely an indicative map of 
the literature reviewed in the above and their conceptual relation to persuasion research.  
 
1.1.5. Initial conceptualisation of persuasion  
In order to further approach a conceptualisation of persuasion from a psychological 
perspective, imagine a game theoretic scenario involving an urn containing 100 purple 
and yellow balls. The colour of the balls is either mainly purple or yellow (e.g. 70/30). 
In the game, person 1 (the persuader) may look in the urn and select 10 balls without 
showing the balls to person 2 (the persuadee). Despite now showing the balls, the 
persuader does report the colour of the balls – the report may be truthful or deceptive 
(i.e. reporting the actual colour versus misrepresenting information). Following the 
presentation of information, the persuadee has to decide whether the urn contains 
mainly purple or yellow balls. The game is antagonistic such that the aims of the 
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interlocutors are opposed. The persuadee wins if she guesses correctly, but loses if she 
guesses wrongly. The question is: what should the persuadee do in terms of the 
information provided by the persuader? This scenario is a simplified version of many 
persuasive situations in which the persuader and the persuadee have different, or 
perhaps even opposing, aims, and in which there is an asymmetrical relationship in 
terms of the access to information and the power to present and frame this 
information33.  
From a reasoning perspective, we should expect that a perceived low 
trustworthiness of the source should drive down the posterior estimation of the validity 
of the information (see also Harris et al., 2012; Harris et al., submitted). This 
hypothetical case, then, is in no way difficult since the trustworthiness is low, which 
subsequently should yield a sceptical stance towards the information presented by the 
persuader, i.e. the best strategy of the persuadee is to ignore the evidence, as she 
remains at chance no matter what he displays. However, when considering the aims of 
the persuaders, we are often faced with a dilemma since these more than often have 
different or additional aims than the ones being communicated. For instance, companies 
advertising for their products are predominantly interested in selling products but will 
claim an interest in improving the lives of the individual customer as well as their own 
employees and politicians run for office to be elected as well as to serve the people. 
Naturally, these aims are complex and mixed in the sense that without a good product, 
which does improve the life of the costumer, the company cannot continuously sell their 
products in the future and without any wish to improve the lives of their constituency, 
few politicians would presumably run for office. However, aims and desires of the 
persuaders are often unknown to the persuadee and may even be at odds with the aims 
and desires of the audience, which mirrors the scenario in the above in three interesting 
ways. Firstly, the aims of persuader and persuadee may differ (see 1.4). Secondly, the 
persuader can, to a large extent, choose which information to present34, which provides 
an epistemological asymmetrical relationship between persuader and persuadee (see van 
Buiten & Keren, 2009). In particular, the persuader will almost always have more 
information pertaining to the particular case as compared to the audience, and he may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For an excellent book on communication and power relations, see Castells (2009) 
34 Disregarding for the time being the complexity of situations in which information may be forced into 
the public such as legal settings, audits etc. 
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not wish to provide the audience with a full account of the details. Finally, again to a 
large extent, the persuader can frame the information in a manner that best suits his 
personal aims, which creates an asymmetrical contextualizing relationship. Given that 
in real life people alternate between being persuader and persuadees in different 
situations, it should be known both interlocutors that an asymmetrical relationship exists 
on three levels: aims, epistemology, and framing potential. Hence, a puzzle arises. If the 
audience conforms to pure probabilistic reasoning, we should expect posterior ratings to 
be low in many persuasive situations (e.g. a sales pitch) whereas in reality audiences 
seem less sceptical. In other words, it is puzzling why people should be open to 
persuasion at all in these circumstances due to truth-conditional volatility and source 
credibility. As such, persuasion goes beyond the confinements of naïve reasoning 
theories in which audiences only process the evidence provided to them as well as the 
credibility of the source35. Indeed, given persuasion in reality, this seems a realistic 
position. The thesis is concerned with exploring this puzzle more in-depth36.  
The urn game entails some interesting points to consider when defining 
persuasion. Firstly, it is a simplified scenario given the fact that information in the urn 
game, at least for the persuader, is certain: he knows for certain the content of the urns. 
As will be evident in the discussion of the epistemic relationship between the persuader 
and the persuadee, such a naïve approach to knowledge cannot be assumed in all acts of 
persuasion. Rather, knowledge may be mediated, negotiated and uncertain for both 
persuader and persuadee, although with important degrees of difference since the 
epistemic asymmetry persists. Secondly, the persuadee’s posterior belief may be 
mathematically calculated given identifiable nodes in a complex Causal Bayesian 
Networks (see Pearl, 2000). The immediate conclusion is that the persuadee should be 
less inclined in believing the information provided by the persuader if the persuader is 
unreliable and has motivation to misinform37. However, this is a simplified model 
compared to real cases of persuasion. For instance, despite having every reason to 
misrepresent information and beautify data, many consumers still rely on 
advertisements. Finally, the case indicates that a simple calculation of the probabilities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 To name a few considerations, a purely rational information-updating approach would ignore the 
intentionality issue discussed in 1.3 as well as the notion of epistemic non-alignment as discussed in 1.5.  
36 As a more in-depth example of the persuasive puzzle on Nixon, see Madsen & Chater (in prep) 
37 Thus, if the persuader has motivation, the subsequent posterior belief should decrease and vice versa. 
This makes use of complex causal networks (see e.g. Harris et al., submitted).  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   52 
of information cannot be sufficient in describing persuasion. Without having interactive 
common knowledge about the context, an interpretation of the persuader, and some 
language capability, the above game would make no sense to the persuadee.  
By exploring this simple game, we may identify central elements of 
persuasion that will be discussed throughout the thesis. Firstly, in any act of persuasion 
at least some information has to be mediated. As evident from the urn game, the 
information is epistemologically uncertain and will consequently be discussed from the 
point of view of probabilistic reasoning (chapter 2). Secondly, the persuadee has to have 
some kind of interpretation of the persuader, which will be discussed in chapter 3. 
Thirdly, the interlocutors have to engage in some act of spoken language in order to be 
understood and understand to some degree although this too is negotiable and mediated 
in context. The communicative will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Finally, the 
context in which the information is provided and how the interlocutors interact with one 
another become central elements of persuasion given the fact that the theoretical 
foundation is concerned with subjective and contextually mouldable concepts. The 
interaction and immersion of the persuadee in the context is discussed in chapters 5 and 
6. Three specific models of persuasion were identified (ELM, HSM, and PKM). They 
provide a comparison to the present model, which will be discussed in greater detail 7.5, 
in terms of how they relate to the approach developed here as well as the theoretical and 
empirical evidence cited as ground for the approach. In sum, the thesis explores the 
theoretical interface of reasoning from uncertainty, language comprehension, and the 
interpretation of the speaker in a cultural context in constant change as identified as 
central elements of a persuasive setting by exploring the hypothetical case of the urn.  
 
1.2. Elements of persuasion 
Taillard (2000) identifies three elements of persuasion: beliefs, desires, and the intention 
of action. Taking point of departure in the latter, the intention of and subsequent 
carrying out of action may be seen as a potential result of persuasive attempts. For 
example, if I vote for a particular candidate in a political election, I am indeed acting 
according to the direction of the intended outcome of the act of persuasion. However, 
intention of actual action is not a necessary element of persuasion in that actual action 
may be difficult to observe for a number of reasons. For example, a person may be 
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persuaded to alter her beliefs pertaining to a particular political candidate, but also be 
dejected by the political scene in general, which entails that she does not vote at all. 
This does not mean that the person has not been persuaded in some form concerning her 
beliefs. However, as Burke (1969a) notes, a hierarchy of beliefs is possible such that her 
belief in not voting takes precedence over the belief that was changed as a results of the 
persuasive attempt, and thus she still refrains from voting despite a successful act of 
persuasion. Therefore, action is an often conjoined and subsequent consequence of acts 
of persuasion, but it is not a necessary element. Furthermore, a person might act 
different without changes in her belief (such as coercion). That is, action can spring 
from other wells than beliefs. However, studies in behaviour change and action does 
provide potential information pertaining to persuasion such that explorations of the 
effects of advertisements provide indirect evidence for persuasion given that these 
measure action. Indeed, given the fact that beliefs are not directly measurable, 
observations of actions and outcomes (and thus indirect evidence) may be the best we 
can do in terms of approaching measuring the success and effects of persuasive 
attempts38.  
Whether desires should be included in a theory of persuasion depends on 
the definition of the concept. If we take desires to mean goal-directed orientation of 
some type, then surely certain types of desires permeate acts of persuasion. In line with 
Sperber and colleagues (e.g. Sperber, 2000; Sperber et al., 2010), I assume that humans 
generally desire to have as accurate information about their surroundings as possible in 
order to function as optimally as possible. This entails epistemic vigilance, which is 
discussed in 3.1. However, desires may not be conscious for humans. Thus, if desires 
have to do with the fulfilment of a passion, it does not seem to be a central element of 
persuasion although it may be a frequent conjoined element. In The Republic, Plato 
remarks that humans can desire contradictory objects (for a discussion of this, see 
Bouchet, 2011). Thus, in its weaker instance of being directed, (un)conscious, and self-
sustainable goals, desires permeate and dominate the scope and aim of acts of 
persuasion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 On another level, a theory of persuasion might very well inform a theory of behaviour change and 
influence regarding what it means that behaviour is charged with meaning and belief (as well as which 
meaning and belief) in communicative contexts.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   54 
Finally, beliefs are, in the conceptual framework of this thesis, at the heart 
of persuasion. Epistemologically, this stance agrees with Budzynsky & Kacprzak 
(2008) who argue that “…persuasion refers to beliefs not knowledge” (p. 53). A belief 
may be seen as a mental state of having some attitude or opinion about whether a 
proposition or an idea is likely to be true, and beliefs may be construed as central 
building blocks of thought. Simon & Jones (2011) define the concept broader by saying 
that "…beliefs are what we each personally consider to be true or probable" (p. 41). In 
accordance with the latter definition, I take beliefs to refer to a psychological state 
pertaining to the likelihood of information and evidence. Importantly, this definition 
includes significant implications for persuasion compared with more rigorous 
propositional theories of beliefs. The implications relate to consciousness, necessity, 
and strength of the beliefs. As shown later, these dimensions are of vital importance 
when examining persuasive attempts from the theoretical strands of literature applied in 
this thesis.  
Beliefs can be conceptualized to contain various elements that qualify 
these. Firstly, in the definition offered here, beliefs are not necessarily, and perhaps very 
seldom conscious in the sense that we all have a plethora of beliefs about the world-of-
affairs. For instance, I will have a host of beliefs that are underpinning my more 
conscious acts of thinking such as beliefs of gravity and intuitive physics, temporal and 
spatial relations, personal and socio-cultural contested histories and so on. These beliefs 
can be called into question, and consequently human beings can consciously revisit 
these in thought, discussion and interpersonally in acts of persuasion, but most of the 
time these are latent and unconsciously held (for instance, I rarely ponder my belief in 
gravity). They may, however, have an impact on the probabilistic evaluation of the 
individual in the process of persuasion. Secondly, despite the fact that beliefs may be 
expressed propositionally (e.g. “I believe that the earth revolves around the sun”), I do 
not assume that beliefs are necessarily propositional in their nature. Rather, I take 
beliefs to refer to mainly latent entities that are neither well defined nor stable. Thus, I 
take beliefs to exist in a fluctuating continuum in which these may be brought to the 
attention of the person in a varying degree of consciousness. Alongside the gradient of 
consciousness, some beliefs are more central to our understanding of the world-of-
affairs than others. For instance, I might believe that Lagos is the capital of Nigeria, I 
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might believe that the people who call themselves my parents are in fact my parental 
units, and I might believe that the earth revolves around the sun. The qualitative 
difference between these beliefs is the degree of necessity that these represent for me. If 
someone corrects me by reminding me that Abuja and not Lagos is actually the capital 
of Nigeria, this does not fundamentally alter my beliefs of the world-of-affairs save a 
minor correction in my beliefs about Nigeria. However, my beliefs about my upbringing 
and the astronomical position of the globe are more central to my understanding of 
myself and the world in general. That is, in a similar vein that beliefs may exist on a 
continuum of consciousness, they also exist on a continuum of necessity. Finally, the 
degree to which I believe a belief to be true is a central element, which will be the focus 
of chapter 2 when discussing Bayesian rationality and probabilistic reasoning as a 
foundational aspect of persuasion processing. On a gradient scale, I might believe more 
or less strongly in a belief (from 0 to 1). Beliefs, then, are not directly commensurable 
on a one-to-one basis, but can rather be distinguished qualitatively from one another 
depending on these three elements. As a helpful tool in conceptualizing beliefs, the 
three essential dimensions of beliefs presented in this section are summarized in fig. 3. 
Fig. 3: Elements of beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, for persuasion to take place, as a minimum, persuader has to try and 
change the beliefs of the persuadee, whereas desires (depending on the definition) and 
(intention of) action are not necessary elements. Information updating also will always 
be involved in the process of alteration of beliefs, as information necessarily need to be 
presented39. However, this raises a central question concerning information updating 
and argumentation theory, namely whether persuasion is equal to these. However, as 
discussed in 1.3, simple information updating and argumentation cannot alone 
constitute persuasion since the former could simply be the act of someone else updating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Note here, than, that I am in line with Burke (1969) who observes that coercion cannot be persuasion 
since it does not involve the freedom to disagree.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   56 
your information pertaining to the weather without any form of persuasive intention 
between interlocutors. That is, the focus is on persuasive settings in which interaction 
between people becomes central to the process. Spoken interpersonal persuasion, then, 
is a special type of belief alteration that involves other processes than simple 
information updating since it also has to involve persuasive intentions (see section 1.3) 
and interaction in a contextually, epistemologically, and an aim-wise asymmetrical 
setting40.  
 
1.3. Persuasive intention 
The notion of persuasive intentions adds to the previous definition of persuasion, where 
it was defined as changes in beliefs. Persuasive intentions help distinguish persuasion 
from information updating and argumentation (as discussed in 1.6). Being updated on 
the weather condition does not constitute an act of persuasion, but rather of information 
due to the fact that there is not necessarily any persuasive intention in simply updating 
knowledge or beliefs about the state of the world (although, as clear from the example 
with Life of Brian later in this section, there can be)41. Given the focus of interpersonal, 
spoken persuasion, the acts of persuasion defined here have to include more than one 
person. However, this does not entail that every situation with new information and 
more than one person is necessarily persuasive. Consider two similar scenarios in which 
a child in a kitchen is reaching for a cookie and is spotted by a watchful parent. In the 
first scenario, the child does not know that she is being observed and is thus simply 
reaching for the cookies without intending to communicate anything to the parent. Note 
that the parent will still be able to consider the mental states of the child (e.g. she is 
peckish, hungry, aware that she is doing something without the consent of her parents) 
and is thus able to mentalize, to update his beliefs about his child and to be induced to 
action. He may even provide the child with a cookie, thus fulfilling the wishes of the 
child. However, this does not constitute persuasion since the child had no intention of 
persuading the parent (unaware of his presence) to provide her with a cookie. Beliefs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Of course, the notion of belief has been subject to very intensive philosophical analysis over the past 
century. I shall not consider these issues in any detail here, but rather consider how persuasion relates to 
the notion of belief, fairly independently of whatever turns out to be appropriate the analysis and 
definition of belief. 
41 Note that this does not entail that updating one’s beliefs in general is devoid of intentionality (see 6.1). 
However, this is significantly different from persuasive intentions the concept is presented here.  
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have been altered, but not due to persuasive effort. In other words, there was no 
intentional or shared interaction between the father and the child. In the same setting, 
imagine that the child is aware that the parent is observing her. She may then try to 
persuade her father by communicating her wishes by telling him about her wishes42. 
The persuasive strategy may be forthright (asking for a cookie), misleading (denying 
reaching for the cookie), or anything in between43, but essentially the child needs to will 
a change in beliefs in the parent concerning the cookie. The central point is that the 
father and the daughter engage interactively in the context of cookies in which both 
parent and child realizes that the other has intentions concerning the beliefs and 
outcome of the situation. These intentions may not be transparent for the interlocutors. 
For instance, the parent may readily assume the child wants a cookie, whilst the child 
may assume that the parent wants to give her a cookie without this being the case.  
 The persuasive intention, however, is not a simple construct. Rather, it can 
be divided into three separate and mutually important intentions (persuader, persuadee, 
and mutual) towards the situation in which, as discussed later, two of the three 
intentions are necessary for a persuasive incident to arise44. Firstly, the persuader may 
intend to alter the beliefs of the persuadee. This is a wilful action in which the persuader 
strategically can choose his words and arguments (recall the asymmetrical nature of 
persuasion) in order to alter the beliefs of the other. Secondly, the persuadee intends to 
engage with the persuasive attempt such that she complies with the SPIMP approach 
described in the thesis (see 7.3). Finally, there need to be a mutual intention of engaging 
with one another from a communicative and information-sharing perspective. If either 
interlocutor opts out of conversation, the persuasive incident comes to a grinding halt. 
As such, the persuasive situation is permeated by a three-layered intentionality, which 
theoretically makes it possible to discuss different types of alignment on a 
communicative versus an epistemic basis (where the two interlocutors need alignment 
on the first, but not necessarily on the second).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The communicative act may be both verbal and nonverbal. However, given the focus of spoken 
persuasion, I will assume verbal communication 
43 Interestingly, human beings seem to become strategically shrewder as they mature (see e.g. Friestad 
and Wright, 1994).  
44 The individual intentions (persuader and persuadee) are closely tied to the persuasive aims of each 
interlocutor, see 1.4 
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As noted by Simon & Jones (2011), the notion of a persuasive intention is 
fluent with grey areas, since situations may occur in which speakers do not wish to 
persuade, but are in turn ascribed with persuasive intentions by the persuadee. In other 
words, given the interpretation of the speaker, there may be discrepancies on either side 
of the persuasive attempt, and whether or not the persuader intends to persuade the 
persuadee may be negotiable and fluctuating in context. But this interpretation of the 
social, and whether or not the act is considered social (as it is to be understood here), 
predominantly lies with the persuadee. Consider Monty Python’s Life of Brian in which 
Brian, believed by followers to be the messiah, finds himself with his unwanted 
disciples in the desert. They are hungry, and Brian points to some bushes with juniper 
berries. This is a completely informative act of communication from the point of view 
of Brian. However, the followers infer that Brian has produced the food out of thin air 
and is showing them the miracle to persuade them of his godliness. This is a humorous 
example, detailing the fact that the complex act of interpretation of the persuasive 
intention is mediated between the persuader, the persuadee and the context. That is, the 
persuasive intention is something inferred by the persuadee despite the fact that the 
persuader is the one supposedly performing the act. This highlights the interactive 
nature of the persuasive attempt. The persuader may to some extent provide the 
framing, the setting, and the message, but it is equally important that the persuadee 
engages in this act. In the case of Brian, it was sufficient for a persuasive situation to 
arise given the mutual and the persuadee intention. However, it is also sufficient with 
the persuader and the mutual intention. For instance, examples where the persuadee 
enters the social situation expecting information updating, but unwittingly ends up in a 
persuasive situation without recognising it. Propaganda and biased news organisations 
provide examples of this instance. In both situations (lacking either of the individual 
intention), the mutual intention of engaging in a social exchange has to remain. 
Therefore, in order to talk about the persuasive, the mutual intention and one of the 
other have to be present, but most often the social situation will be such that both 
interlocutors acknowledge the persuasive and thus all three intentionalities are bound 
within the social (see 6.1 on intentionality). We cannot divide the roles of persuader and 
persuadee in an unproblematic manner. This interactive effort is discussed at more 
length in chapter 5.  
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In sum, in order for the phenomenon to constitute a persuasive intention, 
several conditions need to be fulfilled. Firstly, the interaction between the persuader and 
the persuadee has to be such that they both recognize one another45, hence the example 
with the girl reaching for the cookies. Secondly, the interaction also has to include that 
the persuader intends to alter (or is inferred to intend so by the persuadee) some of the 
persuadees’ beliefs in a manner, which does not simply constitute information updating. 
Thirdly, that the exchange potentially is strategic and that the persuadee may be 
epistemically vigilant (see 3.1). Finally, the persuader and the persuadee will engage in 
communicative action. If these conditions are not met, the act cannot be an instance of 
persuasion, but rather of information updating, bodily interaction (such as meeting in a 
hallway and coordinating so that the people do not bump into one another), or similar 
instances of interaction that are not persuasive.  
 
1.4. Aim and temporal relationship of persuasion 
Alongside the necessary elements and persuasive intentions, one must look to the 
potential scope and aim of persuasive acts given the fact that such situations may not 
entail the same direction of aim between interlocutors. For instance, acts of persuasion 
may be manipulative in the sense that the persuader (perhaps covertly) aims to persuade 
the persuadee of something that may not be beneficial to her. This could be providing 
misinformation regarding certain issues (e.g. when deciding whether or not to intervene 
in Iraq due to WMDs), deceptive representation of the situation (e.g. Bill Clinton’s 
account of the Monica Lewinsky affair) or simply due to misalignment of aims (e.g. a 
car salesman and a potential costumer). That is, in studying persuasion, we cannot 
assume that interlocutors will have a Habermasian aim of consensus and truth-seeking 
(Habermas, 2003). Nor can it be assumed that the persuader has benevolent intentions 
for the persuadee. On the other hand, persuasion is not simply manipulation and 
misrepresentation of facts. If persuasion is taken to be an interactive event involving 
two interlocutors, persuasion may also serve a beneficial purpose. For instance, a nurse 
trying to persuade an inhabitant of a care home to take her medication would be an act 
of benevolent persuasion. In other words, persuasion can neither be taken as something 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Note that this does not entail a one-to-one recognition. For instance, a politician speaking to a crowd 
does not recognize any individual per se, but rather recognizes the crowd as potential persuadees. 
However, as the focus of the present is on one-to-one persuasion, this remains, at the moment, irrelevant.  
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inherently malevolent nor as something inherently beneficial46. Depending on the 
context, persuasion may serve a range of purposes. This claim will be increasingly 
obvious as the thesis progresses. On the whole, however, the thesis is in line with 
Sperber’s (2000) remarks on communication that overall persuasion needs to be 
beneficial. Otherwise, the persuadee should opt out of the situation immediately when 
she realises the persuasive intention, and clearly this is not the case.  
 Persuasive aims As will be discussed in 1.5, persuasion may be directed 
towards alignment of beliefs and reaching consensus. However, we cannot necessarily 
assume benevolent consensus-seeking behaviour in persuasion – neither from the 
persuader nor, in fact, from the persuadee. The persuader is relatively straightforward 
given the fact that persuaders in some situations will attempt to maliciously manipulate 
the beliefs of the persuadee to fit their personal agenda, which may differ significantly 
from the goals and benefits of the persuadee. One could imagine, however, that the 
persuadee should seek to align her beliefs with the proposed act of persuasion. 
However, there are other factors to consider. Firstly, the persuadee should be aware of 
the fact that persuaders from time to time will exactly try to manipulate and deceive. 
Consequently, given epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010, see 3.1), the persuadee 
may approach the act of persuasion from a perspective of non-alignment and distrust. 
Secondly, the persuadee may have an overarching aim reaching beyond the act of 
persuasion in the sense that she may want to use the information gathered in the act of 
persuasion to further other aims that counter the perceived aims of the persuader. Thus, 
it does not seem straight-forward that we should expect benevolence, neither from the 
persuader nor from the persuadee. This discrepancy from both interlocutors is on an 
epistemic level relating to the individual directedness of intentionality towards the 
situation. That is, we cannot expect epistmic alignment. However on a communicative 
level, some form of alignment has to take place since without any common point of 
reference, acts of persuasion and persuasion processing would be impossible. That is, 
given the fact that I do not speak Swahili, I would not be able to be persuaded by 
spoken persuasion in Swahili simply due to the fact that I would have no idea of what 
was being communicated. This holds true for cultural and historical references as well; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Indeed, it is easy to infer the necessity of malice where there is only the potential of malice. However, 
this should not cloud the definition.   
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some form of alignment on the level of mutual intentionality of engaging with the social 
situation has to occur for the persuasive incidence to take place.  
Temporal relationship of persuasion As discussed throughout the thesis, 
acts of persuasion, like acts of communication and interaction in general, carry with 
them complex notions of competing aspects of time. The integration of time-scales in 
persuasion studies is vastly complex and lies beyond the scope of the thesis (but see 
Madsen, submitted). However, given its importance in communication and 
epistemology (see 4.4 and 6.4), it has to be mentioned as a central element of persuasion 
processing. Bohner & Dickel (2011) hints at the importance of the temporal by citing 
memory as an integral part of persuasion47.  
The act of persuasion is in a relatively confined space in time given that a 
particular, single-event persuasive attempt will usually be fairly brief (typically between 
a few seconds in advertisement to a few hours in debates or political speeches). The 
thesis is concerned with defining the cognitive processes that the persuadee undergoes 
in this confined, flash of a moment vested in a larger flux of a time-scale(s). However, 
in order to make sense of the present time-scale, the persuadee and the persuader have 
to make use of larger movements concerning language, culture, and common 
knowledge. The complex notion of time in persuasion thus has to acknowledge at least 
four separate strands of time, each of which entails a complexity that is beyond the 
scope of the thesis. Firstly, given the importance of the developmental background of 
beliefs throughout the life of the individual (Hood, 2012), the individual’s 
psychological framework (7.1) is essential since this posits the frame for the possible 
communicative interpretations a subjective estimation in the situation. These involve 
personal memories, cultural upbringing, personal histories and other events that have 
occurred in their respective lives48. Secondly, historical and cultural incidents go 
beyond the lives of the individuals engaged in the act of persuasion. Thus, despite 
residing on a different time-scale, both individuals will have to be aware of, or at least 
be unconsciously influenced by, historical, socio-economic, and cultural factors. These 
factors are contested in that they might entail different things to each individual. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Note that he ELM also integrates temporal relations on a basic scale in their approach, e.g. the PAST 
model (Petty et al., 2006). 
48 To explore this issue and flesh out a theory of how the individual backgrounds may facilitate 
interaction, an in-depth study of developmental studies as well as interactive literature would have to be 
investigated.  
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Thirdly, in order to make use of language in the present, human beings rely on a 
complex trajectory of past uses of language and communicative conventions. Thus, I am 
able to write this thesis due to the fact that millions of people throughout the past 
hundreds of years have been speaking and writing English from Chaucer to RZA. These 
over-arching linguistic trajectories are manifest in grammatical structures49. However, 
the use of language is also subjective in that words can take on a plethora of meanings 
and mutate with novel uses of language. Finally, as noted in 1.6, persuasion exists in an 
interesting epistemic state given the fact that many acts of persuasion are concerned 
with beliefs and potential behaviour in the future (e.g. who to vote for in the next 
election). Thus, interlocutors also have to keep a potential future time-scale in mind 
when engaging in persuasive interaction. In sum, both the persuader and the persuadee 
occupy a complex space that relies on personal time, historical and cultural time, and 
possible futures. That is, a variety of time-scales ranging from on-the-spot Pico-time 
interaction (Pedersen, 2012; Steffensen, 2013) to complex, intersecting time-scales. 
This will be discussed further in 6.4. 
 
1.5 Alignment, consensus and persuasion  
Bordering persuasion research, theories of consensus, agreement and alignment may 
provide valuable insights into how human beings deal with uncertain evidence and the 
epistemological aims they entail. Indeed, in terms of communication and evidence, 
there has to be some form of alignment for persuasive attempts to even make sense to 
the interlocutors50. In his seminal paper, Aumann (1976) shows that, from a fully 
rational purely probabilistic point of view, “if two people have the same priors, and 
their posteriors for a given event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors must 
be equal” (p. 1236). That is, given the same probabilistic estimations and the same 
common knowledge, interlocutors should reach the same posterior estimation and thus 
consensus when seeking truth (although, of course, they might both arrive at a flawed 
conclusion). Mathematically, this is the same for economics of information (DeGroot, 
1972; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1976, for economic information transmission theory, see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 How solid and innate the grammatical structures are is still a hotly debated issue in lingusitics, see 
chapter 3 
50 This issue will be explored in more detail in chapter 5 concerning the joint action, common knowledge 
and interactivity in persuasion.  
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e.g. Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Jung, 2009). Intuitively, persuasion may be approached 
from a similar view of alignment in the sense that the persuader makes an attempt to 
align or synchronise the beliefs of the persuadee so that she conforms to the ones he 
proposes. Indeed, in such an intuitive alignment-seeking view of persuasion, this could 
be a definition of success. However, as discussed in the previous section, persuasion 
may differ from consensus-seeking activities.  
 Aumann notes that the key notion of agreement is “common knowledge” 
(p. 1236) and that the imparting of knowledge requires “the full description of a state w 
[the “true” state of the world] of the world” (p. 1237) as the manner information is 
transferred. According to Aumann, the Harsanyi doctrine, that “…differences in 
subjective probabilities should be traced exclusively to differences in information” 
(ibid.), permeates the notion of alignment as long as the discussion is not concerned 
with “innate” differences in priors (Aumann, p. 1238, see also Harsanyi, 1968). There 
are at least four interesting assumptions and remarks concerning the nature of 
persuasion that may be elicited here to gauge at the limitation of alignment theory in 
persuasion. Firstly, in mathematics and set theory the notion of common knowledge 
may be straightforward, but in psychology it is not. It does not seem epistemologically 
warranted to assume that interlocutors have common knowledge in the full state of the 
world, w. Therefore, we may assume that interlocutors will have to have some common 
knowledge, but that this notion is more complex than assumed in Aumann. Secondly, to 
reach agreement it is necessary to entertain the same prior probabilistic estimations. 
Like common knowledge, this cannot be assumed in practical situations given the fact 
that people will have had different upbringings, belong to different cultures/sub-
cultures, and thus entertain different priors (Hood, 2012; Haidt, 2012, see also 6.2 and 
7.2 for a discussion of this) – even in situations in which interlocutors are presented 
with the same information, we cannot expect humans to arrive and conform to the same 
priors given difference in the psychological framework against which the evidence is 
perceived (see 7.2). Thirdly, the assumption of knowledge in the full also seems 
unwarranted in practical settings. The complexity of practical reasoning entails that no 
one can entertain full knowledge of a situation, as it would require a massive amount of 
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information concerning politics, data collection, cultural awareness etc.51 Finally, the 
mathematical proof hinges on the assumption that interlocutors engage in benevolent 
information transmission with the purpose of reaching a mutual understanding and 
agreement. As noted in the above, such Habermasian ideals of striving for consensus 
and common understanding cannot be assumed in persuasive settings given the complex 
divergence of persuasive aims as discussed in 1.452. A formal proof of alignment is 
indeed “mathematically trivial” (Aumann, 1976), but only given certain assumptions 
that we epistemologically cannot assume in persuasion given the finite limitations of 
human cognition and the epistemological and communicative asymmetry that invariably 
persists given the differences in aims and power between interlocutors. Therefore, 
despite the fact that interlocutors have to have common ground and interaction in order 
to communicate and make sense of one another, this does not entail that interlocutors 
align on an epistemological level. In other words, alignment can be assumed 
communicatively, but not epistemically. This will be discussed further in chapters 4-5.  
 
1.6. Persuasion and argumentation  
Persuasion and argumentation are frequently linked closely in the literature. For 
instance, Perelman and Olbrecths-Tyteca (1969) argue from an Aristotelian perspective 
that persuasion is concerned with doxastic reasoning from practical argumentation, 
pragma-dialectical theories argue that argumentation underpins persuasion (Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004), and even popular scientific books frequently make this link (e.g. 
Hansen, 1961; Whyte, 2003; Pirie, 2007; Schopenhauer, 2009). The argumentative 
models used vary between logical (Priest, 2008) and practical argumentation (e.g. 
Walton, 1995; 2008a; 2008b). Toulmin’s model of practical argumentation (Toulmin, 
2003) is one of the central developments of practical reasoning (see fig. 4). The model 
consists of three essential elements always present in practical argumentation (claim, 
warrants, and grounds) and three non-essential elements (backing, qualifier, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Let alone suppose an epistemic keyhole through which objective information could be ascertained. 
Proponents of quantum mechanics have eloquently dismissed the notion that we, even at the level of 
observations in physics research, may observe events objectively (see e.g. Heisenberg, 1930).  
52 For an in-depth critique of Habermas, see Hauser (1999). For further discussion of persuasion, 
alignment and consensus, see Tormala et al. (2009), Plantin (2012), and Corazzini et al. (2012). 
Circumventing a lengthier discussion of the topic, however, the thesis claims that we cannot assume 
consensus as a driving aim, neither for persuader nor persuadee.  
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rebuttal). The model remains a structural model of over-arching elements that are 
present in argumentation and reasoning, and it does not go beyond this structure to 
account for how people do reason and make use of the elements in the model. That is, 
despite being a looser approximation of practical argumentation, Toulmin’s model is 
concerned with structure rather than content. Recent developments in Bayesian 
argumentation provide a suggestion for approaching how people reason from uncertain 
evidence in the practical situation (e.g. Oaksford & Hahn, 2006a; 2007b; Harris et al., 
2012). The Bayesian approach, however, will be explored in more detail in 2.4. 
Fig. 4: Toulmin’s model of argumentation 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to discuss persuasion it becomes central to discuss the conceptual difference 
between argumentation and persuasion. The difference, I argue, depends on the notion 
of argumentation and persuasion in which the former is a central element of, but not 
equal to persuasion. Here, I focus on the difference between persuasion and practical 
rather than logical argumentation since the thesis focuses on practical reasoning and 
persuasion and logical argumentation and reasoning will be questioned later (in 2.2). 
Indeed, a driving claim throughout the thesis is that the complexity of human reasoning, 
language, and persuasion cannot be encompassed by the rigorous structural qualities of 
formal logic, but has to be approached from the probabilistic perspective of uncertain 
knowledge.  
 Argumentation may be defined as “... a verbal, social, and rational activity 
aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting 
forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed 
in the standpoint.” (Eemeren & Grotendorst, 2004, p. 1). The first sentiment concerning 
the verbal and social makes this definition particularly relevant, as the focus of the 
thesis is on spoken persuasion. Further, the model proposed here also describes 
persuasion processing from a rational perspective (albeit, a subjective rational 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   66 
perspective from probabilistic estimations rather than from formal logic)53. Alongside 
this, reasoning does not seem to exist in the vacuum of the purely rational,  since our 
emotion states shape the way we estimate information, i.e. we cannot approach 
information objectively (for a discussion of the importance of emotions in reasoning, 
see Damasio 2005; Blanchette, 2006; Melo et al., 2010; for a review, see Blanchette & 
Richards, 2010, see also 6.2 for a discussion of the concept of subjectivity). If we take 
argumentation to be the production and refutation of standpoints (leaving aside the 
notion of propositionalism as discussed in the above), this seems to be an idealized 
approach to reasoning since interlocutors often make use of argumentative diversions or 
persuasive ploys such as ad hominem. Argumentation in practice thus seems to be less 
rule-governed (tying together with the notion that the aim of persuasion and 
argumentation is not necessarily consensus and alignment). Persuasion further departs 
from argumentation in that persuasion is concerned with alteration of beliefs in general, 
which entails alterations that do not stem from the specific propositional information. 
That is, argumentation theory deals with how we should deal with the content and 
structure of the argument, whereas persuasion also includes how we approach this 
content (from a subjective perspective) and how we manage the perceived aims of the 
other. Further, argumentation can occur as a purely information-updating excersise, 
which cannot be the case in persuasion, as the persuasive intention would be missing. In 
this way, argumentation (understood as how we deal with evidence) is an absolutely 
central and important aspect of persuasion, which provides insight into how humans 
reason about uncertain evidence, but it does not constitute a theory of persuasion.  
Like persuasion, practical argumentation deals with a different epistemic 
entity than formal logic (Kock, 2006, 2009) such that it is concerned not only with 
factual knowledge, but also hypothetical simulations of future outcomes of decisions 
such as policies (Evans, 2003), counter-factuals (McCoy et al., 2012, and uncertain 
information (Madsen, 2012). Indeed, a variety of disciplines operate under the 
assumptions that vernacular reasoning is uncertain or defeasible (e.g. artificial 
intelligence, McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; in cognitive psychology, Holyoak & Spellman, 
1993; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). This is due to several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 As will be clear throughout chapter 2, the notion of rational behaviour in the thesis differs significantly 
from the definition of rationality in pragma-dialectics. 
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factors. Firstly, much of practical reasoning is not concerned with factual statements. 
Consider the following 
 1a) If the Spanish economy collapses, the Euro will fall 
 1b) If Walcott scores another goal, England will win the match 
 1c) If you fall down the stairs, you will get hurt54 
1a-1c are all concerned with predictions of future outcomes, and cannot by consequence 
be labelled as factual statements given that they have not yet occurred in the moment of 
utterance. Rather, there is a gradient probabilistic value for the outcomes. Thus, 1c is 
very likely, 1b depends on the state of the match, the opposition (e.g. if England is 
playing Spain or San Marino), etc., and 1a depends on a myriad of complex systems 
that may or may not influence the fate of the Euro. However, factual knowledge also 
plays a part in acts of persuasion. For instance, persuaders may cite historical incidents, 
legal documents etc. However, despite being factual, it is very rare that we have an 
absolute certainty that something is true or false55. That is, even knowledge labelled as 
factual is uncertain on a gradient scale. Thus, this thesis assumes that evidence produced 
in practical settings including persuasive settings is inherently uncertain and thus the 
persuadee is taken to reason from uncertainty (subjective probabilities) rather than from 
certainty (logic), see Oaksford and Chater (2007) for a discussion on the difference 
between the two reasoning stances (see also chapter 2).   
Persuasion and conviction Similar to the distinction between persuasion 
and argumentation, some authors suggest a distinction between ‘persuasion’ and 
‘conviction’ (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Perelman, 2005; Petri, 1968; 2002; 
Scarantino, 2008) 56 . PersuasionP+P “…is situated within a pragmatic, hence an 
emotional, values-based frame of reference… which aims to produce assent from 
among those who are engaged by the discourse” whereas conviction “…aims at the 
truth, is not immediately pragmatic and is not value-based but fact-based” (both quotes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Note that these have been expressed as conditionals, see Evans & Over, 2004 for a discussion of 
conditional reasoning.  
55 For instance, documents disputing and updating current historical knowledge may be found, new pieces 
of evidence may be uncovered in a legal case questioning prior beliefs, and the whole discipline of 
scientific exploration relies on the claim that we can argue something more confidence given evidence, 
but given the axiom of falsification, we can never be absolutely sure that we have perfect knowledge.  
56 The discussion is muddled by the fact that ‘persuasion’ as a term is used both by Perelman, Preti, 
Walton and myself with slightly different theoretical meanings. To represent this difference, I use 
persuasionP+P for Perelman and Preti’s term, persuasionW for Walton’s and persuasionG for the general 
term discussed throughout the thesis.  
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Scarantino, 2008, p. 23). That is, PersuasionP+P aims at assent and is based on values-
based persuasive attempts while conviction is aimed at truth based on facts. The 
distinction between the concepts are “…thus thematized out of the concept of audience” 
(Scarantino, 2008, p. 23) as well as differences in aims.  
 In investigating persuasionG, it is a fundamental question whether there is 
a qualitative difference between persuasionP+P, conviction, and persuasionG. Previously, 
I defined narrow persuasion as being fundamentally concerned with changes in beliefs 
void of any ethical considerations – whether or not these changes occur consciously or 
unconsciously is beside the theoretical point for the moment being. This change in 
belief may occur both via rational, fact-based argumentation, but it may also occur due 
to emotional appeals, by references to the character of the speaker or by other means57. 
That is, beliefs are not only influenced by pure rational argumentation. Construed 
thusly, persuasionP+P and conviction are merely special instances of persuasionG, the 
former relying mainly on pathos whereas the latter trails towards logos. It should be 
noted that the difference between rational and emotional appeals is both theoretically 
important and valid (even though most practical arguments will involve a degree of 
both). There is, in other words, a theoretically valid reason to distinguish between 
persuasionP+P and conviction, but both terms fall within the realm of persuasionG, as it is 
conceptualised here. Another aspect of Perelman and Preti’s definitions involves the 
difference between aims of persuasionP+P and conviction. One is aimed at assent; the 
other is aimed at truth. This distinction is not warranted in the framework of this thesis. 
Rather, logical, emotional and other types of persuasive attempts are aimed at 
probabilistic information concerning the proposed beliefs. As long as both types of 
persuasionG are concerned with practical argumentation, I assume that rational and 
logical argumentation is not qualitatively different in its pursuit of “truth” compared to 
other types of argumentation58. Both involve inherent uncertainty and thus be treated in 
a similar manner in terms of probabilistic reasoning. Throughout the thesis it will be 
increasingly evident that theoretical, analytical, and empirical evidence support this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In other words, the definition used in the thesis covers logos, ethos and pathos.  
58 If, however, the argumentation becomes formal (such as symbolic discussions of internal mechanisms 
of mathematics or logic, Priest, 2008), logical argumentation may be said to search for ”truth” within that 
particular system of investigation. However, the “conviction” term presented here does not seem to be 
concerned with formal-mathematical proofs. Therefore, I reject the difference of aims when it comes to 
practical, informal argumentation.  
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claim. In other words, persuasion theory needs to move away from a distinction 
between logical and other types of persuasion and argumentation and towards a more 
holistic, probabilistic theory.  
Walton (2008b, see also Walton, 1995; 2008a) defines persuasionW as a 
difference in opinion, where both internal and external proofs are used 
methodologically to persuade. For example, Walton contrasts this with action-seeking, 
educational and five other dialogue types (Walton, 1989, p. 10; see also Sigrell, 2003, s. 
117). PersuasionW thus becomes a sub-set of persuasionG in the same manner as 
persuasionP+P in that persuasionW covers a particular type of persuasionG. As discussed 
in the section on the central elements of persuasion, however, Walton’s action-seeking 
concept falls within the broad concept of persuasion whereas persuasionW falls within 
the narrow. Walton’s terms comment on various aspects of argumentation and 
persuasion. As discussed previously, there is a qualitative difference between appeals to 
action and changes in beliefs. This is not included in Walton’s conceptualization of 
practical argumentation. In sum, persuasionP+P, conviction, and persuasionW are all 
special instances that fall within the narrow scope of persuasionG.  
 
1.7. Cognitive processing theories 
The two main previous approaches to persuasion processing in cognitive psychology 
(ELM and HSM) are based on dual-processing theories (see 1.1.4.). The underlying 
assumptions of such models, however, have been questioned by the recent parametric 
unimodel theory of persuasion (Kruglanski et al., 2006). The main difference between 
the dual-process theory and single-process theory is that the former assumes two 
distinct types of reasoning (system 1 and system 2) whereas the latter assumes an 
integrated, continuous cognition from the same type of system (see also Oaksford & 
Chater, 2010). As will be evident from the SPIMP (7.3), the current argument is in 
favour of an integrated model of persuasion processing. One of the main reasons for the 
integration is the data concerning source credibility (3.3) in which this interacts with 
content strength despite presumably belonging to two different processing systems. 
However, the data presents a challenge rather than a definite response to dual-
processing theories of persuasion.  
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In dual-processing models of reasoning, system 1 has been labelled 
associative (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), heuristic (Evans, 2006, see also 
Evans, 2003), reflexive (Lieberman, 2003) and holistic (Nisbett et al., 2001), whereas 
system 2 has been labelled rule based (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), 
analytic (Evans, 2006; (Nisbett et al., 2001)), and reflective (Lieberman, 2003)59. 
Despite varying in labels, the idea is that system 1 is concerned with “unconscious, 
rapid, automatic, and high capacity” processes whilst system 2 is “conscious, slow, and 
deliberative” (both quotes, Evans, 2008, p. 256). Fundamentally, the dual-process 
approach implies that system 1 is an automatic process that humans cannot control. 
Conversely, humans exhibit a high degree of control over system 2 as a conscious, rule-
based system of thinking60.  
Departing from dual-processing accounts of cognition, the position 
adopted here is akin to physical multi-sensory integration (Deneve & Pouget, 2004; 
Lewkowicz & Ghazanfar, 2009), which describes “…the capacity of combining of 
information coming from different sensory modalities to get a more accurate 
representation of the environment and body” (Deneve & Pouget, 2004, p. 249). The 
elements of persuasion identified throughout the thesis are all taken to be necessarily 
involved in processing particular instances of persuasive attempts. That is, no act of 
persuasion can exist without some form of interpretation of the speaker (including 
extraneous and supposedly superfluous traits such as attractiveness), the processing of 
uncertain information, and an act of communication. In this way, rather than assuming a 
high and a low route to processing information, these elements may receive more or less 
attention by the persuadee. However, no matter how much the persuadee contemplates 
the persuasive attempt, the nature of the source, the emotion states, and the 
attractiveness of the source will exert some form of influence on the overall evaluation 
of the act of persuasion61.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This is an incomplete list of labels. For a more extensive list of different labels bequeathed onto the two 
systems, see Evans (2008), table 1, p. 257. Here, I follow Evans (2008) and use the more prevalent 
System1 and System 2 (Stanovich, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
60 Note that the rules do not have to be formal logical rules. Some models assume that formal logic 
underpins the mind (such as the mental logic model, e.g. Braine, 1978; Rips, 1983, 1994, and the mental 
model view, e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byre, 1991). For a discussion of these, see 
chapter 2. 
61 Even in instances where the source is unknown since information in this instance may then be 
presumed to be less certain due to the fact that the persuadee knows nothing about the source, the aim of 
communication etc. In spoken persuasion, however, this will occur less frequently.  
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 O’Keefe (2008) comments on the division of systems in the ELM (p. 
1478). He notes that the model is meant to encompass more fine-grained integration of 
the systems in the sense that a cue may be peripheral in one setting and central in 
another. As an example of this, O’Keefe invokes attractiveness, which is well known to 
potentially influence decision-making. Attractiveness is described as a factor that may 
have potential to enhance persuasion where attractiveness may serve as an argument 
(“in the case of advertisement products”), to inhibit persuasion (“if attractiveness 
enhances message scrutiny and the message contains weak arguments [or vice versa]”) 
or have a relatively little influence on persuasion “if other factors play larger roles”, all 
quotes O’Keefe (2008, p. 1478). Given this potential for serving as an elaborating 
element and thus facilitating of central routes at the same time as having the potential 
for serving peripheral cues and everything in between begs the question: is 
attractiveness a central or a peripheral cue? The point of departure in this thesis is that 
all factors in persuasion processing such as evidence strength, attractiveness, the 
credibility of the source, and other elements identified throughout the thesis exist on a 
continuous scale of relevance for any given persuasive incident, and that they are 
always in some form present (see 7.4 for a discussion on coping mechanisms and the 
gradient influence of extraneous factors such as attractiveness). This indicates that the 
elements are intimately integrated in a more complex processing practice, and that the 
integrated unimodel seems a more plausible cognitive model in describing the 
interaction of the elements in the thesis. Thus, factors considered peripheral in the ELM 
or heuristic in the HSM are always present and will always contain the potential of 
influencing. This does not entail, however, that careful consideration by exertion of 
greater cognitive effort does not alter the way the persuadee processes the acts of 
persuasion – far from it. I argue that the persuadee may assert herself to a greater or 
lesser extent depending on the attention and importance of the act of persuasion so that 
the persuadee will generally make more carefully considered evaluations given greater 
cognitive effort (see also Apperly et al., 2006, 2008).  
 
1.8. Overview of the thesis 
Having gone through a brief history of the concept of persuasion from a variety of 
disciplines, a discussion of the central elements of persuasion, and a discussion of 
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cognitive processes, we may now summarize the discussion in an initial definition of 
persuasion, which will be explored and expanded upon throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Overall, then, interpersonal persuasion is understood as a strategic attempt to alter the 
beliefs (1.2) of the persuadee in a situation where one or both of the interlocutors 
acknowledge the persuasive intention, but in which both acknowledge the mutual 
intention (1.3). This is approached via a probabilistic and interactive framework. 
 In the framework of the thesis, persuasion is defined as an interactive act 
where interlocutors go beyond pure information processing to alter the beliefs of the 
persuadee and where both acknowledge the persuasive intention (or, as mentioned, as 
least one interlocutor recognises the persuasive intention and both recognise the mutual 
intention of exchanging information in the social situation). The central element of 
persuasion is the alteration of beliefs, which has to do with processing of uncertain 
information in an epistemically unstable world, the dynamic use of language and 
communication, and the credibility of the source (from the point of view of the 
persuadee). The estimations of content strength and source credibility are approached 
inherently subjective, probabilistic and contextual in nature. Furthermore, the dynamic 
relationship between the interlocutors happens in a complex time frame in which 
overarching socio-cultural historical factors, personal histories, and the interaction 
between these have to taken into account. The aim of persuasion cannot be assumed to 
be oriented towards alignment or consensus (1.4-1.5). This may be the case in some 
instances of persuasion, but since it cannot be assumed in persuasion as a phenomenon 
in general, it cannot be assumed in a theory and model of persuasion. More broadly, I 
have shown that persuasion cannot be equated with argumentation (1.6) or conviction 
about a belief despite the fact that these are indeed central elements in defining and 
discussing persuasion processing, and as such I will return to these issues throughout 
the thesis. As discussed in 1.7, persuasion and cognition may be thought of as a dual-
processing phenomenon or an integrated model. The thesis argues the latter given the 
complex integration of each element in the persuasion model developed in the thesis.  
 The remaining chapters fall in two main parts in which chapters 2-3 (Part 
I) present the central elements of the core SPIMP model whereas chapters 4-6 (part II) 
present the psychological framework. The final chapter (part III) provides a novel 
approach to persuasion as a human phenomenon and indicate the theoretical and 
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analytical path to a more in-depth understanding by integrating the core model with the 
psychological framework.  
Thus, chapter 2 deals with reasoning from uncertainty in acts of 
persuasion, chapter 3 deals with source credibility. Going beyond the elements of the 
core model, chapter 4 discusses communication in the persuasive setting, and chapter 5 
deals with contextual influences and interaction. Chapter 6 invokes phenomenological 
terminology in order to discuss how the persuadee immerses herself as a subject in the 
persuasive context. Finally, chapter 7 ties together the elements in order to present a 
theoretical framework and the concrete model of persuasion processing suggested in the 
thesis (SPIMP).  The linear nature of this thesis fails to do justice to the integrated 
nature of the elements of persuasion presented.  In an integrated view, the elements 
naturally affect one another (e.g. how we understand language affects how we elicit 
information, but how we process information also influences how we subsequently 
understand language). Consequently, the elements, though presented linearly, should be 
read in a circular manner so that some conclusions and claims produced in earlier 
chapters borrow from discussions in subsequent chapters. This is unavoidable given the 
nature of the thesis as a linear document, but the reader should be aware of this. We 
now turn to the issue of describing how the persuadee engages with uncertain evidence 
in the persuasive incident. That is, chapter two describes uncertain reasoning, as it 
relates to persuasion processing in the model developed throughout the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Reasoning from uncertainty 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created 
them 
Albert Einstein 
 
 
You may fool all the people some of the time 
You may even fool some of the people all of the time 
But you cannot fool all of the people all of the time 
Abraham Lincoln 
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In 1.8, persuasion was defined as a strategic attempt to alter the beliefs of the persuadee 
in a situation where one or both of the interlocutors acknowledge the persuasive 
intention. In this definition, it was clear that information processing is insufficient to 
function as a theory of persuasion, although it remains a necessary element since the 
persuadee has to relate to and evaluate the evidence that the persuader presents in some 
way. Therefore, argumentation and reasoning theories are central in developing a 
holistic approach to persuasion. Alongside formulating the principles of reasoning, 
normativity is a central issue in persuasion (Kock, 2011). The Bayesian approach allows 
for a potential normative account of persuasion, which nonetheless remains flexible to 
the constraints of the context.  
 Reasoning and argumentation have been approached in a plethora of ways, 
ranging from various formal and informal logical accounts (e.g. Priest, 2008), rule-
based argumentation theory (e.g. Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), and, as followed 
here, from a probabilistic point of view that acknowledges the uncertain epistemological 
state of practical knowledge (e.g. Hahn & Oaksford, 2007a). The approach advanced 
here is a probabilistic view of reasoning. Specifically, I employ the Bayesian approach 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007) to reasoning as an approximation of the type of practical 
reasoning that the persuadee undergoes when processing the evidence in acts of 
persuasion. However, as also argued in this chapter, a pure, mathematical instantiation 
of the Bayesian cannot account for persuasion in and of itself since this is concerned 
with pure information updating, which cannot constitute persuasion (as discussed in 
chapter 1).  
The general argument of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, I argue for a 
probabilistic account of reasoning as opposed to a logicist approach. This establishes the 
general form of reasoning that functions as the basis for the theory of persuasion 
developed throughout the thesis. In doing so, though, I do not reject the importance and 
usefulness of formal logic. Nonetheless, rather than functioning as the foundation for 
reasoning capabilities, I argue that formal logic is reserved best as a formal tool of 
analysis against which argumentation and persuasion can be measured whereas the 
probabilistic approaches to reasoning are more useful as the foundation for a 
psychological theory of persuasion processing. This springs from the recognition that 
formal predicate logic predominantly is concerned with dichotomous truth-values with a 
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structural focus whereas the probabilistic accounts focus on the content of the 
persuasive attempt. Thus, logic takes the conceptual place of an analytical tool of 
evaluating the validity of a persuasive attempt, as the beneficial cleanliness and 
rigorousness of formal logic should not be ignored or neglected. Secondly, the chapter 
presents some potential limitations of reasoning paradigms regarding acts of persuasion. 
This shows that a holistic approach to persuasion has to encompass and surpass pure 
theories of reasoning given the complexities presented in chapter 1. Finally, the chapter 
sets out the framework for the normative stance that describes how people should 
respond to persuasive acts.  
 The chapter falls into five parts. In order to embed the discussion 
concerning reasoning, argumentation and information processing within persuasion, a 
brief review of theories throughout Western thought is presented. Following this, a 
discussion of formal logic including potential benefits and limitations is carried out. 
Despite the fact that the model developed in the thesis departs from a logicist point of 
view and takes a probabilistic point of view instead, the logical tradition is nonetheless 
important for two reasons. Firstly, logic has been a cornerstone in philosophy and 
persuasion since the Ancient Greeks (see e.g. Copleston, 1993). Secondly, several 
theories of argumentation and persuasion (e.g. the pragma-dialectical, the ELM, and the 
HSM) rely to some extent on the predictions and evaluations stemming from formal 
logic (such as logical fallacies, for a discussion of these see 2.4). 2,3 present the 
probabilistic approach to reasoning theory in general whereas 2.4 presents Bayesian 
reasoning as one particular model of probabilistic reasoning that will be employed as 
the foundation of reasoning in the theory of persuasion developed here. Finally, 
limitations of Bayesian reasoning are presented to indicate the need to go beyond a 
theory of information processing in persuasion studies as well as remarks concerning 
the difference between local and global consistency.  
 
2.1. Reasoning in persuasion: A brief history 
Since persuasion studies began with the Greek sophists (Dillon & Gergel, 2003), 
reasoning, argumentation, and the question of normativity have been intimately linked 
in various ways with the former two informing the conclusions drawn concerning the 
latter. As already noted, one of the main differences in Western history of thought 
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harkens back to the fundamental disagreement between Plato and Aristotle concerning 
the achievability and worth of epistemological truth and doxa (Gr. ‘belief’), the latter 
being expressible as probabilities whereas the former depends on truth-conditional 
dichotomies. Consequently, the desirability concerning normative standards in 
persuasion studies have been comments and developments on this initial debate. The 
main standard bearer of ‘good’ reasoning in Western thought, however, has been logic 
and logical models. Reasoning, rationality, and normativity are indeed important 
concepts in a theory of persuasion for a number of reasons. Mainly, given the fact that 
human beings do seem to approach acts of persuasion from some sort of rational 
standpoint, i.e. humans do not seem inherently irrational when presented with evidence 
(as will be evident from the empirical work on Bayesian argumentation, see 2.4). 
Throughout history, several types of logical inference have been suggested 
to function as a normative theory for persuasion theory and argumentation. Setting out 
the discipline, Aristotelian logic (see Aristotle’s Organon, 1995b-g) is concerned with 
sentential and propositional logic in which arguments phrased in natural language are 
identified as being of certain structures, which may be rationally valid or fallacious. 
Well-known valid argument structures are modus ponens (if P, then Q; P; Therefore Q) 
and modus tollens (if P, then Q; not Q; therefore, not P), whereas Aristotelian fallacies 
include affirming the consequent (if P, then Q; Q; therefore P) and denying the 
antecedent (if P, then Q; not P; therefore, not Q). The underlying structure of 
Aristotelian logic is the syllogism revolving around the concept of deductive reasoning, 
classically phrased so that 
P1 (major premise) All humans are mortal 
P2 (minor premise) Socrates is human 
C (conclusion) Therefore, Socrates is mortal 
Aristotle framed a theoretical suggestion for evaluating argument quality normatively 
by investigating the general structure underlying the argument. Note, however, that 
Aristotle acknowledges doxa as a valid basis for argumentation when the topic is 
concerned with uncertain epistemic areas such as deciding the course of future action, 
policy suggestions etc. (Aristotle, 1995h)62. As we shall see, however, the notion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The stance taken here is similar: formal logic is naturally a valid system of reasoning if information is 
objective and certain and as such, it provides a normativity of structurally desirable argumentation. 
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determining the structure of an argument and drawing conclusions pertaining to the 
validity of this argument from the overall structure is a tradition that is still active in 
modern argumentation and persuasion theory (e.g. ITT, pragma-dialectical 
argumentation theory, dual-process theories and others).  
Kantian logic (Kant, 1988) is a development of Aristotelian logic in which 
Kant makes use of syllogistic reasoning and natural language logic in a metaphysical 
manner that substantiates his general philosophical project. The use of natural language 
as the foundation for logic, however, was to be altered shortly hereafter due to the fact 
that logicians moved from sentential to formal, mathematical symbolic logical notation. 
Key to this development in the middle of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th 
century, mathematicians (most notably Russell, 1992, Frege, 2007, and Boole (see 
Burris, 2010)) developed a formal, symbolic logic that would provide the foundation for 
modern logical systems such as the ones presented and discussed in the following 
section. This allowed logicians to posit with greater clarity and mathematical precision 
assessments of structural validity for arguments. In other words, logical inference had 
moved from natural languages to mathematical notation – a move that will pose serious 
challenges to logical models if they are to be construed as the foundation of rationality 
for a theory of spoken persuasion in natural languages involving uncertain information. 
The previous models on the cognitive psychology of persuasion (ELM and HSM) 
seemingly rely on formal logic as the viable normative model for argumentation and 
persuasion. This stance will be questioned throughout this chapter.  
Importantly, reasoning theories throughout the ages have been focussed on 
the notion of epistemological and argumentative validity. That is, reasoning theory (be 
it probabilistic or logical) has been preoccupied with developing procedures for 
determining the foundations of knowledge in terms of the epistemological well from 
which the conclusions are drawn or the structures by which the arguments are 
developed. In other words, the basic idea that one could start with certain prescribed 
foundations that entail valid arguments (whether in mathematics, science, or religion). 
As a complementary issue to this, reasoning theories have had normative traction (as 
mentioned in the introduction) such that the conclusions reasonably follow the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
However, for practical, uncertain information, probabilistic reasoning might be more appropriate, as 
discussed throughout this chapter.  
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premises. In other words, if I believe the premises, I ought to (on the face of it) believe 
the conclusion63.  
 
2.1.1. Structure and content 
The relationship between structure and content is a complex issue where the two types 
of normativity mentioned in the introduction (desirable and approximating) come to the 
foreground. As an example of the discrepancy between focussing on structure versus on 
content, consider conditional reasoning (for an excellent discussion of conditionals, see 
Evans & Over, 2004). From a structural perspective, conditional reasoning takes the 
form of A→B in which B follows A. Whether the overall argument is true or false, 
however, depends on the truth-values of A and B. Thus, the argument should be true if 
A is true and B is true, or if A is false and B is true whereas instances in which A is true 
and B is false, the argument is not true in an overall manner. However, the important 
issue here is the fact that the structure determines the rules by which the argument is 
evaluated such that an overall truth-value might be assigned if the truth-values of each 
component is known. Thus, the logical structure prescribes the normative conditions for 
these statements. However, consider the following 
 2a) If the moon is made of cheese, Jens Koed Madsen wrote this thesis 
2b) If the Spanish economy had collapsed completely in 2009, the EMU 
would have been dissolved 
Noticeably, both 2a and 2b have the same structure, but they differ in content in terms 
of epistemology and in terms of relevance. 2a is a well-formed argument and it follows 
the truth-values of the above-mentioned structures such that A is false whereas B is true, 
both of which are factual statements. 2b, on the other hand, is also a well-formed 
argument, but the truth-values here are different since A is a counterfactual and B is a 
hypothesis that is a probable or improbable consequence of the counterfactual. 
Furthermore, the link between A and B in 2a is irrelevant, as the former has no bearing 
on the latter. Both the aspect of relevance as well as the epistemological differences 
might be difficult to pick up structurally, as they refer to the content rather than the 
structure.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 This epistemological connection, however, might not be so straightforward. As Harman (1988) argues, 
people might begin doubting the premises rather than accepting the conclusion. This epistemological 
discussion, however, reaches beyond the scope of the thesis.  
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Logical models are concerned more with structure whilst probabilistic 
models primarily describe the content. This emerges as an underlying difference 
between the two approaches, and will be a central element in the thesis. Thus, the aim is 
to introduce to persuasion theory a normative account of argument strength, which 
captures the emotional, subjective, and contextual nature of persuasion processing 
whilst retaining a predictive, normative element. That is, a normative account, which on 
the one hand contains predictive power and is capable of evaluating good and bad 
persuasion from the point of view of argument strength (since humans clearly find some 
persuasive attempts and argument more persuasive than others), but which on the other 
hand acknowledges the fact that the same persuasive structure and content may 
reasonably invoke different effects depending on the persuadee’s priors and likelihood 
estimations, the socio-cultural context, and the discrepancy between the local and the 
non-local. In other words, a normative account that hinges on a subjective and 
contextual variability between persuadees. Given the epistemic uncertainty necessarily 
contained in the persuasive situation, such a normative account, as we shall see, cannot 
primarily rely on formal logical models of reasoning and argumentation, but is more 
closely described by invoking probabilistic reasoning models such as Bayesian 
reasoning and argumentation theory. This does not entail that logical reasoning has no 
merit in a persuasion framework. However, it entails that formal logic takes on a 
analytic rather than an explanatory and predictive potential. Before introducing 
probabilistic reasoning, the following section presents logical reasoning and the benefits 
and limitations from approaching persuasion from such a framework.  
 
2.2. Logical reasoning and logicist cognitive models 
Logical reasoning is prevalent in approaches to persuasion in at least three central 
manners pertaining to the processing of argumentation, to epistemology, and to general 
reasoning. For instance, pragma-dialecticians make use of formal logic as their 
normative point of departure when discussing argumentation in general (Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004) and when assessing the argumentative worth of what is labelled 
logical fallacies (Eemeren et al., 2009, 2012)64. The pragma-dialectical approach makes 
use of the logical rules for normatively distinguish between good and bad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 I present and discuss the pragma-dialectical approach in more detail in 2.4 
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argumentation in order to derive certain argumentative rules of conduct. 
Epistemologically, formal logic assumes interesting notions concerning truth-
conditionals, how these are formalised, and how they should be applied to acts of 
persuasion and processing thereof (see e.g. Budzynsky & Kacprzak, 2008). Finally, 
despite the fact that the idea of formal logic as the foundational aspect of human 
cognition has been criticised (e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 1991; 2007), prominent models 
of cognition still make use of formal logic. For instance the mental logic view (Braine, 
1978; Rips, 1983, 1994), which claims that reasoning involves logical calculation of 
symbolic representations and the mental model view (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byre, 1991), which argues that human beings make use of representations 
containing true formulas of situations rather than using an inherent logical calculus. One 
direct consequence of such approaches to reasoning is their evaluation of actions and 
reasoning that seems irrational. Thus, “…mental logics may explain errors in terms of 
the accessibility of different rules, whereas mental models theory explains errors in 
terms of limitations in how mental models are constructed and checked, and how many 
models must be considered” (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 5)65. Common to the 
approaches, though, is the reliance on indefeasible systems. In terms of the ELM (which 
possibly is the most influential psychological account of persuasion), it is unclear 
whether the central route should be taken as a logical statement due to the fact that the 
ELM neglects to specify the mechanisms of the central route (O’keefe, 2008), however 
in exploring their analyses and experimental set-ups, it seems that the central route 
relies on a formal logical paradigm66. In sum, the presentation and investigation of 
formal logic is not only warranted due to the immense historical impact of the 
discipline, but also due to the fact that contemporary theories and models of 
argumentation, reasoning, and persuasion make frequent use of formal logic as the 
normative framework.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For data seemingly inconsistent with the two approaches, see Evans et al. (1995) 
66 As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that the ELM, HSM, and PKM neglect to specify how 
arguments may be stronger or weaker is a limitation to the frameworks. The model of persuasion 
processing argued here presents such a normative foundation in the shape of Bayesian reasoning.  
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2.2.1. Introducing logic 
One of the objectives of modern, formal logic is to provide a mathematical account that 
distinguishes between good and bad arguments purely on the basis of their structure. 
That is, given the formalisation of arguments into symbolic, logical notation (as 
described later in this section), the rules of formal logic aims at differentiating between 
good (valid) and bad (invalid) argument structures. In exploring the validity of 
arguments expressed in natural languages, formal logic needs to account for the truth-
values of these expressions. However, as mentioned in 4.2, the surface form of natural 
languages might be too unruly to serve as the basis for such a theory67.  That is, natural 
languages might be too ambiguous to create an unambiguous, mathematical language 
with a precise set of inferential rules defined over it, which formal logic needs (this will 
be explored further in chapter 4).  
Formal logic is derived from mathematical expression developed amongst 
others by the early positivists such as Boole (see Burris, 2010), Frege (see Beaney & 
Reck, 2006; Frege, 2007), and Russell (1992) as well as logical positivists such as the 
early Wittgenstein (1996), and Ayer (2001) 68 . These authors are the historical 
proponents for introducing a mathematically sound system of formal logical reasoning 
to areas such as argumentation and analytic philosophy69. As will be discussed in this 
section, formal logic predominantly (but as will be evident from investigating doxastic 
logic not exclusively) relies on truth-conditional dichotomies (discussed in this chapter) 
and a code-like approach to language (see 4.1-4.2). The present section will deal with 
the epistemic level of formal logic and how this entails benefits in terms of structural 
clarity and completeness of quality estimations as well as limiting the epistemology of 
practical reasoning and persuasion as well as empirical limitations when structure is put 
above content in the analysis. Specifically, I present underlying epistemological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For instance, the potential problem of empty names such as ’nobody’, which syntatically seems to 
function as a noun without picking out any reference and Russell’s example of ’The king of France is 
bald’ (Russell, 1905) 
68 Note, however, as a minor point that formal logic and mathematics are inherently undecidable systems 
in that they cannot prove the principles of mathematics without relying on the principles of mathematics 
to prove them. This complex mathematical epistemological tautology is described in Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems (see Gödel, 1931, see also Gödel, 1995; Nagel & Newman, 1958; Hofstadter, 
1979). Furthermore, it is mathematically possible to construct a non-halting Turing Maching (such as the 
busy-beaver function, BB(n), see Rado, 1962, see Turin, 1936, 1038; Prager, 2001) for first-order logic, 
which underlines the potential undecidability.  
69 For a good introduction to formal logic, see Priest (2008) and Strawson (1952), and for mathematical 
logic, see Bell & Machover (1997) 
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assumptions of formal logic as well as two instantiations of the logical approach, 
namely predicate and doxastic logic. Alongside the presentation of these specific 
models, I discuss both benefits and limitations of approaching persuasion from the point 
of view of formal logic and ends by discussing the role of logic in the theoretical 
approach developed in this thesis.  
 The most basic system of formal logic is propositional logic to instances 
of which are predicate and modal logic. Propositional logic functions as the basis for 
more complex models of logic that have subsequently been proposed such as doxastic 
logic (see later), fuzzy logic (Priest, 2008, chapter 8), and intuitionist logic/possible 
world semantics (Kripke, 1965, 1980; Haack, 1974, chapter 5; Dummet, 1977)70. 
Propositional logic, as it is well-known, is made up of a strict vocabulary of logical 
connectors such as ¬ (negation), → (conditional, if… then),  (therefore), and, 
including connectors in modal logic, such as α (‘it is possible the case that α’). The 
basic vocabulary of predicate logic allows for well-formed formulas to be phrased and 
analysed. Thus, to prove that (αΛβ) (αΛβ) is a logical truth (i.e., is true purely on the 
basis of its structure, irrespective of what it is about), one follows the rules of logical 
connectors and draws a semantic tree diagram (for an illustration of this basic structure, 
independent of the content, see fig. 5). Further, modal logic allows for more complex 
formalization of argument structures by including in the vocabulary notions of necessity 
and possibility such as statements necessarily true in all possible worlds and statements 
that are only true in some possible worlds (see e.g. Kripke, 1980). 
Fig. 5: semantic tree in logic 
 
Despite eventually arguing for a probabilistic approach to persuasion when describing 
how humans relate to the content of an act of persuasion, it should be noted that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For a general introduction to these including predicate and modal logic, but excluding doxastic logic, 
see Priest (2008), chapters 1-4, 6, 11, 12, 20, and 25 
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mathematically valid system of propositional logic (both predicate and modal) entails 
significant analytical benefits on a structural level. Here, I present two central benefits 
concerning the cleanliness of evaluation from logical structures and the analytical 
reverberations hereof concerning the de-contextualization and universality of 
assessments. The latter is particularly beneficial from the manner by which it deals with 
logically fallacious argumentation and persuasion. Firstly, formal logic, as a 
mathematical formalization of argumentative structures, enjoys the benefit of clean 
evaluations. That is, no matter what content is inserted in (αΛβ) (αΛβ), the overall 
logical structure axiomatically remains true. In other words, by reasoning from a purely 
mathematical basis, we may posit strict rules of conduct for evidence, argumentation, 
and reasoning in general. Furthermore, these rules posit the remits of validity 
universally.  
From the first benefit of universally applicable, clean rules of reasoning 
follows the second benefit, namely that this may be applied to assess acts of persuasion 
in real life to determine whether they fall within the normative boundaries of logical 
validity. If they do, the argument is deemed logically valid, if they do not, it is a logical 
fallacy or error. This is particularly appealing in argumentation and persuasion studies 
given the fact that especially the latter is often wrought with fallacious and malevolent 
instances of misinformation and mistaken argumentation. Thus, formal logic allows for 
a formalization of any given argument by transcribing it to logical symbols as 
conjunctions with the structure αΛβ and must subsequently all be subject to the same 
truth-conditional treatment71. In this way, formal logic allows for a transcription from 
natural to formal, de-contextualized language that makes for absolute discriminations 
between good and bad argumentation from a structural point of view. That is, given the 
universal nature of formal logic, we may use this analytically to determine whether 
humans conform to the rigorous rules of logic or if these rules are violated. The latter, 
according to formal logic, is fallacious and bad argumentation whereas the former is 
desirable and valid. Given the murkiness of practical argumentation and persuasion, 
such cleanliness of analysis and evaluation is indeed alluring. However, as the next 
section argues, this focus on structural validity poses significant limitations to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I return to these conjunctions in 4.2, but note already here that this ‘extra’ enrichment of the 
conjunctions might be captured by non-logical processes such as pragmatic inferences (see Grice, 1989) 
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applicability of formal logic to describe what humans computationally do when 
processing persuasive attempts.  
 
2.2.2. Limitations of formal logic 
The limitations to be discussed here cluster around three main themes. Firstly, when 
dealing with acts of persuasion, formal logic is faced with epistemic limitations or 
challenges. Secondly, logic is faced with challenges concerning the fact that, as 
described in the above, the universality of the structural assessments is challenged with 
empirical data describing what humans do. Finally, in order to function as a normative 
framework for argumentation in general and spoken persuasion in particular, the 
formalization of natural languages entails challenges with how this mapping functions. 
However, as this will be discussed further in 4.1 and 4.2, I will refrain from developing 
this argument here. Instead, I focus on the former two limitations, viz. epistemic and 
empirical limitations.  
 As noted in 1.6, acts of persuasion invariably take place in an 
epistemically uncertain world in which interlocutors cannot be entirely certain of the 
validity of the evidence. Rather, both the persuader and the persuadee rely on uncertain 
knowledge, which may be more or less likely depending on the evidence. However, 
formal logic is constructed on the epistemic notion of dichotomous truth-values (i.e. that 
a proposition is either true or false), and that we may assign a truth-value to each node 
in the well-formed formula. If we cannot assign truth-value to the predicates, we may 
not arrive at an evaluation whether or not the argument is true overall (e.g. for αΛβ, if 
we know that α=1, but have not knowledge of β, we cannot determine whether the well-
formed formula is logically valid since both α and β need to be true). Logicians have 
tried to circumvent the limitation of dichotomous truth-values by introducing doxastic 
characteristics (i.e. graded beliefs) rather than epistemic characteristics (i.e. 
dichotomous truth-values) in the so-called doxastic logic, but a discussion of this is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis72. However, propositional logic (as it is employed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 However, see Segerberg, 1995, 1999; Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1999; Wansing, 2000, see also 
Hendricks & Symon, 2006; Ditmarsch & Labuschagne, 2007. Interestingly, Budzynsky & Kacprzak 
(2008) developed a logic for dealing with persuasion processing constructed on the premises of doxastic 
logic coupled with graded modalities (Fattorosi-Barnaba & Caro, 1985, 1988; Caro, 1988). Much like the 
current approach, their approach to persuasion acknowledges the importance of different sources since 
“…the same arguments can cause different results depending on an agent who performs them” (p. 64). 
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in the approaches mentioned in the above) suffers from the epistemic limitation of truth-
conditional dichotomies that may not be assignable in practical reasoning.  
The uncertain epistemological nature of persuasion situations may thus 
indicate a potential limitation of the use for a formal logical framework in dealing with 
natural language, semantics, and truth-conditionals in the natural world. This is 
reminiscent of the liar-paradox (Simmons, 1993), which reads 
 3a) This sentence is false73 
Truth-conditionally, if 3a is true, it is false. However, if 3a is false, it is, qua the 
phrasing of the sentence, true74. Thus, it is impossible to determine a truth-conditional, 
as each refers to the other. Kripke (1975) suggested a potential solution by introducing 
the notion of many-valued logic (see e.g. Bochvar, 1939; Kleene, 1952). Introducing the 
#-value, which reads “neither true nor false”. However, this leads to the revenge liar-
paradox. 
 3b) 3b is either false or neither true nor false 
which entails the same truth-conditional undecidability as 4a. In sum, formal logic runs 
into a truth-conditional challenge if it retains a demand to have dichotomous 
conditionals. Natural language, quite simply, is more flexible than stable truth-
conditionals. The liar-paradox is not restricted to referentiality, but extends into 
epistemic fields as well (Eldridge-Smith, 2011). Consider Pinocchio stating the 
following 
 3c) My nose grows now 
Given what we know of Pinnochio, this is a self-defeating statements since if it is true, 
his nose would nor grow, making it false, which would make his nose grow and come 
full circle. Thus, the epistemic, or doxastic, knowledge may influence and shape 
paradoxes of truth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
However, Budzynsky and Kacprzak build upon the notion that persuasion is concerned with consensus 
and belief alignment (as opposed to the present framework) and it assumes the rules of predicate logic as 
a baseline for reasoning as opposed to the probabilistic framework adopted here. However, a detailed 
discussion of Budzynsky and Kacprzak’s framework goes beyond the limitations of the present thesis.  
73 This paradox might spring as a consequence of Tarski’s (1983) definition of truth, which states that ” P 
is true if and only if P” 
74 Smullyan (1986) extends the liar paradox y arguing that Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem may 
be applied to the semantics of logic such that a reflexive, stable type 4 reasoner (a reasoner with complete 
information of predicate logic, who believes that his beliefs are closed under modus ponens, and is 
consistent in his beliefs, i.e. if he believes P, he believes that he believes P) “…can never believe p and 
can never believe ¬p without becoming inconsistent in either case” (p. 350). 
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The second challenge for formal logic, as a computational basis (for a 
description of the various levels, see Marr, 1982), is the application of formal logic to 
practical reasoning. In particular, formal logic assumes that structure enjoys hegemony 
over content in that a logically fallacious structure should be disregarded from a 
normative point of view no matter the content. Thus, by introducing a slippery slope, 
the arguer commits to a logical fallacy and the argument (and by extrapolation the 
persuasive attempt) should be dismissed. As I will explore more in 2.4, this does not 
seem to fit with the data from argumentation theory as it is developed in the Bayesian, 
probabilistic approach. Rather, humans seem to place the content of an argument over 
and above the formal structure. Here, I focus on syllogistic and conditional reasoning 
due to the fact that these may be considered the basic structures of formal reasoning.  
Syllogisms take a variety of forms75. The standard elements of syllogistic 
reasoning is: all X are Y (A), some X are Y (I), No X are Y (E), and Some X are not Y 
(O), with Chater & Oaksford (1999) adding ‘most’ (M) and ‘few’ (F). From the 
traditional elements, 64 types of syllogisms may be constructed. Of these, 22 are 
traditionally identified as having valid conclusions (Chater & Oaksford, 1999, p. 196). 
To deal with syllogistic reasoning probabilistically, Chater and Oaksford describe the 
probability heuristics model containing three main principles, namely the min-heuristic 
(choose the quantifier of the conclusion to be the same as the quantifier in the least 
informative premise), the p-entailments (the next most preferred conclusion will be the 
p-entailment of the conclusion predicted by the min-heuristic), and the attachment-
heuristics76. They explore the semantics of the probabilistic heuristics model, Chater 
and Oaksford  
Fig. 6: The probabilistic semantics for the quantifiers AMFIEO77 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For a table comparing treatments of various types of syllogistic reasoning by Aristotle, Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, and Frege from a logical perspective, see Oaksford & Chater (2007), p. 216. 
76 The definitions are taken from Oaksford & Chater (2007), pp. 219-227 
77 This figure is taken from Chater & Oaksford (1999), p. 201 
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From this point of view, Chater & Oaksford (1999) argue that “…probability theory 
rather than logic provides a more appropriate computational level theory of human 
reasoning” (p. 239). They investigate syllogistic reasoning from a probabilistic 
perspective involving fast, frugal heuristics (McKenzie, 1994; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996) and argue that such heuristics may be highly adaptive “…insofar as they 
approximate optimal solutions” (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 227)78. That is, people 
pay more attention to the content of the syllogism rather than the strict structural 
validity, as would be prescribed by formal logic.  
The aforementioned mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byre, 1991) also investigates conditional reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002; Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird et al., 2009, for a more in-depth 
critique of this model and how it deals with conditionals, see Evans et al. 2003, 2005; 
Evans & Over, 2004). Formally, table 3 identifies the truth-conditionals for conditional 
reasoning.  
Fig. 7: Venn diagram of conditional reasoning             Table 3: truth-table for conditional reasoning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the rules of formal logic, conditional structures are only logically invalid if P=1 
and Q=1. Otherwise, conditional reasoning is structurally valid. However, as Oaksford 
& Chater (2007) notes, this seems counterintuitive given that this means that the 
following are logically valid.  
4a) If Mars is made of cookies, then the moon is made of milk (F→F) 
4b) If Mars is made of cookies, then Jens Madsen wrote this thesis (F→T) 
The first appears false, nonsensical, or metaphorical at best whereas the antecedent in 
the second bears little relevance for the consequent. That is, no new information is 
added with 4b concerning whether or not I have written this thesis. Clearly, formal logic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For a discussion of the reliance on heuristics in persuasion theory, see 2.3.  
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is faced with a challenge in accounting for the logical validity and argumentative worth 
of such sentences (a fact which is discussed more in-depth by Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 
chapter 5). Furthermore, the challenge of mapping formal language onto natural 
languages as discussed in 4.2 is evident from the fact that “…no current analysis of the 
conditional provides a satisfactory account of the wealth of natural language sentences” 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 71, see also Bennett, 2003). Furthermore, if conditionals 
are considered as material implications combined with logical machinery, they do not 
“…allow conditional statements to admit exceptions”, which entails a puzzle 
concerning “…how it is possible for the cognitive system systematically and 
successfully to rely upon a store of knowledge, almost all of which consists of false 
statements [such ‘for all objects, x, if that object is a bird, then it flies’]”, which is a 
false statement given that “…almost all natural language rules are defeasible” (all 
Oakfsord & Chater, 2007, pp. 71-72). In terms of information and in terms of relevance, 
and the challenge of mapping logical conditionals as material implications onto natural 
languages converge on suggestion the limitation of formal logic in providing a 
framework for reasoning with conditionals in natural languages, practical reasoning, 
and when processing acts of persuasion. As with syllogistic reasoning, probability 
theory offers a different perspective on conditional reasoning (Oaksford et al., 2000, 
2003, 2007; Evans et al., 2003, 2005; Evans & Over, 2004), the rest of the chapter deals 
with benefits and limitations of probabilistic models of cognition as the foundation of 
persuasion processing).  
Both syllogistic and conditional reasoning are fundamental aspects of 
reasoning, and both seem to struggle when faced with non-trivial cases when explored 
from a formal logical perspective. In 2.4, I explore fallacious structures of 
argumentation such as slippery slope, circular reasoning, and ad Hitlerum to provide 
further evidence for the contention that humans approach the strength of the content of 
the evidence before they attend to formal structural issues, which further calls into 
question the applicability of formal logic as the basis for a psychological theory of 
persuasion processing. Indeed, as will be evident, people are sensitive to modulations in 
content despite being confronted with logically fallacious arguments. Thus, taken 
together with the philosophical remarks concerning the epistemological uncertainty of 
practical reasoning and persuasion attempts, evidence suggest that formal logic is faced 
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with serious challenges when accounting for human reasoning from a structural 
perspective. Consequently, the role of logic in the persuasion theory developed in this 
thesis is fundamentally different from previous models making use of formal logic to 
determine good or bad argumentation and, consequently, persuasion. That is, rather than 
assuming the validity of formal logic on a computational level, I argue that formal logic 
is better reserved as an analytical tool to criticise instances of persuasion within the 
limitations of formal logic since the considerable benefits of cleanliness and structural 
assessments derived from formal logic should not be ignored. Formal logic appears 
inadequate as the computational foundation to formulate a theory of persuasion given 
that it struggles to account for practical reasoning and argumentation However, I will 
assume that logical consistency does contribute to the validity of a persuasive argument 
such that structure (S) is supplementary, but subordinate to content (C) such that S+C+ 
> S-C+ > S+C- > S-C-. This remains an open empirical question to be explored further. 
However, given this assumption, formal logic may well function as a powerful 
analytical tool for discussing persuasion attempts and the desirability of these provided 
that the critique retains the limitations mentioned in the above and in 4.2. The logical 
analysis, however, are normative on a societal, ethical, and desirable level more than 
normative on an approximating level.  
 
2.3. Probabilistic reasoning 
As mentioned, the focus of formal logic is the validity of the structure of the argument. 
Compared with this, probabilistic reasoning is predominantly concerned with the 
content of the argument. Thus, departing from the pastures of formal logic, probability 
theory has been suggested as the computational foundation for human cognition (Schum 
et al., 1967; Chater et al., 2006; Tenenbaum et al., 2006, 2011). As argued convincingly 
in Oaksford and Chater (1991, see also Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2001, 2007), 
probabilistic reasoning provides a viable alternative for modelling reasoning to logicist 
accounts relying on formal logic. Indeed, rather than being geared toward the rigour of 
logical reasoning as described in 2.1, probabilistic reasoning aims at modelling how 
humans computationally and algorithmically (Marr, 1982) deal with “the uncertain 
character of everyday reasoning” (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 67) in which we have 
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doxastic, uncertain information and beliefs rather than Platonic, epistemic knowledge. 
Thus, rather than seeing human beings as irrational because they fail to live up to the 
standards of formal logic, probabilistic approaches argue that humans may indeed be 
rational, although from an uncertain point of view. That is, in an epistemically uncertain 
world, humans cannot have certain information (and hence, cannot rely on the premises 
of certain inference, i.e. formal logic). Such an approach has been invoked to account 
for seeming human reasoning flaws (e.g. Wason’s selection task, Oaksford & Chater, 
1994). Thus, humans are thought to approach situations from a probabilistic point of 
view such that they estimate the likelihood of particular pieces of information to gauge 
at the validity of the argument. As such, actions that may seem illogical and irrational 
from a formal logical perspective may be entirely within reason from a probabilistic 
perspective (e.g. arriving at very different conclusions concerning the same content, 
which will occur if the priors, likelihood estimations, and perception of source of the 
same persuasive act differ) 
 
2.3.1. Introducing probability theory 
Probabilistic approaches have been applied to a range of topics such as confirmation or 
disconfirmation of scientific hypotheses (Mackie, 1969; Good, 1984; Milne, 1996), 
argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b), and language 
evolution and comprehension (see 4.3). Furthermore, as mentioned in 2.2, there are 
indications that humans make use of probabilistic reasoning when considering 
conditional reasoning (Over et al., 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, chapter 5), when 
engaging with in argumentation (such as employed in Harris et al., 2012, see 2.4 for a 
more in-depth discussion of argumentation), syllogistic reasoning (Chater & Oaksford, 
1999), and it has been employed to deal with other frequent phenomena such as 
counterfactual reasoning (e.g. Zultan et al., 2012; McCoy et al., 2012). In sum, 
probability theory has wide-ranging possible applications. This thesis argues for a 
probabilistic approach to persuasion as a fundamentally different approach to previous 
accounts of persuasion mentioned earlier in the thesis such as the ELM and the HSM.  
Fundamentally, probability theory relies on three axioms set out, amongst 
others, by the Russian mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov (see Howson & Urbach, 
1996). Firstly, probabilities are constrained to be real numbers between 0 and 1. That is 
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rather, than assuming truth-conditional dichotomies as with propositional logic, 
probability theory assumes truth-conditional uncertainty between 0 (completely 
certainty that something is not the case) and 1 (completely certainty that something is 
the case). Epistemologically, this is a big difference, which entails significant 
consequences for how persuasion processing is conceptualized in the thesis. Secondly, 
tautologies are assigned probabilities of 1. This allows probability theory to postulate 
and conclude similar conclusions as propositional logic given a tautological, certain 
estimation of probability. In reality, however, almost no (if any) claim can be 
conceptualized as 1 due to the limitation of human knowledge79. Thirdly the joint 
probability of mutually exclusive events is equal to the sum of their individual 
probabilities80. From these three (or potentially four) axioms, all mathematical laws of 
probability necessarily follow. One expression of such mathematical calculation of 
probability is given by Bayes’ theorem, as presented later in this section. That is, 
Bayesian reasoning fundamentally relies on these axiomatic assumptions.  
When presenting Bayesian reasoning in 2.4, it will be clear that 
probabilities here are considered subjective. The notion of subjectivity is naturally a 
vastly complex issue that has been discussed repeatedly throughout the history of 
philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. In the context of the present framework, 
I understand the subjective estimation of probabilities as a degree of belief given some 
state of knowledge. This degree of belief springs from the individual person’s states of 
knowledge and related beliefs rather than from an objective truth-value (for instance, a 
person might subjectively entertain a high degree of belief in astrology even though the 
objective evidence for this belief is minimal). Thus, the degree of belief is subjective 
rather than objective. Importantly, as discussed in chapters five and six, the 
conceptualisation of subjectivity is inherently interactive, contextual, and cultural rather 
than solipsistic (see also Madsen, submitted, for a discussion of the importance of 
temporal aspects in subjective probabilistic estimations). That is, the subjective 
estimations might spring from the individual, but they do not emerge in isolation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Note that even mathematical validity may be called into question due to Gödel’s incompletenss 
theorems.  
80 However, as we will see in 2.5, this may be challenged to some extent – not mathematically, but from a 
persuasive point of view by investigating the persuasiveness of narratives. Also, some authors consider 
the definition P(a | b) = P(a& b)P(b)
, where P(b) ≠0, to be a fourth axiom of probability (e.g., Howson & 
Urbach, 1996).  
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Furthermore, historically, Bernoulli (1954, 2005, see Oaksford & Chater, 2007, pp. 78-
80) argued that probabilities are subjective (see also Keynes, 1921). This harkens back 
to a fundamental distinction between accounts of probability theories that rely on 
frequencies and accounts describing probability estimations as inherently subjective. As 
Oaksford & Chater (2007, p. 10) notes, the difference does not hinge upon the 
mathematics, as this is “neutral” between the two approaches.  Rather, the difference 
between frequentists and subjectivists boil down to the application of probability. 
Frequentists argue that “…probability calculus can only be applied where frequencies 
can be obtained – e.g. for events such as throwing a dice…” whereas subjectivists 
“…are fundamentally concerned with degrees of belief, given certain bodies of 
evidence, where those beliefs may be about any proposition [concerning] whatever” 
(both, Oakfsord & Chater, 2007, p. 10). That is, subjectivists have no problem speaking 
about probabilities of single events81. The Bayesian account of persuasion processing 
suggested here relies on a subjectivist notion of probability estimations such that 
propositions and beliefs, which are not necessarily expressible in terms of obtainable 
frequencies, fall within the framework. Thus, a probabilistic estimation of both the 
following makes sense in the present framework 
5a) The likelihood of rolling 1, 2, or 3 of a fair dice is ½ 
5b) Homosexuals cannot marry because the bible says so 
The probability of the former may be easily obtained by probability calculus combined 
with the physical properties of rolling a dice, whereas the latter makes sense as a degree 
of belief that may differ depending on the subjective estimations of the individual 
person. For the argument developed here, I assume that this estimation is an 
amalgamation of various factors such as personal upbringing (e.g. one’s childhood), 
socio-economic influences, more immediate influences concerning emotional aspects, 
as well as larger influences such as language, historical, and cultural aspects82. That is, 
the subjective estimation of strength drawn from the individual degrees of beliefs in a 
particular proposition may result in great differences such that the argument in 5b may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 There may be a terminological confusion of how to conceptualize subjectivity in probability theory due 
to the fact that the notion of degrees of belief has developed in different ways (e.g. Keynes, 1921; Cox, 
1946, 1961; Savage, 1954). Here, I use the term as Oaksford and Chater (2007). Note that in the close 
relationship of subjectivism in Bayesianism, Oaksford and Chater ”use the terms subjectivist and 
Bayesian interchangeably” (p. 11) 
82 The framework that surrounds the development of subjective beliefs is discussed further in 6.2 and 7.2 
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seem very strong and likely to someone who have grown up in a fervent Christian-
fundamentalist home whereas someone who is not bothered strongly with the biblical 
text may find it thoroughly weak and unconvincing. The challenge for a psychological 
theory of persuasion is to account for these individual differences such that, given each 
individual’s upbringing and subjective beliefs, two people may be confronted with the 
same argument and arrive at inherently different conclusions pertaining the validity and 
persuasiveness of the evidence. Indeed, given the wide range of beliefs (political, 
religious, scientific, etc.), a psychological theory has to encompass individual 
differences as well as the notion of epistemic incommensurability.  
It is worth noting that Bayesian reasoning by far is not the only model 
around for reasoning about uncertainty. Various authors have suggested different 
models of cognition relying on probabilistic or defeasible reasoning rather than formal, 
propositional logic. These include, but are not limited to, plausible reasoning (Rescher, 
1976), fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965; see also Schum, 1988, 1994), epistemic belief 
theory (Spohn, 1990), possibility theory (Dubois & Prade, 1988). The preceding 
theoretical proposals are pre-eminently normative accounts, but probabilistic theories 
have also been employed descriptively such as decision-by-sampling (Stewart et al., 
2006; Stewart & Simpson, 2008)83. The purpose of the thesis is not to discuss 
probability theories and measure them against one another, and the thesis is based on 
Bayesian reasoning in particular (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, see 2.4). However, it would 
seem disingenuous not to acknowledge other models of probabilistic reasoning here. 
The rest of this section, then, is devoted to presenting some more general remarks 
concerning probabilistic reasoning as a foundation for a theory of persuasion 
processing. In the following, I will briefly go through two issues for probability 
theories, namely plausibility versus probability and the role of heuristics. Each present a 
general challenge to general probability theory (for more in-depth replies to these 
queries, see Pearl, 1988, 2000; Adams, 1998; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Harris, 2009) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See also logical, argumentation-based approaches to uncertain reasoning and decision-making (e.g. 
Fox, et al., 1992; Amgoud et al, 2005, as well as doxastic logic, which was presented in 2.2). I am 
particularly thankful to Dr. Adam Harris for pointing out these theories and providing me with the 
theoretical background (see also Harris, 2009, chapter 1).  
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2.3.2. Probability and plausibility 
Conceptually, some authors have argued that uncertain reasoning is captured better in 
the framework of a plausible rather than a probable framework (Walton, 2004, see also 
Pollock, 2001). In other words, these authors call for a plausibilist framework as a third 
reasoning alternative to deductive and inductive reasoning. The motivation for 
suggesting a third reasoning option rests on Theophrastus’ rule, which states that the 
strength that a chain of deductively linked arguments confers on the conclusions cannot 
be weaker than the weakest link. As noted in Oaksford and Chater (2007), this is a 
condition that cannot be guaranteed by probability calculus, and consequently this 
opens a possibility for a third reasoning alternative. Whether or not this plausibilist 
approach is a viable alternative remains an open question, and I will not venture into a 
larger discussion due to the limited amount of space available here. But for the sense of 
conceptual completion, it deserves mentioning when presenting the probabilistic 
framework.  
Citing Oaksford and Chater, two arguments can be made against the 
inclusion of a plausibilist framework in general reasoning theory. Firstly, there is 
discrepancy between what constitutes plausible reasoning and how this should be 
conceptualized formally. Thus, Pollock ranges plausibilities from 0 to ∞, whereas Fox 
and Parsons (1998) operate with a notational system of ++, +. -, and -- (as familiar in 
many-valued logics). Thus, at present no consistent system of plausibility is available, 
and consequently the case for plausibility theory springs more from intuitive 
attractiveness than from a consistent systematic approach84. This is a minor point of 
criticism as many fields need time to solidify and agree upon a common notational 
system, and indeed most disciplines would find internal terminological discord. Thus, 
given time and development, the plausibilist argument might alleviate this worry by 
coming up with a coherent system. Secondly, and more seriously, it may be argued that 
any account of uncertain reasoning invariably ends up in the calculus of probability 
theory (see e.g. Howson & Urbach, 1996). If this holds true, there is little reason to 
develop and introduce a new set of theories, which ultimately converge upon a 
mathematical point, which is explainable by previous probabilistic models of cognition. 
As such, proponents of plausible reasoning need to account for a more consistent string 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Note that this might be alleviated if a single plausibility theory is agreed upon.  
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of cases that probability theory fails to deal with. However, this too may be solvable. 
Thus, for the moment being, I restrict the remark to introducing the notion of a potential 
third reasoning capability alongside deduction and induction, but leave this as an open 
question for future research. 
 
2.3.3. Probabilities and heuristics 
Heuristics have consistently been suggested as a viable psychological explanation for a 
range of cognitive phenomena (see e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 
1982; Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) 85 . Given the 
probabilistic approach in the present framework, it seems necessary to comment briefly 
on the relationship between probabilistic and heuristics. To describe cognitive strategies 
for coping with the plethora of information available, some of the above quoted authors 
suggest that humans rely on baseline heuristic strategies, which are fast, frugal, and 
effortless. Authors argue that such heuristics are at the heart of cognition and may 
provide a faster cognitive model compared with complex computation accounts such as 
probabilistic approaches. Indeed, several heuristics have been suggested such as the 
availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972), escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976), the scarcity principle (Cialdini, 2007), 
the similarity heuristic (Read & Grushka-Cockayne, 2011) as well as several others not 
listed here. Such evidence is compelling and interesting given the principle of Occham’s 
razor that a simpler explanation should be preferred to a more complex one. However, 
heuristics are faced with two fundamental problems discussed in Oaksford and Chater 
(2007, pp. 276-278). Firstly, the existence of heuristics and their subsequent success in 
reasoning tasks are confounded or limited by considering how heuristics can function, if 
not underpinned by some rationality in form of goal-directed actions, information from 
the environment as well as some basis to evaluate what is the ‘right’ course of action. 
That is, heuristics seem to come full circle and require the very rational analysis that 
they argue against. Secondly, the list of heuristics provided is far from exhaustive. 
Several other heuristics have been identified, which begs the question whether any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 In the psychology of persuasion, heuristics have also been influential such that the ELM and HSM both 
rely on heuristics in peripheral-route persuasion processing – recall that the H in HSM stands for 
’Heuristic’ 
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slightly new situation would elicit a new type of heuristic to solve the situation. That is, 
a firm description of set heuristics that perform one type of task seems incomplete when 
faced with the immense flexibility of the human cognitive capability. That is, if we truly 
do rely on heuristics as a baseline for cognition, we may assume hundreds if not 
thousands of situations requiring slightly different heuristics or a combination of 
already existing heuristics. Indeed, Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) rely on the 
cognitive system as an “adaptive toolbox”. However, if we postulate the existence of a 
host of heuristics that are combinable in a number of ways, it seems to defeat the 
purpose of creating fast, frugal mechanisms since surely this is a highly complex 
network of heuristics. Furthermore, the heuristic mind is also faced with the challenge 
of accounting for how humans decide which heuristic to make use of. The stance taken 
here, then, is compromising between hard-core computational and heuristic positions in 
that the model developed here assumes a computational basis for cognition, but 
concedes to the fact that human beings may indeed learn some simple ways of dealing 
with complex information in the future. That is, confronted with a new situation, we 
may need to consider the case more carefully, but with experience we may develop 
simple strategies to deal with complex situations. As discussed in 7.4 on coping 
mechanisms, a learning trajectory over time may account for the fact that humans may 
become more critical as they are exposed to persuasive strategies such as logical 
fallacies, emotional appeals and so on. That is, we may learn how to cope strategically 
with persuasive strategies, but these heuristics may not be the computational baseline of 
what we do when we are confronted with acts of persuasion in general. 
Alongside the general argument against probability theory from 
Gigerenzer and colleagues, empirical evidence might suggest that people are unable to 
even approximate the prescription of probability theory. These are reasoning errors such 
as the conjunction fallacy (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) and base rate neglect (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), probabilistic fallacies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), 
biases of overconfidence (e.g., Lichtenstein, et al, 1982), conservatism (e.g., Phillips & 
Edwards, 1966), and framing effects (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; McKenzie 
2004, however, see Harris, 2009 for an account of how probabilistic theory can deal 
with the findings of prospect theory). Thus, despite being very real grounds for 
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probabilistic concern, this does not amount to a dismissal of the underlying 
assumptions.  
Branching over probability theory, several theoretical points emerge. 
Firstly, and most importantly for the present epistemological purpose, probability theory 
differs significantly from propositional logic in its graded, subjective estimations of 
strength and probability as compared with truth-conditional dichotomies. This stance is 
more in sync with the epistemological remarks concerning acts of persuasion as they 
were identified in 1.6. Furthermore, as will be evident from 2.4, probability calculus 
enjoys a closer fit with behavioural data such that it may account for and potentially 
predict with greater accuracy how human beings approach uncertain evidence, as is the 
case in any persuasive situation. However, proponents of probability theory must also 
concede to the fact that such a model of cognition entails less rigorous analytical claims 
concerning argumentative structure. Indeed, as will be argued, human beings may find 
an argument compelling despite the fact that it is formally fallacious (such as the 
slippery slope argument). This seems to indicate that humans approach content before 
structure. Consequently, analyses become less clean structurally, but enjoy greater 
psychological validity as compared with formal logic. Whether probability theory is 
sufficient in account for acts of persuasion will be discussed in 2.5, but for the time 
being it suffices to note that a cognitive framework relying on probability theory seems 
more reasonable and plausible when describing uncertain situations such as acts of 
persuasion. In 2.4, I discuss Bayesian reasoning as a potential specific candidate for 
providing the theory of persuasion developed here with a model for probabilistic 
reasoning.  
 
2.4. Bayesian approach to cognition and argumentation 
Bayesian reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2007) is a particular instantiation of 
probability theory, which, like other probabilistic accounts, depart epistemologically 
and analytically from indefeasible monotonic logic as presented in 2.2 and which 
consequently has been suggested as a viable alternative to logicist reasoning (Oaksford 
& Chater, 1991). Bayesian reasoning follows from the axiomatic assumptions described 
by Howson and Urbach (1996) presented in 2.3. Like general probability theory, 
Bayesian reasoning and inference has been applied to a wide range of topics such as the 
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informativeness of quantifiers (Oaksford et al., 2002), incomplete game theory 
equilibriums (Gibbons, 1992; Mas-Colell et al., 1995), information processing (Kirby et 
al., 2007) the evaluation of scientific evidence (Corner & Hahn, 2009)86, vision (Yuille 
& Kersten, 2006; Moore, 2012), and legal reasoning (Lagnado et al, 2012). Of 
particular interest to the present discussion, research has also applied Bayesian 
reasoning computationally to human decision-making (Oaksford & Chater, 2007) and 
argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b), which will be 
discussed later in this section.  
 
2.4.1. Bayes’ theorem 
Mathematically, the Bayesian approach relies on the, to quote Oaksford & Chater, 2007 
‘Bayes’ celebrated theorem’ (p. 72, see Bayes, 1763), which describes manipulations of 
probabilities. Formally, the theorem is phrased as 
)(
)|()()|(
eP
hePhPehP =  
where P(h|e) represents the posterior degree of belief that a hypothesis h is true after 
having received a type of evidence, e. P(e|h) represents the probability of receiving the 
evidence e if the hypothesis is true, and P(e) represents the probability of the evidence 
occurring regardless of the truth or falsity of the hypothesis. This may be calculated 
from P(h), P(e|h) and P(e|¬h) (the probability of receiving the evidence if, in fact, the 
hypothesis is not true (¬h). That is, the subject entertains a prior concerning the topic in 
hand as well as the relationship between P(e|h), the likelihood of receiving the evidence 
if the hypothesis is true and P(e|¬h), the likelihood of receiving the evidence if the 
hypothesis is false. This relationship is called the likelihood ratio, ! ! !! ! ¬! . From this, the 
initial theorem presented above may be expanded to 
)|()()|()(
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The posterior degree of belief that h is true following e depends on perceived relevant 
relationship between e and h compared with the likelihood of e occurring regardless of 
h. The conditional probability of h given e equals “…the probability that both H and E 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 For an alternative, logicist account of scientific reasoning (or the child as ”scientist”), see Carey (1988) 
– however, see also Oaksford & Chater, 1991; 2006, chapter 3 for an assessment of the logicist approach 
to reasoning.  
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occurs, divided by the prior probability that E will occur” (Gibbons, 1992, footnote 12, 
p. 80). The output of the formal theorem is the posterior belief, P(h|e), which refers to a 
person’s degree of confidence that a particular belief is true. In complex instances such 
as practical reasoning, P(h|e) may be calculated via Causal Bayesian Networks (Pearl, 
2000), which are a graphical representation of structure of probabilities representing 
their random variables and conditional dependencies via directed acyclic graphs (Bang-
Jensen, 2008), which provide a representation to make explicit the connection between 
the priors and coherence. Such networks have been used to account, for instance, for 
reasoning in legal settings (Lagnado, 2012, see Pearl, 2000 for a discussion of Causal 
Bayesian Networks). Bayesianism may either be regarded as an inference of posterior 
probability (Brase et al., 2006) or as confined to the more strict definition of complying 
with Bayes’ theorem (Brase, 2002). Without discussing this at length due to lack of 
space, here the approach taken is the former such that the theorem acts as an 
approximation of how human beings infer posterior probabilities and subsequently 
make use of these probabilities to reason about a complex world. This inference is made 
from the priors and likelihood estimations as formally described in the theorem.  
 
2.4.2. Normativity, structure, and content 
Most Bayesian models are normative (Tenenbaum et al, 2006; Oaksford & Chater, 
2007). That is, given an identified prior and likelihood ratio, a clear posterior 
mathematically follows such that the rating for how a person should adopt and update 
from new evidence is given as a normative standard. The normative approach is also 
suggested for the model of Bayesian argumentation87. This is of particular interest given 
that Bayesian inference in this way may function as a strong, normative alternative to 
indefeasible, monotonic logic. Despite this prevalence of normativity, some authors 
have suggested that rational algorithms (such as Bayes’ theorem) may be applied 
descriptively on a computational level (see e.g. Sanborn et al., 2010)88. Despite the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 As mentioned in the introduction, this harkens back to the distinction between the normativity of the 
desirable and the normativity of the approximated. The SPIMP approach is normatively predictive given 
the subjective probabilistic estimations concerning content strength and source credibility. As such, it is 
normatively predictive. However, given the complexity of the psychological framework (as described in 
7.1), this outline in practical analyses would involve descriptive elements.  
88 Further tentative evidence for the claim that Bayes’ theorem may be applied qualitatively come from 
Chang & Setter (2007) who argue that qualitative knowledge can be used and translated into a set of 
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that this issue is still being debated, I will, for the remainder of the thesis, assume that 
probabilistic reasoning as expressed by Bayes’ theorem may at least approximate 
subjective reasoning on Marr’s (1982) computational level. That is, the theoretical 
proposal developed in the thesis is conceived as a process theory, but should be 
understood as a computationally descriptive theory (i.e. what people do, not necessarily 
how they do it). In this way, the Bayesian approach is normative on the one hand, as the 
mathematics clearly prescribe how probabilistic inferences should be made given 
certain priors and likelihood estimations. One the other hand, given the complexity of 
the psychological framework that underpins the subjectivity of the probabilistic 
estimations (see 7.2), the analytic potential of the Bayesian account of persuasion might 
function descriptively.  
The relationship between structure and content is particularly interesting 
for the Bayesian inference perspective due to the fact that the mathematical structure 
underlying this approach differs from the one underlying indefeasible, monotonic logic 
in that they target and describe two inherently different qualities of argumentation: 
structure (formal logic) and content (Bayesian). That is, the relationship between formal 
descriptions (formal logic and the mathematical foundation of Bayes’ theorem) and 
application is an essentially different relationship for formal logic and Bayesian 
inferences. The Bayesian approach represents a formal, mathematical way of 
approximating human reasoning from a content-oriented perspective. This is 
represented in two general ways. Firstly, the theorem is a formalized mathematical 
expression constructed on the same mathematical principles as indefeasible, monotonic 
logical models. In this central manner, the Bayesian approach does not differ from these 
models (in that they both rely on the validity of mathematical expressions). Secondly, 
Bayes’ theorem formally calculates the manipulation of probabilistic content, i.e. how 
the likelihood-ratio mathematically manipulates the prior such that a posterior emerges. 
This application of Bayes’ theorem is a direct consequence of the mathematical 
qualities inherent in the theorem. Thus, the fundamental formal aspect of Bayes’ 
theorem is derived from the axioms of probabilities described earlier, and the formula is 
a mathematical representation and expression following these axioms.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constraints on the Bayesian model space (even for inconsistent qualitative knowledge, Chang et al., 
2008). 
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When applied in a practical setting, the formal aspects of Bayes’ theorem 
and the representations of the Bayesian networks (Pearl, 2000) remain a frame through 
which the application of the theorem in general may be perceived. That is, the 
application of the formal to the non-formal, i.e. from mathematical expression to 
approximation of and the mapping onto human reasoning. For a theory of persuasion 
this would specifically entail the manner by which human beings reason about and 
approach content that is being proposed to them in a persuasive setting89. This is a 
significantly different aspect of the Bayesian approach that is not formal in the same 
way that the theorem is formal. In other words, the application of the theorem and 
networks approaches instances of persuasive attempts and approximates these by 
describing them in terms of the theorem. Formally, Bayes’ theorem is a mathematical 
expression that describes the manipulation of probabilities. That is, how probabilistic 
calculus function mathematically. Practically, the approach relates to how people 
estimate, approach, and assess persuasive content. This is a crucial difference between 
the formal (mathematical) and the practical (content-driven) aspects of the Bayesian 
approach. The fact that the approach contains both strengthens the account.  
This relationship between the formal and the informal, practical aspects of 
Bayesianism is interesting in another way: empirical testability of whether participants 
reason in a Bayesian manner. Studies indicate that people are not very good at 
calculating complex probability mathematically. It might be argued that if subjects 
cannot calculate probabilistic content mathematically, they are presumably not 
approaching the content probabilistically. For instance, humans find the Monty Hall 
problem difficult (Selvin, 1975a; 1975b, but see Gill, 2002 for a Bayesian approach to 
the problem), Villejoubert et al., (submitted) report that subjects have trouble dealing 
with pure mathematical expressions of probability in card games compared to situations 
in which they can manipulate with the physical world, and Hoffrage et al. (2005) report 
that the mode of presentation of statistical information affect success-rate in solving 
statistical problems. However, if the assumptions underlying Bayes’ theorem are to be 
taken as a formal expression approximating how people approach informal content as 
discussed in the above, such a formal, truth-conditionally dichotomous problem should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 As will be evident throughout the thesis, ’content’ refers more than simply the information provided in 
the persuasive setting. Thus, authority, emotional content, source credibility and more is taken as nodes in 
a complex, causal network as described in the interim conclusion.  
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indeed be expected to be difficult for people without training in mathematics, statistics, 
or probability calculus. That is, there is a conceptual difference between being able to 
do complex mathematical equations expressed formally and performing acts that may 
be approximated or described using mathematics (e.g. the computational complexity of 
catching a ball in the air is immense whereas humans seem to be able to do this fairly 
easily). Thus, if the probabilistic content were presented in another manner by which 
people were more accustomed, reasoning would presumably be easier. Indeed, there is 
evidence indicating that subjects do perform better when they are given physical 
manifestations of the probabilistic problems when solving problems (Villejoubert et al., 
submitted). 
 
2.4.3. Bayesian argumentation 
We now turn out attention to the application of Bayesian reasoning to argumentation 
theory since this is central to developing a probabilistic approach to persuasion (given 
that reasoning and argumentation are central elements of persuasion as mentioned in 
1.6). Oaksford, Hahn, and colleagues have explored argumentation from this point of 
view (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b; Hahn et al., 2012). The two main 
aims of these investigations have firstly been to suggest Bayesian theory as a viable 
model of argumentation processing and secondly to highlight the difference between the 
Bayesian account of argumentation compared with frameworks making use of 
indefeasible, monotonic logical models such as the pragma-dialectical approach 
(Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). The difference between Bayesian and indefeasible, 
monotonic logical models has predominantly been explored by investigating logically 
fallacious argument structures. Logically fallacious structures are violations of logical 
rules, which should result in the dismissal of the argument. For instance, a slippery 
slope argument is fallacious due to the fact that one outcome does not logically or 
necessarily entail the trajectory prescribed by the slippery slope. Given the hegemony of 
structure in indefeasible monotonic models, we should expect that subjects should treat 
all fallacious structures equally harsh. However, if subjects do not dismiss the argument 
despite of its logical shortcomings, but rather differentiate this weakens the rigorous 
positions and strengthens positions such as the Bayesian, which argue that humans 
predominantly focus on the content of the argument. That is, subjects may be 
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confronted with the same structural message (e.g. an ad hominem argument), which 
from a logical point of view should be dismissed, but from a content-driven point of 
view may be more or less valid/persuasive. Consider the following examples of slippery 
slope arguments where 6a might be somewhat likely and 6b is very unlikely.  
6a) If we allow voluntary identification cards for youths, obligatory cards 
will follow 
6b) If we raise taxes any more, we will soon pay 100% in taxes 
The Bayesian claim goes that despite the structural similarities, humans evaluate the 
two arguments differently given the difference in the likelihood or their content. Indeed, 
the data supports this claim. In line with the Bayesian framework, empirical evidence 
indicates that people are sensitive to relevant probabilistic features of an argument. This 
has been examined across a variety of argument fallacies, including argument from 
ignorance (Hahn, Oaksford & Bayindir, 2005; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004), slippery slope 
arguments (Corner et al., 2011) and circular arguments (Hahn et al., 2005), ad hominem 
(Oaksford & Hahn, 2013), and the ad Hitlerum (Harris et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
empirical works have examined people’s treatment of source expertise in a manner, 
which seems consistent with Bayesian prescriptions (Hahn et al., 2009; Harris et al., 
submitted, see also 3.3). Corner & Hahn (2009) demonstrate that the evaluation of 
arguments concerning current scientific issues is also in line with Bayesian descriptions. 
Thus, there is a considerable body of experimental work being compiled to argue that 
there is a connection between how human beings process evidence and argumentation 
understood as in the above and how humans reason from a Bayesian perspective.  
Typically (though not exclusively), the method of investigation in these 
experiments mentioned in the above is to derive the prior degree of belief concerning a 
particular piece of evidence, then present the subject with additional information, which 
is weighted, and then elicit the posterior degree of belief and see whether Bayes’ 
theorem may help account for the decision-making and reasoning process that the 
subject goes through. That is, the formal theorem is used to account for the practical 
implications of the argument content and is thus an instantiation of the formal-informal 
relationship between structure and content. That is, the formal structure is used to 
account for the informal content. One of the significant strengths of the Bayesian 
approach is that the theory resides in this interesting relationship of being mathematical 
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in the one formal hand and content-driven in the application other. The mapping from 
formal theory to application seems to be experimentally supported. As a theoretical 
consequence of this, the Bayesian approach enjoys strengths from both sides of the 
veritable pond the credibility of which is supported by the empirical success of the 
individual studies cited in the above. Furthermore, a few studies have shown that the 
Bayesian explanation can function predictively as well (e.g. Harris et al., submitted). 
The approach differs significantly from the predictions from rule-based models of 
argumentation theory constructed on the premises of indefeasible, monotonic logic such 
as the pragma-dialectical approach (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) as the Bayesian 
account acknowledges that humans may treat the content of an argument in a strength-
wise gradient manner even if the argument strictly speaking is a logical fallacy90. The 
relationship between reasoning with uncertain beliefs, Bayes’ theorem and persuasion 
should emerge clearer as the thesis presses on and elements such as phenomenology and 
social aspects are incorporated.  
However, the picture is not entirely clear, and indeed evidence that does not fit 
perfectly with Bayesian networks has been found. For instance, Lagnado & Harvey 
(2008) investigate how evidence is discredited in legal scenarios. Here, the findings are 
more in line with coherence-based models of juror reasoning (e.g. Simon & Holyoak, 
2002) than Bayesian networks91. Thus, it is not possible given the evidence to state with 
certainty that human beings reason in a Bayesian manner. Given the subjective nature of 
Bayes’ theorem, it is not unfeasible to assume that evidence against the theorem may be 
influenced by factors that are not accounted for in the data analyses (this is purely 
speculative, though, see also Jones & Love, 2011a). Omitting particular biases in the 
calculation would skew the mathematical predictions of the theorem and cause data to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The pragma-dialectical approach was developed as a normative account of rule-based argumentation 
processing under which interlocutors are meant to follow given codes of conduct (derived from ethical or 
logical considerations) in argumentation (for a list of the ten rules of critical discussion, see Eemeren et 
al., 2002, pp. 182-183). Amongst other issues, these rules are concerned with the freedom to produce 
arguments, the relevance of the information, and the validity of the reasoning. Note here, then, that this is 
concerned with argumentative conduct and as such registers as a normative framework for proper and 
decent argumentation rather than a normative account of how people process the evidence. This harkens 
back to the distinction between the societal and the functional normative approaches mentioned in the 
introduction. In the same way as logic, then, I argue that the pragma-dialectical is immensely important in 
analysing argumentation and for critical purposes, but that it fails to describe how people (mis)use 
argumentation in persuasive incidents. It is essential to keep these types of normative approaches apart.  
91 However, Lagnado (in press) suggests that people are sensitive to intricate conditional dependencies 
between evidence items in legal scenarios  
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appear inconsistent with the theorem. Regardless, there is a great amount of evidence 
(as cited above, see also 5.1) that suggests that human beings are affected by other 
humans, contextual biases, limitations of memory and other influences, which entails 
that beliefs are not as stable as assumed in traditional defeasible models of logic. The 
Bayesian account is a strong contestant in accounting for human reasoning in 
contextually influenced situations.  
Bayes’ theorem, then, may be used as a formal approximation of people’s 
subjective relationship to uncertain content. For a theory of persuasion this has several 
interesting consequences. Firstly, it supplies the present framework with a normative 
account of rationality that departs from the epistemological assumptions of indefeasible, 
monotonic logical models. Secondly, the model of persuasion proposed in the thesis 
argues for a interactive, contextual, and subjective account of persuasion. As a theory of 
reasoning and argumentation, the Bayesian approach seems particularly well suited to 
function as a theory of rationality in such a framework given its subjective estimations 
of probabilistic content. As discussed throughout the rest of the thesis (and in particular 
in chapter 7), the Bayesian account can potentially function as one of the cornerstones 
of such a theory of persuasion. However, the approach is not without question and 
authors have suggested limitations to Bayesian inferences. In 2.5, I will go through 
some of the potential limitations, which ultimately suggests that persuasion theory does 
well by relying on Bayesian reasoning, but that it cannot do so exclusively given that 
persuasion, as argued, cannot be reduced to information processing, there are temporal 
issues (Madsen, in prep B), and unanswered questions remain in the literature.  
 
2.5. Limitations to Bayesian reasoning 
Alongside the challenges to probabilistic theory in general mentioned in 2.3, some 
particular issues should be discussed concerning the Bayesian approach, especially 
given its position in the theory of persuasion developed here. The challenges 
predominantly cluster around a version of Bayesian inference, which solely relies on 
computational and mathematics since mathematical models, alongside considerable 
theoretical benefits such as cleanliness and clarity of expression, suffer from limitations 
from mathematical notation (from a linguistic point of view, such potential limitations 
concerning conjunctions will be discussed in 4.2). Here, I briefly present three separate 
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issues concerning computational complexity, narratives and the complexity of acts of 
persuasion, and finally some unknown elements of Bayesian inference.  
 The real world of affairs in which we live is massively complex and 
involves an almost infinite amount of data (which may account for the reliance on 
intuitive physics, Gerstenberg et al., 2012). If Bayesian inferences are conceptualised as 
a concrete calculus concerning uncertain information, it needs a stopping mechanism 
since humans could potentially include a seemingly endless amount of contextual 
information. This may potentially cause computational problems for Bayes’ rule since 
this posits that human should integrate information across domains and use their 
subjective probabilistic estimations of information to arrive at their response to a 
particular issue (Bramley et al., submitted). Computing relevant information is by no 
means a trivial matter since it is not clear what information should be considered 
relevant. For instance, watching a speech by Obama, I have to comprehend a foreign 
language (English), make use of visual information, make sense of my subjective 
position in the world, recall a myriad of information about the presidential elections, 
infer a multitude of conclusions and implications from the suggested policies and so on 
and on. It remains an open issue, but some proponents of Bayesian accounts do not 
consider complex computation as a model for how cognition should be appreciated in a 
Bayesian framework (see e.g. Griffith et al., 2010. Indeed, the issue of complex 
computation nonetheless presents an enticing problem for proponents of a Bayesian 
approach that need to be addressed by discussing how to tease apart relevant 
information and whether this may aggregate computationally across complex causal 
networks. In other words, proponents of a Bayesian approach need to account for a 
stopping mechanism that circumvents the complexity issue.  
 Secondly, narratives (Velleman, 2003; DeSanctis, 2012; Goldie, 2012) 
provide an interesting case concerning pure accounts of Bayesian inference since, 
mathematically, the temporality and order of evidence should not matter since the 
computation of evidence mathematically should yield the same posterior regardless of 
their position in the argument. In other words, this states that evidence may be presented 
in any order, and that mathematically the subsequent posterior should be equivalent. 
Madsen and Lagnado (in prep) investigate the persuasiveness of narratives in order to 
explore whether the temporal order of information presented in narrative form in a legal 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   108 
setting matters when subjects estimate and judge who committed a murder. Given the 
assumption that humans experience time in a thermo-dynamic sequence, it may not be 
surprising if temporal order does indeed effect how we perceive evidence. However, 
this is a mathematical challenge for a pure Bayesian inference account, which becomes 
less strained if considering Bayesian calculus as an element rather than the element in 
persuasion processing, and whether or not this poses a serious challenge for a Bayesian 
account of persuasion processing remains to be explored. I will, however, briefly return 
to the case of conjunction and linguistic order effects in 4.2.  
 Finally, there are some elements that remain undecided in terms of 
learning, epistemology, and “Bayesian fundamentalism.” Regarding the former, the 
Bayesian approach does not as of yet specify how human beings go from posterior to 
prior. That is, given a set of prior beliefs (subjectively manifested in a truth-
conditionally gradient manner) and some evidence, a Bayesian reasoner should arrive at 
a posterior. However, it remains an open question how to proceed from this point. That 
is, how does the posterior subsequently become the prior for the next piece of evidence? 
This should happen in some way given that we may use information we have acquired 
to guide our subjective estimation of any subsequent pieces of evidence of acts of 
persuasion. Perhaps, as used in Hahn and Oaksford (2004) and Hahn et al. (2012) in 
calculating simulations, the posterior might simply turn into the next prior. Or perhaps 
the posterior will it be forgotten over time, so that a new prior may be quite different 
from the former posterior? In that case it would be quite difficult to know something 
about the prior since it may have been formed by a series of unknown incidents or 
perhaps even be more or less random. Such a situation would require the formalisation 
of a person’s knowledge in total, which would be a monumental task.  
 Related to this, proponents of Bayesian inference need a thorough account 
for how humans arrive at priors in the first place. Presumably, as discussed briefly 6.2 
and 7.2, this is an amalgamation of single events throughout our lives in terms of 
upbringing, socio-economic context, cultural aspects, memories, friends and family, and 
so on. But the pure Bayesian framework needs to provide a richer story in order to go 
beyond mathematical calculus and toward reasoning from uncertainty in real life as it is 
experience and lived by humans.  
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A general remark concerning the challenges and potential limitation is 
warranted. These problems seem to arise insofar that Bayesian inference is understood 
in a fundamental manner as pure probability calculus (Jones & Love, 2011a, 2011b; 
Bowers & Davis 2012). However, as Chater et al (2011) note, it is not clear if there are 
any proponents of such a strict account of Bayesian inference do really exist, or if it is a 
straw man. This, however, remains an open question. Despite this, the general trend 
emerges that a pure mathematical account runs into challenges in much the same way as 
indefeasible, monotonic logical models, and that persuasion includes elements that are 
difficult to capture in such a pure account. For example, throwing the mind back to the 
urn example in 1.1.5, it is difficult to see for how a pure, or naïve, Bayesian inference 
calculus could solve the scenario. Given low source credibility, the posterior conclusion 
should invariably be low simply due to standard probabilistic calculus. That is, in a 
situation in which persuadees may realistically expect persuaders to be less frank, or 
downright deceptive, the low source credibility should translate into a low posterior 
estimation of argument strength. However, confronted with actual cases of persuasion 
such as advertisement, political oratory, and judicial rhetoric, this clearly is not the case 
since people are readily swayed by these acts of persuasion despite the fact that the 
persuaders should be deemed low in trust given that the asymmetricality of aims should 
be apparent. It is not at all clear how a pure Bayesian would explain away the data from 
real life cases of persuasion (see Madsen & Chater, in prep. for a brief analysis of 
Nixon’s Checkers speech as an example of this, Nixon, 1952). In conclusion, a theory 
of persuasion may gain much from exploring reasoning from uncertainty in a 
probabilistic manner in terms of conceptualising how the persuadee deals with uncertain 
evidence in a persuasive setting, but it would seem that a pure mathematical 
instantiation of the approach cannot be the whole story.  
 
2.7. Local and global consistency 
The theoretical components proposed here deal with the complexity of content strength 
from a probabilistic, Bayesian perspective. The argument will be extended in 3.3 to 
provide a formalisation of content strength as well as source credibility. The underlying 
assumptions derived from the Bayesian component entail at least two potential 
problems revolving around the issue of consistency. Firstly, it may rightly be questioned 
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whether humans really are capable of carrying out the complex computations necessary 
to comply with Bayesian inferences (as mentioned already in 2.6). Several studies 
report the fact that participants are faced with difficulties when having to perform 
probabilistic inferences from a mathematical point of view without the aid of external 
resources of graphical representations (for a discussion of this and potential helpful 
graphical representations to facilitate statistical information processing, see Hoffrage et 
al., 2005; for a discussion of potential helpful systemic embodiment, see Villejoubert et 
al., submitted). This issue, then, is concerned with whether or not the ecological 
assumptions are reasonable or if the computational component proposed here is too 
idealistic and demanding for everyday reasoning humans perform when the faced with a 
persuasive attempt. Secondly, the mathematical properties of priors pose the question 
whether human beings are consistent with their own beliefs. Indeed, a consistent system 
should mathematically be constant throughout concerning the global beliefs. However, 
the existence of cognitive dissonance (the ability to hold two beliefs at the same time) 
indicates that humans are not globally consistent (for instance, it is conceivable that a 
left-leaning British person favours policies of equality at the same time as favouring the 
monarchy despite the fact that ideals of equality are directly contradicted with a support 
for a monarchy, which is constructed on the premise that some are born royal92). 
However, the fact that cognitive dissonance seems to bother humans also indicates the 
desire to strive towards consistency rather than tolerating inconsistencies. Thus, the 
existence of cognitive dissonance indicates that humans are not globally consistent, but 
also supports the general aim of being consistent and correct, as postulated in 1.3 
regarding the persuasive aims. The mathematical properties of a Bayesian system would 
entail no such inconsistency, as the same priors would lead to the same posteriors across 
the system given they are not the aim of the persuasive attempt. That is, a person’s 
subjective prior estimate concerning ideals of equality should permeate throughout the 
system and feed into all relevant issues pertaining to this (such as whether or not to 
support the monarchy). In this section, I provide some tentative replies to these 
objections in order to further qualify the theoretical background that supports the theory 
of persuasion developed here, although both warrant a more in-depth discussion that 
goes beyond the scope of the thesis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Thanks to (soon to be) Dr Rebecca Chamberlain for this example 
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 The ecological validity of computational reasoning from a probabilistic 
point of view may rightly be called into question due to studies that show how people 
experience difficulties in dealing with mathematical expressions of probability. This 
evidence seems particularly damaging for the probabilistic approach given the fact that 
the notion of rationality derived from the Bayesian approach explicitly deals in 
mathematics (from Bayes’ theorem). If people, then, are unable to perform relatively 
simple computations, how is it then possible to assert that the fundamental approach to 
reasoning may be expressed in the calculus of probabilities? An initial reply to this 
comes from the conceptualisation and use of Bayes’ theorem. Despite the fact that 
probabilities are expressible in mathematical terms and that a normative theory of 
reasoning may be derived from such terms, this does not entail that the Bayesian 
approach necessarily assumes that humans actually perform these calculations in their 
minds (be it consciously or unconsciously). Rather, the stance of Bayesian reasoning 
may simply approximate how people reason from a normative point of view (as 
expressed, for instance, in the approach taken to argumentation from a Bayesian 
perspective). Understood in this way, humans should do better if the probabilistic 
information is expressed in ways that are more natural to their environment, and indeed 
evidence exist to support this notion (Vallé-Tourangeau & Villejoubert, in press; 
Villejoubert et al., submitted). In sum, the notion of computational description remains 
an open question, but the stance taken in the current approach is that probabilistic, 
Bayesian reasoning provides the best normative account of ecologically valid reasoning 
that takes into account how humans approach evidence from a subjective point of view.  
By bringing in the notion of completeness*, Oaksford and Chater (2007, 
pp. 89-91) bring to the foreground an essential philosophical component concerning the 
underlying assumptions of probabilistic reasoning. Completeness* is concerned with the 
problem of “…providing a formal characterization of everyday knowledge that picks 
out all, and only, the common-sense inferences that people endorse” (pp. 89-90). The 
notion of completeness and subsequent consistency needs to be taken into consideration 
when arguing for a probabilistic approach to persuasion processing. Consider the 
following excerpt from an interview conducted by The New Left Media during the 2012 
American presidential election: 
Woman: His [Obama’s] father was a Muslim, an atheist, and a communist 
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Interviewer: So, was his father a Muslim or an atheist? 
Woman: [thinking] he is all three 
On the face of this exchange, it may be thought that the woman does not know what 
being an atheist and a Muslim entails given the fact that you cannot be both given the 
mutual exclusion. However, it seems unlikely that the woman has no idea that there is a 
difference between believing that there is no god and believing in Allah. Therefore, 
there are at least two possible explanations for the seeming irrationality and 
inconsistency at this point. One plausible explanation is that the woman lumps the three 
terms (Muslim, atheist, and communist) into one category concerning people, in her 
view, toward whom you should be suspicious (or some similar unfavourable category) 
without distinguishing between the three concepts. In this way, it does not matter 
whether Obama’s father was either or all since he is placed in such a category. An 
alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanation could be that the woman simply has 
not devoted much cognitive effort into considering the theoretical ramifications and 
entailments of what she says, and she speaks more from a conceptually shallow pond 
than from a place of consistency. In either case, such cases of cognitive dissonance (the 
ability to entertain two mutually exclusive ideas) seem prevalent in human society. 
From a Bayesian perspective, as mentioned in the above, this should not be the case 
since the priors should lead to consistent posteriors across the Bayesian system. By 
introducing the theoretical distinction between global and local consistency as well as 
some remarks concerning the general aim of vernacular reasoning, some of these 
potential problems may be explained, alleviated, or simply softened. The following 
theoretical distinction between global and local beliefs and consistency depends on the 
underlying assumptions of the propositionality of beliefs as well as the aim of 
reasoning.  
I define global beliefs as being a propositional and finite set of beliefs that 
covers everything in which a person believes. This entails several assumptions 
concerning beliefs and how these manifest psychologically and cognitively. Firstly, the 
notion that humans may be globally consistent entails some degree of stability within 
the beliefs in G. That is, given a person’s subjective estimation of the content strength 
pertaining to the notion of equality, this should permeate throughout the system, which 
indicates stability in beliefs. Secondly, in order to permeate the system, such beliefs 
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would appear propositional in nature, as they would refer to fixed propositional beliefs 
to which a subjective probabilistic estimation is ascribed. That is, the propositions make 
up the underlying belief identify of the person. Note that these beliefs might change 
with novel evidence and experiences, but if one proposition alters in probabilistic 
estimation, the system should update in general. Such an update would hinge upon a 
notion of belief clusters in which propositionally expressed beliefs may influence other 
beliefs, thus creating a hierarchy of beliefs in which some beliefs are fundamental to 
others (like the notion of equality is fundamental to a variety of issues ranging from 
labour laws, the issue of the monarchy, women’s rights, same-sex marriages and so 
forth). From this, a complex network of intertwined beliefs may be drawn, which could 
be said to describe the personality of the individual. However, a recent suggestion from 
developmental and cognitive psychology challenges this classic notion of the self and 
personality by pointing out the instability of the self and the permutations of beliefs 
(Hood, 2012). Indeed, beliefs and the notion of the self do not seem stable when 
confronted with developmental evidence. This leads to the notion of local consistency, 
which depends on different psychological assumptions. In accordance with Hood’s 
notion of the changing, contextual, and mutable self, in this framework, I assume that 
humans are geared towards consistency of beliefs, as these cognitively are beneficial 
compared to entertaining inconsistent beliefs, but also that humans are cognitively 
limited and finite beings who might not be able to integrate evidence across a global 
belief system (which also assumes some notion of stability across the global system), 
but rather that evidence first and foremost is evaluated on a local scale. That is, in the 
above example, a person might believe strongly in the equality of humans when it 
comes to equal opportunities, anti-discriminatory laws, and so forth, but the same 
person might well be fond (to some extent) of the British monarchy despite the fact that 
this directly contradicts with the general belief of equality of humans.  
Rather than assuming a stable network of beliefs, local beliefs are 
expressed in the moment of relevance directed towards and constructed in the situation, 
but where humans can be consistent with past beliefs and actions mainly due to 
experiences and memory. In the above, global beliefs were defined as a propositional 
and finite set of beliefs, which covers everything in which a person believes. In order to 
have consistency within such a system, a range of assumptions concerning the stability 
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of beliefs and identity had to be assumed. Relying on developmental evidence arguing 
for the contextual and cultural upbringing of beliefs (e.g. Hood, 2012; Haidt, 2012) as 
well as previously cited literature in reasoning and judgement and decision making that 
argues for the claim that humans are subjective, cultural and contextual in their 
assessments of beliefs, local beliefs may de defined as a subjective estimation 
concerning a contextually salient belief in a limited temporal frame. This carries 
different assumptions compared with global beliefs. For instance, whereas consistency 
on a global scale requires a systemic consistency in which beliefs permeate throughout 
the system and influences all relevant conjoined beliefs, beliefs on a local scale do not 
make the same grand system assumption concerning the cognitive make-up of the 
individual. Rather, given the limited time-scale, limited cognitive capability and 
investment, and the contextual nature of the probabilistic estimations, local belief 
consistency aims for consistency within the beliefs in the specific act of persuasion. 
This bears interesting consequences for the notion of consistency and the cognitive and 
philosophical aspects of reasoning as humans from this point of view consider the local 
first, and the potential global second93. This ties well with the assumptions concerning 
reasoning provided by the present understanding of Bayesian rationality since this 
assumes contextual and immediate estimations. That is, given an act of persuasion, the 
persuadee supposedly has a range of probabilistic estimations given the topic in hand, 
which are influenced by factors such as culture, context, and emotions. The 
persuasiveness of the act is then concerned with how likely the attempt is locally such 
that the immediately salient beliefs are considered related with one another. Then, 
depending on the level of cognitive effort invested in evaluating the quality of the 
persuasive attempt, the persuadee may consider the more global aspects of the act. 
However, this is not a necessary cognitive process. Furthermore, Foley (1979) presents 
compelling evidence that humans are able to entertain justified inconsistent beliefs 
concerning particular issues such as the lottery and preface paradox94.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Note, than, that local beliefs do not exclude the possibility of global beliefs. Indeed, as argued in 7.4 
and mentioned later in this section, factors such as upbringing, intelligence might influence how well a 
particular individual may keep beliefs consistent across issues.  
94 Lewis Carroll provides a humorous example of entertaining competing beliefs when the White Queen 
states ”Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast”. This quote 
reflects the local and potentially incoherent nature of beliefs.  
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 The notion of beliefs and local consistency assumed here further relies on 
the notion that beliefs are relational rather than categorical. That is, beliefs are relative 
in nature rather than fixed across a global system. Burke (1969) notes that humans think 
of persuasion and beliefs in hierarchical rather than atomised terms. Extrapolating from 
this general idea, a belief cannot be viewed in isolation from the beliefs that are related 
to this – or, at least, to separate beliefs atomically from the context on which they 
depend entail a qualification and alternation of the estimation of the belief. This 
hierarchical, non-atomic, and relational conceptualisation of beliefs links to the notion 
that beliefs might incommensurable with other beliefs such that two beliefs might not 
be directly comparable despite pertaining to the same issue (e.g. economic versus 
ethical concerns of the effect of a policy, see e.g. Kock, 2009). For instance, consider a 
policy concerning economic growth versus ethical considerations. Proponents and 
opponents of the policy might well agree of the likelihood that a given consequence of 
the economic policy is likely to occur if the policy is implemented, and of the likelihood 
of undesirable ethical entailments of the policy. However, despite agreeing on the 
probabilistic content, different humans might value these economic and ethical 
consequences differently depending on the hierarchy of beliefs (whether economic 
growth is more important then ethical considerations, for instance). Further, the 
conclusions drawn from economic and ethical premises might yield different 
conclusions despite being argued rationally given the fact that the premises from which 
they spring might be different. As such, the conclusions are incommensurable. In this 
way, the beliefs are relational and relative (indeed, decision-by-sampling studies lend 
support to this notion, see Stewart et al., 2006) as well as potentially incommensurable. 
In relating to the previous local-global assumptions, the premises of the thesis 
hypothesises that humans first and foremost are attentive to local consistency and only 
potentially global (depending on a range of factors such as cognitive effort, intelligence, 
reasoning capabilities, cultural background etc.).  
Following from the assumptions and arguments produced in this section, 
the aim of reasoning and mutatis mutandis the aim of persuasion processing is 
understood in a clearer light as to what it entails for the theory and model presented in 
the thesis. Rather than a mechanism to appreciate global consistency across a 
multifaceted and multivariate system of beliefs, persuadees are thought to approach acts 
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of persuasion as a local phenomenon in which they estimate the probabilistic strength of 
the content, the credibility of the source, and the validity of the reasoning. The model 
presented in the thesis is concerned with this immediate and instantaneous assessment. 
This, however, does not exclude the importance of socio-economic background, cultural 
influences, and personal history. As discussed in 6.2, 7.2, and 7.3, these are integral 
elements in describing a more in-depth account of the trajectories that lead to the 
assessment of the persuasive attempt in the moment as well as coping strategies95. 
Reasoning, then, is the vehicle through which the persuadee attempts to optimize local 
and potentially global consistency by considering the evidence in relation to what she 
believes. This is not a logical exercise, but rather a probabilistic approximation as the 
one described in 2.3.  
Summary Branching over the second chapter, several points of discussion 
emerge to push forward a theory of persuasion. Firstly, the normative frameworks based 
on indefeasible, monotonic logic such as they are employed (or suggested) in several 
theories of persuasion seem inadequate in dealing with the epistemological complexity 
of reasoning that departs from the rigorous standards of a formal logical model. Rather, 
a probabilistic point of view seems more compatible epistemologically, empirically and 
theoretically with the definition of persuasion presented in 1.8 given that this 
emphasises persuasion as an interactive, subjective, and contextual phenomenon. 
Thirdly, Bayesian inference is suggested as a particular model of uncertain reasoning in 
order to deal with the uncertain evidence presented in acts of persuasion. The Bayesian 
model, however, is not without limitations and should be construed as an important 
element rather than the whole story. That is, given the potential limitations of Bayesian 
inference from the point of view of computational complexity, temporal and narrative 
effects, and unanswered questions, the thesis will subsequently look beyond a pure 
Bayesian model and toward a model of persuasion constructed on a dynamic and 
interactive foundation. Finally, it is assumed that humans strive for local consistency. 
Despite the fact that Bayesian reasoning may invoke mathematically stringent global 
consistencies, this seems cognitively infeasible on a global level, as it would require 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Indeed, given the differences in socio-economic background, cultural upbringing, level of education 
and other such factors, we should expect, even from just a reasoning perspective, the same act of 
persuasion to carry with it significantly different assessments from different people. Interestingly, this 
brings the notion of time-scales to a focal point of a theory of persuasion.  
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massive fact and error-checks every time new information enters the system. Rather, as 
a baseline assumption, humans firstly strive for local consistency in the moment and 
secondly (if possible and given the amount of cognitive investment and capability) on a 
global, systemic level. This distinction between local and global puts the cognitive 
effort in perspective as humans in this view are not required to be perfect reasoners. 
That is, local beliefs are placed as a fundamental theoretical assumption underlying the 
theory of persuasion developed in the thesis. Compared with global beliefs, local beliefs 
assume that humans are geared towards optimization of consistency in a limited 
temporal scope with the possibility of a more global consistency across beliefs. The 
former, however, requires more cognitive effort than the latter, which is why local 
beliefs are assumed to be the point of departure in terms of evaluations of the quality of 
persuasive attempts. 
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Chapter 3: Interpreting the persuader 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ultimate authority must always rest with the individual’s own reason and critical 
analysis 
Dalai Lama 
 
 
Believe those who are seeking the truth. Doubt those who find it 
André Gide 
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This chapter presents the theoretical approach of the thesis with regard to the 
interpretation of the persuader. Initially, I revisit the epistemological relationship 
between persuader and persuadee and introduce the notion of vigilance toward 
misinformation, as taken from Sperber et al (2010). Following the presentation of how 
vigilance is incorporated in the theoretical framework of the thesis, I discuss two 
conceptualisations of mentalizing (simulation-theory and theory-theory) since these has 
been suggested as a central cognitive capability to infer beliefs, wishes, and intentions 
of other people as well as a foundational aspect of communication as a 
metarepresentational function (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995). The discussion is then 
taken further towards source credibility, as this is a central element both in persuasion 
literature since the Ancient Greeks and as a central element in the SPIMP developed in 
the thesis. Finally, the conceptualisation and formalisation of source credibility in the 
SPIMP model is presented.   
The importance of source credibility in argumentation in general and 
persuasion in particular is no new idea. As far back as ancient Greece, Aristotle (1995a) 
mentions in Rhetoric ethos (the character of the speaker) as one of three essential 
persuasive appeals (alongside logos (reasoning) and pathos (short, inflamed emotional 
outbursts)). It is important to note that in persuasive situations other humans constantly 
surround us. We are inherently social, and a growing body of theoretical and empirical 
evidence suggests that reasoning, rather than serving solipsistic information processing, 
is geared towards argumentation with others (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Oaksford, 2011; 
Mercier & Landemore, 2012) 96 . Further, evidence from language studies (e.g. 
Steffensen, 2013) shows that humans make use of one another in order to manage 
communicative situations. Taken together, then, reasoning and communication 
inherently relies on interactions with others rather than a reliance on the individual’s 
capability of reasoning without others. Taking our point of departure in this realization, 
persuasion, as a special type of interaction, also becomes inherently social, and the 
persuadee consequently has to acknowledge and interpret the persuader in order to 
navigate the persuasive situation and evaluate the quality of the persuasive attempt. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Oaksford (2011) agrees with Mercier and Sperber in that reasoning is social and argumentative, and 
expands upon this by introducing the Bayesian qualification of argument strength already discussed in 
2.4. That is, the framework for persuasion developed agrees with both these contentions: that persuasion 
is inherently social and that it relies on probabilistic, uncertain reasoning.  
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chapter focuses on central elements involved in interpreting the persuader as well as a 
concrete model describing, from a probabilistic perspective, how humans deal with 
source credibility.  
As noted previously, we live in an epistemologically uncertain reality, and 
the plausibility of beliefs may constantly shift. In other words, information is uncertain 
from an epistemological point of view. Furthermore, the benefits of communication, as 
pointed out in Sperber (2000), rely on the fact that we might obtain information from 
others that we would not be able to ascertain ourselves. In this way, humans need to 
engage with others in order to share and gain information. That is, of the amount of 
information that any given human being contains, much of it will come from other 
human beings in form of information about history, scientific explorations, everyday 
conversation and so forth. Given this benefit of communication and information 
negotiation, persuasion becomes a central aspect of human social existence, as humans 
are able to strategically push each other’s beliefs. To reap the great benefits of 
communication, there has to be some degree of trust between the interlocutors such that 
the information presented by the persuader is taken to be more or less reliable. 
However, as Sperber et al. (2010) discuss, the communication picture is not always 
beneficial. One specific danger of communication in general and persuasion in 
particular is the potential of being misinformed and deceived such that the persuadee 
alters her beliefs to something that seems more likely to her, but is less likely in reality 
(e.g. believing that the 1969 moon landing was fake despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary). This can occur when the persuader is malicious or has deceptive aims that 
differ from those of the persuadee. In this way, the persuadee’s interpretation of the 
persuader from the point of view of perceived expertise and trustworthiness become 
central elements of approaching acts of persuasion.  
Invoking Bayesian inferences in particular, and probabilistic reasoning in 
general, as the underlying model of reasoning, the subjective and contextual nature of 
processing persuasion becomes apparent. Investigations in social psychology strongly 
suggest that humans are susceptible to their immediate environment both in terms of 
what other people do (Cialdini, 2007) and how their choices are framed (the so-called 
choice architecture) (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). There is an important element of 
defining persuasion lurking here since the social context, interactions with others, and 
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the physical context might well alter the behaviour of the persuadee. That is, the 
influence of others as well as the environment is capable of changing the way we act 
and possibly also of affecting our beliefs. As discussed in 1.8, this constitutes influence 
since behaviour can be altered in a variety of ways that need not necessarily involve 
change in beliefs (for instance, coercion, suggestive contexts, following the acts of 
others, etc.). The definition of persuasion offered in the first chapter is concerned with 
the change in beliefs, which may or may not entail changes in behaviour. Thus, the 
evidence cited in Cialdini (2007) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) is concerned with 
influence, not persuasion. However, these influences also have the potential of changing 
the beliefs of the persuadee. Indeed, given the assumptions from Hood (2012) 
concerning the importance of interactions, the socio-cultural upbringing, etc. on beliefs 
it would be contradictory to suggest that social interactions and the environment only 
affect behaviour and thus functions as influence. In other words, the premises of the 
thesis fully acknowledge that social interactions and the context has the capability to 
change beliefs and thus function as a type of persuasion. However, the thesis explores 
verbal persuasion between two individuals. Therefore, the potential belief changes 
stemming from socio-contextual factors, though essential in describing the 
conceptualisation of subjectivity, is another type of persuasion than the one investigated 
here. Nonetheless, it remains an incredibly interesting topic and future research should 
explore the relationship between persuasive utterance (as explored here), persuasive 
social interaction (on beliefs, not necessarily behaviour), and the persuasive potential of 
the environment (also, focussing on changes in beliefs).  
As mentioned in 2.3.1, this indicates the remits of the subjective element 
of the probabilistic estimations. That is, the estimations are personal and subjective 
springing from states of knowledge and beliefs, but, as evident from social psychology 
and nudging studies, the estimation does not happen in isolation from others. Rather, the 
frame from which the subjective estimation is possible relies on the presence of the 
other interlocutor. The notion of interaction and immersion will be discussed further in 
chapters 5 and 6, as the focus of the present chapter is concerned with discussing the 
notions of vigilance, motives, and source credibility as central concepts of persuasion 
processing. In particular, I argue that vigilance toward misinformation is a crucial 
element in the persuasive situation due to the inherent risk of deception in persuasion. 
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The concept of vigilance, as discussed in 3.1, is motivated by the perception of 
persuasive motives such that the same person might yield different estimations of 
credibility and expertise and beckon different levels of cognitive effort in the form of 
vigilance depending on the situation. In 3.2 the discussion of mentalizing offers a more 
in-depth understanding of how the capability to infer beliefs, wishes, and intentions of 
other people affects vigilance as well as source credibility in general. Finally, 3.3 and 
3.4 outline how trustworthiness and expertise constitute the credibility of the source 
from a probabilistic perspective in line with Harris et al. (submitted). The formalisation 
presented is an attempt to integrate on a conceptual level the definitions of uncertain 
reasoning from the previous chapter.  
 
3.1. Persuader and persuadee: Vigilance toward misinformation 
Sperber rightly points to the immense benefits of social interaction and human 
communication. He argues that instead  “…of being restricted in one’s knowledge to the 
products of one’s own experiences and thinking, communication makes experience and 
thinking available by proxy” (Sperber, 2000, see also Sperber, 2001). However, this 
beneficial phenomenon entails certain vulnerabilities since being open to new 
information that the person has not experienced herself makes her open to 
misinformation. This does not entail that humans lie frequently, however, as compared 
with honest communication in everyday conversation. A diary report by DePaulo et al. 
(1998) report that college students on average lie only 1.96 times per day (see table 2, p. 
984, see also O’sullivan et al., 1988). This low level compared to the amount of times 
students are honest makes sense given the proclivity to lie is tied to situations in which 
one interlocutor has something particular to gain rather than, say, misinforming a 
stranger as to what time it is. Thus, in most situations, humans should thus expect their 
interlocutor to be honest (e.g. when asking a stranger for the time). If lying was more 
prevalent, we should expect a rapid breakdown of communication due to a high 
likelihood of misinformation. However, when approaching other humans, we need to 
keep the potential in mind that they may have the intention to misinform us. 
Nonetheless, given the pervasiveness of communication, it may be assumed that people 
in general are well equipped to evaluate the source of information such that 
communication becomes overall beneficial (Sperber, 2001; Bergstrom et al., 2006). If 
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they were not, communication would be non-productive and would soon come to a 
grinding halt. Sperber’s (2000) argument for the necessary benefits of communication 
in general can, mutatis mutandis, be made for persuasion.  
As Sperber et al (2010) remark, the problem with communication is often 
not concerned with the competence of the speakers, but with honesty and diverging 
intentions. Communication and persuasion, as discussed in 1.3, needs the perception of 
intentionality when conveying information (recall the example with the child and cookie 
jar in which the communication was only conceptualised as persuasive if both 
interlocutors acknowledged the persuasive intention of the child). Without an intention 
to engage in a persuasive setting, beliefs may be altered, but in this framework they are 
not altered due to persuasion unless (at least one of) the interlocutors are aware (to some 
extent) of the fact that they are engaged in a persuasive situation. The potentially 
diverging aims of the persuadee and persuader thus become central to the interactive 
situation in which the persuasion takes place. In acts of persuasion, DePaulo’s data may 
potentially be an underestimation since persuasion represents a particular type of 
communication in which the potential difference in aims between interlocutors might 
cause the persuader to lie, deceive and misrepresent information more frequently than in 
vernacular conversation (e.g. the difference between selling a car and telling the time to 
a stranger). Persuaders, as previously mentioned, cannot expect to entertain the same 
aims as the persuadee, and persuasion may be antagonistic and manipulative. 
Furthermore, as remarked in 1.5, persuasion, in a goal-oriented manner, cannot be 
equated with alignment and consensus due to the potential different aims of the 
persuader and the persuadee97. As a direct consequence of this, we may expect acts of 
persuasion to invite more vigilance towards misinformation on the part of the persuadee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 As a baseline assumption, however, I expect that most instances of persuasion will still involve 
benevolent intentions (such as everyday arguments, political discussions, scientific debates and so on 
where interlocutors do try and persuade one another, but from benevolent intentions). I assume this firstly 
because of the vast pervasiveness of persuasion and the societal benefits of these and secondly due to the 
fact that if persuasion were mainly manipulative and deceptive, interlocutors should opt out of these 
situations as soon as they realize that are in a persuasive situation. However, this is not the case, and 
consequently I assume that the amount of lies may be greater than in everyday conversation, but not so 
great as to undermine the general aim of persuasive efforts such that it benefits both persuader and 
persuadee.  
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since she can be taken to be aware of the potential deceptive element involved in 
persuasion98.  
 The tendency to vigilance is increased due to the epistemological 
uncertainty of the world in general and in acts of persuasion in particular. DeRose 
(1992) expands upon this by introducing the notion of epistemic contextualism. This is 
the notion that standards of knowledge and meaning vary across different epistemic 
states of contexts of communication (De Rose, 1992, see also Origgi, 2008). That is, 
depending on the situation, the persuadee may require a different weight of evidence in 
order to be persuaded depending on the possible consequences of misinformation. In 
other words, the same information pertaining to the same issue may be evaluated very 
differently depending on the potential outcomes of acceptance. Origgi (2008) provides 
an example concerning the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq where the 
epistemic nature of such a question is less pressing at a dinner table than if the same 
contention is uttered in a political context. Hearers in the latter would naturally assert 
more vigilance toward misinformation whereas the same hearer might not bother to 
think too much about the issue in the former situation. That is, hearers “…adjust [their] 
interpretations according not only to [their] pragmatic expectations, but also to [their] 
epistemic needs” (Origgi, 2008, p. 41). Here, I take epistemic needs to refer to the 
epistemological considerations for the persuadee given the persuasive situation. That is, 
the directedness of her intentionality towards consistency (as discussed in 2.5) and the 
persuasive aim of obtaining likely beliefs (as discussed in 1.4)99. This relates to the 
notion that humans may invest a varying degree of cognitive effort in being vigilant 
towards misinformation depending on potential future outcomes (Evans, 2003, see also 
7.4)100. So, to sum up, the present thesis assumes vigilance because divergent aims, 
epistemological uncertainty, and the potential of misrepresentation in the situation.  
 In order to describe the differences in interpretations that spring from the 
varying epistemic needs, Sperber et al (2010) presents the notion of epistemic vigilance, 
which is “…targeted at the risk of being misinformed by others” (p. 359). Epistemic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Like with previous distinctions, this naturally is a gradient distinction since some persuasive incidents 
would involve little cause for epistemic vigilance (e.g. a teacher trying to change the beliefs of her 
students).  
99 The intentionality stance is further discussed in 6.1 
100 Note, however, that the account developed here does not entail a dual-process mechanism despite 
referencing Evans. This will be discussed later in the thesis. 
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vigilance, then, is aimed at describing the degree of trust or distrust you invest in a 
person, the content, or the reasoning. Vigilance toward misinformation has been applied 
to a range of topics ranging from children’s attitudes towards deception (Mascaro & 
Sperber, 2009), consumers’ persuasion knowledge in the PKM (Kirmani & Zhu, 2007) 
as well as general epistemic vigilance towards misinformation and deception (Sperber et 
al., 2010). Notice, however, that vigilance is not the opposite of trust; it is the opposite 
of blind trust (Yamagishi, 2001). That is, given trust, the persuadee may accept some of 
the proposed statements; given blind trust the persuadee would accept all statements. In 
formal terms, epistemic vigilance is the negation of a universal quantifier of trust (¬∀), 
rather than a negation of the existential quantifier (¬∃). As such, epistemic vigilance 
exists on a gradient scale of trust in which the persuadee may invest more or less energy 
in examining the act of persuasion. By invoking a potentially gradient scale of 
vigilance, we may assume that the persuadee may invest a gradient amount of cognitive 
effort such that more vigilance requires a greater effort. Sperber et al. (2010) hint at this 
by reminding the reader that “…if you happen to hear a comment on the radio about a 
competition in some sport you neither know nor care about, you are unlikely to invest 
any extra energy in deciding whether or not to believe what you hear” (p. 362). As will 
be discussed in 7.4, divergence in cognitive effort and divergence in experience may be 
central elements when accounting for the fact that some people are easier to persuade 
than others.  
In the persuasion situation, there are several elements that the persuadee 
may be vigilant towards. Some important elements are vigilance toward subjectively 
estimated source credibility and the content strength of the persuasive attempt. The 
former is concerned with the interpretation of the persuader, which in the formalisation 
of source credibility in the SPIMP concerns trust and expertise. As such this aspect of 
vigilance is the main focus of this chapter. As Oaksford (2011) notes and as discussed 
in the previous chapter, the conceptualization of argument strength as well as reasoning 
from uncertain evidence may well be captured in a Bayesian framework. To reiterate 
from chapter 2, the persuadee makes use of her probabilistic estimations to drive her 
interpretation and evaluation of the evidence and the reasoning in the act of persuasion. 
Having already discussed the theoretical considerations for this from a persuasion 
perspective, I will say little of this here. I will, to provide a thorough theoretical 
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background for the theory of persuasion developed throughout the thesis, briefly discuss 
vigilance toward the reasoning in the act of persuasion and how this reinforces the role 
of formal logic discussed in 2.2, namely that people may well aim for logical 
consistency, but that this cannot be the psychological underpinning function in 
describing what humans computationally do (as in Marr’s (1982) levels). 
Naturally, the way the persuader presents himself is not necessarily 
honest. This is already observed in rhetorical theory, which bequeaths the rhetor as ‘first 
persona’ (see e.g. Black, 1970), meaning that the rhetor may don a mask and present 
himself in a favourable way to a particular audience. That is, the persuader often 
presents himself strategically such that it will suit his aims the best. This is hardly 
surprising, but it does present an extra layer of difficulty when the persuadee has to 
manage the interaction with the persuader, namely that the persuadee cannot (in any 
way) be certain that the persuader presents himself in an honest manner. As will be 
discussed in 3.3, the persuadee’s attitude towards the source may be broken down into a 
variety of elements including amount of expertise on the subject, the perception of how 
benevolent/malevolent the persuader is, and the perception of his qualities from an 
ethical perspective. The particular variables considered in the present formalisation of 
how the persuadee deals with source credibility in a persuasive situation are 
trustworthiness and expertise. Source credibility, alongside he subjective estimation of 
content strength, is the central element of the SPIMP. Extraneous elements such as 
authority, height, and attractiveness might also play a part in our perception of our 
interlocutors, and consequently the present conceptualisation concerning source 
credibility lodges in a larger discussion concerning source credibility that also takes into 
account these extraneous variables and explores how they influence trustworthiness and 
expertise. The relationship between the central elements of the model and modifying 
factors (such as extraneous variables, the interaction with others, and emotion states) 
should be further explored in future research in order to sharpen, test, and expand upon 
the SPIMP. Given these elements of the perception of the persuader, the persuadee may 
be more or less inclined to believe him101. For instance, if the persuadee believes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 As with reasoning in general, bear in mind that the perception of the persuader is taken to be 
inherently subjective such that two people may entertain vastly different opinions about the speaker. The 
model presented in 3.3 takes this into account in the same way that differences in the perception of 
probabilistic estimations of argument strength is taken into account in the Bayesian framework: different 
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speaker to be an expert in the given topic, but simultaneously believes that he is 
malevolent, both traits will feature in a complex causal network that describes how we 
approach source characteristics. As discussed in 6.3 and 7.4, whether we focus on 
particular elements of source credibility is a matter of persuasive presence, cognitive 
effort, and cognitive limitations, which will subsequently influence the ultimate 
evaluation of the persuasion attempt.  
 Vigilance towards the quality of reasoning may be seen as tied to a 
somewhat larger reasoning perspective, namely consistency (see 2.5 for a discussion as 
to why consistency in the present framework is assumed to be geared towards local 
rather than global consistency). In the persuasive situation, there are at least two types 
of consistencies that are essential. One is the consistency of the evidence provided by 
the persuader. That is, when presenting the evidence, the persuader might provide 
contradictory evidence. This should naturally decrease the persuasiveness of the 
attempt, as the intentionality of the persuadee is assumed to be directed towards 
consistency. The second, and conceptually trickier, type of consistency is the 
consistency of beliefs of the persuadee compared with the persuasive attempt. The 
reason for the increased complexity is due to the fact that this type of consistency is tied 
to the persuasive aims of both interlocutors. In the one hand, it is assumed the 
intentionality of the persuadee is directed towards consistency such that she aims to 
ascertain as credible and grounded beliefs as possible. As such, evidence that is 
consistent with what is (locally) credible according to her prior beliefs should be more 
persuasive. However, the persuader is assumed to know the persuasive aim of the 
persuadee, which entails that he should direct his evidence such that it seems maximally 
consistent and persuasive. Thus, this type of consistency between the evidence and the 
prior beliefs of the persuadee is complex since it adheres to both aims of the 
interlocutors in a potentially deceptive situation. Throughout the chapter, I argue that 
the perceived persuasive motives (whether or not the persuader aims to deceive or 
inform) and the credibility of the source (as formalised from trustworthiness and 
expertise in 3.3) influences the amount of cognitive effort invested in being 
epistemically vigilant, as discussed in this section. In other words, evidence-persuadee 
consistency represents a challenging phenomenon, which is influenced heavily by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
estimations of the speaker yields different posteriors given the fact that they skew the perception of the 
acts of persuasion differently.  
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interactions and the context since it features in both interlocutors’ aims in a potentially 
antagonistic situation. The exploration of source credibility and vigilance in the 
following sections of the chapter is concerned with the persuadee-evidence consistency 
rather than the more simple evidence-based consistency. The concepts of epistemic 
vigilance, motives, and source credibility are central to discussing evidence-persuadee 
consistency.  
Sperber (2000) coins the term logico-rhetorical ability connected with 
consistency-checking, which exists “…as a means to filter communicated information, 
and, on the other hand, as a means to penetrate the filters of others”. That is, the 
persuadee is directed towards consistency of the information presented to her such that 
greater consistency should yield greater argument strength102 . As argued in 2.5, 
consistency in general is a desirable aim for the persuadee given the benefits of a 
consistent belief system. However, as argued, the consistency-checking first and 
foremost occurs on a local level. Indeed, global consistency might be an unrealisable 
aim, since a perfectly consistent global belief system requires full access to all beliefs 
and enough cognitive effort to cross-reference all beliefs when confronted with novel 
evidence. Such a (limitless) system containing all knowledge should mathematically 
yield consistency throughout the system. However, this is cognitively unattainable. 
Humans are incapable of living up to such standards and the subsequent consequences 
for global belief consistency due to limited cognitive capabilities, limited knowledge, 
and limited time. For now, then, it suffices to remind that humans are assumed to be 
geared towards being locally consistent with their immediately recalled beliefs in the 
present moment (see also 6.3 for a discussion of presence), and that this primary local 
focus is an aim for the persuadee: to be as consistent as possible with as well-informed 
beliefs as possible given that this will entail greater consistency in mental structures, 
world knowledge, and general performance, 
Since epistemic vigilance provides an interesting framework for 
conceptualizing the epistemic relationship between persuader and persuadee an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Note that consistency in no way is the only argument quality. Thus, a proponent of slavery may take 
point of departure in certain assumptions and develop a fully consistent argument (we only need to look 
to history for examples of this). This does not entail that a persuadee should accept the argument due to 
the fact that the premises may be flawed, other interpretations of evidence may be provided etc. That is, 
consistency does not necessarily entail persuasion despite the fact that being consistent helps the 
persuader.  
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investigating of literature from this field is of central benefit. However, the ontogenesis 
of epistemic vigilance falls beyond the scope of the thesis. Studies of children’s’ 
development have shown interesting aspects of vigilance that may provide an initial 
picture concerning the question of vigilance toward misinformation. Various authors 
show that vigilance toward misinformation develops throughout early childhood as 
children become more capable of critically evaluating the intentions and persuasive 
strategies of others. For instance, children at the early age of four exhibit traits of 
vigilance towards deception (Couillard & Woodward, 1999; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), 
around the age of seven they seem to acquire beliefs about strategic deception (Beal & 
Belgrad, 1990; Peskin, 1992), and during adolescence children become more sceptical 
towards different forms of social communication (Boyes & Chandler, 1992) 103 . 
Identifying trustworthiness and expertise as the two main factors of source credibility 
(see 3.3.), it is interesting that children already at the age of three have a propensity to 
prefer informants who indeed appear competent (Clément et al., 2004) and benevolent 
(Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), which supports the assumption that these traits are central 
to evaluation of source credibility already at an early age. Despite this evidence, 
relatively little is known concerning the offset of vigilance and the knowledge of 
persuasion strategies (Boush et al., 1994)104. Nonetheless, it seems fairly safe to assume 
that humans gain an increasing amount of knowledge about and vigilance towards 
deception and deceptive strategies, but that differences remain between individuals in 
terms of how critical and vigilant they are capable of being (incidentally, this is in line 
with the predictions of the Persuasion Knowledge Model, see Friedstad & Wright, 
1994, 1995, since greater knowledge of persuasion strategies should entail that the 
individual is better equipped to critically assess persuasive attempts).  
In sum, the three types of vigilance central to persuasion theory (content, 
reasoning, and source) may readily be integrated in the framework suggested in this 
thesis. Firstly, in terms of content, probabilistic reasoning is invoked such that the 
vigilance toward misinformation should be captured by the subjective element of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 For a review of developmental literature on vigilance towards misinformation and persuasion 
strategies, see Heyman (2008), but also Friestad & Wright (1994), pp. 6-8; Sperber et al. (2010), pp. 371-
374.   
104 The illusiveness of pinning down the developmental ability to cope with persuasion attempts may to 
some extent be due to the fact that children are exposed to increasingly varying education, cultures, etc. as 
they grow up, which would facilitate differences in coping mechanisms, see 7.4 
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probabilistic estimations. That is, given vigilance toward a piece of evidence, we should 
expect the probabilistic estimation to be lower. This may materialize either as vigilance 
stemming from the persuadee’s priors or from her estimation of the likelihood of the 
given piece of evidence. If she is highly vigilant towards misinformation, the 
subsequent posterior should therefore be lower. It remains an open question how this 
vigilance develops and materializes throughout life, but given vigilance toward 
evidence, the present model expects lower estimates of either priors of likelihood.  
Essentially, the notion of vigilance is intimately connected with the 
perception of motives. The concept of motives underlies the necessity of vigilance and 
frames the credibility of the source, and, as such, it is a central element to conceptually 
describe persuasion processing. Notably, I do not assume that the persuadee necessarily 
has a conscious and reflected perception of the motives of the persuader (this links to 
the use of the concept of mentalizing as discussed in 3.2). However, as noted in 1.3, the 
type of persuasion discussed in the thesis is one in which both interlocutors 
acknowledge the persuasive intention. As such, I assume that the motive of persuasion 
is recognised in the situation. However, there might be supplementary motives 
accompanying the persuasive intention (such as the motive to earn money, deceive, pick 
up, etc.), and these might not be recognised in the situation. However, in navigating a 
persuasive situation effectively (i.e. avoiding deception), a greater appreciation of the 
motives should facilitate a greater awareness of when vigilance towards misinformation 
is necessary.  
Importantly, the perception of motives and the potential ramifications for 
persuasion processing mechanisms are influenced by context and topic. To exemplify 
the context- and topic-dependency of the perception of motives and the consequence for 
the potential evocation of vigilance, consider a car salesman. A person might converse 
with the salesman in a situation in which the salesman tells the person about the well-
being of his petunias. Here, there is no immediate perception of a persuasive, or 
deceptive, motive, as an everyday conversation regarding flowers is epistemically 
‘safe’. This, however, can be considered an information transmission rather than a 
persuasive situation given the potential lack of persuasive intention. More closely 
related, the same salesman might engage in a political debate with a clear persuasive 
intention, recognised by the interlocutor. Again, the interlocutor might not attribute any 
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particular motive to the salesman (other than a desire to triumph in discussion or to 
persuade the interlocutor of a particular belief) since the salesman does not stand to gain 
a particular boon by persuading the persuadee. Conversely, the same salesman might 
inform a costumer about the performance of a particular car in a sales situation. Here, 
the persuadee might rightly expect an accompanying motive of profit to the persuasive 
intention and consequently we might expect vigilance toward misinformation to be 
activated to a higher degree. Thus, the notion of motive, as an underlying factor for 
vigilance, is context- and topic-dependent. Furthermore, the perception of an 
antagonistic motive, alongside facilitating higher degree of vigilance, might also 
influence the perception of trust-worthiness. 
Secondly, I approach vigilance toward reasoning from two angles. Firstly, 
as discussed in 2.4, Bayesian argumentation theory provides clear predictions 
concerning the validity of practical argumentation that are supported empirically. In this 
way, subjective probabilistic reasoning provides the computational background for 
conceptualizing vigilance toward the quality of reasoning in the act of persuasion. 
Secondly and underpinning this, it is assumed that humans generally are geared towards 
being consistent with themselves from a logico-rhetorical (as described by Sperber, 
2000) perspective in order to function as optimally as possible. Recall here, that there is 
a distinction between global consistency as a goal and local consistency as an 
achievable aim. I assume that humans are directed towards being consistent, but that 
they often find themselves faced with cognitive limitations, contradictory beliefs, and 
normatively flawed reasoning due to a lack of ability to be consistent105.  
Finally, Vigilance toward the source is the focus of both 3.2 and 3.3, but 
as a preliminary remark it is worth noting that a similar relationship should take place 
such that a source estimated to be incompetent, containing undesirable character traits, 
or malicious should yield lower posterior outcomes. In 3.3, I formalize the notion of 
source credibility and integrate it in a complex, causal model in order to provide a 
snippet of the picture.	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 I speculate that this inconsistency may stem from a range of influences such as cultural background, 
your upbringing, your mental faculties, your attention, your education etc. To investigate this further 
would be a very interesting field of research that could potentially discuss differences in how easily 
humans are manipulated and persuaded.  
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3.2. Mentalizing 
To further approach vigilance, source credibility, and the concept of the psychological 
other as a central element in processing acts of persuasion, we turn to mentalizing 
capabilities. Recent developments in psychological literature offer a theoretical 
description a particular type of cognitive activity humans seem to perform when they 
interpret the beliefs and actions of other humans. Mentalizing refers to “…our belief 
that other people have minds different from our own and also to our capability to infer 
beliefs, wishes, and intentions of other people in order to predict their behaviour…” 
(Frith, 1992, see also Hooker, 2008)106. The concept has been applied to a range of areas 
such as child development (e.g. Surian, et al., 2007) and marketing (Sujan, 1999; 
Dietvorst et al., 2009). To support the behavioural evidence, neuroscientific research 
has further explored mentalizing. The results of the studies suggest that mentalizing is 
an activity spread over a large area of the brain. Thus, Grèzes et al (2004a; 2004b), 
Gallagher et al. (2002), and Fletcher et al. (2002) report mentalizing activity in the 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), Saxe and Wexler (2005) report mentalizing in both 
left and right temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ) whilst Frith and Frith (2003; 2006) report 
activity in the temporal pole (TP). Dietvorst et al. (2009) find support for both MPFC 
and TPJ107. The fact that neuroscientific evidence places the mentalizing ability in such 
a variety of brain regions might indicate that mentalizing can be taken to be a complex, 
high-level ability that might be activated in a plethora of social and interactive situations 
(hence the difference in activation of ROIs).  
Mentalizing can be phrased as two different psychological concepts, 
namely theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST). This will be discussed later, but 
refers to whether or not a high-level propositional theory is necessary for mentalizing or 
not. As will be evident from the subsequent discussion, the stance taken here argues that 
humans have the capability to infer complex mental states in a propositional manner 
(e.g. “I think he is lying”), but that the mentalizing process involved in persuasion does 
not need to be conscious. As such, the acknowledgement of the fact that the interlocutor 
has different knowledge, intentions, and motivations, a conscious reflection upon this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Mentalizing is similar to Theory of Mind (ToM), which “…refers to the capacity to interpret, predict, 
and explain the behaviour of others in terms of their underlying mental states” (Scholl & Leslie, 1999, p. 
132, see also Leslie, 1987; 1994; Fodor, 1992).  
107 For a review of neuroscientific research in social cognition see Frith & Frith (2008). For a general 
introduction to neuroscientific research, see Ward (2006).  
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fact is not necessarily involved in persuasion processing. As noted regarding the role of 
motives, the recognition of the persuasive intention is necessary, but more complex 
inferences of motives are not necessary, although they might be very useful for the 
persuadee. Note also that high-level metarepresentational and propositional mechanisms 
face serious challenges in functioning as the baseline for cognitive mechanisms such as 
persuasion processing (see Madsen et al., in prep). Thus, despite the potential 
involvement in persuasion processing, high-level TT mentalizing from a theoretical and 
empirical point of view cannot be the foundation of reasoning and communication (this 
concerns metarepresentational constructs in general. The argument against these as 
foundation cognitive mechanisms is developed in 4.2. The argument for the limitations 
of mentalizing follows mutatis mutandis, as mentalizing can be construed as a 
specialised form of metarepresentation). Given the prevalence of the concept in various 
disciplines with a number of practical applications alongside the neuroscientific 
evidence, it seems safe, though, to assume that humans are able to perform mentalizing 
activities, even though such a cognitive function might be high-level rather than 
cognitively foundational. That is, human beings are able to guesstimate the mental 
states of other people given gradient cognitive investment. However, as argued in 5.3, 
some interaction with the other is necessary in reasoning and communication (and 
consequently in persuasion), but that this might be better approached foundationally 
from a mechanistic perspective. Indeed, as evident from the Sally-Anne tests (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985)108, the sense of the other is fundamental to 
reasoning and interaction, as humans are able to distinguish between the type of 
knowledge entertained by different people as opposed to their own knowledge 
structures (such that for example I reliably can infer that the meteorologist knows more 
about weather conditions than I do myself). As will be evident from 3.3, such 
differences in knowledge (or: expertise) play a major role in defining source credibility 
in persuasive settings.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 The Sally-Anne test is briefly that the child watches two dolls play with an object. Following the 
game, they place the object in a container and one doll is removed. The remaining doll then plays with the 
object again and places it in a different container. After this, the removed doll is reintroduced and the 
child is asked where she will look if she wants to play with the object. To answer correctly, the child has 
to be able to sustain the knowledge that the remove doll has less information. Thus, if the child is unable 
to mentalize, it thinks the removed doll has the same information as itself and will look in the new box. 
Elder children, however, are able to say that the removed doll will look in the now empty container. 
Incidentally, autistic people have difficulty with this, indicating their difficulty with mentalizing and 
consequently with navigating social situations (White et al., 2009).  
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The beneficial aspects of including mentalizing in an integrated theory of 
persuasion lie in the fact that the persuadee conceptually needs a cognitive mechanism 
to guide her perception of the persuader given the assumption that persuasion is 
interactive and contextual. Given the volatile and potentially antagonistic nature of 
persuasion, the ability to form an impression of the other interlocutor is essential for 
both the persuader and the persuadee. From the persuadee’s perspective, every 
persuasive situation carries with it the presumption that there might be differences in 
aims between her and the persuader – as discussed in the previous section pertaining to 
epistemic vigilance. In order to navigate more effectively, she consequently needs to 
entertain a notion of these differences, and here mentalizing offers an interesting 
account of the type of high-level cognitive activity that may occur109. By inferring the 
mental states and differences in knowledge, the persuadee may more successfully be 
epistemically vigilant toward misinformation. For the persuader, on the other hand, the 
story is inverted. In order to circumvent the epistemic vigilance (in antagonistic 
situations), he may proffer from having an idea of his interlocutor. That is, without such 
awareness, the persuader would find strategic communication difficult (or downright 
impossible) to deceive and manipulate. Conversely, in beneficial situations, the 
persuader needs some approximation of shared knowledge in order to be informative. In 
sum, some form of mentalizing, or at least the concept of the other, is necessarily 
involved in persuasive settings both from the point of view of the persuader and the 
persuadee. To further this conceptual discussion, 3.3 formalizes source credibility as an 
evaluation of source credibility concerning expertise and trustworthiness as central 
elements that the persuadee has to (consciously or unconsciously) infer.  
From a conceptual point of view, mentalizing defined in the above as 
“…our capability to infer beliefs, wishes, and intentions of other people” (Frith, 1992) 
is a related, but more narrow concept in comparison with the concept of empathy110. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 As before, I stress that mentalizing varies on a gradient scale of effort such that the persuadee may 
invest a lot of energy in trying to interpret and understand the persuader, but she might also invest next to 
no cognitive effort. For instance, imagine the difference between the efforts exerted that a text message 
might invoke. If a teenager in love receives one message, she may spend hours considering the intentions 
and beliefs underlying the message whereas if the same message were sent several months into a 
relationship, less cognitive effort would be exerted.  
110 Mentalizing has also been proposed as a foundation for empathy (see Hodges & Klein, 2001, pp. 438-
440 for a review of definitions, see also, Hooker et al., 2008; Schnell et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), 
which is a quality that might be important in persuasion processing given the potential influence of 
emotion states on probabilistic estimations. Note, however, that persuasion processing at its most basic 
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order to ascertain a closer terminological exploration of mentalizing and its role in 
persuasion processing, it is necessary to further explore the concept. Two main 
descriptions of mentalizing has been put forth, namely theory-theory version (TT, see 
e.g. Gopnik, 2008)111 and a simulation-theory version (ST, e.g. Gallese, 2001, see 
Zahavi, 2011b, for a discussion of simulation theory and subjectivity). TT refers to a 
type of mentalizing in which the person has in mind a theory on a propositional level of 
the interlocutor. ST, on the other hand, does not assume a propositional theory, but 
rather a simulated experience from which the person infers the mental states of the other 
(for a presentation of this, see Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Zahavi, 2011b)112. That is, TT 
is concerned with a mental inference concerning the mental states of someone else. This 
is indicated well by the fact that the approach is described as a theory of the mental 
states of the other. ST, on the other hand, is empathetic in nature in the sense that it 
presupposes that humans not only infer and hypothesise about the mental states of 
others, but also that they engage with these in a way such that they feel these 
themselves. Traditionally, these approaches have been theoretically separate. However, 
recent discussions in the philosophy of phenomenology suggest that the separation may 
not be as clean as previously thought (see e.g. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). That is, at a 
basic level, ST provides a simple mechanism for emulating and appreciating the 
feelings and thoughts of others without necessarily involving a direct propositionally 
expressible mental theory of the other. However, given the cognitive cost of 
mentalizing, it would be unsurprising if more investment could in fact yield more 
complex and conscious inferences such as posited in the TT. In this way, TT is merely 
an extension of a more basic ST mentalizing ability. As such, the basic concept of 
mentalizing invoked here as a fundamental element of persuasion processing need not 
be propositional or metarepresentational (as in TT), but can spring from an engagement 
with the interlocutor. It might be hypothesised that some form of mentalizing could 
function as the cognitive foundation for inferring the motives of the interlocutor. That 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
does not require empathy from a TT perspective (although whether or not empathy in a simple ST manner 
is required to conceptualise the other remains unclear). Rather, persuasion processing requires subjective 
estimations of content strength and source credibility. But subjectivity, as discussed in part II, is framed 
by a psychological framework (see table 7), which necessarily involves the context, the socio-cultural, 
and the other interlocutor.  
111 Zahavi (2007) further argues that Dennett’s concept of subjectivity and mind is akin to a theory-
theory, see p. 23 
112 For a general introduction to the notion of theory of other’s minds, see Carruthers (2006, pp. 174-186) 
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is, some form is indeed necessary in inferring the motive since such an inference 
requires the realisation of different mental states of the other, which is a key feature of 
mentalizing.  In the above car salesman example, the persuadee would have to recognise 
the fact that the car salesman has different beliefs, access to different knowledge, and 
potentially has different motives. As such, in order to elicit and infer motives (beyond 
that of recognising the persuasive intention), some form of mentalizing has to occur. 
Therefore, it is essential for a theory of persuasion to indicate the cognitive foundation 
from which it emerges, and here I assume, as a baseline, that mentalizing is interactive 
(as discussed in chapter 5) and not necessarily propositional, although this higher-level 
form of mentalizing naturally is possible given more cognitive effort (for instances in 
cases where the motive is considered to be doubtful, the persuadee might invest more in 
epistemic vigilance as well as contemplating the motives of the persuader in a more 
direct fashion)113.  
 Despite the evidence for the existence of mentalizing, however, the 
higher-level version of the concept is difficult to utilise as the foundation for interaction 
between humans in a persuasive situation. In particular, T-T mentalizing appears to be a 
high-level cognitive ability that relies on a more basic mechanistic interactivity (for a 
further discussion on the relationship between higher-level cognitive mechanisms such 
as metarepresentations and mentalizing and a mechanistic foundation, see chapter 5). 
That is, the cognitive assumptions underlying mentalizing do not guarantee empathy, 
coordination and other behavioural aspects necessary for a well-founded approach to 
interaction114. Specifically, some accounts of mentalizing – especially those relying on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Incidentally, the simulation theory might be supported by the recent findings in mirror-like systems, 
which argue that humans make use of cues from other humans in guiding their perception of these, and 
that humans, to some extent, cognitively ’mirror’ their actions, see Fadiga et al., 1995; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Iacobini & Dapretto, 2006, for a general introduction to the mirror-neuron hypothesis 
(see also Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008 for a philosophical account of how this matches with 
phenomenological approaches to subjectivity). Note, though, that the evidence is merely sketchy support 
for ST, as the mirror-neuron studies have not, to my knowledge, explored the notion of mentalizing. 
However, it does indicate that we, to some extent, simulate when understanding the emotions and mental 
states of others.  
114 It should be made clear that empathy is not a necessary element in persuasion processing, if the 
phenomenon, as here, is approached from the foundation of a mechanistic interaction (see 5.3). That is, 
on a fundamental level, empathy is not involved (if understood as a higher-level cognitive function in 
which the person empathises with the other). If empathy, however, is understood as a mirror-like 
mechanism through which we inform our perception of others, it might play a part as a fundamental 
element in conceptualising the other in the interactive immersion. This depends on the definition of 
empathy (as a low- or high-level function) 
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TT – are extrapolated form theories of metarepresentational capabilities 115 . The 
incapability of metarepresentational systems to function as the foundational basis of 
cognition bears relevance for a plethora of theories thought to be fundamental such as 
pragmatic enrichment and mentalizing, as these might be considered higher-level 
cognitive functions that are possible, but not necessary functions when communicating, 
reasoning, and interacting with others (see 4.2).  
 By revisiting literature on common knowledge, coordination and joint 
action in 5.2-5.3, I provide an approach to the other by introducing a mechanistic notion 
of interaction, which provides a foundation for the interpersonal relationship in 
persuasion processing. That is, given the evidence (developmental, neuroscientific, as 
well as anecdotal) it is safe to assume the existence of some form of mentalizing despite 
the fact that this might not function as the foundational element of interaction of mutual 
understanding. Some form of mentalizing is clearly a central aspect of persuasion 
processing such that the persuadee has to acknowledge (on some level) the otherness of 
the persuader and some qualities of the persuader (such as expertise and benevolence, 
which will be discussed in 3.3). In this way, mentalizing provides a key element in 
developing a holistic theory and model of persuasion processing.  
In particular, mentalizing is a complex cognitive process, which requires 
cognitive effort. As a higher-level cognitive mechanism and sophisticated tactic for 
navigating persuasive attempts by inferring the beliefs of the other, mentalizing is very 
useful in the process of evaluation of the credibility of the persuader, i.e. the source of 
the persuasive attempt. However, this is not a necessary cognitive involvement in 
persuasion. Rather, a simple form of mentalizing is required in order to consciously or 
unconsciously conceptualise the other (i.e. to acknowledge that others have different 
minds from our own). In its simple form (acknowledging the cognitive difference of the 
other), it is required in persuasion processing since the persuadee needs to engage with 
the proposed belief by interacting with another interlocutor. However, a more complex 
definition of mentalizing in which the persuadee consciously infers and contemplates 
the make-up of the beliefs of others is not necessary for persuasion processing. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 The notion of metarepresentations and the limitations of theories extrapolated from this will be 
discussed further in 4.2-4.4 when discussing the theoretical limitations of relevance theory as a theory of 
communication. Consequently, the discussion of the limitations of mentalizing is abridged here as many 
arguments will be similar, mutatis mutandis, in 4.2 
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example, the SPIMP takes into account the perceived trustworthiness and expertise, 
which does not necessarily include an idea of the mental states of the other. As such, the 
persuadee might perform some mechanism akin to an ST, but not necessarily a TT 
function when approaching the other. Finally, as argued in 4,2, higher-level cognitive 
mechanisms that rely on metarepresentational qualities (such as mentalizing) cannot be 
the foundational element from which a theory of cognitive behaviour and processing 
theory can emerge.  
 
3.3. Source credibility116 
Following, 3.1 and 3.2, it remains clear that the otherness of the persuader is a central 
element when the persuadee processes acts of persuasion 117 . In particular, by 
entertaining an idea of the mental states of the other and by engaging in epistemic 
vigilance, both interlocutors need to interact on some level in order to successfully 
navigate a persuasive situation. This section presents a specific model for source 
credibility to further explore the complex process of otherness in persuasion. 
Historically, source credibility is recognised in rhetoric under the guise of ethos (see 
e.g. McCroskey & Young, 1981; Aristotle, 1995a; see Conley, 1990 for a the use of the 
concept throughout rhetorical history). As mentioned in 1.1, ethos was split into three 
distinct sub-categories, namely phronesis (practical wisdom), arête (virtues), and eunoia 
(goodwill). As will be evident from the definition and formalisation of source 
credibility in this section relies on an updated, but similar idea of source credibility as 
being made up of various entities.  
 Alongside investigations in persuasion and attitude research in social 
psychology (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Schum, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a review see Pornpitakpan, 2004), source 
credibility has been applied to a range of topics relevant for a theory of persuasion. 
These include, but are not limited to, advertising (Braunsberger & Munch, 1998), 
judgement and decision-making (Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983), as a predictive parameter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 The content of the present section, though theoretically expanded and distinct, owes much to Harris et 
al. (submitted) and consequently, there will be similarities between the theoretical proposal here and the 
one presented in their paper.  
117 Alongside the psychological and philosophical literature on the other mentioned here, it is worth 
noting that literary and anthropological theory deal with the complex notion of ’otherness’, referring to 
something along the lines of DEFINITION (I am indebted to Ana Baeza Ruiz for pointing me to relevant 
literature in these disciplines) 
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for how testimonies should be evaluated (Hahn et al., 2012), and in argumentation 
(Harris et al., submitted)118. As Mascaro and Sperber (2009) convincingly argue, the 
development of the epistemic need to interpret and evaluate other begins early in 
childhood (see also Harris & Corriveau, 2011, for a review of children’s ability to 
distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources). As mentioned in 3.1, 7-year old 
children seem to acquire beliefs about strategic deception (Beal & Belgrad, 1990; 
Peskin, 1992), and adolescent children become increasingly sceptical towards different 
forms of social communication (Boyes & Chandler, 1992). In other words, the notion 
and use of trust in social situations seem to stem from childhood, and remains an 
important capability in various phenomena, as shown by the breadth of the studies cited 
in the above concerning the psychology of trust and expertise.  
 To approach a working definition of source credibility for a theory of 
persuasion processing, Walton (1997, p. 223) in his seminal contribution defines six 
main criteria for qualifying the relevance and strength of a particular source (see table 
4)119.  
Table 4: Walton’s (1997) criteria for source credibility 
Expertise question                 How credible is the source as an expert source? 
Field question                          Is the source an expert in the field that the issue concerns? 
Trustworthiness question                          Is the source a personally reliable source? 
Opinion question     What did the source assert that implies the conclusion? 
Backup evidence questions                       Is the source’s assertion based on evidence? 
Consistency question            Is the conclusion consistent with what other expert sources assert? 
 
Two remarks deserve to be discussed regarding Walton’s definition of source 
credibility. Firstly, there is no mentioning of the motives of the source as a factor in 
evaluation credibility. For reasons discussed in 3.1, motives seem to be a key element in 
distinguishing between the credibility of different speakers. Secondly, the boundaries 
between the criteria are not clearly defined and limited, as the first two criteria overlap 
significantly (if not entirely). As such, we might question the theoretical validity of 
Walton’s criteria, as they seem to overlap and omit motives as a key factor in source 
credibility. The criteria of ‘expertise’ and ‘trustworthiness’ are incorporated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Evidence also suggests that the use of particular language may increase/decrease source credibility, 
e.g. by using stereotypical representations (Abbate et al., 2004). For a review of the use of expertise and 
trust in psychological research, see Harris et al. (submitted).  
119 See also Walton (2008b), p. 218 
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formalization of the source credibility in the present thesis whereas the other criteria 
mentioned by Walton are incorporated as content elements or supplementary issues.	  
 Eventually, as discussed below, the definition of source credibility in this 
thesis will hinge upon issues concerning ‘expertise’ and ‘trustworthiness’, which 
conceptually are more clearly teased apart. Given this, a few remarks need to be made 
concerning Walton’s criteria. His first two criteria (expertise and field) are directly 
applicable to the formal definition of source credibility in the thesis given the fact that 
‘expertise’ (in the formalization) very much reflects whether or not the source can be 
considered an expert source, but also whether the expertise is within a relevant field. 
Thus, if debating economic policies, a meteorologist may very well be an expert (in 
weather conditions), but not an expert in the relevant field (economics). Overall, then, in 
a debate on economic policies, the meteorologist should not be considered an expert 
given the fact that her field of expertise is something else. Thus, expertise and field 
underlie the subsequent notion of ‘expertise’ (in the general model developed in this 
thesis). To continue, the ‘trustworthiness’ criterion in Walton’s criteria is directly 
represented in the subsequent model in that the reliability of the source is a major factor 
in the overall interpretation of the persuader (see conceptualization of trust later in this 
section).  That is, the persuadee may well believe that the persuader is an expert within 
a relevant field, but retain the notion that he is unreliable or untrustworthy, which 
consequently will bring down the persuasiveness of his act of persuasion. For instance, 
on April 27 2010 in the wake of the financial crisis, Lloyd Bankfein (Chairman and 
CEO of Goldman Sachs) was summoned to defend and explain the dispositions of the 
bank and the part the firm played in conjuring up the crisis. Bankfein is clearly an 
expert in a relevant field, but listeners to the inquiry might question the trustworthiness 
of the statements. That is, in any persuasive attempt, the persuader may present 
compelling evidence in a field within which he is an expert and still find that the 
persuadee does not believe him if she believes that he is untrustworthy120. Indeed, here 
the notion of motives resurfaces as important, as Bankfein presumably has a strong 
motive to avoid censure, which entails low trust in this specific case. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Indeed, a lack of trust is particularly damaging for a persuasive attempt given the fact that little trust 
entails little confidence in the evidence presented so that the entire act of persuasion is stultified given the 
fact that the persuadee would think the persuader might be lying about the evidence (and potentially his 
expertise).  
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importantly, although this motive would often be inferred, it is not a necessary 
component of the persuasive transaction since all that is required for persuasion to occur 
(from the scope of the present investigation) is for both interlocutors to realise the 
persuasive intention regardless of other accompanying motives. That being said, 
motives will most likely feature in most persuasive attempts, as persuadees should be 
able to recognise ulterior motives and potential differences in aims to some extent. As 
such, motives might very well become a motivating factor in determining the amount of 
cognitive effort and epistemic vigilance, but it is not necessarily involved since the 
persuadee, in principle, could be naïve and fail to realise any accompanying motives 
above and beyond the persuasive intention.  
Thus far, the expertise, field, and trustworthiness question all fall within 
the subsequent model of source credibility. However, the opinion and backup evidence 
questions touch on a slightly different nerve as this is concerned with the content of the 
statements that the source references rather than the evaluation of the source in and of 
himself. Naturally, producing high quality evidence will eventually increase the 
perception of the persuader’s source credibility, but mainly due to the fact that 
producing such content (with relevant backup evidence) eventually entails that he is an 
expert within a relevant field. That is, the quality of the content of the evidence (as 
conceptualised in 2.4) is concerned with how likely the evidence is rather than how 
credible the source is in the moment (the notion of time in acts of persuasion will be 
discussed further in 6.4)121. Thus, opinion and backup evidence are concerned with the 
content of the message rather than the credibility of the source. Finally, the consistency 
question touches upon whether the source agrees or disagrees with other experts within 
the relevant field. As will be evident from the subsequent model of source credibility, 
this is readily integrated in the approach as a supplementary issue when interpreting the 
persuader. In sum, Walton (1997) provides a strong and relevant point of departure for 
conceptualizing credibility despite the fact that some elements (opinion and backup 
evidence) are concerned with content rather than with source per se. Nonetheless, it 
remains that source credibility is a major element of persuasion. To sum up, the criteria 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 As reiterated throughout the thesis, persuasion cannot be reduced to a single moment in time in which 
the persuadee and the persuader interact. However, separating source credibility from quality of content 
conceptually requires the distinction between content and source despite the fact that these will interact 
with one another over time.  
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of ‘expertise’ and ‘trustworthiness’ are incorporated in the formalization of the source 
credibility in the present thesis whereas the other criteria mentioned by Walton are 
incorporated as content elements or supplementary issues.  
The reliance on source credibility, however, has been questioned in 
philosophical literature when examining the highly related concept of authority, which 
refers to information about the source without relevance for the actual persuasive 
information and act. As discussed in more detail in this section, authority can be divided 
into three distinct types of authority, namely epistemic authority (e.g. judges regarding 
legal issues), administrative authority (e.g. policemen whom you have to follow, not 
because of expertise, but because of the legal power vested in them), and cultural 
authority (e.g. Lady Gaga on legal issues who has authority due to popularity, but lacks 
expertise and administrative authority). The later formalisation of source credibility is 
concerned with epistemic authorities because it is closely related to expertise as well as 
trustworthiness and as such, this is the main focus of the remaining of the chapter. 
However, for the sake of completeness, the following briefly discusses the different 
types of authority.  
Appeal to authority (or ad verecundiam) is seen as a general logical 
fallacy (see e.g. Schopenhauer, 2009) due to the fact that it does not follow logically 
from a statement that simply because the statement is uttered by an authority, the 
content is necessarily true. However, I argue that this applies to a sub-set of elements 
pertaining to source credibility (such as administrative or cultural authority) whilst other 
elements are perfectly reasonable to consider when processing acts of persuasion (such 
as epistemic or cognitive authority). Nonetheless, the fact remains that interpreting the 
other interlocutor is a multifaceted and difficult process that involves a myriad of 
different elements. As a consequence, the remarks here are preliminary in nature (as 
indicated in the title of the thesis as well) that point toward future research in order to 
integrate source credibility with content sensitivity (see 7.2).  
 Given Walton (1997) and Harris et al. (submitted) we may qualify and 
expand upon the notion of ad verecundiam by exploring the difference between 
expertise and authority – or more generally, between information about the source, 
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which is or is not relevant for assessing the quality of an act of persuasion122. Harris et 
al. (submitted) distinguishes between epistemic authority (what Walton (1997) would 
label as cognitive authority) and administrative authority. Expertise may be 
conceptualized as the former, which entails that the person possesses “…superior 
knowledge about a specific field” (Harris et al., submitted). For example, a doctor 
possesses expert knowledge about medicine and should thus be considered an epistemic 
authority on the subject of health. Note, however, that expertise is tied to a specific 
field. Thus, the aforementioned doctor cannot be said to be an expert on high-risk 
trading123. Administrative authority, on the other hand, “…relates to those who have had 
authority bestowed upon them, and are thus in a position of power” (Ibid.). The example 
provided by Harris et al is that of a policeman to whom you should adhere concerning 
the laws of the land despite the fact that the policeman may not be a judicial expert. A 
crucial difference between the epistemic and the administrative authority is the 
consequences of disobedience. If I fail to adhere to the law, the administrative may 
exert upon me legal punishment whereas noncompliance with advice provided by the 
epistemic authority may result in undesirable consequences (e.g. not following medical 
advice from the doctor), but it cannot result in legal consequences.  
To this definition of two types of authority, one might add yet another 
type of authority, namely that of a cultural authority (which could theoretically include 
elements such as attractiveness, social standing, etc. as such factors might potentially be 
important to persuasion). Whereas the epistemic authority (or, the expert) enjoys a 
particular standing due to superior knowledge within a specific field and the 
administrative authority may exert influence due to the fact that power has been 
bestowed upon them by society, a group of people exert authority despite the fact that 
no social institution has bestowed any authority upon them. In the case of the 
administrative authority, the policeman should be adhered to only qua the fact that 
society (and the judicial and political experts who shaped the laws that the policeman 
upholds) has signed a social contract deeming him an authority. Compare this with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 As will be evident, however, both elements that are and are nor deemed to be relevant for assessing the 
quality of persuasion are present in any process of assessment (the prevalence and influence of relevant 
and non-relevant information is discussed more in-depth in 7.4) 
123 In order to further understand the notion of expertise and the reliance on this, it would be interesting to 
investigate potential spill-over effects of expertise given the fact that some people ask doctors for advice 
on other than strictly medical issues despite the fact that the doctors are not experts on this per se.  
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celebrities who, to a large extent, shape the beliefs of those who admire them despite the 
fact that they are given authority neither by possessing specialist knowledge about 
political, ethical, or environmental issues nor by a social contract with established 
society124. For instance, celebrities might be asked to comment on a variety of situations 
in which there are neither experts nor authoritative sources such as the financial crisis, 
animal welfare, and so on.  
In sum, authority may be sub-divided into (at least) three distinct entities, 
namely epistemic, administrative, and cultural, and this bears serious consequences for 
the conceptualization and subsequent evaluation of the ad verecundiam. This is due to 
the epistemic fact that information is uncertain, precarious, and difficult to obtain 
(especially specialist knowledge). For example, to diagnose whether or not you are 
affected with typhus, requires knowledge that takes years to obtain. Therefore, to rely 
on the information provided by a medical expert is entirely within the confinements of 
rational behaviour due to the fact that we cannot all be experts within a field. To adhere 
to administrative authority may also be considered rational due to the fact that the social 
consequences for breaking the law may be dire. Finally, though, to follow the advice of 
a cultural authority, with no epistemic or administrative authority, is the closest instance 
to ad verecundiam as a fallacy given the fact that the information provided by a cultural 
source should not be considered any more reliable than information provided by a 
random stranger with no epistemic or administrative authority125.  The formalisation of 
source credibility does incorporate epistemic authority since it builds on expertise, and 
also indirectly cultural authority since being an esteemed person from a cultural group 
may very well enhance the trustworthiness of this source among members of that group. 
Administrative authority is not incorporated since this type of authority mainly affects 
behaviour directly, and is not directed much towards affecting beliefs. The formalisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 This may be qualified a bit, as I fully acknowledge that stardom may be seen as a form of social 
contract between the celebrity and the rest of society in which celebrities are hoisted to a position of 
administrative authority qua their celebrité. However, this is a qualitative difference from the social 
contract by which the policeman gains his administrative authority and consequently should be 
considered, if not absolutely distinct, then different enough to warrant specific commentary. For instance, 
the issue of legal ramifications differ between the administrative and the cultural authority.  
125 Naturally, these definitions will often blur in real life as some celebrities do in fact possess epistemic 
knowledge, and disobedience with the administrative authorities may be rational for other reasons (for 
instance in an oppressive and tyrannical regime). The three types of authority, then, should be seen as 
stereotypical archetypes rather than definite categories.  
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of source credibility thus relies on expertise and trustworthiness, including authority 
elements as mentioned. 
Throughout the chapter, several points concerning motives, vigilance, and 
source credibility have emerged to set the tone for a subsequent formalisation of source 
credibility (as will be presented in the next section). In inferring the persuasive intention 
and potentially inferring accompanying motives, the persuadee has to recognise that the 
persuader has different aims, different access to knowledge, and might potentially be 
deceptive. As such, some basic form of mentalizing is needed since this describes the 
ability to infer the mental states and knowledge of others. However, as discussed, the 
type of mentalizing assumed in the thesis is non-propositional and weak in nature since 
it is not necessarily conscious, despite the fact that the persuadee can invest cognitive 
effort in mentalizing consciously. From this acknowledgement of the persuader, the 
persuadee infers the persuasive intention and potentially motives, which influence both 
the amount of epistemic vigilance needed as well as the credibility of the source. The 
following formalisation of source credibility relies on two factors, namely 
trustworthiness and expertise, both of which are influenced by motives and epistemic 
vigilance. Thus, evidence produced in the persuasive attempt might be very persuasive 
in and of itself, but given the perception of malevolent motives, the final posterior 
conclusion can be weaker. For instance, in the above car salesman example, the 
salesman might mention that the car has a low mileage. From a trustworthy source, this 
would be a good quality and consequently the customer should be more favourably 
disposed towards the car. However, given the inference of a motive for profit, the 
posterior should take on a different quality since the trustworthiness of the salesman is 
low. That is, the strength of the evidence remains high, and so does expertise. But 
trustworthiness might be low, which ultimately yields a lower posterior even though the 
evidence is consistent with beliefs regarding cars that the persuadee might already 
entertain. It is important to note that the persuadee might still think the evidence is 
compelling, but also be reasonably unconvinced given low trustworthiness from the 
inference of motives and epistemic vigilance. From this example, it seems clear that the 
perception of trustworthiness and expertise (grounded in the inferred motives, epistemic 
authority, persuasive intention, and need for epistemic vigilance) are central elements of 
persuasion processing.  
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The following section further explores source credibility from the 
perspective of these elements and formalises them in a Bayesian framework such that 
the underlying assumptions are in line with the ones for uncertain reasoning presented 
in 2.4. The formalisation of source credibility does incorporate epistemic authority since 
it builds on expertise, and also indirectly cultural authority since being an esteemed 
person from a cultural group may very well enhance the trustworthiness of this source 
among members of that group. Administrative authority is not incorporated since this 
type of authority mainly affects behaviour directly, and is not directed much towards 
affecting beliefs. The formalisation of source credibility thus relies on expertise and 
trustworthiness, including authority elements as mentioned. 
 
Formalising source credibility  
In order to provide a formal framework for conceptualizing persuasion, the following is 
a formalization of source credibility that can be integrated in the model of persuasion 
processing to be developed in 7.3. Alongside theoretical benefits from defining source 
credibility in a more rigorous manner, formalization provides an empirically testable 
framework that lends credence to persuasion research.  Hahn et al (2009) as well as 
Harris et al. (submitted) provide such a test from a Bayesian perspective that formalises 
credibility in a complex network (see also, Hahn et al., 2012) and the model presented 
here is largely taken from these papers126. Following Hahn et al (2009) and Harris et al. 
(submitted), the notation in the following is made clearer by replacing the original 
Bayesian notation ‘e’ with ‘Hrep’, which refers to the representation of the hypothesis. A 
key point here is that Hrep is treated as ‘data’ for the persuadee, which treats utterances 
as evidence and which uses a standard measure of the strength of evidence as a measure 
of the persuasiveness of the attempt (see 2.4). One such measure of strength of 
evidence, given data D, is Pr(H|D)/Pr(H|¬D)127.  So this is a different approach than 
ordinarily taken in probability theory in which the probability of H is seen as 
independent of its representation. In the SPIMP approach developed here it is, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 For a brief presentation of complex, causal networks, see 3.4 
127  Note that others are possible. For instance, log[Pr(D|H)/PrD]] = log[Pr(H|D)/Pr(H)] in which 
equivalence follows from Bayes’ theorem. Alternatively, one can look at the absolute value of Pr(H|D)-
Pr(H). The specific method of measurement is less of an issue here, as equivalence follows from Bayes’ 
theorem. For a discussion of measurements, see Fitelson, 2007; Fitelson & Hitchcock, 2011; Crupi et al., 
2013 
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of decisive importance to incorporate how the representation of the hypothesis may 
affect the strength of the evidence. By doing so, the credibility of the source as 
discussed above may be evaluated. 
 Given the likelihood ratio mentioned in 2.4, an argument should thus be 
more persuasive the greater the value of ! !"#$ !! !"#!   ¬! . This follows from the notion that 
the more reliable the source, the greater the likelihood ratio, which subsequently should 
yield greater posterior ratings (on Bayesian approaches to source credibility, see Bovens 
& Hartman, 2003; Corner et al., 2010 as well as the references already cited in the 
above). The two key factors in formalising source credibility in the approach to 
persuasion developed here, then, are expertise and trustworthiness. This reflects the 
insights derived from the importance of source credibility in persuasion from in 
previous psychological literature (such as the abovementioned Chaiken, 1980; Schum, 
1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Briñol & Petty, 2009) 
and from a rhetorical point of view, the formal model described here reflects Aristotle’s 
notion of ethos. As mentioned, Aristotle describes three main elements concerning 
source credibility in ethos, namely arête (the perceived virtues of the persuader), 
phronesis (the practical wisdom or competence of the speaker), and eunoia (the 
goodwill towards the persuadee)128. Arête is indirectly featured in the model given the 
fact that virtues do have an impact on trustworthiness, but in the current approach 
virtues are taken as an extraneous influence that does not specifically entail whether or 
not a person is an expert. Indeed, in discussing source credibility, Fiske et al. (2007) 
identify the latter two as central elements, and the present formalisation is in accordance 
with this view. In this way, the formal approximation of source credibility is in line with 
a range of previous studies that investigate or theorize about this phenomenon.  
From a mathematical point of view, as mentioned in Harris et al. 
(submitted, see also Schum, 1981; Hahn et al., 2012), both the influence of expertise 
and of trustworthiness may be captured in one likelihood ratio, namely P(Hrep|evidence) 
where P(Hrep|H) may be found by marginalizing out the conditional probabilities that 
depend on the evidence by invoking the chain rule for joint probabilities such that  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 In a later development, McCroskey and colleagues identify specific elements connected to source 
credibility and ethos (McCroskey 1966; 1997; McCroskey et al., 1974; McCroskey & Young, 1979; 
1981) such that they have identified a plethora of aspects of the concept. 
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P(Hrep |H ) =
P(Hrep,H )
P(H ) =
P(Hrep,evidence,H )
evidence
∑
P(H ) =
P(Hrep | evidence,H )P(evidence |H )P(H )
evidence
∑
P(H )
	  
This provides a probabilistic measure for describing the influence of source credibility 
on the persuasiveness of the attempt. As already mentioned previously, the 
persuasiveness of the utterance, Hrep, depends on the perceived strength of the evidence 
as well as the credibility of the source from the perspective of trustworthiness and 
expertise. Again, the perception of ulterior motives is an essential backdrop from which 
these estimations emerge since the perception of a deceptive motive might yield greater 
epistemic vigilance and lower trustworthiness. Indeed, the persuadee might well expect 
that the persuader is likely to produce a strong and likely Hrep even if H is false if they 
are deceptive. As such, the persuasiveness of the attempt goes beyond the evidence 
given the integration of source credibility. In the above car salesman example, this is 
illustrated by the fact that the persuadee might be more vigilant towards misinformation 
and estimate a lower trustworthiness given the situation, which causes her to expect the 
salesman to provide compelling evidence, even if this evidence is false129.  
 Given the importance of source credibility in the theory of persuasion 
presented in the thesis, it is worthwhile reporting the central findings from the empirical 
test of the formal model of source credibility as provided in the above. Investigating 
arguments concerning the effectiveness of fictitious medicaments involving dialogues 
with interlocutors either conceived as an expert (doctor) versus non-expert (rock 
musician) and trustworthy (friend) versus untrustworthy (enemy). The study in Harris et 
al. (submitted) was designed to “…test the degree to which participants’ quantitative 
probability ratings approximated the prescriptions of a Bayesian formalisation of the 
appeal to expert opinion incorporating the notions of expertise and trustworthiness”. 
The participants were asked to imagine a scenario in which one interlocutor (either 
friend or enemy and expert or non-expert) provides information pertaining to a made-up 
medicament. Having followed the dialogue, the participant is asked a question in the 
form of “How likely do you think it is that Keith would deliberately give James wrong 
information about whether taking Proftanine lowers cholesterol?” to which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Notice that to really formalize this in probability theory we would need a probabilistic account of how 
the probabilities of different utterances depend on different pieces of evidence, the knowledge states of 
the persuader, etc. This is currently too ambitious and goes beyond the scope of the thesis, as the thesis 
merely proposes a probabilistic measure. 
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participant responds by moving a slider from “I’m completely convinced he would 
NOT deliberatively give James wrong information” to “I’m completely convinced he 
WOULD give James wrong information”. Responses thus elicited a percentage value 
for the convincingness of the argument given the particular source. Expertise and 
trustworthiness estimations were elicited, and the potential of another source agreeing 
or disagreeing with the information was included. The above equation on p. 130 was 
used to predict the expected convincingness of arguments given participants’ prior 
beliefs concerning expertise and trustworthiness. Harris et al (submitted) report an 
excellent fit of data with the model: The Bayesian quantitative predictions derived from 
eliciting the priors of the participants account for 89% of the variance (p<0.001, see fig. 
8 – fig. 5 in Harris et al.). As such, the experiments lend support to the notion that 
source credibility might be formalisable from a Bayesian perspective, which follows the 
line of reasoning developed in the second chapter in which persuasion processing is 
conceptualised from the perspective of probabilistic, uncertain reasoning compared to 
certain reasoning from a logical perspective.  
Figure 8. The fit between the Bayesian predictions and the observed convincingness ratings 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Harris et al. (submitted) proceed by comparing the model with a potentially competing 
analysis of the data stemming from a relative-weight averaging model 
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in which R is the convincingness of an argument and w1 is set to equal 1 a prior (this 
setting was taken from Birnbaum & Meller’s, 1983, fit of the related scale-adjustment 
averaging model). Compared with the Bayesian prediction (which accounts for 89% of 
the variance and 93% if outliers responding 1 are removed), the averaging model 
accounts for 87,5%. Furthermore, a 4-way ANOVA identifies more local deviations 
within the Bayesian model compared with a more global deviation of the data in the 
averaging model.  
As mentioned earlier, both the ELM (e.g. Petty & Cacioppoe, 1981; Briñol 
& Petty, 2009) and the HSM (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) 
acknowledge the importance of source credibility in persuasion processing. However, it 
is not clear how these approaches deal with the seemingly integrated nature of source 
credibility, which is also reported in Hahn et al (2012) and Harris et al (submitted). The 
results in Harris et al (submitted) are problematic for the ELM and the HSM since both 
models do not specify how the integration between a peripheral cue (source credibility) 
and a central cue (argument strength) should be conceived. On a more fundamental 
level, it might be questioned that if there is interaction between the systems, can they 
subsequently be considered distinct and separate systems, or should the interaction 
allow for a uni-modal approach (such as the formalisation of source credibility that 
integrates with content strength in Harris et al, submitted)? This harkens back to the 
discussion concerning the potential limitations of the dual-process approaches to 
persuasion: the data, especially from Harris et al. (submitted) suggests that the content 
strength and source credibility are integrated in some manner (which may be 
approximated by a Bayesian approach), but neither the ELM nor the HSM specify how 
this integration should take place. That is, if supposedly peripheral cues are integrated in 
supposedly central elements, it begs the question whether the model really is dual-
process or merely an integrated process in which elements may enjoy more or less 
influence. The theory and model developed in the present thesis argues the latter, 
namely that humans assess acts of persuasion from a subjective point of view in terms 
of content strength and source credibility, and that less desirable influences such as 
attractiveness always play a part, but that these may play a smaller or greater role 
depending on a variety of factors (such as the culture in which the persuadee is 
immersed, the amount of cognitive effort exerted, and the reasoning training of the 
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persuadee). In any case, the data reported in the above represent a serious challenge to 
the ELM and the HSM. These models need to be able to account for the data with 
greater precision than the Bayesian integrated approach if they are to maintain their hold 
as the prevalent models of persuasion processing. Indeed, the conceptualisation and 
question of integration of cues is a central distinction between the SPIMP and the 
ELM/HSM, and consequently it provides ample ground for future research in re 
empirical distinctions and tests that distinguish between the approximating capabilities 
of the three models.  
In sum, source credibility is centred as a vital element in persuasion 
processing from a subjective, probabilistic point of view. The Bayesian network 
identified and tested in Hahn et al (2012) and Harris et al (submitted) lend credence to 
this approach, which in turn challenges the conceptualisation of source credibility in the 
ELM and the HSM. Expertise and trustworthiness are identified as two key factors in 
formalising how the persuadee approaches and assesses the source credibility of the 
persuader, which is in line with the literature from rhetorical theory on the concept of 
ethos. This provides the subsequent theory and model of persuasion with a clear concept 
of source credibility that may readily be integrated in a more holistic conceptualisation, 
theory, and model of how persuadee’s approach persuasive attempts in the moment (the 
temporal relationship between theory and model will be discussed further in 6.4 and 
chapter 7 in general). Before proceeding, however, a few remarks should be made 
concerning the theoretical make-up of the conceptualisation presented here due to the 
fact that this makes use of complex, causal networks.  
 
3.4. Complex, causal networks 
A Bayesian network is a way of graphically representing conditional dependencies 
between concepts in a given argument such as the one in fig. 8 below (Pearl, 2000). 
Such a network may be drawn in different manners depending on the elements involved 
in the network (e.g. environmental networks may look very different from legal 
networks; or networks may be more or less comprehensive and complex). For example, 
Hahn et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive causal network through which source 
credibility may be conceptualized. This expanded network importantly captures all 
elements identified by Walton (1997, table 4 in the above) in a formal manner, which is 
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readily subjected to empirical tests. However, given the theoretical considerations and 
arguments in the above, some elements may be subsumed by others and eventually 
make way for a cleaner network focusing entirely on trustworthiness and expertise. For 
example, the back-up question identified by Walton should not be considered on the 
same level as persuasiveness derived from source qua credibility. Rather, per definition 
back-up evidence is concerned with presenting evidence and information to validate the 
original claim130. The quality of expertise is essentially that one may be persuasive 
without providing back-up evidence because of one’s expertise within a field (for 
example, a doctor rarely cites medical journals when describing an illness because it is 
assumed that she has expert knowledge about this).  
Furthermore, as assumed in the cleaner network model it is entirely 
conceivable that persuasion takes place between two and only two people rather than in 
a more complex social situation (although, obviously, most actual acts of persuasion 
take place in a vastly complex social sphere that involves a plethora of persuaders, 
diverging interests, and different levels of expertise in a variety of fields). To 
conceptualize how the persuadee relates to the specific persuader may be formalized in 
a simpler manner without resorting to other interlocutors. However, in more complex 
situations (such as real life examples of persuasion), the expanded network provides a 
closer approximation to the elements involved in processing source credibility. The use 
of a network to represent a complex causal issue is in no way novel. For instance, recent 
developments in legal decision making employs networks in order to account for the 
juror decision making process (Lagnado et al., 2012; Fenton et al., in press; Lagnado, 
submitted).  
The account of source credibility in the above relies on causal structures, 
which may be graphically represented in such a complex, causal network. As Pearl 
(2000) describes, “a graph consists of a set V of vertices (or nodes) and a set E of edges 
(or links)” (p. 12). One of the key questions when drawing up a graphic representation 
of a complex system is whether the nodes are linked cyclically or if they are acyclic. 
This describes the potential mutual influence from one node to another in which more 
complex systems may contain variables that cyclically influence one another. Given the 
fact that the graphical formal representation of source credibility in the present context 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 This reminisces of ’backing’ in Toulmin’s model of practical argumentation, see 1.6, fig. 4.  
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(fig. 9 below, fig. 2 in Harris et al., submitted) contains no directed cycles, however, the 
formalisation of source credibility is acyclic and thus represents a Causal Bayesian 
Network (as described and defined by Pearl, 2000). The figure is a sketch of the form 
that a model might take, and it illustrates how source credibility might be described 
graphically. The convincingness (the report, or Hrep in the SPIMP presented in the 
introduction and in 7.3) is not only influenced by the likelihood of the hypothesis (H), 
but also by the trustworthiness and expertise such that seemingly good evidence (high 
H) might still be estimated at a lower overall posterior given low trustworthiness and 
expertise. As mentioned previously, this predicts direct involvement of source 
credibility in persuasion processing unlike how source credibility is treated in the ELM 
(as a peripheral cue) and the HSM (as a heuristic)131.  
Fig. 9. Graphical representation of source credibility in the present model132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alongside notions concerned with the theoretical foundation of the Bayesian account 
and the previous empirical data to support the representation of source credibility in a 
direct acyclic graph (DAG), Pearl (2000) notes several advantages for representing 
DAGs as causal rather than associational systems. Firstly, judgements in such graphs 
“…are more meaningful, more accessible, and hence more reliable” (p. 21) given the 
fact that the dependencies of the nodes become more apparent and subsequently easier 
to tease apart theoretically, empirically, and analytically. As Pearl notes, “dependencies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The specific role of source credibility in persuasion processing should be explored further, as this is an 
element where the SPIMP directly predicts different involvement compared to the ELM and HSM. As 
such, the first tentative evidence from Hahn et al. 2012 and Harris et al., submitted needs to be replicated 
and elaborated upon in order to challenge the data from ELM on source credibility (see Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984b).  
132 Note that this is a sketch of the form a model might take and not necessarily a complete account of the 
model. Indeed, as noted in the above, a full probabilistic account of source credibility needs to take into 
account the different utterances and how these depend on different pieces of evidence, the knowledge 
states of the persuader, etc., which is beyond the scope of the present thesis.  
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that are not supported by causal links are considered odd or spurious and are even 
branded ‘paradoxical’” (Ibid.). This focus on causality may, however, rightly be 
questioned from the point of view of disciplines that traditionally depart from such 
rigorous assumptions of necessary causality (such as the terminology from the 
phenomenological tradition, as it is briefly presented in 6.1)133. Secondly, DAGs 
provide “…the ability to represent and respond to external or spontaneous changes 
(Ibid., p. 22). This is due to the fact that local reconfigurations, with only minor 
modifications to the general network, may be translated into an isomorphic 
reconfiguration of the network topology. That is, by making minor changes in the 
network, the system is capable of responding to outside change.  
Given too much flexibility, however, networks potentially runs the risk of 
lacking falsifiability such that they are adaptable and changeable to any new 
information (as mentioned in 2.5, this is an objection raised against Bayesian reasoning 
in general, see Jones & Love, 2011a; 2011b). The network described in the above, 
however, is less flexible given the nature of the theoretical foundation as compared with 
a garden sprinkler system (the example in Pearl, 2000). That is, a mechanical system 
may easily be amended with the inclusion or isomorphic alteration of particular nodes 
and/or links. However, the definition and formalisation of source credibility as 
presented in the above is incommensurable on a theoretical level with a sprinkler system 
due to the fact that the theory of source credibility and how it filters into persuasion 
processing in general is thought to be an explicit definition. In other words, some 
additions and alterations may be warranted given certain cultural contexts, but the 
formalisation is thought to be a basic model of how humans make use of information 
from the trustworthiness and expertise of a source to subsequently form their overall 
evaluations of acts of persuasion134.  
As with the second chapter, the present discussion presents some key 
issues that help shape the prolegomena to a theory and model of persuasion processing. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Indeed, as will be evident from the eventual theoretical foundation presented in the thesis, I 
acknowledge this scepticism by distinguishing the broader contextual context in which the persuadee is 
immersed and the narrower application of the SPIMP approach in the moment of persuasion evaluation. 
Thus, the causal elements are not stretched to be deterministic nor are they meant to be all-inclusive of a 
very complex process of persuasion, which needs to be explored in more detail in future research. For 
now, however, the assumption of causality in DAGs stands.  
134 Note, though, that the internal flexibility of the formalisation remains such that the estimation of each 
node remains subjective according to the probabilistic principles.  
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Firstly, it is argued that the epistemic asymmetric relationship between persuader and 
persuadee entails the importance of the interactivity between the interlocutors. This 
leads to potential epistemic vigilance towards misinformation, which is a defining 
characteristic in persuasion situations. As noted in 3.2, however, mentalizing cannot 
account for this alone, and a more mechanistic notion of interaction, joint action, and 
common knowledge is necessary to define the interactivity in persuasive attempts. The 
outlines for such a mechanistic process is presented in 5.3. A complex Bayesian 
network as derived from Harris et al (submitted), however, may approximate source 
credibility and thus provides an integral and focal element of the subsequent model of 
persuasion presented in 7.3. The network defines expertise and trustworthiness as 
potential factors to describe how humans assess the quality of the source and the 
ensuing influence of the quality of the source on the general quality of the act of 
persuasion in general. Finally, persuasion is an inherently social and interactive 
phenomenon, which takes seriously the notion of source credibility and epistemic 
vigilance in order to described the cognitive challenges with which the persuadee is 
faced. In navigating this complex social situation, the persuadee first and foremost 
considers the local consistency before potentially extrapolating the subjective 
estimations of the strength of the persuasive attempt to a more global system.  
In sum, the chapter shows the importance of the perception of the 
persuader for the cognitive mechanisms involved in processing a persuasive attempt. On 
a conceptual level, the perception of motives (alongside the persuasive intention) might 
yield differences in the amount of epistemic vigilance and cognitive effort invested in 
processing the attempt. Thus, if a deceptive motive is perceived, it has direct 
consequences for the trustworthiness of the source, the amount of cognitive effort 
invested, and the epistemic vigilance asserted regarding the evidence. From a formal 
perspective, lower trustworthiness and expertise yields lower convincingness of the 
evidence presented in the argument, as shown in Harris et al. (submitted). This indicates 
that source credibility is an integrated aspect of persuasion processing (and not, as 
suggested by the ELM and HSM, a peripheral cue). The direct involvement of source 
credibility, however, remains an open issue, as much needs to be explored if a richer 
account of different types of authorities (epistemic, administrative, and cultural) is to be 
developed. For now, thought, it suffices to note it is theoretically possible and 
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empirically viable to integrate the notion of source credibility in describing 
persuasiveness from a probabilistic perspective, as is attempted in the present thesis.  
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Chapter 4: Language comprehension  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought  
George Orwell 
 
 
Speech is an arrangement of notes that will never be played again.  
F. Scott Fitzgerald 
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The central elements of the core SPIMP model (content strength and source credibility) 
were introduced in chapters 2 and 3 (part I of the thesis). These are the central elements 
in the conceptualisation of the alternative model of persuasion, which is sketched out in 
the present thesis, i.e. the Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of Persuasion 
(SPIMP). As evident from the discussions in the previous chapters and as will be 
discussed in 7.3 (where the model is presented in more coherent detail), content strength 
and source credibility may be formalised and approximated via Bayesian reasoning 
models from subjective estimations of probability and these elements are seen as 
required, but not necessarily exhaustive in the attempt to formulate the broader 
theoretical framework through which the SPIMP approach to persuasion processing 
functions as an alternative model to the prevalent ELM and HSM135. Having established 
the central elements needed to construct the model of persuasion (content strength and 
source credibility), the theoretical attention turns to the psychological framework in 
which the core model is lodged (part II of the thesis). The framework takes persuasive 
verbal communication (chapter 4), interactivity (chapter 5), and the immersion of the 
subject in the persuasive situation (chapter 6) into consideration. This provides the 
conceptual background against which the central elements of the model should be 
appreciated136. Given the assumption that the persuadee entertains estimations of 
likelihood, which may be approximated in modelling via Bayesian probability theory 
and given the fact that the focus of the thesis specifically squares on interpersonal and 
verbal persuasion, it is necessary to attain a fundamental understanding of how language 
is comprehended by the persuadee and how persuasive communicative functions. The 
present chapter provides the main issues of relevance for this additional theoretical 
foundation for the model.  
 It is essential to mention that the present chapter (as well as the following 
two chapters) are not concerned with the specification of an exhaustive theoretical 
foundation for a complete model of persuasion, but rather with the conceptualisation of 
some of the required foundations for the formulation of the theoretical framework and 
assumptions of the model. That is, the Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 A direct comparison of the three models is presented in 7.5. In this section, I present the potential 
benefits and shortcomings of the SPIMP approach compared with the ELM and the HSM 
136 Note, however, that the model is labelled Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of Persuasion. 
The notion of interactivity is presented in chapter 5 given the fact that this has bearings both on the notion 
of language as well as reasoning invoked in the thesis.  
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Persuasion provides a framework for understanding how the persuadee normatively 
should deal with uncertain information from an uncertain source in terms of how she 
should evaluate the content strength and the source credibility in the persuasive 
situation. However, the notions of language comprehension (the specific type of 
persuasion explored throughout the thesis is verbal communication), interaction, and 
subjectivity provide additional theoretical frameworks for the model. Accordingly, the 
present chapter provides a sketch of some of the required communicative elements 
related to language comprehension, chapter 5 does the same for interactivity, and 
chapter 6 considers subjectivity. As mentioned in the introduction, the thesis is a 
prolegomena, as the SPIMP model needs to be further explored, sharpened, and 
substantiated. The same might be said for the additional theoretical frameworks 
underlying the model (as discussed in the present and the following two chapters): the 
thesis represents only the fundamental work and future research definitely has provide a 
more in-depth understanding of how language comprehension, interactivity, and 
subjectivity play a role for the central elements of the model (content strength and 
source credibility). 
Given the scope of the thesis as spoken persuasion between two 
individuals, the concept of language comprehension becomes pivotal to shape the 
theoretical setting for two distinct reasons. Firstly, and most obviously, considerations 
pertaining to how language may function in a persuasive setting from a linguistic point 
of view are a central theoretical point for developing a theory of spoken persuasion. 
This involves tracking the complexity of language from traditional code-like models 
(4.1) via pragmatic enrichment (4.2), probabilistic approaches to communication (4.3), 
and interactive, distributed models of communication (4.4) to finally consider the 
importance of style, rhythm, and sound (4.5), which throughout the centuries of 
rhetorical enterprise have been considered a cornerstone of persuasion. Indeed, of the 
five elements of persuasion identified by Aristotle, style (elocutio) is a major 
element137. The purpose of the discussion, then, is to engage with language acts to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 The other elements are the invention of the persuasive argument (Lat. inventio), the disposition (Lat. 
dispositio), memorizing the speech (Lat. memoria), and the delivery (Lat. actio). Historically, elocutio has 
a special significance in persuasion studies as Ramus (15th century philosopher) placed inventio and 
dispositio as philosophical disciplines and memoria and actio as belonging to the performing arts. This 
left rhetorical theory with elocutio and reduced the disciplines to a discussion of tropes and rhetorical 
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discuss how this relates to persuasion processing. Secondly, and more concretely, as 
argued throughout the chapter, language may perform a central role with regard to 
probabilistic estimations, the possibility of epistemic vigilance, and the emotional 
stance of the persuadee. These traits are directly influencing how the SPIMP approach 
conceptualises persuasion processing from a subjective-probabilistic point of view. 
Alongside these two main reasons for discussing language, given the fact that Bayesian 
inference is concerned with what humans do when confronted with uncertain 
information, a natural course of action is to pursue how human elicit information in the 
persuasive setting, namely via communicative acts.  
The flow of the present chapter begins by looking at more static models of 
language comprehension (4.1). In particular, this mirrors the discussion concerning 
logic in that logical frameworks have been employed to appreciate and understand 
comprehension in a structural and more rigid way to mirror the cleanliness and clarity 
of logical expression in argumentation theory. However, as will be argued, this does not 
seem to function as an underlying element of natural languages. Rather, I present 
theories that rely on contextual cues in the form of pragmatic enrichment (4.2), which 
leads to more comments on communication from a probabilistic point of view (4.3). 
This places communication as something inherently interactive and cooperative, which 
is explored further by discussing theories from the distributed language approach (4.4). 
That is, the flow of the argument takes point of departure in minimally contextualized 
logical settings and ends in a wholly interactive, contextual, and probabilistic point of 
view, which will drive the understanding of communication in the persuasive setting.  
 Throughout the chapter, the literature reviewed suggests at least three key 
theoretical points of interest for a theory of persuasion. Firstly, it will become clear that 
language cannot be reduced to a code-like approach that centres on the logical and 
reduced linguistic content of the utterance. Rather, communication is seen as 
pragmatically enriched, socially coordinated and mediated, and distributed between 
interlocutors in a complex manner. Secondly, a probabilistic perspective is suggested to 
describe the foundation of language evolution, acquisition, and use. This framework 
points toward an interactive approach, which is explored further from a distributed point 
of view. Finally, some remarks concerning stylistic aspects of persuasion (such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
figures for centuries to come, which in turn affect the general reputation rhetoric has today: form without 
content (see Conley, 1990 for a presentation of Rhetoric in the European tradition).  
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rhythm, sound, and the novelty of expression, 4.5) are discussed to suggest the fact that 
persuasive acts are inherently imaginative and innovative. Together, the remarks on 
persuasive communication point towards an interactive and coordinated perspective 
discussed in 5.3138.  
 
4.1. Traditional theories of language 
Given the prevalent and significant function of language in human interaction and 
society building, it is not surprising that language as a phenomenon has been studied 
throughout millennia. Despite obvious differences in the respective theoretical 
approaches and with some notable exceptions (such as Vico, 2000; see also Catana, 
1996), most theories of language before the 20th century resemble a code-like 
philosophy of language in which, as Francis Bacon puts it, language is the medium 
through which thought is expressed, received, and understood. In this view, 
communication is a phenomenon that facilitates the expression of inner mental states 
and thoughts. Here, language is the container that clads the thought in a way that may 
be unpacked by the received who subsequently, if the unpacking is done correctly, 
divines the intended meaning of the sentence, which thereby succeeds in transmitting 
the thought from sender to receiver. Conversely, an unsuccessful communicative 
attempt is one in which the receiver decodes in a flawed manner and thus reaches a 
different mental state. Importantly, this relationship hinges on the assumptions that 
thoughts are essentially propositional in nature, that thoughts are transmittable mental 
states, and that words and sentences refer to mental concepts that may be understood 
and transmitted via language. The viability of these points will be discussed and 
considered in this section and throughout this chapter it will become increasingly clear 
that such a conception of communication seems unfeasible for a number of reasons such 
as pragmatic enrichment, the distribution of language, and the manipulation of common 
ground as discussed in 5.3. Taken from Sperber and Wilson (1995, p. 5), fig. 10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 It is important to note that the essential elements of the SPIMP approach (as described in 7.2 and 7.3) 
are content strength and source credibility. The present chapter discusses language comprehension, as the 
thesis is concerned with verbal persuasion. Nonetheless, the specific approach to language presented here 
is not strictly necessary (that is, the SPIMP might fit within other approaches to communication). 
However, given the probabilistic and subjective foundation of the SPIMP, the assumptions underlying the 
presentation of communication given here are in accordance with the model. But the approach to 
communication remains linked with the SPIMP rather than necessarily needed. 
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illustrates the relationship between sender and receiver in a traditional code-like 
philosophy of language. In particular, the figure illustrates a communicative process in 
which the speaker first produces a thought (in code-like approaches thoughts are often 
conceptualised as a propositional entity). This thought is then encoded in linguistic 
elements (from phonemes to words to entire sentences), which are then transmitted 
(spoken) as an acoustic signal. The signal travels through a medium (in verbal 
communication, this would most likely be air), which may or may not contain noise. 
The hearer receives the acoustic signal after it has been transmitted through the 
potentially noisy medium. After receiving this, the hearer uses her linguistic knowledge 
to decode the linguistic elements (in code-like approaches, the decoding if most 
prominently described via logical processes, and indeed many such accounts rely on a 
logical framework, see e.g. Stanley 2000, 200). Having decoded the linguistic 
information, the hearer may (more or less successfully) obtain the central thought 
process initially clad in linguistic form by the speaker. As evident, this view of language 
transmission relies on a clear sender and receiver, on packaging information, and on a 
propositional nature in which the information as a whole is encoded and decoded in 
order to obtain sense. That is, the logical interpretation needs to entirety of the sentence 
to decode and arrive at the thought. A fitting metaphor for the code-like approach might 
be a mental gift, which is linguistically wrapped and subsequently opened to discover 
the thought residing inside.  
Fig. 10: representation of traditional code-like philosophy of language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central to the code-like philosophy of language is the assumption that communication is 
reducible to linguistically encoded messages expressible in propositional form that, 
given a minimal contextual salience, is readily decoded by the receiver in order to elicit 
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the meaning of the sentence139. As illustrated by fig. 10, this propositionally expressible 
encoded thought is transmittable between speaker and hearer. Historical proponents of a 
code-like approach to communication are philosophers such as Locke (1996) whereas 
more recent proponents come from a variety of disciplines such as the linguistic 
semanticists (Stanley, 2000; 2002), proponents of logical languages such as Lojban (as 
discussed later in this section), and biological behaviourists (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984).  
Researchers on animal behaviour in biology argue that human 
communication, akin to other animal communication, is reducible to a sender-receiver 
relationship of information that is encoded and decoded. Indeed, communication 
between bees seems to function in this way such that the dance encodes and transmits to 
the other bees the location of fertile fields of pollen. However, human communication 
seems to be more complex than the one found between bees simply due to the fact that 
humans have a more extensive range of communicative expressions (facial, tonal), 
modes (including irony and sarcasm), and acts (as noted by Austin, 1961, see 4.2). 
Therefore, it is not immediately clear how applicable animal communication studies are 
in order to describe human communication. To facilitate human-computer interaction 
and communication (HCI), computer scientists work to develop a code-like form of 
communication that is reducible to logical inferences that are computable by a 
computer. This would be advantageous since this would improve the possibility of 
interaction between humans and computers. However, given the fact that such a 
language has to be invented is an inverse argument for the claim that human 
communication is exactly not reducible to logical inferences. If human language were, 
HCI should be able to simply use English to facilitate communication between 
computers and humans. Finally, linguistic semanticists make a compelling case for a 
code-like approach to communication (depicted in fig. 10).  
Branching over the various approaches, the essential qualities of the code-
like approach are that language is propositional, thoughts are transmittable, and 
communication is an encapsulated phenomenon with encoded messages that are 
solvable by the listener. In conversation, this somewhat mentally static back and forth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Note, concerning pragmatic enrichment, as Carston (2002, p. 206) notes ”one important consequence 
of the underdeterminancy thesis and the thorough cognitivazation of pragmatics is that the concept of 
what is explicitly communicated cannot be equated with [the] linguistically encoded meaning, or with 
some minimal boosting of it so as to fill linguistically indicated slots or to meet some logical 
requirements of minimal propositionality”. This will be discussed in 4.2 
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between sender and receiver is reducible to the rules of formal logical inference and 
analysable from the same theoretical point of view140. In order to further formalise and 
described language, Chomsky (1975) made impressive strides in setting out a formal 
way of describing sentences (see fig. 11a and 11b for examples of such a formalisation 
of the passive and active sentence ‘the dog ate the bone’ and ‘the bone was eaten by the 
dog’). 
Fig. 11a: Active syntactic tree      Fig. 11b: Passive syntactic tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the sentence, the various components relate to specific syntactic elements that are 
present in the utterance (such as the verb phrase, VP, and the noun phrase, NP, here 
containing a determiner, D, and a noun, N). These grammatical elements allow the 
researcher to fragment a given sentence and to rigidly analyse the grammatical structure 
(incidentally, such an analysis is central to analysing the encoded linguistic elements in 
the code-like approach mentioned in the above since the Chomskean analysis allows for 
a logical fragmentation and interpretation of individual linguistic elements, which 
subsequently should elicit meaning from structure and semantics). Importantly, these 
elements fall in a specific order in which the elements relate to one another. If the order 
is changed from the universal grammatical principle, the original structure remains with 
elements moved out or their place such that a trace remains141. Central to the Universal 
Grammar (UG) hypothesis is the idea that linguistic capability stems from an innate, 
language-specific module in the mind that shapes the grammatical structure in such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Note that the limitations to formal logic in terms of reasoning as presented in 2.3-2.4 also apply to 
language. In addition to the limitations concerning reasoning mentioned previously, this chapter presents 
some limitations for formal logic when applied to communication.  
141 According to theory, this is why passive sentences are harder to read given the fact that the NP is 
moved and the general structure is changed, leaving traces and movement that is harder to process 
compared to an active sentence (see fig. 11b).  
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way as to conform to the principles of UG (for potential problems of this, see Chater & 
Christiansen, 2010 and 4.3). There are a range of UG accounts, but generally these are 
expressed either as adaptionist or non-adaptoinist accounts142. Despite differences 
between theories, however, the above seem to permeate as underlying assumptions for 
the various theories of UG.  
In 2.2, I argued that formal logic is not an appropriate framework through 
which to approach how humans practically reason due to the rigidity of and focus on 
structure as well as the truth-conditional dichotomies. Interestingly, the rigidity of 
formal logic has been applied to natural languages in an attempt to create a model of 
communication to supplement the theory of reasoning such that both reasoning and 
communication may function logically and consequently might form a stronger 
foundation for describing human phenomena such as persuasion. The underlying 
assumption is that logic may be used to describe communication in the same way that it 
may be used to describe reasoning. One example of the marriage between formal logic 
and communication is the development of the artificial language, Lojban, which is 
constructed to facilitate a culturally neutral language with the potential of developing 
precise and user-friendly human-computer linguistic interfacing, but that also retains the 
expressive power of natural languages (Nicholas, 1996; Cowan, 1997; Nicholas & 
Cowan, 2003; Hallberg, 2005; Speer & Havasi, 2005; Goertzel, 2005; 2006, for the 
official website of the language, see www.lojban.org). That is the cleanliness of formal 
logic combined with the expressiveness of natural languages. However, for Lojban to 
function as a language, several assumptions have to be fulfilled. Firstly, the linguistic 
codes, given the fact that they have to work in a computer, have to be de-contextualised. 
Secondly, there can be no linguistic ambiguity. Thirdly, given a construction on the 
premises of formal logic, propositions are modular and atomic, meaning that P∧Q= 
Q∧P. As discussed in 4.2, none of these assumptions seem to be warranted for natural 
languages. Indeed, as mentioned, the fact that there is a need to artificially create a 
language that rests on the premises of formal logic is an indirect argument for the claim 
that natural languages are not since if they were, there would be no need to develop a 
language that has those specific qualities: English would be sufficient if it was perfectly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See Chater & Christiansen, 2010 for proponents of both of these accounts.  
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formalisable from the point of view of formal logic. The following section deals with 
this in more detail.  
 
4.2. Pragmatic enrichment and relevance theory 
In the 1950s, several linguists and philosophers rejected the notion that language was 
encapsulated meaning wrapped in codes and moved toward construing language as a 
phenomenon concerned with action, expectancies, and contextual enrichment143. One of 
the essential developments was the change of theoretical heart by Wittgenstein. In 
Tractatus, he is might be thought to position himself within the code-like approach by 
famously stating that “The limits of my language is the limits of my world” (1996, 
5.6)144. With Philosophisches Untersuchen (2001), he departs radically from his earlier 
mantra of the link between language, thought, and potential immserion in the world by 
introducing language games (Sprachspiel) that points to the inventive and collaborative 
nature of communication. Wittgenstein marks the beginning of a novel approach to 
language in Anglo-American literature that takes inspiration from William James’ 
notion of pragmatism (see Putnam, 1997) rather than from John Locke’s notion of the 
individually transmittable thought (1996).  
Continuing the train of thought initiated by people like the late 
Wittgenstein, Austin (1961) and Searle (1969) argue that communication is not just the 
transmission of mental states, but functions inherently as a performative act. That is, 
humans do things (e.g. beg, order, request) when they communicate above and beyond 
the mere transference of thought and meaning from A to B. In order to describe this 
performative element of communication, Austin (1961) describes three distinct 
communicative functions of language, namely the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the 
perlocutionary. Roughly speaking, the differences are as follows. A locutionary act is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 It should be recognised that earlier breaks with the code-like model can be identified. For instance, 
theories of language from a continental that relies neither on propositional nor logic assumptions, some 
might argue Saussure (see Sanders, 2004), and definitely Vico (see Catana, 1996). These represent breaks 
from the general, historical trend of a code-like approach and should therefore be acknowledged. 
However, only in the recent decades have the break with the traditional code-like assumption manifested 
clearly throughout philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, hence the present focus.  
144 This reading of the early Wittgenstein can be controversial since it is not entirely clear whether 
Wittgenstein thinks of thoughts as hidden mental states, transmittable by language or as constituted by 
linguistic acts (which seems more in line with his later thinking). In either case, the quote from Tractatus 
suggests an intimate relationship between thought, language, and potentially the perception of truth such 
that the early Wittgenstein in some fashion proposes a code-like approach to language.  
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concerned with the surface meaning of the utterance (i.e. what is said). As will be 
evident from the following discussion of pragmatic enrichment, this can be said to 
include not only the specific linguistic content, but also be extended to include 
explicatures (enrichments that follow from the utterance, which nonetheless affect the 
truth-conditional estimation). For instance, the utterance “is there any salt?” functions as 
a direct question concerning the existence of salt, not in general in the world, but in the 
immediate presence (due to enrichment following the relevance of expressions). An 
illocutionary act is the implicatures (see also later) concerning the utterance. Thus, the 
same question is also an invitation for the rest of the dinner party to pass the salt to the 
speaker rather than to be taken as an informative situation (indeed, most would probably 
find it rude, if someone merely responded ‘yes’ without passing the salt despite the fact 
that this strictly speaking would fulfil all the linguistic requirements for reciprocity, but 
it would not respond to the illocutionary request). Finally, the perlocutionary act is 
viewed as the psychological consequences of a particular speech act. This might be 
expressed as offers, requests, invitations, etc. In other words, the perlocutionary act 
follows from the locutionary and the illocutionary acts. From Austin and Searle, we 
clearly see that humans do things above and beyond the linguistic meaning when they 
communicate. For persuasion, this is a particularly relevant insight as the implicatures 
and psychological consequences (from the persuadee’s subjective point of view) are 
central to the evaluation of the act of persuasion as this is concerned not only with the 
transmission of information, but potentially also social and behavioural consequences.  
Most relevant for the present section, however, is the notion of pragmatic 
enrichment initiated by Grice (1978; 1989). A foundational insight of pragmatics is the 
fact that meaning is not limited to the linguistic content, but is mediated by implicatures 
and explicatures (see 4.2.1). The foundation of Gricean pragmatics is the co-operative 
principle, which states that interlocutors should “make [their] conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose 
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1989, p. 26). That 
is, the conversational part has communicative merit is when it somehow brings forward 
relevant information pertaining to the situation whereas if, for the persuadee, the 
communicated act does not bear relevant information, the act can be considered 
irrelevant for processing in the situation (note that this estimation is not necessarily 
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conscious). To elucidate the co-operative principle, Grice develops four maxims of 
quantity, quality, relation, and manner (see table 5). Given the definition of persuasion 
as something potentially malevolent without necessarily being aimed at epistemic 
alignment, the Gricean maxims seem to be curtailed by an intrinsic ethical stance of 
open, honest consensus-seeking rather than strategic, persuasive communication in 
which stylistic embellishment is a dominant feature (see also 4.5). Consequently, the 
maxims seem too idealistic when faced with persuasive communication. Relevance 
theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, but see also Carston, 2002) is an interesting 
development from the fundamental Gricean insights (that communication goes beyond 
the encapsulated linguistic content) 145 . Rather than assuming co-operative 
communication, relevance theory focuses on the cognitive enrichment of language in 
order to arrive at a theory of cognition involved when processing statements. The 
guiding principles driving relevance theory are the principles of relevance (see table 5). 
The presentation of pragmatic enrichment in the present section takes primary point of 
departure in relevance theory. This is mainly because of its prevalence in the linguistic 
literature but also due to the fact that it posits a cognitive theory of enrichment, which is 
of theoretical importance to the cognitive theories of reasoning presented in previous 
chapters.  
Table 5: Gricean maxims and the principles of relevance 
Gricean maxims 146 Principles of relevance147 
Maxim of quantity 
1) Make your contribution as informative as is 
required (for the current purpose of the 
exchange) 
2) Do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required 
Maxim of quality 
1) Do not say what you believe to be false 
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate 
evidence 
Maxim of relevance 
1) Be relevant 
Maxim of manner 
1) Avoid obscurity of expression 
2) Avoid ambiguity 
3) Be brief 
4) Be orderly 
The cognitive principle of relevance 
The human cognitive system as a whole is 
oriented towards the maximization of relevance 
 
The communicative principle of relevance 
Every act of ostension communicates a 
presumption of its own optimal relevance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Note that the pragmatic framework has been substantiated by empirical evidence alongside theoretical 
considerations (see e.g. Katsos, 2008; 2009) 
146 Grice (1989), pp. 26-27 
147 Carston (2002), p. 45 
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Despite representing one of the most significant recent developments in terms of going 
beyond the traditional code-like approach to communication, pragmatic enrichment 
suffers from some theoretical limitations as well. This will be clear throughout the 
section, but for now it suffices to remark that Gricean enrichment and relevance theory 
may be considered to be an extended type of code-like approach given the fact that the 
enrichments in the end describe the content of the message – the difference being that 
pragmatic theories allow for extra-linguistic enrichment, which makes for a more 
complex code. In other words, despite departing from the rigidity of focussing on the 
linguistic content, pragmatic enrichment remains oriented towards a clear distinction 
between the speaker and the listener and how the listener interprets and enriches the 
linguistic content in order to elicit meaning. The focus, that is, remains on the 
construction and interpretation of meaning rather than a broader communicative and, 
more importantly, interactive focus (as discussed in 5.3). Despite limitations, pragmatic 
enrichment provides a strong point of departure for tracing the multifaceted and 
complex nature of persuasive language.  
 
4.2.1. Underlying assumptions 
The reliance on maxims or principles, as mentioned in the above, highlight the 
theoretical importance of the difference between explicatures and implicatures, as well 
as, most centrally, the reliance on metarepresentational content make up the underlying 
assumptions for relevance theory. However, before jumping into the theoretical deep 
end of the pool and presenting the assumptions that underlie pragmatic enrichment in 
general and relevance theory in particular, a few choice examples are in order to 
illustrate and make concrete the main points of pragmatic enrichment.  
7a) I am starving! I haven’t had breakfast 
7b) She left him and he took to the bottle 
7c) He took to the bottle and she left him 
7d) Most doctors drink 
Clearly, 7a-7d need additional contextual information to make relevant sense. 6a, for 
instance, literally states that the person has not had breakfast [period]. A more relevant 
interpretation of this would be that the person has not had breakfast on that particular 
day. Similarly, there is a causal connection between the clauses of 7b such that the fact 
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that he took the bottle is a direct consequence of her leaving him. Reversing the 
connected elements, the causal relation is such that she left him because he took to the 
bottle (see 4.2.2 for a discussion of the enrichment of conjunctions). Finally, 7d, in its 
literal sense, provides little information as the sentence merely states that most doctors 
drink some form of fluid, e.g. water. However, this is a trivial fact given the fact that 
without water, humans quickly perish. Therefore, most would enrich 7d to specifically 
mean drink [alcohol]. Note that this directly affects the truth-conditional (or in the 
framework set out in 2.4: probabilistic estimations) of a proposition.  
8) I cannot allow you to drive – you have been drinking all night! 
The intended meaning of 8, much like 7d, is concerned with alcohol consumption. 
Indeed, without the pragmatic enrichment, the statement is equally valid if the other 
person has been consuming water all night in which case the disallowance would make 
little sense. These enrichments may seem trivial, but none are present in the 
linguistically encoded content. The insight that the intended meaning of most utterances 
relies on other and more than the linguistic content is an important driver for pragmatic 
theories of language such as relevance theory. The fact that meaning is constructed with 
the help of enriching the encoded linguistic meaning is called the underdeterminancy 
hypothesis. Importantly, “Linguistic ‘underdeterminancy’… does not entail that there is 
not fact of the matter as regards the proposition expressed, but rather that it [meaning] 
cannot be determined by linguistic meaning alone” Carston (2002, pp. 20-21), a point 
which challenges the code-like assumption that meaning is found by decoding the 
linguistic content. In other words, a key insight from pragmatic enrichment consists of 
the fact that the encoded linguistic content cannot be sufficient to explore what is 
communicated given the fact that the linguistically encoded content is enriched by 
implicatures and explicatures (see below), which in turn may be driven by a variety of 
factors such as cultural influences, body language, tonality of voice, etc. This insight is 
key to conceptualising spoken persuasion, as the linguistic underdeterminancy shows 
that the persuasive attempt cannot be reduced to the raw linguistic material. In other 
words, analyses and psychological models of persuasion processing need to take into 
account extra-linguistic factors and pragmatic enrichment in order to appreciate the 
complexity of the linguistic interaction.  
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As mentioned in the above, Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory 
account for enrichment in different ways. In Grice’s perspective, interlocutors adhere to 
the co-operative maxims of conversation whereas the cognitive principles of relevance 
guide the enrichment from a relevance theoretic point of view. Notably, the maxims 
operate from an ethical stance such that conversation in this view is open, honest, and 
contributing directly to the topic in hand. This reminisces of the aforementioned 
pragma-dialectical stance to principles of decent argumentation in which interlocutors 
are meant to keep to their respective turns of contribution, avoid logical fallacies if 
possible, and carry forth the argumentation in a straightforward manner (Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004, see also Eemeren et al., 2009; 2012). It is important to note that this 
is a different normative scope than the one presented here. As mentioned in the 
introduction and 2.4, we have to be careful concerning the type of normativity in 
theoretical play. The maxims, as well as the pragma-dialectical account, seem to be 
constructed on premises derived from an ethical stance concerning the societal and 
epistemological desirability of conversation and argumentation. That is, given an open 
and honest conversation, it would be desirable if interlocutors were brief, concise, to the 
point, and so on148. However, in social situations in which the goals of persuader and 
persuadee may vary and even contradict, and persuasive communication is embellished 
and strategic, most utterances could be considered to breach the ideals set forth either by 
being too stylistically embroidered, by omission of warrants, or by other persuasive 
tactics, which are psychologically successful, but societally undesirable. For a theory of 
persuasion and persuasive communication to arise, such behaviour has to be accepted 
on a psychological foundation despite the fact that they may seem ethically repellent.  
 
4.2.1.1. Explicatures, implicatures and their importance for persuasion 
Relevance theory provides a step towards a theory of communication, which is less 
entrenched in maxims concerning desirable communicative conventions (such as the 
notion that the speaker should be as informative as possible in situations, such as 
persuasive situations, where this cannot be assumed), and concerned more with the 
process of how humans subjectively interpret utterances in a cultural context. The 
cognitive and communicative principles of relevance aim at describing this process. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Whether these maxims would be floundered in a poetic and stylistic context is unclear.  
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Here, rather than how humans should converse from a foundation of maxims, the theory 
is concerned with how we enrich the linguistically encoded content with pragmatic 
effects that makes relevant sense in the context. A crucial distinction for appreciating 
this is the distinction between explicatures and implicatures. Sperber and Wilson (1995, 
p. 182) describe the difference between the two 
i) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if 
and only if it is a development of the logical form encoded by 
U149 
ii) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is 
implicit 
That is, the frame for developing explicatures stem from the conceptual schema 
delivered by the encoded logical form150. In other words, what follows logically from 
the logical form (or, as will be suggested, the probabilistic estimations and possibilities 
of the epistemic content).  
 Implicatures, on the other hand, stem only from pragmatic enrichment and 
some utterances, like a brief response to a stranger pertaining to which direction to take, 
may convey no implicatures at all. That is, implicatures are the implied pragmatic 
enrichment that takes place between interlocutors when conversing. Centrally to this, it 
should be noted that this makes the implicatures inherently subjective in interpretation. 
Consider the following 
 9) We have to make Britain prosper 
The explicatures are, to a large extent, confined by the linguistic content such that the 
proposition expresses a hope for rebuilding the strength of Great Britain. However, the 
implicatures may vary greatly depending on the specific speaker. What constitutes a 
prosperous Great Britain varies significantly from speaker to speaker (whether the 
speaker is Nick Griffin, David Cameron, or Ed Miliband) given the fact that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 As noted after the Carston (2002, p. 144) example presented on the following page, it is not entirely 
clear what constitutes a logical consequence of the explicature. Indeed, proponents of relevance theory 
need to account for the precise definition of the logical form encoded in the utterance since it is not clear 
what the logical form is and how this is developed (although, the development presumably is linked with 
the principles of relevance (see table 5, see also Levinson, 1987 who argues that apparent problems with 
explicatures follow from the original definition by Sperber & Wilson, 1995) 
150 Note, however, the fact that the explicatures following from the alleged logical form seems difficult to 
pin down as a multitude of explicatures can be drawn from the same linguistic content (see examples in 
Carston, 2002, throughout chapter 2). This lends support to the claim that explicatures derived from the 
linguistic content should be seen in a probabilistic rather than a logical light.  
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pragmatic enrichment given cultural background, expectations from the 
situation/speaker etc. may vary between each individual. Following the theoretical 
distinction, we are now able to posit the difference between explicatures and 
implicatures with an example from Carston (2002, p. 144). 
 Ann: Shall we play tennis? 
 Bob: It’s raining 
 Explicature: It’s raining at locationA/B  
Implicated premise: If it’s raining in locationx, then it’s not possible to play 
tennis at locationx 
 Implicated conclusion: Anna and Bob can’t play tennis at locationA/B151 
For persuasive communication, the conceptual introduction and difference between 
explicatures and implicatures point to two conceptually interesting notions. Firstly, from 
an analytical point of view, it indicates the potential of the conclusions drawn from 
persuasive artefacts in analyses. For instance, when Clinton stated ‘I did not have a 
sexual relationship with that woman, Ms. Lewinsky’, the distinction between 
explicatures and implicatures allow for a more seamless analysis of the difference 
between what the explicated and the implicated premises and conclusions, which thus 
enriches the terminological scope of persuasion analysis. Indeed, as seen in a variety of 
rhetorical analyses (as referenced throughout the thesis), the same persuasive artefact 
may very well be interpreted very differently by different audiences, not only in terms 
of the more confined explicatures, but also the less constrained implicatures. Keeping 
with the Clinton example, this allows for a distinction between a discussion of what it 
said (in terms of explicatures) and what is implied (in terms of implicatures)152. Thus, 
for the persuasion analyst, this distinction is important to keep in mind when discussing 
persuasive attempts. Secondly, the linguistic conclusions point to the subjectivity of 
language comprehension and communication in general. That is, the free pragmatic 
enrichment from sparse linguistic content may vary greatly depending on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 It is not clear why this specific explicature follows from the logically encoded material of the 
utterance. Indeed, this reading of the explicatures seems to be one of other possibilities (such as ’it is 
raining here’). As mentioned in the above, the notion of development of the logically encoded material in 
the utterance needs to be accounted for. However, as argued later in the chapter, relevance theory, as a 
foundational and cognitive theory of language, is faced with problems given the fact that it relies on 
metarepresentational content. This issue will be discussed in 4.2.1.2. 
152 In the implicatures, concepts from chapter 3 concerning potential motives and intentions alongside the 
persuasive intention become central in the interpretation process.  
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background of the individual153. In the present framework, this subjective foundation of 
interpretative processes is in line with the subjective estimation of content strength and 
source credibility. That is, reasoning from uncertainty as well as eliciting information in 
the persuasive setting are inherently subjective processes (although, as mentioned in 
5.1, the notion of subjectivity is not solipsistic, but rather social).  
 
4.2.1.2. Metarepresentations 
Like mentalizing (presented in 3.2), relevance theory relies on the concept of 
metarepresentations. Sperber (2000) describes these such that metarepresentations 
represents the content of representations. In further elucidating, Sperber presents three 
types of metarepresentations, namely mental, public, and abstract. These 
metarepresentations form the cognitive and propositional basis for subsequent higher-
level phenomena such as explicatures and implicatures (as well as mentalizing). From 
Sperber (2000) the following can thus be described according to the different types of 
metarepresentations in which these are written in italics.  
10) Peter thinks that Mary said that it is implausible that pigs fly 
10a) Peter thinks that Mary said that it is implausible that pigs fly (mental) 
10b) Mary said that it is implausible that pigs fly (public) 
10c) It is implausible that pigs fly (abstract) 
The abstract metarepresentations “…are reduced to their logical, semantic, and 
epistemic properties…” (Sperber, 2000). Public metarepresentations are concerned with 
an act that “…typically occurs in the common environment of two or more people; it is 
an artifact aimed at communication” (Ibid.). As such, the public represents an act of 
communicating in public, such as attempting to persuade someone else. Finally, the 
mental metarepresentation is concerned with the inference of the intentions of the 
interlocutor. As mentioned in chapters 1 and 3 regarding the specific persuasive focus 
on verbal acts of persuasion between two interlocutors, it is essential for persuasion 
processing to occur that both recognize the persuasive intention. Thus, the three types of 
metarepresentations provide a terminological apparatus for discussing different 
elements of persuasion, namely the probabilistic estimation of the content, the 
publically communicated act and the intentionality. However, as argued in Madsen et al. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 For a more in-depth discussion of explicatures/implicatures, see Carston (2002), chapter 2. See also, 
Carston (1988; 2004; 2009) 
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(in prep), metarepresentations are faced with difficulties (see 4.2.2) in terms of 
functioning as the terminological foundation for persuasion processing. They do, 
though, provide a helpful terminological screen against which a theory of persuasion 
might be developed since they are useful in the attempt to distinguish between act and 
intension.  
 Pragmatic enrichment as well as relevance theory relies on several 
assumptions, some of which are challenged here. Firstly, metarepresentations are the 
cognitive foundation from which more complex processes such as pragmatic 
enrichment are derived and explained. In 4.2.3, this is challenged from a theoretical 
point of view. The distinction between explicatures and implicatures is a central concept 
that sheds light on a higher-level linguistic process, which may clearly be used in 
persuasive communication; to analyse whether something is explicitly stated in the 
linguistic content, whether it follows logically from the linguistic content (explicatures), 
or whether it is a result of loose, free pragmatic enrichment (implicatures)154. However, 
the notion that explicatures follow logically from the linguistic content may be 
challenged from a probabilistic point of view. Indeed, explicatures are not necessarily 
derived, but are subject to subjective interpretive processes.  
The notion of explicatures/implicatures is central to a later discussion of 
the subjective interpretation and subsequent evaluation of persuasive communicative 
attempts. In particular, the subjective process of understanding and enriching language 
given a particular interlocutor links up very well with the formalisation and estimation 
of content strength and source credibility since these processes are rooted in the 
subjective estimations and interpretations rather than in some objective measurement. 
This facilitates a linguistic approach comparable to the Bayesian approach to reasoning 
given its subjectivity. Given this theoretical link between language and reasoning, it is 
worth noting the differences in underlying assumptions and how these potentially may 
be reconciled (as will be a focus throughout this and the following chapter). With this in 
mind, I now turn to the potential benefits and limitations of pragmatic enrichment from 
the point of view of the subjective approach to persuasion processing.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 The case of Bill Clinton in appendix A briefly investigates a rhetorical case in which the explicature-
implicature boundary is used in a fascinating manner.  
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4.2.2 Pragmatic enrichment: Benefits and limitations 
Compared with traditional code-like approaches to language in which there is a direct 
symbolic relationship between word, thought, and meaning, relevance theory provides a 
theoretical foundation with concrete cognitive assumptions for bringing language into 
fore a more contextual, cultural, and subjective interpretive sphere. In particular, the 
explicatures/implicatures distinction is a helpful tool to describe the contextual 
implications present in persuasive attempts. To elucidate the benefits from relevance 
theory, consider the case of conjunctions (see Carston, 2002, chapter 3).  
 Benefits From a logical point of view, conjunctions (P∧Q) are simple 
constructs, which are easily captured in the formalised language of mathematical logic 
(see table 6 for the truth-conditionals to illustrate the logical conjunctions). Importantly, 
from a mathematical point of view P∧Q= Q∧P due to the notion of interchangeability 
between conjunctions given the logical rules for truth-conditions (see table 6).  
            Fig. 12: Venn diagram of logical conjunction         Table 6: Truth-table of logical conjunction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a logical point of view, then, conjunctions are simple. In 2.2, I considered the 
limitations of formal logic as the appropriate theory of reasoning for the uncertain 
information provided in a persuasive situation. Here, the argument that formal logic is 
badly suited to deal with the complexity of persuasion is enhanced by the fact that it 
struggles to deal with the multiplicity of potential interpretations of simple conjunctions 
in natural languages. That is, if logic should be the model par excellence for analysing 
persuasive attempts, it should certainly be able to capture simple conjunctions expressed 
in natural languages. However, consider the following 
7b) She left him and he took to the bottle 
7c) He took to the bottle and she left him 
 11a) I went to Paris and I spoke French 
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 11b) It rains in Copenhagen, and it is sunny in London 
These sentences are all of the P∧Q form. As mentioned in the above, the causality in 7b 
and 7c is very different as the links between cause and effect is effectively reversed. 
However, from a logical point of view, this should not be problematic as the 
conjunctions are simply reversed and should thus entail the exact same truth-
conditional. The pragmatic enrichment of conjunctions goes beyond causal links such as 
11a. Here, there are potentially a plethora of relevant interpretations such as a simple 
conjunction concerning the linguistic capabilities of a traveller. But it also indicates a 
temporal relationship concerning the use of linguistic capabilities during a travel. 
Finally, 11b is a purer conjunction as the clauses could be reversed without alteration of 
meaning155. On an analytic level, then, a logical approach can encompass only the 
conjunction expressed in 11b, but struggles with the rest due to the subjective 
interpretations of explicatures and implicatures. From a pragmatic point of view, it 
becomes clear that the multitude of potential interpretations and implications in a simple 
conjunction is impossible to capture in a formal logical framework. Rather, we have to 
acknowledge the constructed and contextual nature of language such that interlocutors 
interact on actions of language to make sense of one another.  
 From a theoretical point of view, then, pragmatic theory in general and 
relevance theory in particular bring to the table several advances in terms of 
understanding the complexity of natural languages. Firstly, it appears that the 
complexity of natural languages, despite attempts of proponents of Lojban and other 
artificial languages constructed on the premises of formal logic, cannot be reduced to 
linguistic content and logical structure given free pragmatic enrichments. Secondly, 
these enrichments are inherently subjective, which is essential to the present theoretical 
framework. The interpretive processes, much like priors in the probabilistic approach, 
have to be considered from a personal and subjective point of view such that the same 
utterance may entail very different implicatures depending on your cultural socio-
economic, and personal background. In order to understand why the same persuasive 
message from e.g. politicians is understood very differently, we need to appreciate the 
subjectivity of these interpretive processes much in the same way that the subjective 
reasoning process needs to be grasped from this point of view. If not, we risk a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 However, the implicatures of 10b may be multiple if the interlocutors for example are talking about 
where to go on a holiday.  
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normative theory of persuasion that negates individual and cultural differences, which 
would be a serious mistake, as these seem to influence the perception of persuasive 
attempts to a large extent. As such, relevance theory provides an important step towards 
a contextual, cultural, and subjective interpretation of utterances that go beyond the 
constrained limitations of the concrete linguistic content, but acknowledges a richer and 
more elegant appreciation of natural languages and the creativity of this.  
 Limitations As evident from the above, the notion of pragmatic 
enrichment and the distinction between explicatures and implicatures are both very 
useful concepts in sketching out the verbal communication between interlocutors in the 
persuasive situation. However, the foundations of pragmatic enrichment as it is 
conceived by relevance theory rely on metarepresentational content (as described in 
4.2.1.2), which carries with it some inherent potential problems and limitations. Sperber 
(2000) argues that for a metarepresentational account of communication to be possible 
between interlocutors, humans need 4th-order metarepresentational content. Concretely, 
this means that 121 is the necessary metarepresentational extension of 12 in situations 
where two or more individuals attempt communication between them (that is, not 
talking to oneself).  
12) Mary is saying: “These berries are edible“ 
121) Mary intends that he should believe that she intends that he should 
believe that these berries are edible (Sperber, 2000) 
Firstly, theories of communication, according to Grice (1989) should adopt the simplest 
explanation available (he labels this Ockham’s Modified Razor, OMR). From this 
principle, one might intuitively question the validity of a 4th-order metarepresentation as 
a necessary cognitive component for communication between individuals given the fact 
that 121 is rather complex compared to the utterance it is meant to describe 12. In other 
words, the metarepresentational construct seems needlessly complicated to account for a 
relatively simple utterance. Secondly, the required linguistic movement required in 
language comprehension given the necessity of 4th-order metarepresentations mandates 
that the listener receives the initial 0th-order utterance “these berries are edible”. 
Following this, the listener is then assumed cognitively to have in mind a 4-order 
metarepresentation of the utterance (as described in 121), after which the 0th-order 
utterance becomes comprehensible. Such a movement between orders seems needless if 
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a simpler explanation is possible and, as such, defies the principles of OMR again. 
Finally, the notion of metarepresentations is faced with a challenge regarding the fact 
that the linguistic content that is ultimately the aim (the 0th-order) is embedded within 
the more complex metarepresentation (the 4th-order one). In other words, the elements 
of what is sought after (the meaning of the sentence) are already embedded within the 
more complex metarepresentation apparently necessary to extract itself. This seems 
contradictory since it requires that the listener already entertain in her mind the 
utterance, which is sought after.  
 For these reasons, theories of communication (as well as mentalizing, see 
3.2) requiring metarepresentations are faced with significant challenges in overcoming 
these problems. However, the main conclusions concerning pragmatic enrichment and 
the explicatures-implicatures distinction are both valid observations despite the fact that 
the foundation from which they are developed within the relevance theoretic framework 
seems challengeable. Consequently, given the principle of OMR, it is interesting to 
explore whether another cognitive foundation than reliance on metarepresentations is 
possible. Recent developments in language studies have indicated that a probabilistic 
approach to language evolution, acquisition, and processing might yield a potential 
candidate for such a foundation since it does not require the same metarepresentational 
content. This possibility is explored in 4.3. Furthermore, the interaction between 
interlocutors as well as common knowledge has been shown to matter when humans 
communicate (see 4.4 and 5.2). As such, these possibilities are explored to ground 
pragmatic inferences in a collaborative, interactive, and probabilistic foundation, which 
does not require metarepresentations.  
 
4.3 A probabilistic approach to language comprehension 
The previous section argues that pragmatic enrichment seems reasonable to assume as 
well as relevant for persuasion processing since the recognition of implicatures places 
language comprehension in a position where the listener subjectively interprets and 
infers entailments of an utterance. For the approach to persuasion argued here 
concerning subjective probabilistic estimations as the foundation of persuasion 
processing, the subjectivity of language comprehension is central. Indeed, throughout 
the thesis, the notion that truth-values cannot be objectively gauged by the individual, 
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but always is subjectively mediated is a key assumption, which is thought to be 
fundamental to reasoning and language processes. As such, the pragmatic enrichments 
as well as the difference between explicatures (what is inferred from the linguistic 
content) and the implicatures (what is inferred alongside the linguistic content) provide 
key concepts to describe the effects of verbal, persuasive communication. However, 
given the reliance on metarepresentations the relevance theoretic approach is faced with 
significant conceptual challenges if it is to function as the foundation for a theory of 
(persuasive) communication (see Madsen et al., in prep). Thus, despite the fact that the 
pragmatic enrichments and explicatures-implicatures distinction lends a valuable 
conceptual addition to sketching out persuasive communication, it seems that additional 
foundations need to be invoked to account for these phenomena. As such, the following 
section presents a cognitive framework for language evolution, acquisition, and 
processing grounded in probabilistic approaches. Such a framework does not require 
metarepresentational content in the same way as relevance theory, and it is within the 
vein of previous assumptions of uncertain information since language, in this approach, 
is not seen as a code through which the thought is transmitted and inferred, but as a 
series of verbal and non-verbal cues.  
Recent approaches to language evolution, acquisition, and processing have 
looked at a variety of linguistic phenomena from a probabilistic approach (see e.g. 
Chater & Manning, 2006, table 1, p. 336 for a table summarizing the probabilistic 
contributions to language in particular and cognitive processes in general), which 
resembles the probabilistic approach to reasoning argued in 2.3 and 2.4. These 
approaches assume probabilistic inference, meaning that rather than reasoning from 
certainty in which statements are true or false (0 or 1), the persuadee is taken to reason 
from uncertainty in which statements are more or less likely to be true between 0 and 1). 
Formally, this is captured by the Bayes’ theorem (see e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 
Tenenbaum et al., 2011. Importantly, these estimations – and here, interpretations – are 
inherently subjective and social. Thus, two persuadees may listen to the same statement 
and reasonably arrive at different conclusions if one believes that the statement or 
argument is weak (e.g. 0.17) and the other believes it is strong (e.g. 0.85).  
The evolution of language capacity over time as a cultural and human 
phenomenon may be described probabilistically (Chater & Christiansen, 2008a; 2008b; 
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2010; Chater et al., 2009). This longitudinal look at language may go beyond the life 
span of any individual as it may be concerned with the development of language strings 
over long periods of time. Slightly more confined in temporal space, language 
acquisition and development of linguistic capability in children may be approximated 
by probabilistic models. This focuses on the individual’s linguistic development over 
time rather than the societal development and evolution of language. Both the general 
evolution of language as well as language acquisition takes place over a prolonged 
period of time156. Persuasive attempts, and in particular persuasion processing, are 
characterised by being lodged in a concrete moment of time157. Of specific relevance to 
a theory of persuasion processing, then, is language processing, which also has been 
approached from a probabilistic perspective. Of particular interest to the pragmatic 
enrichment, probabilistic processing might provide a lens through which the 
interpretation of implicatures and explicatures can be understood. As evident from the 
following, probabilistic approaches to language have been employed to explore a range 
of linguistic elements, ranging from general evolution of 2nd –order languages (see 4.4.), 
over the individual’s acquisition of language to processing of communicative acts in the 
moment. That is, tracking communication from general development across eons to the 
development throughout the life of the individual to the active use in the specific 
communicative instance.  
 
4.3.1. Evolution  
A central consideration pertaining to evolution is whether the brain has evolved to fit a 
specific language and thus has a domain-specific language module such as argued in 
various accounts of UG (both adaptionist e.g. Pinker & Bloom, 1995 and non-
adaptionist accounts of UG, e.g. Lightfoot, 2000), or if language is shaped to fit the 
brain without the existence of such a domain-specific model (e.g. Chater et al., 2009; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 As will be evident from 4.4, this reminisces of the distinction between first- and second-order 
language (Thibault, 2011) 
157 Persuasive attempts may naturally be recorded for posterity, which makes the time-scale of persuasive 
attempt more fluent. However, persuasion processing takes place at two potential periods of time: in the 
moment when the persuadee is confronted with the persuasive attempt and subsequently if the persuadee 
invests additional cognitive effort in evaluating the validity of the persuasive attempt. But being subjected 
to a persuasive attempt, however, is a phenomenon characterised by being in the moment and 
consequently processing the attempt in the moment.  
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Chater & Christiansen, 2010)158. An initial argument against the UG comes from a 
range of data concerning language acquisition (Pullum & Scholtz, 2002; Tomasello, 
2003), the neural basis of language (Müller, 2009), and linguistic incompatible 
phenomena (e.g. Goldberg, 2006), which suggest that UG is not ideally suited to 
account for the uses of language. Indeed, some authors argue that certain aspects of UG 
hinders rather than advances communication (Chomsky, 2005; Lightfoot, 2000). Chater 
and Christiansen post three distinct ‘logical problems’ for domain-specific accounts (see 
also Hsu & Chater, 2010). Firstly, each UG should develop to a different linguistic 
environment given the dispersion of humans, which entails that UGs should diverge to 
fit their respective environments. However, there is no evidence to suggest that humans 
are more adapted to learn languages from their own language group. Rather, humans 
from birth seem to be able to learn equally any of the natural languages (see e.g. Dediu 
& Ladd, 2007). Secondly, given the fact that natural selection “…produces adaptions 
designed to fit the specific environment in which selection occurs” (Chater & 
Christiansen, 2010, p. 1134), the development of UG should be context-specific rather 
than domain-specific. Lastly, changes in natural languages occur much faster than 
changes in genetic make-up. Evolutionarily speaking, as Chater and Christiansen put it, 
this makes language a ‘moving target’ for evolutionary adaption. Taken together, these 
problems highlight the theoretical unfeasibility of an innate, domain-specific language 
module, and indicate that language is adapted to the brain and the socio-cultural 
environment rather than the other way around. Importantly, this places language 
development and use in the environment. That is, a process coming from outside the 
mind rather than an innate module coming from within such that humans learn from 
their surroundings.  
 
4.3.2. Acquisition  
Taking point of departure in the evolutionary notion that language is adapted to the 
brain and lodged in a social sphere rather than the other way around, Chater & 
Christiansen (2010) point to the difference in inductions. N-inductions are concerned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Incidentally, the argument concerning the unfeasibility of a domain-specific language module shines a 
light on the discussion mentioned previously concerning whether or not pragmatic enrichment is 
neurologically modular. From the probabilistic point of view, the pragmatic enrichment is better 
explained by invoking cultural interchanges and coordination.  
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with the ability to understand and manipulate the natural world whereas C-inductions 
are the ability to coordinate with one another. These are very different types of 
induction. Thus, for N-inductions require an external world to be manipulated in which 
performance may be assessed as failed or successful. For instance, the individual effort 
of picking up a cup is an ability children have to learn to manage and navigate in the 
physical world. In this way, N-inductions may be solipsistic due to the fact that this is a 
skill that the individual learns and retains159. Compared to this, C-inductions are social 
in nature. That is, the objective is to do the same thing rather than ‘the right thing’ 
(Chater & Christiansen, 2010, p. 1137). Given the social and contextual influences in 
language acquisition, communication, including persuasion may be approached from a 
C-inductive perspective160. As will be evident from 5.2-5.4, the notion of interactivity 
and coordination is assumed as a baseline model of communication for persuasive 
attempts. Some empirical support is available to advance the probabilistic approach to 
learning. Experimental data suggest that probabilistic learning models may be 
successful (Chater & Vitányi, 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2007; Safto & Goodman, 2008; 
Hsu & Griffiths, 2009; Hsu et al., 2011; Shafto et al., 2012). That is, rather than a innate 
language module that facilitates language capabilities, humans seem to be sampling 
positive learning from relevant interlocutors in a coordinated manner in order to make 
sense of communicative acts.  
 
4.3.3. Processing  
Finally, probabilistic models have been applied to language processing, which 
invariably is the most central element of communication as mentioned previously in this 
section (see Chater & Manning, 2006 for a review). As Oaksford & Chater (2007, p. 96) 
mention: “speech processing, in which the goal is to convert a hugely complex acoustic 
waveform into a discrete symbolic representation of what has been heard [i.e. meaning 
construction], must necessarily deal with uncertainty”. Consequently speech processing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Note, however, that the learning is almost never solipsistic. Either parents are around the child to teach 
and correct movements, or when faced with a learning opportunity without the presence of other people, 
it is still possible to remember how other people may have performed a particular movement. In other 
words, I am critical towards the notion of solipsism, but acknowledge that – compared to C-inductions – 
N-inductions are lodged more in the individual.  
160 As Chater & Christiansen (2010) point out, C-inductions are easier to perform than N-inductions. See 
Chater & Christiansen (2010) p. 1138 for a table classifying various problems of understanding according 
to the distinction between the two types of inductions.  
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also has to deal with probability. There is some evidence that probabilistic occurrences 
(that can be described statistically) may facilitate language processing and acquisition 
(Redington & Chater, 1998; Denis, 2005) such that language processing (including 
loose, free pragmatic enrichments) may be approached from a subjective probabilistic 
stance derived from the development of language throughout the life of the individual. 
Thus, if a child is exposed to a particular word such as ‘bed’ following the words ‘go 
to’, it is plausible that the child probabilistically will expect to hear ‘bed’ in the 
evenings. Statistical information can only provide a crude estimation of the potential 
direction of the utterance. As Chater & Manning (2006) note, however “…we use world 
knowledge, understanding of the social and environmental context, pragmatic 
principles, and much more, to determine what people might plausibly say or mean” (p. 
339), bringing the connection of probabilistic models of language processing close to 
the pragmatic enrichment. In this way, the probabilistic approach may offer a 
foundational aspect of higher-level principles that enrich and shape interactions and 
communicative acts (including acts of persuasion, see also Rodd et al. 2012; 2013, who 
argue a similar approach to word retrieval and the use of context to prime the 
probability of word meaning).  
Thus, the findings from the evolutionary development, the acquisition, and 
the use of language from a probabilistic point of view frame the existence of pragmatic 
enrichment. Indeed, if free pragmatic enrichment stems from subjective estimations and 
interpretations of uncertain acoustic and visual information (incorporating body 
language to the acoustic stimuli), probabilistic models are useful as baseline 
assumptions for language processing. Furthermore, from a theoretical point of view, it 
is interesting to note the potential connection between models of explanation in terms of 
reasoning and communication. Indeed, from a reasoning perspective the model 
proposed in the thesis is derived from the axioms of probabilistic reasoning. In a similar 
vein, the subjective interpretation processes from loose, free pragmatic enrichments 
may be described by invoking similar probabilistic assumptions that might explain such 
diverse aspects of language such as evolution, acquisition, and processing. Notably, 
probabilistic models in general and the C-inductive remarks in particular point to the 
conclusion that language inherently is interactive and coordinated in a social context 
between human beings. Naturally, we are able to think individually and by ourselves, 
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but language arises in a social context in which we learn to navigate linguistically. In 
5.2-5.3, this notion of interactivity will be explored further as recent developments in 
psychology and computer science inform us about how humans perform in joint actions 
to solve complex social situations such as linguistic interaction. Alongside this 
interaction and coordination, the probabilistic focus presented here places language as 
phenomena, which is both inherently present in the moment of linguistic interchange, 
but also is a product of a millennia-long development that reaches back to the evolution 
of language. In the following section, I present some theoretical considerations 
concerning this temporal relationship stemming from the field of distributed language, 
as the general development of language intervenes in the specific persuasive situation.  
 
4.4. Distributed language161 
The previous two sections provide important concepts in sketching out the act of 
persuasive communication. However, thus far the theoretical contributions have been 
concerned with one agent providing a verbal cue to another. In this way, it might 
conform to the traditional sender-receiver model in which one agent sends a signal, 
which is subsequently received, interpreted, and inferred by another. However, verbal 
communication can be seen as inherently interactive and collaborative (in 5.2, the thesis 
explores the notion of collaboration and interactivity in communication in more detail). 
Indeed, the notion of distribution of tasks in language between interlocutors such that 
the sender does not merely send, but also receives bodily feedback from the receiver in 
the same way that the receiver communicates and sends signals whilst being addressed 
has been explored in recent years (see Cowley, 2011). For persuasion processing, this is 
important, as the presentation of persuasive rationales, non-rational influences, and 
communication often is explored in the traditional sender-receiver manner. Indeed, most 
methods in rhetorical criticism explore the persuasive artefact in isolation from the 
receiver (see Foss, 2004 for an introduction to the most prominent theories of rhetorical 
criticism) and argumentation theory tends to focus on the content and/or structure of the 
argument. By introducing the notions of interactivity, distribution, and collaboration in 
persuasive reasoning and communication, the notion of subjectivity and the emergence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 I would like to thank Stephen Cowley, Sune Steffensen, Paul Thibault, and (especially) Sarah Bro 
Pedersen for interesting feedback and stimulating conversations concerning this section.  
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of probabilistic estimations is placed in the framework of interaction rather than 
isolation, The potential for interpretation of language and evidence in a collaborative 
and social sphere is a key assumption of the SPIMP framework and the distributed 
language approach provides a stepping stone towards conceptualising persuasive 
attempts and how these are processed.  
Pragmatic enrichment and probabilistic models of communication both 
push the idea that language is more than a referential task in which coding and decoding 
is the essence of the phenomenon. The notion of distributed language (and cognition) is 
relatively new and may be said to emerge with Hutchins’ Cognition in the wild (1995, 
see also Cowley, 2009; 2011; forthcoming). One of the central tenants of the approach 
is to firmly place language in a dynamic view that “…integrates ecological, social, 
cultural, biological, material, and bodily dimensions” (Thibault, 2011, p. 3). 
Consequently, analyses from a distributed language view tend to focus on a holistic 
dynamic, which incorporates aspects that traditionally have been neglected in analytical 
philosophy of language such as the interaction between humans, gaze direction, bodily 
movements in general, and so forth (see e.g. Linell, 2009; Pedersen, 2012; Steffensen, 
2013, section 4). That is, communication is seen as both dynamic and symbolic 
compared to the focus on the symbolic in traditional theories (Raczaszek-Leonardi, 
2009; Cowley, 2011). Here, I present the distributed language view since it functions as 
a theoretical link to the comments already made pertaining to the socio-cultural and 
interactive foundation of language. That is, language is an organism-environment 
phenomenon grounded in bio-social with little or no distinction between internal and 
external (depending on the strength of the assumption). Here, humans navigate as 
optimally as possible in order to function as efficiently as possible individually as well 
as in society162. One caveat, however, is the fact that the distributed framework is 
relatively novel, which means that terminological issues are still being debated. The 
presentation here, then, is a theoretical trend that bears interesting theoretical and 
empirical findings and points in a stimulating direction for the communicative 
considerations already presented.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 As clear from my comments throughout, I do acknowledge an internal potential process and external 
influences. However, I assume that the internal processes (such as quite reflection) do not occur in 
isolation and without the influences of the external. As such, the internal-external distinction blends 
together to an immersed cognition in the environment.  
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4.4.1. Distributing language tasks 
At the heart of the distributed language view is the awareness of the fact that 
investigations of linguistic acts should not take point of departure in fixed linguistic 
systems, but rather in real-time events in which language, action, and perception are 
integrated between humans in order to make sense of the actions of one another (see 
Cowley, 2011, see also Steffensen et al., 2010). This focus on interaction and 
coordination places distributed communication squarely in line with the probabilistic 
approaches to language, which points to joint action and coordination when humans 
communicate (this point is expanded upon in 5.2-5.3). From a persuasive perspective, 
this provides an interesting linguistic backdrop against which the communication 
between the persuader and the persuadee unfolds such that the act is not reducible to the 
transmission of codes, but rather persists in a interactive sphere in which both 
interlocutors act to move along conversation163. The coordination discussed in the 
distributed view is not reduced to the coordination of the linguistic code or the acoustic 
signals sent in communicated situations. Rather, coordination is ‘full-bodied’ (Cowley, 
2011, p. 186), meaning that coordination takes place in a bodily context in which 
languaging goes beyond the conveyed words and acoustic stimuli and incorporates 
nods, gestures, and the complex interaction of movement (see Pedersen, 2012 for an 
analysis of meaningful bodily movement at a Danish hospital). The bodily grounding of 
communicative skills seem additionally warranted by Anderson (2008) who argue that 
the same neural basis might easily be employed for a variety of functions including 
language and motor acts. Incidentally, this employment should, according to Anderson, 
happen at various time-scales.  
 The important point to take away from the distributed framework for the 
purpose of the present thesis, is the fact that language cannot be reduced to a string of 
acoustic signals that may be analysed in absentia from the context and interaction in 
which they occur. Rather, acts of communication arise pragmatically in a bio-social 
context in which humans make use of their full bodily spectrum (and indeed the 
available ecology in which they are immersed) to communicate, convey meaning, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163  In order words, if communication inherently is interactive and mutually coordinated, strong 
assumptions of stable and clearly divisible turn-taking are difficult to entertain since the interlocutors 
work together to be understood and understand (as also posited by the mutual intentionality of the 
persuasive situation).  
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sway one another. This puts the process that the persuadee undergoes in perspective as 
persuasion between humans take on an interactive and coordinated basis such that the 
persuader does not have a classically understood one-way connection with the audience. 
Rather, meaning and persuasion are mediated in complex interaction between humans. 
Naturally, the level of interaction takes place in a continuum. For instance, when an act 
of persuasion takes place between two people who are face-to-face, the amount of 
interjections and potential shifts in the persuader-persuadee relationship is frequent. 
Less frequent interjections arise in situations such as a parliamentary hearing in which 
members of the opposition might call out during a speech, which makes the persuader 
reiterate, repeat, alter, or otherwise depart from the initial trajectory. Finally, in some 
situations interjections and conversational contributions can be near impossible. For 
instance, at Obama’s inauguration speeches (2009; 2013a), persuadees’ possibility for 
interjections is very constrained. However, even in situations such as these, there is a 
clear bodily interaction between persuader and persuadees such that ovations, shouts, 
and other reactions are clear interactive elements164. In this way, the persuadee may 
directly affect and influence the persuader as he is speaking, most obvious in face-to-
face situations in which nodding, frowning, and other bodily reactions may cause direct 
conversational contributions for the situation to develop. In other words, the persuader 
and the persuadee can never be understood in absentia from one another, as language is 
coordination and interaction between interlocutors. This challenges the classical notion 
of the persuader delivering a one-way message to a passive audience, and reminds us of 
the integrated role humans play when persuading and being persuaded.  
 
4.4.2 first and second-order languages 
As already mentioned in 1.4, persuasion is a temporally interesting phenomenon given 
the fact that it represents a temporal intersection of complex influences in terms of past, 
present, and future. The model (SPIMP) developed in the thesis is concerned with the 
reasoning process that the persuadee undergoes in the specific persuasive attempt. 
However, in order to appreciate a richer extent of the persuasive situation, the past and 
the present have to be taken into account as well. The past (personal, cultural, and 
historical) is essential because it frames the type of response of which the persuadee is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Note, however, that Obama’s persuasive situation is beyond the scope of the present thesis, as the 
topic of the current discussion is verbal persuasion between two and only two interlocutors 
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capable and the priors the persuadee brings to the persuasive situation (see Hood, 2012 
for a discussion of the developments of beliefs and the ‘self’). Without an understanding 
of the socio-cultural and personal background of the persuadee, reactions that seem 
unwarranted may be entirely reasonable given the specific background. That is, the past 
that leads up to the specific moment of persuasion bears tremendous importance in 
terms of how the persuadee can evaluate and assess the persuasive attempt. The future, 
on the other hand, holds importance in persuasive situations as much persuasion is 
concerned with issues that directly affect the future context and choices of the 
persuadee, e.g. political elections, health decision, etc. are direct involvements in the 
life of the persuadee. Consequently, persuasion cannot be extracted from the socio-
cultural context nor from the perspectives to which the act of persuasion points (as 
discussed in terms of the temporal influences on epistemic qualities and communication 
in 6.4).  
Linguistically, the distributed framework discusses this temporal aspect by 
invoking the difference between first and second-order languages. First-order is 
concerned with a “…contextually determined process of investing behaviour or the 
products of behaviour (vocal, gestural, or other) with semiotic significance (Love, 2004, 
p. 530). That is, in the concrete situation of dynamic interchange between persuader and 
persuadee, a specific act of communication takes place that both have to relate to as an 
intentional phenomenon (importantly, persuasion has to be intentional as defined in 
1.3). However, as already noted in terms of coordination in 4.3, this act is not 
solipsistic. Rather, it is dynamic, interactive, and coordinated between interlocutors. 
Such first-order behaviour is “…grounded in the real-time dynamics of interacting 
bodies in and through which persons coordinate their actions, intentions, perceptions, 
and feelings with each other” (Thibault, 2011, p. 6). Traditional views of language tend 
to abstract away the linguistic content, but as already seen, this significantly reduces the 
communicative and pragmatic action and diminishes the linguistic act given the fact that 
communication is inherently dialogical and cannot be contained in a one-way analysis 
where the persuader’s persuasive attempt is analysed. In the distributed framework, this 
dynamic, bodily relationship is expressed in real-time from pico-scale events to larger 
units of time during the conversation. Thibault (2011, p. 7) describes the conversational 
importance of at least three time-scales.  
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N+1: the (sense of) flow of situated social events (measured in 
second, minutes…) 
N: Microscale sayings and doings (roughly, the scale of 
“moves” and “turns” in discourse-analytical and conversational-
analytical traditions… (measured in tens of seconds to seconds) 
N-1: Pico-scale bodily dynamics (milliseconds to tens of 
seconds) 
Importantly, these time-scales have to be taken into account for an in-depth analysis of 
the interaction and joint coordination between interlocutors. Humans are exposed to 
these interactions on a daily basis throughout our lives, and slowly patterns emerge and 
solidify in conversational conventions and praxis and vice versa. In assembling such a 
meshwork of linguistic acts that eventually emerge as a more stable linguistic pattern, 
individuals play an integral part. This meshwork and stability is what is traditionally 
being considered ‘language’ from an analytic point of view (Steffensen et al., 2010).  
Second-order language is these stabilized cultural patterns that manifest on 
longer and slower time-scales. That is, throughout years, decades, and centuries, 
humans interact and communicate with one another in a first-order, coordinated manner 
through which these patterns emerge (here, bear in mind the probabilistic evolution 
mentioned earlier). These may then take form in shape of grammatical structures, 
conventional explicatures and implicatures, conversational praxis, and so on. 
Importantly, the second-order is not rigidly fixed such that changes may occur 
throughout time. And indeed, this is observable in the development of languages, which 
may happen at different time-scales165. When interlocutors meet and perform first-order 
communicative acts, they make use of the second-order developments in order to have 
some stable ground from which the conversation might take off. We are, so to speak, 
dipping into the collective communicative pool of expression, grammar, and so on in 
order to make sense in the concrete situation. In the specific situation, humans are 
anticipatory beings who depend on their own predictions concerning the direction of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Think of the different types of developments of English. Globally, English moves somewhat slowly 
(although the Internet is increasing development speed), but pockets of language users may quickly 
develop conversational conventions within their own community (e.g. rappers, poets, cockney rhyming 
slang, etc.). These local developments may easily be integrated in second-order English globally, but this 
takes longer time since more people have to get use to the conventions (e.g. the integration of slang in 
vernacular speech).  
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conversation (see e.g. Bickhard, 2004; Thibault, 2005a; 2005b). The development of 
these conventions may subsequently be described over conditional probabilities (Hasan, 
2009) as second-order developments are “…culturally transmitted and socially enforced 
as community standards through schooling and other formal and information learning 
situations” (Thibault, 2011, p. 10).  
For persuasion, the distinction between first-order interaction and second-
order development is essential because it hints at the complexity of the persuasive 
situation, in particular for the persuader. In order to make his case probable and appear 
both trustworthy and expert so as to make a compelling, persuasive case, he needs to dip 
into this collective communicative pool and speak with the persuadee, or as Burke 
(1969) would say “walk his walk, and talk his talk” (1969). Burke points to the process 
of identification between persuader and persuadee such that the persuadee has to be able 
to recognise an element of herself in the persuader in order to increase likeability, trust, 
and persuasiveness. For the present purpose, it suffices to note the importance of the 
development of conversational conventions. These are culturally negotiated and 
mouldable phenomena that are subject to constant change through individual first-order 
communicative acts. For instance, metaphors might readily be employed in a persuasive 
situation. The persuader can draw either from a stable set of conversationally known 
metaphors or develop a novel expression (as discussed concerning style and persuasion 
in 4.5).  
 
4.5 Beyond meaning: Style, sound, and mood 
Rhetorical theory readily accepts the claim that persuasion potentially is a creative 
action and that successful persuasive attempts need to contain both persuasive content, 
but also a compelling style. This is expressed by the fact that elocutio (style) and 
inventio (invention) make up two-fifth of the traditional rhetorical canon, and modern 
approaches to rhetoric such as Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric (1969) 
continue to argue for the inclusion of style as a central element of persuasion (as 
Plaintin, 2009, rightly notes, see also Kozy, 1970). However, throughout history, 
sceptics have pointed out that stylistic features distort and mislead rather than provide 
the audience with honest rhetoric.  
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The normative question of the inclusion of emotional content, stylistic 
panache, and auditory elements harken back to the two types of normative stances 
described earlier. Throughout history, a frequently voiced criticism of rhetorical praxis 
is concerned with the joint focus on style and content. Stylistic eloquence was seen as a 
manipulative and shallow way of persuasion from a philosophical point of view, when 
bare content should be sufficient. However, this normative stance is rooted in the 
societal type. The theoretical background developed here, though, is concerned with the 
normative stance of how human beings are persuaded despite what might be desirable, 
and stylistic ornamentation, auditory elements, and mood have to be acknowledged as 
important factors in this process as they provide the frame through which a persuasive 
attempt is evaluated (see 5.1 for a further discussion of framing effects in persuasion). 
For instance, Lincoln (1863; “a government of the people, for the people, by the 
people”), Churchill (1940; “I have nothing to offer, but blood, sweat, and tears”), and 
Kennedy (1961; “ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for 
your country”) are all examples of oratorical craftsmanship that conveys not only the 
content of the persuasive argument, but also clads the content in a persuasive style that 
invokes feelings of e.g. patriotism and self-sacrifice. Simply stating that the intended 
meaning is X or Z does not capture the persuasive potential of such rhetoric as it 
reduces the act of persuasion to enriched information transmission. Intuitively, the 
importance of stylistics in persuasion is readily acceptable if one bears in mind the 
immense labour put into this in advertisements, political rhetoric in campaigns, and so 
forth. And despite the fact that not much empirical research has been done in the area 
(especially in terms of discussing the implications of style on the psychology of 
reasoning), some research does exist to support the claim that style functions 
persuasively (see Blankenship & Craig, 2011 for a review of stylistic figures and their 
relation to persuasion166, see also Sparks & Areni, 2008). Despite the focus on spoken 
persuasion, it is interesting to note that stylistic changes of visual expressions of a 
similar topic (in this case, the angle of a camera), may function differently in terms of 
changes in beliefs (Yang et al., 2010), and that verb types (passive versus active) in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 For the present discussion it is of further interest to note that both Sparks & Areni (2008) and 
Blankenship & Craig (2011) make use of the ELM when discussing the potential persuasive implications 
of style. A treatment of style in the present SPIMP framework is well beyond the scope of the thesis, but I 
argue that given the subjective interpretations and strategic potential in persuasion, style is an essential 
element, the psychological and persuasive effects of which should be investigated carefully.  
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writing enhanced reading enjoyment, which made the message more persuasive 
(Carpenter & Henningson, 2011).  
The question, then, is how the issue of style is integrated in the reasoning 
framework developed throughout the thesis. This is still a very open issue given the lack 
of empirical research conducted in connection to Bayesian reasoning, but as will be 
evident, style and auditory elements of speech may function as a framing device, as a 
mood negotiation that can alter the probabilistic estimations, and as a mean to 
circumvent epistemic vigilance. This, it should be made clear, is speculative and follows 
from the general framework, and research is needed to further explore the effect of style 
on reasoning in general and persuasion in particular.  
 
4.5.1. Style, rhythm, and sound 
As already noted in the above, stylistics may influence the persuasiveness of an 
argument. Language is a multi-facetted and multi-performative tool. From a basic 
perspective, interlocutors need coordination and joint action in a shared environment 
(see 5.3). From this coordinated, bodily foundation, interlocutors make use of 
grammatical structures, semantics, and pragmatic inferences. In this linguistic 
environment, the persuadee combines auditory input (Cosmides, 1983) with body 
dynamics to facilitate sense-making in the situation by using second-order languages in 
a first-order manner. From a higher-level perspective, interlocutors may engage in 
mentalizing and metarepresentational practices to gain a more in-depth understanding of 
the utterances and bodily dynamics. No surprise, then, the perception of language is a 
complex stimulus (Pickett, 1999)167. To this complex picture, stylistics, rhythm, and 
sound add another level of difficulty in analysing and appreciating the persuasive 
potential of communication. In terms of sound, consider the following excerpt from The 
Daily Show with Jon Stewart.  
Jon Stewart (JS): [imitating George W. Bush] We will not 
apologize for our way of life. Nor will we waver in it’s defence 
[smirky laugh] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Note, that Pickett (1999) is concerned with the complexity of perceiving words. That is, the 
complexity reported in the book is not concerned with the added complexity of coordination and bodily 
dynamics.  
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Jason Jones (JJ): wo-o-o-o-o, Jon, Jon! The cowboy days are 
over. God, when I even hear that it makes me wanna take off my 
shoe and jam it down your… 
JS: Right, But those aren’t Bush’ words. That was me reading the 
Obama quote you just played for me in Bush’s voice. It’s the 
same rhetoric.  
JJ: …You’re the same rhetoric 
(The Daily Show, 20th of January 2009) 
As the example humorously illustrates, particular sounds and ways of speaking may 
invoke powerful pragmatic enrichments concerning the implicatures of the message and 
the persuasive attempt. Moreover, sound may invoke emotional reactions that 
potentially skew our evaluation of what is being said. Rhythm is yet another element of 
communication that needs to be taken into consideration in a richer appreciation of 
persuasive attempts. Consider the melodic rhythm of Dr Martin Luther King, which is 
derived from sermons in churches and thus potentially invokes connotations of 
religiousness as well as audience participation (as Dr King frequently made use of call 
and response cues in his rhetoric). Finally, stylistics, as mentioned, is an important 
factor of persuasiveness. Atkinson (1984) notes, presenting political ideas in 
dichotomies, provide the persuader with an effective way of presenting his message. 
The final speech in The Great Dictator provides numerous stylistic figures. Amongst, 
the dichotomy is prevalent. 
We have developed speed, but we have shut ourselves 
in; machinery that gives abundance has left us in want. Our 
knowledge has made us cynical, our cleverness hard and 
unkind. We think too much and feel too little. More than 
machinery we need humanity, more than cleverness we need 
kindness and gentleness  
 (Chaplin, The Great Dictator, 1940) 
The use of dichotomies in this excerpt of the speech, juxtaposes the technological 
advances with the deprivation of human sensibility. Furthermore, Chaplin makes use of 
repetition to invoke a rhythmic pattern. Sound, rhythm, and stylistics have received 
extensive treatment throughout the history of rhetoric as these are acknowledged as 
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important contributors to the persuasiveness of an argument. However, from a 
psychological point of view (and especially in the present framework of Bayesian 
argumentation and subjective probability estimations), they have been scarcely 
researched and documented. To investigate these elements from a probabilistic 
perspective to enrich and further the present framework is a fascinating challenge for 
future research. However, a few speculative remarks may be made. Firstly, it may be 
hypothesised that emotional content may skew probabilistic estimations (e.g. when 
angry, a human may estimate the same content differently as compared with situations 
where the person is happy, see also 7.2). If this holds true, sound, rhythm, and stylistics 
may potentially influence the emotional content of persuasive attempts such that the 
persuadee is put in a particular emotional state, which may influence (positively or 
negatively) her probabilistic estimation. Furthermore, all language is enveloped in some 
style. Classical philosophers such as Descartes eschew ornamental style and condemn 
such elocution to be needless embellishment. In doing so and proposing a ‘neutral’ and 
‘objective’ way of communicating, they forget that plain-speak, too, is a stylistic choice 
that may be invoked to connote particular implications and sentiments. That is, all 
words and sentences are clad in style as soon as they are uttered (stylistics can even be 
said to be present in silence given the importance of effective pauses in speeches). In 
other words, it is impossible to separate and devoid acts of persuasion from its style. 
Thirdly, stylistics may function as a framing effect that places a particular idea in a 
particular frame (see 5.1 for a discussion of framing). Finally, stylistics may provide 
additional information by invoking pragmatic enrichment, putting the persuadee in a 
particular mood, and connoting a myriad of poetic references. As such, some stylistics 
may increase the cognitive effort required to understand a particular message168. In this 
way, stylistics may be a tool to circumvent the epistemic vigilance, as additional 
cognitive effort may be needed to appreciate the content. Importantly, these are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Think, for instance, of politicians who wish to hide certain policies by wrapping policy proposals or 
admissions in complex language that needs to be technically deciphered before being understood by 
laypeople (an example of this is Clinton’s use of ‘sexual relationship’ when initially describing his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky since he intended this term in a technical manner by which he in fact 
did not have a technical sexual relationship with the intern. However, this reading of the concept ‘sexual 
relationship’ had to e uncovered. .  
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speculations of the effect of style, and it remains to be tested and explored to see if these 
are valid assumptions169.  
 
4.5.2. Nonverbal communication 
As already noted in 4.4, the body plays an integral part in communication and 
coordination and consequently it plays a part in persuasion. For instance, Pedersen 
(2012) note how the alignment of the bodies of doctors and nurses may hinder or further 
particular types of communicative acts, and the general distributed framework 
emphasises the importance of bodily contributions. Here, like with stylistics, rhythm, 
and sound, a few remarks concerning body language are warranted. The contribution of 
body language, appears to be concerned with alignment of communication (Atkinson, 
1984; Argyle, 1988) and thus facilitates clarity of communication and supports the 
credibility of the persuader.  
 Argyle (1988) lists five main functions of nonverbal communication (thus, 
including body language, facial expressions etc.), namely expression of emotions, 
expression of interpersonal attitudes, rituals (such as greetings), self-representations of 
personality, and finally to accompany speech acts via gestures. The latter is especially 
salient in a persuasive situation in which, as Atkinson, 1984 notes, gestures may 
accompany the content of persuasive attempts physically (see e.g. the example of 
gestural accompaniment of Michael Foot, pp. 82-83). Atkinson further discusses the 
importance of relevant, clarifying, and magnifying gestures as a mean to increase the 
charisma of the speaker. As a communicative tool, however, gestures have to be used 
relevantly and in coherence with the spoken utterance in order to clarify the persuasive 
message. For instance, if an orator speaks of grandeur whilst accompanying his delivery 
by gesturing minimally with his hands, the effect may be of confusion rather than of 
clarification and emphasis. Furthermore, rhetoricians deal with the gestural meta-
communicative space in which orators indicate gestural linguistic placeholders. For 
instance, if an orator states “I can sum up my policies in three concise points” whilst 
holding up only two fingers, the result may cause confusion rather than lucidity. Indeed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 One way of testing these predictions that style can function as framing is to present the same content 
in different styles, with different nonverbal styles, and to alert people of the ’trick’ to ascertain whether or 
not vigilance is alerted in a stronger manner. However, the exploration of the psychology of the 
persuasive potential of style goes beyond the scope of the present thesis, but remains a fascinating and 
hitherto little explored field in experimental psychology.  
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empirical data suggests that ‘weird’ body movements might affect the effectiveness of 
deception (Bond et al., 1992). The effects of the importance of body language, like 
stylistics, is an important factor in persuasion and should be studied empirically from 
the point of view of the present model and theoretical framework. However, this 
remains to be done in future research.  
 
4.5.3. On persuasive language: defiance of expectations 
So far, 4.5 considers the importance of style in persuasive communication and how 
expressions may convey presence (see 6.3 for a presentation of presence). Alongside 
these stylistic elements, Vatz (1998) describe how the persuader may create the 
persuasive situation, thus placing theoretical importance on the persuader’s ability to 
steer the social context170. Ending the chapter on language in general and stylistics in 
particular, the following is briefly concerned with the notion of expectancy in 
persuasion. This is specifically concerned with the relevant expectations that the 
audience might have prior to a persuasive attempt. Often, the persuadee carries 
expectations of a particular type of act of persuasion, e.g. when watching a commercial, 
we expect that the company tries to sell us a particular product, when listening to a 
politician on the campaign trail, we expect that she will try to persuade us to vote for 
her, and so on. However, certain acts of persuasion arise unexpectedly when a situation 
is turned, a novel idea is introduced, or the mood of a persuasive situation is altered. A 
splendid example of this comes from The Great Dictator by Charlie Chaplin (as did the 
stylistic example previously). Throughout the film, the audience has laughed with 
Chaplin as he portrays the dictator and the barber, and the general mood of the film is 
comical. At the end of the film, following a case of mistaken identities, the Jewish 
barber who has been persecuted throughout the film, is set to give a speech as the 
dictator in front of the conquering army. Given the tone of the film hitherto, the 
audience might well expect a humorous finale. However, Chaplin defies expectations.  
I'm sorry, but I don't want to be an Emperor, that's not my 
business. I don't want to rule or conquer anyone. I should like to 
help everyone if possible, Jew, gentile, black man, white. We all 
want to help one another. Human beings are like that. We all want 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Although, as Benoit (1994) notice, the situation provides constraints on what is possible to say. So, 
this has to be taken into consideration.  
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to live by each other's happiness, not by each other's misery. We 
don't want to hate and despise one another. In this world there is 
room for everyone and the good earth is rich and can provide for 
everyone. The way of life can be free and beautiful. But we have 
lost the way. 
Chaplin (1940) 
The subsequent speech is a passionate plead to cease greed, malevolent machinations, 
and hate, which must have resonated powerfully in the context of the second world war 
and still remains relevant and poetically moving. The audience, however, is placed in a 
situation in which the previously negotiated social contract of humour is broken. This 
leaves the audience to relate to an entirely novel expression of sincerity and humanity.  
 From the perspective of the present theoretical framework, novelty and 
unexpected acts of persuasion may be explained by invoking the aim of the persuadee 
concerning vigilance towards misinformation. As fact-checking, consideration of the 
validity of reasoning and epistemic vigilance in general require cognitive effort, 
introducing a novel scenario for which the persuadee is unprepared may well prove an 
effective tool in persuasion as this confounds the ability to be epistemically vigilant.  
Like stylistics, then, the defiance of expectations might prove a valuable asset for 
persuaders. That is, persuasion exists in a constantly mediated and negotiated social and 
cultural situation in which persuader and persuadee have to coordinate and co-act to 
form and shape the persuasive situation. As discussed in 6.6, this entails that persuasion 
analysis benefit from descriptive approaches such as the ones found in many 
rhetorically critical methods (see Foss, 2004), and it moves language and especially the 
persuasiveness of communication into a less constrained spectrum, which has to be 
acknowledged from a perspective that seems difficult to formalise from a logical point, 
but has to be approached from a contextual and cultural perspective.  
 Summary The chapter brought forward a range of important points 
concerning the communicative acts between the persuader and the persuadee. Firstly, 
language cannot be reduced to logical connectors given the pragmatic inferences 
stemming from explicatures and free implicatures. As such, the chapter substantiates a 
general point concerning formal logic argue throughout the thesis, namely that formal 
logic is faced with serious difficulties when approximating and formalising reasoning 
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and also natural languages. Rather, the framework places communication inherently in a 
mediated and negotiated, cultural context in which humans make use of second-order 
languages in order to perform first-order linguistic acts. That is, communication in this 
framework is seen as something inherently coordinated, collaborative, and full-bodied 
in which the persuader is not simply transmitting a persuasive proposal to the 
persuadee, but has to communicate with the persuadee. If this collaborative effort is 
shunned, the act of persuasion may well be misunderstood or the persuadee may not 
engage with the persuader. From this perspective, then, language is a performative acts 
as mentioned in the early speech act theories, which happens in a coordinated 
perspective. The notion of coordination will be explored further in 5.2-5.3, both from a 
linguistic and a reasoning perspective. In other words, persuasion is inherently placed in 
the realm of the social (see 5.1). As mentioned, persuasion temporally reaches beyond 
the specific moment as the interlocutors make use of past experiences, knowledge, and 
so on to guide their priors and likelihood estimations, and central to many persuasive 
proposals is a strong awareness of the implications on future behaviour. This 
perspective qualifies the model proposed in 7.3. The theoretical framework points 
beyond the concrete situation, but the model formalises the process in that situation 
given the temporal, and socio-cultural constraints. Or as coined and presented in 6.4: a 
flash in a flux. Language, then, is an enriched, coordinated, inter-bodily and dynamic 
process, and the persuasive use and the interpretation of said communication should be 
seen in the light of the persuasive intentions on behalf of both interlocutors and the 
theoretical framework strongly suggests the incapability of reducing persuasive 
communication to a logically decodable code, but rather suggests an interactive and 
dynamic position. Furthermore, given the importance of style, rhythm, sound, and the 
potential persuasive effect of defying expectations, persuasion is inherently creative and 
productive. To navigate the complex social sphere, both as persuader and persuadee, is 
tricky given the amount of uncertain information and asymmetry in aims and 
knowledge, and the most successful persuaders are surely the ones who are innovate in 
thinking, style, and modes of delivery As such, the present framework agrees 
wholeheartedly with Aristotle’s perspective that rhetoric is the art of persuasion. 
Indeed, in the view proposed here, science might help understand the ‘tricks’ of the 
persuader, but it does not replace the artistic and creative element of production. Thus, 
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science can improve out understanding of complex phenomena (for instance, how 
science has increased out understanding of art and the perception of drawing, see e.g. 
Chamberlain, 2013) in the same way that looking at persuasive artefacts from a 
rhetorical perspective might yield clues about how language processing and reasoning 
functions.  
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Chapter 5: Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All our knowledge is the offspring of our perceptions 
 Leonardo Da Vinci 
 
 
Any fool can make a rule, and any fool will mind it 
Henry David Thoreau 
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So far, the components of the acronym in the SPIMP have been fairly obvious. The 
Subjective-Probabilistic (SP) element is described in the probabilistic, Bayesian 
approach to content strength and source credibility, which constitutes the foundation for 
how SPIMP provides a Model of Persuasion (MP). The present chapter explores the 
Interactive (I) component of the model and provides a communicative and reasoning 
context for the argument that humans influence one another when communicating, 
thinking, and reasoning about acts of persuasion. As Frankfurt puts it, “[a]s conscious 
beings, we exist only in response to other things, and we cannot know ourselves at all 
without knowing them” (2005, p. 66). In particular, interaction puts in perspective the 
conceptual appreciation of subjectivity since the probabilistic estimations of content 
strength and source credibility and the interpretation of the communicative acts, though 
personal and subjective, are not solipsistic, but socially influenced. The SPIMP 
specifically models and describes persuasion processing for verbal acts of persuasion 
between two and only two interlocutors (although, the model is potentially expandable 
to include more than one persuader, see fig. 13 in 5.1). Therefore, the interaction and its 
importance for reasoning and communication considered here is concerned with the 
type of interaction in which two interlocutors are faced with one another in a physical 
environment (i.e. not via digital media, via the telephone or similar types of 
communication). As such, the persuadee can necessarily interact and engage with the 
persuader in the persuasive situations explored here. Persuasion via the telephone, 
through digital or other means, brings with it a host of different ways of 
communicating, social conventions, and ways of managing the persuasive attempt (for 
instance, it is easier to blur one’s identity online than when face-to-face with the 
persuadee). This is not to say that these instances of persuasion are not important, but it 
is necessary to limit the scope of the thesis. Thus, ‘interactivity’ is here understood as 
interaction between two and only two interlocutors who share a physical space and 
communicate verbally (gather than with, e.g. sign language)171.  
Chapters 2-4 considered various central elements to processing persuasion 
such that we have established the plausibility of a theory of persuasion relying on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 On a speculative basis, however, many of the central elements (such as probabilistic estimation of 
argument strength and source credibility) will remain similar in other types of persuasion, and the 
theoretical foundation presented throughout the thesis might thus provide a conceptual springboard to 
discuss these. However, to explore the psychology of other forms of persuasion is an issue for future 
research.  
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dynamic communication, the interpretation of the speaker in context, and the subjective, 
probabilistic estimations of content. Together, they suggest a tentative theoretical lens 
through which the complexity of the persuasive situation may be appreciated. In 
discussing these, however, it has collectively emerged that each of these aspects, 
subjective probabilistic estimations, source credibility, and language, exist in an 
interactive, coordinated context. So far, the concepts of interactivity and coordination 
have remained elusive in discussion despite figuring as an underlying assumption and 
activity running through the other concepts. This chapter remedies this by looking at the 
notions of interaction and coordination from the perspectives of joint action, common 
knowledge, and context in order to frame the theoretical contribution of the preceding 
concepts. Providing the theoretical context for appreciating these concepts in hindsight 
and further pointing towards an integrated theory of persuasion, the chapter presents and 
discusses recent findings from social psychology and coordination literature that have 
significant bearings on content strength, source credibility, and communication.  
 As evident, the SPIMP approach developed in the thesis is predominantly 
conceived as a cognitive psychological model. The focus of the theoretical discussion of 
the thesis is concerned with the persuasive situation between two people in which the 
act of persuasion is delivered via verbal (bodily) dynamics. This specific act of verbal 
persuasion is, however, firmly lodged in the social, contextual, and cultural interaction 
and immersion, and consequently this needs to be considered in order to flesh out a 
more in-depth theory of interpersonal spoken persuasion. In particular, the elements 
concerning content strength and language acts are shaped by the interaction as argued in 
4.3-4.5. The chapter deals with this aspect of the theoretical foundation. Furthermore, in 
discussing this, I acknowledge the limitation of the persuasive situation under 
consideration since influence (i.e. change in behaviour) may happen for other reasons 
than spoken communication. For instance, recent findings in social psychology (5.1.1.) 
and behavioural economics (see 5.1.2) show the influence of group dynamics and 
changes in the choice architecture on beliefs and, especially, behaviour. A rich theory of 
persuasion must be able to connect the cognitive with the social aspects of psychology, 
and consequently the discussion in this chapter helps frame the theoretical contribution 
of the thesis by placing it in relation to the (equally important) social psychological 
findings. Broader sociological and cultural theories are relevant as well when examining 
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persuasion since these provide the frame for the subjective estimation of probabilistic 
content. Such broader aspects are, however, only considered very briefly in the thesis 
(in 6.2) because of its focus on spoken persuasive attempts between two people. As 
mentioned before (in 1.8) this focus reduces the impact of broader social and cultural 
perspectives. Therefore, even though these are still important, they fall outside the scope 
of the thesis. 
Throughout the discussion in the thesis, I have frequently made reference 
to the social and contextual aspect of persuasive situations. Indeed, one of the most 
influential recent contributions to the psychology of persuasion, Cialdini’s Influence 
(2007), stems from social psychology. Therefore, chapter 5 provides an interactive 
perspective and chapter 6 further expands the social perspective concerning how 
subjectivity is immersed in the contextual that points toward the role of social 
psychology in relation to the psychological frame work which will be fully presented in 
7.2. as well as the SPIMP in 7.3.  
The chapter falls in five sections. Firstly, 5.1 examines how the social 
psychological literature contributes to setting the context in relation to persuasive acts, 
potential behaviour change, and the SPIMP. This provides the foundation for 
subsequent discussions on the contextual importance of the interactions. Following this, 
5.2 discusses how the main concepts of interactivity, namely joint action, common 
knowledge, and coordination, shape the communicative act of persuasion in terms of the 
persuasive aim and potential, but also bear important theoretical entailments for 
language and reasoning in general. Finally, 5.3 takes its point of departure in the 
interactive situation of the persuasive act in an attempt to explain how the social and 
interactive theories and concepts have an impact on the definition of persuasion as 
developed throughout the thesis.  
 
5.1. Insights from social psychology 
The way other people behave and the set-up of the environment change how humans 
approach and evaluate a situation. In order to appreciate the contribution of various 
findings from social psychology, it is useful to consider the theoretical position of the 
current model developed in the thesis. The SPIMP approach and the surrounding 
theoretical frameworks concerning source credibility, and content strength are 
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concerned with a concrete type of persuasion, namely verbal persuasive attempts 
between two and only two interlocutors.  
 A comprehensive model of persuasion has to take into consideration more 
than verbal utterances, more than just interpersonal persuasive acts, and wider social 
contexts. However, the focus of the thesis remains the verbal situation in which 
evidence is presented in an interpersonal setting. This choice of this limitation has been 
made because this initial formulation of the novel SPIMP approach will be more 
straightforward in a quite simple situation. Extending the SPIMP framework to include 
several persuaders is possible, but has clear empirical implications. The persuasive 
situation will be increasingly complex. This may for most parts be captured by the basic 
idea of the model, but some parts will be affected and have to be adapted172. 
The incidence with multiple persuaders is thus beyond the scope of the 
thesis. However, given the fact that the probabilistic estimations are taken to be 
subjective, the social and the interactive are highly important aspects of the current 
psychological approach, even in situations with only one persuader since the persuadee 
is still lodged in a social context (in which there may be other people aside from the 
persuader, but where no other persuader participates in the persuasive interaction). 
Indeed, the persuasion, with the definition presented in the thesis, further differs from 
argumentation and information theories in the way it acknowledges that the social 
situation is negotiated given the persuasive intention rather than restricting the 
persuasive potential to the linguistic and communicated content (as described in 1.6). In 
order to appreciate the social context of persuasion we therefore need to present insights 
from social psychology for three reasons. Firstly, social psychology has done immense 
work in describing the influence that other people and social constraints exert on a 
persuasive incident. Secondly, a richer psychological theory of persuasion needs both a 
cognitive and a social element. Indeed, the findings from much cognitive literature on 
reasoning argue the importance of the interactive, contextual, and social element, and as 
such social psychology becomes a fundamental lens through which to understand the 
contributions from the cognitive field. Thirdly, by appreciating the social, the concepts, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 One potential consequence of the increased complexity of multiple persuaders is an increase in 
cognitive load, as the persuadee now has to consider an increasingly complex situation. Therefore, we 
may predict that epistemic vigilance is further challenged in situations with high complexity since the 
persuadee has to keep in mind a greater range of potentially differing aims and objectives when multiple 
persuaders are involved.  
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theory, and the subsequent SPIMP model become clearer in terms of contextuality. 
Collectively, these considerations warrant a look at the social side from a persuasive 
point of view, and the present section is a snippet of a complex and vast field of 
literature to indicate some important contributions to a theory of persuasion. As evident 
from the illustration of how various disciplines relate the persuasion (1.1, fig. 2), the 
research from social psychology mainly stem from behavioural studies where changes 
in the social lead to changes in behaviour. As mentioned, this is influence and merely 
indicative of persuasion, but it remains an important leeway into the social influence on 
persuasion.  
 
5.1.1. Cialdini’s social psychological tools of persuasion 
The distinctive lesson to learn from social psychology, in the present framework, is the 
fact that no action or emergence of belief is done in isolation173. As such, social 
psychology provides a lens through which the emergence of probabilistic estimations 
can understood as well as the background against which actions take place. Cialdini’s 
Influence (2007) is one of the most prominent books on the social psychological aspects 
of persuasion. In the book, Cialdini goes through an impressive amount of social 
psychological data that suggest various ways in which humans are persuaded to change 
behaviour. In the end, he lists six main social psychological tools of persuasion, namely 
reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, authority, liking, and scarcity. In 
the ensuing, I will very briefly present the ideas underlying reciprocity, scarcity, and 
authority since Cialdini’s work reciprocity and scarcity contributes only marginally to 
the SPIMP framework and due to the fact that I have already dealt extensively with 
authority in chapter 3. Scarcity is concerned with the influential potential of the lack of 
resources such as time and goods, which will increase the likelihood of the persuadee 
doing what the persuader intends given a pressure of time. However, the persuasive 
situation considered in the thesis is concerned with changes in beliefs, which do not go 
on sale or expire after a certain period of time has passed. As such, scarcity is less 
important. The same goes for reciprocation, as this is concerned more with a social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 This can even be said to include actions taken in complete isolation due to the fact that others have 
influenced social conventions, modes of thinking, etc. throughout the life of the agent. As such, even 
solitary actions carry with them the trace of the social. However, here we are considering persuasion 
between two and only two interlocutors, and therefore the influence of the other is even more apparent.  
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contract than changes in beliefs.  For these reasons, I will more in-depth discuses how 
the remaining tools of social proof, liking, and consistency have important implications 
for the SPIMP framework. 
 Commitment and consistency Cialdini’s commitment and consistency 
concepts provide a social psychological perspective on the local-global consistency 
issue discussed in 2.7. Cialdini notes that humans have an inert tendency to strive for 
consistency within themselves and their actions and behaviour. Thus, if the persuader 
gets the persuadee to commit to a particular trajectory, the theory goes that it 
subsequently becomes easier to invoke more fundamental changes in behaviour on the 
same line as the initial commitment. That is, humans are thought to immerse themselves 
in the action of a particular type and stick to the self-image that this portrays (see 
Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010 for a review of findings), and commitment has even been 
suggested as a coping mechanism against persuasive attempts (Gopinath & Nyer, 
2009). This notion of commitment and constancy harkens back to the local-global 
consistency issue. In the present framework of subjective probabilistic estimations on 
the spot in a complex flux of temporal influences (see 6.3-6.4 for a discussion of this), 
local consistency within actions become central as humans are taken to evaluate 
particular instances of persuasive attempts on the spot from previous experiences 
concerning what they believe they believe and what they recall having done previously 
in their lives (“oh yes, I am a socially conscientious person, so this policy appeals to 
me”). Cialdini’s notion of consistency adds to the notion of consistency discussed in 
2.7, as it is concerned not with belief consistency, but with consistency of action. One 
of the fundamental assumptions throughout the thesis is that humans are geared towards 
consistency such that their beliefs and desires are consistent with what they generally 
otherwise believe and desire. Note that this gearing towards entails a movement towards 
consistency such that most humans tend to be conflicted in some way (for instance, 
there can often be discrepancies between beliefs and desires, e.g. belief that crisps are 
bad for you, but a desire to eat some nonetheless). As such, the intentionality of humans 
(discussed in 6.1) is driven towards being consistent and entertaining beliefs that are 
consistent within themselves (first, as discussed in 2.7, on a local level, then only 
potentially on a more global scale). Cialdini’s social psychological principle of 
consistency adds credence to this assumption in that it indicates a desire for consistency, 
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not only on the level of beliefs and desires, but also on the level of action174. Thus, the 
social psychological notion of consistency supports the notion discussed in 2.7 as a 
fundamental trait of human intentionality.  
 Social proof We take cues from one another when (consciously or 
unconsciously) deciding how to behave, what to believe, and on what to focus. The 
social proof of persuasion is concerned with the instance in which changes in behaviour 
occur simply because other people are acting in a particular way. For instance, Rao et 
al. (2001) provide evidence that people make use of social proof in deciding whether to 
initiate or abandon coverage of firms listed on the NASDAQ. Social proof is a tricky 
concept, malleable to cultural change. Thus, Cialdini et al. (1999) show that in more 
collectivist cultures (they compare the USA to Poland), social proofs are more effective. 
Further, social proofs are amendable given other factors. For instance, romantic desire 
can lead to the outcome that social proofs become ‘counter-persuasive’ (Griskevicious 
et al., 2009). The social proof can be seen as social psychology in pure form since it is 
concerned with the actions of others (as compared to commitment and consistency, 
which is concerned more with the desire to be or appear to others as consistent 
regarding ones own previous actions). However, the distinction between influence and 
persuasion is important here, as social proofs might yield different behaviour without 
necessarily changing the beliefs of the persuadee. For instance, imagine a person 
standing on an empty road at a red stoplight, waiting for permission to cross despite the 
fact that there are no cars. Then, another person crosses before the light turns green, and 
the person decides to follow suit and cross despite the fact that the belief concerning 
whether or not she would be run over has not been altered (i.e. believing that there are 
no cars on the road)175. In the SPIMP, a range of factors is thought to influence how 
beliefs emerge and are probabilistically estimated in the situation. Cialdini’s principle of 
social proofs support the notion that beliefs are not solipsistic since social proofs 
provide indirect evidence that humans guide their perception of their world from the 
actions and behaviour of others. If beliefs were truly solipsistic, the behaviour of others 
would matter less (if it would matter at all). Thus, the principle is telling of the type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 The notion of social contracts and expectations, however, might be a strong influencing factor in 
driving people’s desires to appear consistent in their behaviour.  
175 Other beliefs, however, might have changed (such as the acceptability of jaywalking), but as a 
simplified example, the above illustrates the point that social proofs may yield behaviour change without 
change in beliefs.  
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subjectivity considered in the thesis since subjectivity can be taken to mean subjective 
to the person or subjective to the person as influenced by other factors. The thesis 
assumes the latter version of subjectivity (in line with Hood, 2012, and as discussed in 
6.2), and Cialdini’s principles of social proofs lend support to this assumption. As such, 
an exploration of social psychological evidence strengthens the framework of the 
SPIMP.  
Liking Alongside the notion of authority, Cialdini (2007) pays importance 
to the aspect of liking as a persuasive tool. Liking refers to how enjoyable and likable 
someone is, and, according to findings in social psychology, liking is not confined 
merely to friends and family, but also strangers with whom we strike a connection. As 
such, it bears resemblance to the arête aspect of classical ethos. Notable, phronesis 
(expertise) and eunoia (trustworthiness) are captured in the formalisation of source 
credibility in 3.3. From an ELM and HSM perspective, the likeability would 
presumably feature as a peripheral cue as it is not central to the evidence provided by 
the persuader. In the present framework, however, the elements identified in the SPIMP 
approach (content strength and source credibility), extraneous influences such as social 
cues, likeability, and contextual influences on perception feature as modifying factors 
that shape and push the probabilistic estimation. Importantly, however, these are always 
present in the model. That is, despite the best effort to remain objective, whether the 
persuader is charming is thought to play a role in the perception of the persuasive 
attempt. However, this is gradient, as the persuadee may invest more cognitive effort 
into minimizing the influence of these factors (see 7.4 for a discussion of this). Liking 
provides an interesting perspective on the notion of trustworthiness (which was 
identified as a main element of source credibility in 3.3) and as such it points to the fact 
that the notion of trust is multifaceted and complex. Indeed, the elements of the SPIMP 
(content strength and source credibility, which is divided into trustworthiness and 
expertise) might be the central elements identified in developing an alternative theory 
and model of persuasion processing based on a probabilistic approach to human 
reasoning and communication, but Cialdini’s principle of liking indicates that the 
discussion is not exhausted and concluded with the identification of these elements. 
Indeed, persuasion is a massively complex phenomenon that involves a range of issues 
not discussed here such as charisma, body language, coping mechanisms (although, this 
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is briefly discussed in 7.4), and so forth. Thus, the principle of liking indicates the 
fragmentation of the notion of trustworthiness such that it can be explored in more 
detail and qualified in a more precise manner. As such, liking points to future research 
and challenges for the SPIMP.  
 Authority As already dealt with throughout chapter 3, authority is an 
important factor in persuasion processing. This has been shown both by the ELM (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1984b) and by the present framework (Harris et al., submitted). Further, 
the different types of authority presented in 3.3 (epistemic, administrative, and cultural) 
further nuances the influence of the general label of authority. The conceptual 
discussion and formal representation in 3.3 deals with how source credibility (and not of 
the ad verecundiam type) influences the perception of the evidence presented. Here, 
however, the literature on authority is concerned more with the social influence of 
authority rather than the argumentative. For instance, amongst other social 
psychological experiments, Cialdini (2007) cites the Milgram experiment (Milgram, 
1963) to show the importance of authority in persuasion. Here, told to do so by lab 
coated experimenters, participants thought they delivered electrical currents of 
dangerously high voltage to a fellow participant (who was in fact collaborating with the 
experimenters). As such, the different manifestations of authority need to be taken into 
consideration when analysing the complexity of persuasive attempts.  
Reciprocation Reciprocity is the notion that good deeds socially seem to 
mandate the response of other good deeds (and conversely, ill treatment warrants bad 
reactions). Cialdini (2007) mentions free samples in the supermarket as an example of 
behaviour change via reciprocity. Additionally, Fehr & Gächter (2000) provide 
empirical support in a common goods situation. Here, an increase of potential 
reciprocity leads to an increase in contributions to the common good. Likewise, when a 
disguised experimenter bought a participant an unrequested drink, the participant was 
more likely subsequently to buy raffle tickets from the disguised experimenter (Regan, 
1971). Finally, reciprocity by proxy indicates where reciprocation from a benefactor 
provides value for a third party on behalf of the intended reciprocation target (Goldstein 
et al., 2011). From the principle of reciprocity, it seems clear that social norms play a 
crucial part on behaviour changes. That is, without necessarily uttering a phrase, 
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changes in behaviour may be achieved, which puts in perspective the focus of the 
spoken, interpersonal persuasive situation investigated in the thesis.  
Scarcity Finally, Cialdini (2007) describes scarcity of resources and time 
as a persuasive tool.That is, if the persuadee imagines that a given opportunity (e.g. the 
right to vote for a particular candidate) is time-constrained and potentially limited in 
stock (such as clearance sales), this might spark changes in behaviour. Note, however, 
that the principle of scarcity refers to the subjective perception of scarcity rather than 
the actual scarcity. Thus, objectively there may be plenty of a particular resource, but if 
the opposite is experienced by the persuadee, it may still be thought of as a scarcity 
situation. For examples of scarcity, see Cialdini (2007).  
 Simon and Jones (2011, pp. 220-228) discuss some potential limitations to 
Cialdini’s persuasion tools. Of particular interest here, the primary focus is on the tools 
available for the persuader such that he may induce a change in behaviour or the beliefs 
of the persuadee. Cialdini may neglect the complexity of the interaction and the 
possibility of defection. As discussed in 3.1, humans are equipped with epistemic 
vigilance. Cialdini’s so-called ‘click and whirr’ approach indicates a deterministic 
appreciation of the social influences, which overstates the persuasive effect of the tools 
given the fact that humans are perfectly capable of refraining from opting for the same 
behaviour as their peers or avoiding reciprocating a kind gesture. The effect of the 
principles, in other words, should be modified (and indeed, Cialdini acknowledges the 
fact that humans can avoid these persuasive effects by discussing how at the end of each 
chapter and that the tools work better in some conditions than in others).   
From the six empirically supported principles of persuasion posited by 
Cialdini (2007, see also Goldstein et al., 2009) it seems clear that a solipsistic approach 
to persuasion is inherently unwarranted. That is, classic models of communication and 
argumentation tend to assume the persuader and the persuadee as separate entities in the 
persuasive process, and that the persuasive attempt is transmitted by the persuader and 
then processed by the persuadee. However, from social psychology, we can gauge at the 
social influence in the on-the-spot construction of beliefs, perception, and attention, 
which shows interactivity in work: humans cannot be reduced to solipsistic processing 
engines, but have to be taken into consideration via the social and contextual. This 
social and interactive view subsequently provide an interesting theoretical background 
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for the later development of a theory of persuasion relying on subjective probabilistic 
estimations given that these subjective estimations become social and cultural rather 
than solipsistic.  
Secondly, and as indicated further throughout this section, the evidence 
from Cialdini shows the range of changes in behaviour, which in turn helps qualify the 
contribution of the thesis. The focus of the thesis is concerned with interpersonal, verbal 
persuasive attempts. The thesis, however, has to acknowledge the importance of the 
social contribution in order to appreciate the processes that the persuadee undergoes 
given the fact that this social situation contributes in shaping her immediate beliefs, 
perceptions, and so on. In other words, it is entirely possible to obtain changes in 
behaviour and belief without uttering persuasive appeals verbally, but it is not possible 
to utter spoken, interpersonal persuasive attempts without the acknowledgement of the 
social, cultural, and contextual situation. In this way, by incorporating insights from 
social psychology, the contribution of the thesis is a cognitive model of persuasion 
processing in the social moment. That is, a model of a specific instance of persuasive 
attempts, which can be seen in connection with the principles of persuasion mentioned 
above.  
 
5.1.2. Contextual influences on behaviour, estimations, and communication176 
In persuasion studies, Cialdini (2007) remains the most influential book concerning 
specific tools of persuasion that aims at changes in behaviour (such as voting, buying a 
car, etc.). Alongside this concrete look at the social nature of persuasion, social 
psychology contributes with more general insights on social influence, group behaviour, 
and interactive dynamics and how these influence beliefs and behaviour. However, 
before venturing into the social and contextual, it is warranted to reiterate the difference 
between persuasion and influence since this distinction frames the evidence from social 
psychology in such a way that the evidence becomes indicative and supportive of rather 
than directly contributing to a theory of persuasion. Persuasion was defined as a 
strategic communicative act designed to change the beliefs of the persuadee and in a 
situation where both interlocutors acknowledge the persuasive intention. Note that this 
definition does not entail action. Influence, however, is broader, as it implies the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 I’d like to thank Robert Teszka who provided me with invaluable literature references throughout this 
section.  
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influence on behaviour. Indeed, the Cialdini book Influence (2007) is concerned with 
the social psychological factors that might lead to changes in behaviour rather than in 
beliefs.  
 [Nudging] can be viewed as a social psychological approach, which is 
even more focused on behaviour since it argues that the mere physical context might 
shape how humans behave and thus constitute the frame through which we perceive a 
given situation. A nudge is defined as “…any aspect of the choice architecture that 
alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). 
Choice architecture is the physical context in which a decision takes place. This could 
be a layout of a supermarket in which the costumer has to decide what to buy. That is, 
an alteration of the physical context that entails changes in actual behaviour without 
coercion. From the point of view of the definitions in this thesis, this does not constitute 
persuasion as such since there are no two interlocutors present, changes in beliefs are 
not necessary and the persuasive intention is not immediate. However, it does fall under 
the category of influence since it aims at changing people’s behaviour rather than their 
beliefs per se. Nudges have been explored in a variety of functions such as honesty in 
self-reports depending on the timing of signing an ethical document (Shu et al., 2012), 
the use of financial incentive in weight-loss (Volpp et al., 2008), and it has been used to 
great effect by the Behavioural Insights Team in the British government. Johnson et al. 
(2012) further qualifies the contribution and understanding of nudging by dividing the 
effects of nudging into those structuring the choice task and those that describe the 
choice options. That is, the difference between the decision and the grounds leading to 
decision. Nudging indicates the importance of the context in which the decision is 
made. Following the general findings, it suggests that despite the fact there is no 
infringement on freedom of choice, significantly different behaviour is obtainable by 
altering the choice architecture.  
Nudging indicates the importance of the make-up of the choice 
architecture as the subject behaves, i.e. the physical environment. Alongside these 
physical nudges, the choice background is important. Defaults presents a way of 
approaching the choice background, as they refer to “…what happens in the absence of 
choice” (Dinner et al., 2011, p. 1).  Thus, in the absence of decision, defaults inform us 
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of the belief background already assumed by the persuadee. As argued in 7.4, 
persuasion processing is a complex social mechanism where the persuadee may invest 
more or less cognitive effort, which in turn will influence how critically she may 
approach the proposed beliefs. Defaults inform us of the effort necessary to change 
behaviour and support the claim that our perception of issues to some extent is based on 
the default position from which the issue is approached. For instance, whether or not 
someone chooses to donate his or her organs post-mortem largely depends on the legal 
default in society. That is, the difference between whether you have to actively say yes 
or actively say no to organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003, see also Goldstein et 
al., 2008; Johnson & Goldstein, 2012 for more recent explorations of the importance of 
default positions). In decision-making, the estimation of the worth of a particular 
product has also been shown to be relative given the particular point of departure and 
the range of choices possible (Stewart et al., 2006; Seymour & McClure, 2008; Stewart 
& Simpson, 2008). As such, the lens through which the persuasive attempt is presented 
might suggest (or even impose) upon the persuadee a frame (much in the same way that 
stylistics in 4.5 is mentioned as a potential framing effect). Thus, the social situation 
further provides a general framework for the persuasive attempt to unfold and be 
received. This calls into conceptual existence the complexity of persuasion since the 
framing effects might be traced both to the mode of presentation as well as the socio-
cultural lens against which it emerges.  
Branching over the evidence from nudging and contextual influences such 
as defaults and the relative point of departure, it seems warranted to argue that expected 
utility estimations are neither stable nor fixed, but rather that these are relative and 
depending on the interaction with others and the environment in which the choice and 
estimation occurs. For persuasion research, this is fascinating since it might be 
postulated that the subjective probabilistic estimation of the relative strength of an 
argument and the credibility of the source equally are affected by the physical context, 
the actions of others, and the defaults against which such estimations occur. In other 
words, it qualifies the subjective element of the reasoning approach underlying the 
SPIMP. Indeed, different linguistic frames might yield different outcomes in actions 
(for instance, loss versus gains, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and the framing effects 
on the outcome of choice have been replicated in a variety of contexts, e.g. early tuition 
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fees as fines or discount (Gätcher et al., 2009), support for economic policies framed as 
either employment or unemployment (Druckman (2001), and even in de-contextualised 
monetary games (de Martino et al., 2006). 
The concept of framing is two-fold in the SPIMP framework in the sense 
that the application of the SPIMP might yield a potential explanation or account of 
framing as well as the fact that framing may inform persuasion processing and thus the 
elements central to the SPIMP. The theory of persuasion, as presented in the thesis, 
relies on a probabilistic approach to human reasoning and communication. Noticeably, 
the estimations are subjective (the focus of chapter 6 is the notion of subjectivity) and 
thus responsive to the perceptions of the individual. As indicated by a vast experimental 
literature in social psychology (some of which is referenced in the above), beliefs, 
decisions, and behaviour are influenced by the social (as well as the cultural). One 
potential way of accounting for the effects of framing is to look at how the subjective 
estimations might change when faced with different frames. That is, by employing a 
probabilistic framework such as the SPIMP as the foundation for the appreciation of 
framing, we might get a novel insight regarding the framing effects (indeed, this seems 
to be in line with McKenzie and colleagues, although this is speculative). On the other 
hand, framing informs the psychological framework of the SPIMP. As mentioned in 
4.5, persuasive attempts can never be separated from or devoid of a stylistic choice. The 
same might be said for framing and the contextual. Persuasive attempts are never in a 
void, and always come in a socio-cultural context and in a particular frame. Indeed, by 
the very nature of communication needing cues such as verbal and nonverbal signals, 
communication is always framed and styled. As such, the framing of the persuasive 
attempt draws the remits of the manner by which the evidence can be processed and 
accessed177. As such, the notion of framing can shape the emergence and value of 
probabilistic estimations and thus directly influence the persuasiveness of an attempt. 
That is, the same content might be presented to the same persuadee in two different 
frames and styles, which will entail that the persuadee produces different probabilistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Naturally, the persuadee might reject the framing of the persuader by considering whether the frame 
and style is appropriate, but this concerns coping mechanisms and possibilities, which are discussed in 
7.4. For now, the simpler version of framing in which the persuader predominantly frames the persuasive 
attempt is considered.  
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estimations on the spot, which, according to the SPIMP, should yield different posterior 
ratings of persuasiveness. In this way, framing directly informs persuasion processing.  
 The fact remains, despite this potential objection to the original study, that 
the framing of utterances pushes people, as is entirely expected from the point of view 
of pragmatic enrichments. Indeed, several researchers (especially McKenzie and 
colleagues) have studied framing effects in general (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; 
McKenzie, 2004; Sher & McKenzie, 2006; 2008; Kareev & Trope, 2011; Kühberger & 
Gradl, 2013). This suggests the importance of linguistic phrasing as this will shape and 
influence the interpretation of the likelihood and strength of propositions and thus of 
spoken, interpersonal persuasion. Indeed, given the empirical support for the relativity 
of valuation from behavioural economics cited at the beginning of this sub-section, it 
seems plausible to assume that, given limitations on attention span and cognitive effort, 
humans may be swayed by the specific phrasing of persuasive attempts.  
So far, the evidence indicates the influence of social and contextual cues 
to behaviour change. However, recent evidence on face-to-face dialogue and direct 
interaction in communicative situations argue that communication also functions as a 
joint process rather than as a classically conceived listener-speaker interlocution178. The 
considerations against the classic code-like model in 4.2 already outlined some 
linguistic problems concerning the transmission of mental states as the baseline for 
communication and persuasion. If the code-like model was correct, we should assume a 
more introvert communicative stance in which person A transmits a propositional belief 
and corresponding mental states to person B who decodes the message and mentalizes 
in order to gain a perspective on the interpretation necessary to elicit the meaning of the 
utterance. However, in face-to-face communication, interlocutors seem to make use of 
and be influenced by one another to a large extent; they take cues from the other to 
determine turn-taking, gaze direction, and general attention and focus (see e.g. Mundy 
& Newell, 2007; Bavelas & Gerwing, 2011; Holler & Wilkin, 2011; Innocenti et al., 
2012; Richardson et al., 2012). That is, in order to make sense of the communicative 
situation, the listener makes use of physical cues such as gaze direction to navigate the 
conversation. In this way, the interlocution rests on a simpler, physical manifestation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 The interactive perspective from the point of view of common ground and speech acts will be 
discussed further in 5.2 and 5.3.  
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conversation compared to a more complex mentalizing and metarepresentational aspect 
(see 5.2-5.3).  
In this perspective, both the reasoning and the communicative stance are 
squarely directed at the interactive and the social such that the persuadee needs the 
persuader in order to make sense of her appreciation of the situation and vice versa. In 
other words, reasoning and communication can be thought to have evolved to cope with 
practical situations in which humans need to interact with others in order to process 
persuasive attempts. In a similar vein, Mercier & Landemore (2012, see also Mercier & 
Sperber, 2011) argue that deliberation functions best in social situations given the claim 
that reasoning primarily developed for arguing with others. That is, reasoning has 
developed as a social skill predominantly rather than as an introvert skill. The SPIMP 
framework of interaction in reasoning and communication supports this approach and 
takes persuasion to be a social and interactive situation par excellence since the 
interpersonal aspect cannot be reduced to the mental states of either interlocutor, but has 
to take the joint action and mutually mediated into account. This common ground and 
joint action perspective is explored further in 5.2 and 5.3 and serves as the basis for the 
existence of the subjective estimations of probabilistic content in the persuasive 
situation.  
 
5.1.3. Lessons from (and potentially for) social psychology  
When developing a theory of persuasion that takes seriously the notion of interactivity 
and socio-contextual influences, the findings reviewed in 5.1 yield some generally 
interesting insights179. The three main issues presented throughout the chapter have 
been the importance of the social other as illustrated by Cialdini’s principles of 
influence, the importance of the contextual and the environment illustrated by nudging, 
and finally the importance of the manner by which the persuasive attempt is framed. 
Thus, the social, the contextual, and the framing collectively suggest that reasoning and 
communication are interactive (as defined in the beginning of the chapter) phenomena. 
Indeed, taken together, the empirical findings discussed in the above support the claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Note, however, that the findings cited here naturally merely are a sliver of a much larger discipline 
concerning social psychology and influences on humans that challenge the solipsistic point of view. A 
more detailed cognitive psychological theory of persuasion needs to take this complexity into account and 
build a bridge to the social and descriptive in terms of theory and analysis.  
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that the persuadee can never be construed as solipsistic in the persuasive incident. 
Rather, findings strongly suggest that beliefs, perception, and attention are all 
modulated by the doings of others, the make-up of the immediate environment, and the 
way the content is framed. Of particular interest for the reasoning account described in 
the thesis, these influences may be taken to affect our estimations of probabilities both 
in terms of the priors we believe as well as the likelihood of a given argument. As such, 
this indicates the importance of the contextual and cultural analyses when describing 
specific instances of persuasion. Furthermore, alongside the evidence from reasoning 
and language theory presented in the chapters 2 and 4, the current evidence puts 
additional pressure on logical accounts that rely on objective truth-conditional content 
in order to determine the quality of an argument. That is, formal logic is challenged as 
the normative foundation for a theory of persuasion on at least three separate levels, out 
of which the first two have been discussed previously. On an epistemic level, the 
empirical studies from Bayesian argumentation challenge the truth-conditional 
dichotomous assumptions. On a linguistic level, probabilistic, dynamic and pragmatic 
enriched accounts of communication challenge the notion that natural language may be 
expressed via logical connectors. Finally, the evidence from social psychology 
challenges the solipsism inherent in some logical accounts, since it suggests volatility 
and mutability of priors and likelihood estimations. As such, the current evidence lends 
further credence to the subjective and contextual assumptions from which the SPIMP 
approach is derived.  
 It is worth to note, however, that the social issues presented here do not 
rely on spoken persuasion as such, but on deeds, changes in context, social norms etc. 
This is a slightly different influence situation than the one presented in the thesis as the 
focus here is concerned with verbal acts of persuasion. This qualifies the contribution of 
the SPIMP approach, as this becomes a special instance of a wider range of potential 
influences on beliefs and behaviour. That is, the changes resulting from the interactive 
(social, contextual, and cultural) influences may happen in absentia from verbal 
persuasion, but verbal persuasion cannot happen in isolation from these interactive 
influences. Thus, the concrete instance of persuasion that is investigated and described 
in the thesis is a special case of a more general class of persuasion and influence.  
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 Finally, a brief remark concerning coercion and persuasion seems in order 
as the boundaries between the two may become blurred by invoking these influences as 
many of them presumably work the best when the persuadee is not considering these 
(e.g. the influence of ad verecundiam is more effective if the persuadee does not 
consider the weakness of such arguments, see the discussion of ad verecundiam and its 
relation to the present framework in 3.3). Burke (1969) is adamant in defining 
persuasion as a phenomenon in which the persuadee is free to reject the particular 
proposal and thus is not coerced (i.e. forced). I wholeheartedly support this qualification 
of persuasion (indeed, Thaler & Sunstein seem to agree with some type of this notion as 
they present their suggestion of ‘libertarian paternalism’180). If the persuadee is coerced, 
the change in behaviour or belief is not a result of an act of persuasion, but of coercion. 
For instance, handing over your wallet if being held up at gunpoint cannot be 
considered an act of persuasion. Therefore, the boundaries of coercion stemming from 
these social situations are interesting to consider. Naturally, whether or not the 
persuadee is coerced by a particular social instance has to be evaluated from case-to-
case, but as a general remark the definition of persuasion presented here is such that a 
verbal attempt is an act of persuasion if and only if the persuadee can reject the 
proposed changes in beliefs. Indeed, coercion specifically involves change in behaviour 
without change in belief (e.g. by threatening someone with a gun in order to make them 
hand over money concretely involves the fact that the person being robbed does not 
believe it to be beneficial to hand over the money). As such, coercion might be seen as 
an opposing term to persuasion.  
 
5.2. Joint action, common ground, and coordination181 
The focus of the thesis is interpersonal persuasion between two interlocutors, and the 
interactivity in the SPIMP approach is concerned with the interaction between persuader 
and persuadee on a communicative and persuasive level. In other words, the focus of 
the thesis is on persuasion rather than influence. In order to move the theoretical picture 
further and discuss the interaction between persuader and persuadee (and not social and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180Defined as a society that ”…preserves freedom of choice but that authorizes both private and public 
institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, p. 179; 
however, for criticism of the idea, see Mitchell, 2005) 
181 I am grateful to Giovanni Pezzulo for providing me with much needed literature for this section.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   221 
contextual influences in general), it is the interpersonal (as opposed to the interaction 
with the physical environment) interaction from a mechanistic point of view that may 
facilitate or impede a communicative foundation for the persuasive incident. This will 
provide a conceptual basis for a communicative stance that allows for higher-level 
cognitive mechanisms such as mentalizing, but which also relies on the physical 
interaction between the interlocutors. The following section, then, is based on the 
contributions from social psychology and focuses on joint action, common knowledge, 
and coordination as central conceptual aspects of describing interaction between 
persuader and persuadee in the act of persuasion182.  It should be noted that interactivity 
between two persons with physical presence involves factors that are also important in 
other kinds of interactivity. For instance, visual, tonal, and gesture factors as mentioned 
below are also important in for example film acting where the audience (the 
‘persuadees’) really cannot interact183. Thus, the factors mentioned below do not 
necessarily belong only to interpersonal interaction with physical presence. 
 
5.2.1. Interacting in communication 
5.1.2 briefly touched upon the contextual and interpersonal influence on the 
communication between persuader and persuadee. Adding to this, a range of research 
has been conducted in recent years to support the claim that, in some way, human 
communication relies on interactivity such that they make use of visual, tonal, and 
gestural cues to facilitate language production and perception (e.g. Holler & Wilkin, 
2011). That is, communicative and linguistic conventions arise much quicker if the 
interlocutors have visual information and are able to engage with one another physically 
rather than purely linguistically. In addition, the conventions also solidify in a quicker 
manner when interaction is possible such that if the interlocutors are switched round 
(that is, if the interlocutor believes that she is in conversation with an interlocutor from 
her established communicative conventions, but in reality is conversing with someone 
using another set of conventions) during conversation, confusion arises such that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 The remaining sections of the chapter, alongside the general literature cited throughout, takes 
inspiration in Madsen et al. (submitted) in order to develop the interactive framework and subsequently 
tie this to the act of interpersonal spoken persuasion. 
183  Furthermore, given the focus of face-to-face, verbal persuasion between two and only two 
interlocutors, persuasion and communication via media such as television, radio, the internet, etc. are less 
relevant instances since they are concerned with other types of communicative and persuasive acts. Thus, 
for the present purpose, interactivity is bound to a physical presence between the two interlocutors.  
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communicative conventions established might be cause of disruption (see e.g. Healey et 
al., 2007). Indeed, some researchers argue that interaction is an essential underpinning 
phenomenon, which is necessary for higher-level mechanisms such as pragmatic 
enrichment, mentalizing, metarepresentational content, grammar, and communication in 
general (Clark, 1996; Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Levinson, 2006; Mundy & Newell, 
2007; Pickering & Garrod, 2007; Shafto & Goodman, 2008; Shafto et al., 2012; Madsen 
et al., submitted). This provides a psychological and mechanistic foundation for the 
linguistic components described by philosophers and linguists by lodging 
communication squarely in the physical interaction in the context. This reiterates the 
point that the act of persuasion cannot be reduced simply to the transmittal and passive 
reception of the persuasive, verbal utterance. Rather, communication, meaning, and 
persuasive reasoning exist in a complex dynamic and interactive sphere (incidentally, 
this is further supported by the empirical findings of the distributed language idea 
presented in 4.4), which relies on common ground, joint action, and coordination. Given 
the problems for a metarepresentational basis of communication outlined in 4.2.3, it 
seems necessary to explore alternative approaches.  
 Rather than grounding communication in the transmission of mental 
states, the present view assumes a physical and interactive basis, which relies on two 
mechanisms that facilitate coordination. First, the interactive grounding requires a class 
of mechanisms that automatically mimics and synchronises behaviour. This can be 
produced by motor resonance and mutual emulation (see e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999)184. The common ground formation (also known as ‘sharing’ or ‘alignment’) is the 
second necessary mechanism. Common ground might be defined as “…the subset of 
cognitive variables that are assumed by both agents” (Madsen et al., submitted), which 
does not entail metarepresentations of the beliefs and intentional states of the other (that 
requires a 4th level metarepresentational content as shown by Sperber, 2000, see also 
4.2.2), but rather it entails an approximation of what is known collectively (as such, the 
collective knowledge can be thought of as a kind of third party in communication). That 
is, rather than approaching the mental states of the other as primus foci, interlocutors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 This assumption is strengthened by the finding of mirror-neuron-like activity in humans (see e.g. 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Mukamel et al., 2010) 
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approach what is shared and commonly known (fig. 13 illustrates the common ground 
stance, taken from fig. 3 in Madsen et al., submitted)185.  
Fig. 13: Sharing representations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the difference between the situation on the left where the 
interlocutors infer metarepresentational content of one another and 
transmits beliefs and intentions via the linguistic content and the situation 
on the right where the interlocutors make use of commonly assumed 
knowledge to guide their perception of the act of communication.  
The figure illustrates two different situations. On the left, the interlocutors act on the 
basis of different presuppositions for action, which makes it difficult for both to predict 
the actions and beliefs of the other. Conversely, on the right, shared representation and 
common ground facilitate that interlocutors might predict the behaviour of one another. 
Pickering & Garrod (2004) argue that automatic mechanisms similar to those 
responsible for synchronisation of behaviour (such as moving a table together) might 
produce the alignment phenomenon in common ground186. Madsen et al. (submitted) 
provide the example that co-actors might use similar syntactic expression or they might 
concretely align on a common belief communicatively, which subsequently becomes 
common ground (see also Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Sebanz et al., 2006; Pezullo, 
2011). However, Clark (1996) notes that common ground might be created intentionally 
given specific strategies of forming such a phenomenon (e.g. feedback to the 
interlocutor, see also Pezzulo & Dindo, 2011). Pezullo (2011) describes such intentional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 The common knowledge and interactive approach favoured here still allows for misunderstanding 
since wrong approximations of the common knowledge would result in failed attempts of interpretation 
and communication.  
186 This notion of interaction also opens for the potential of persuasion via non-rational means where the 
persuader might elicit automatic mechanisms, which make them more likely to be convinced (one 
example of this could be the persuasive use of body language to signal confidence and expertise as 
common knowledge held of the speaker) 
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actions as “joint action optimization”. Indeed, if the listener acknowledges that the 
interlocutor has a communicative stance, she learns more effectively (Csibra & 
Gergerly, 2007)187. As such, a mechanistic focus on common ground provides an 
alternative basis for communication in which high-level mechanisms such as 
mentalizing are less necessary, but still possible (given exertion of more cognitive 
effort).  
As mentioned, common ground is also known as sharing of alignment. 
Given the dismissal of alignment as a fundamental aim of persuasion in 1.5, however, it 
might seem conceptually questionable to allow for alignment as the basis of 
communication. However, the alignment dismissed in 1.5 is conceptually different from 
the alignment proposed here since the alignment mentioned here is communicative and 
resides with the mutual intention whereas the former type of alignment is epistemic and 
resides with the individual intentions (persuader and persuadee). As mentioned in 1.3, 
three distinct persuasive intentions and aims are ascertainable. Firstly, the persuadee 
aims at optimizing her beliefs such that they are as probable and useful as possible. 
Secondly, the persuader aims at persuading the persuadee to believe the proposed belief, 
meaning that she assigns a likelihood ratio as high as possible to it. However, for 
persuasion to occur in the specific situation discussed in the thesis, both interlocutors 
need to acknowledge the persuasive intention of change of beliefs. That is, there is a 
conceptual difference between the aims of the persuadee, the persuader, and the mutual 
(as described in 1.3) In 1.5, the alignment dismissed was concerned with an epistemic 
transmission of beliefs from the persuader to the persuadee such that she increases her 
probabilistic estimation of what the persuader believes. This is dismissed given the fact 
that the persuader might wish to deceive. In other words, he wishes to propose a belief 
in the social sphere that he might not believe himself, but that he wants her to believe 
nonetheless (an example of this could be a politician trying to cover up a personal 
scandal before an election since this involves the persuader (politician) intending the 
persuadee (the voter) to have a low likelihood of whether or not the scandal is true 
despite the fact that he knows it to be true). In this way, as mentioned in 1.5, epistemic 
alignment cannot be a fundamental goal, although it may be an accidental goal in 
beneficial persuasive situations. Compared to the epistemic alignment, the alignment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187  Note that in the specific act of persuasion processing discussed here, the recognition and 
acknowledgement of the persuasive intention is necessary.  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   225 
and common ground presented here is communicative. In the persuasive situation, a 
mutual aim for both is for the persuader to be understood communicatively. From the 
point of view of the persuadee, she cannot evaluate the proposed beliefs if she does not 
understand what the persuader is proposing. That is, without an understanding of the 
communicated, there is no chance for reaping the benefits of the persuasive situation. 
The persuader also seeks understanding since he wishes to communicate to her his 
proposed belief. As such, communicative success is a fundamental mutual aim in any 
interpersonal, verbal persuasive setting. The specific use of communication, however, 
might differ since the individual aims differ. Thus, a deceptive persuader might wish for 
a certain interpretation of his communiqué. However, on a fundamental level, both are 
interested in aligning themselves in a communicative manner.  
As mentioned, there are various strategies for creating and managing 
common ground including feedback, intentional strategies, and so forth. The fact that 
common grounds need clarification indicates that it is not immediately shared, but 
rather negotiated and constructed in the situation. Indeed, both interlocutors might 
entertain different ideas of what constitutes the common ground. From a linguistic 
perspective, if one interlocutor expects the persuasive attempt to take place in Danish 
and the other in English, a breakdown of the situation quickly occurs. Thus, both bring 
to the situation their respective expectations of relevance of common ground, which 
may then be clarified in a coordinated and interactive manner once the conversation 
begins. As with the probabilistic estimations feeding the SPIMP, the approach to what 
constitutes common ground depends on a variety of factors, including socio-economic 
and cultural background, personal experiences and memories, and so forth (as discussed 
in 7.1 when outlining the general psychological framework in which the act of 
persuasion takes place).  
 
5.3. An interactive approach to persuasion processing 
The influence of interactivity, as presented throughout the chapter, is manifold and each 
component discussed directly relates to an aspect of persuasion processing. That is, 
from a communicative, reasoning, and epistemological point of view, the social and 
contextual interaction with other humans influences how we manage these tasks. From 
this, the notion of subjectivity becomes more interesting. Indeed, from the perspective 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   226 
of the present framework, the persuadee does indeed entertain her own, subjective 
probabilistic estimations of the value of content strength and source credibility. 
However, despite the fact that she constructs these estimations, the frame in which she 
functions is social, rather than solipsistic. The following will tie together the interactive 
notions concerning beliefs, communication, and how this affects persuasion processing.  
Given the fact that the SPIMP provides a normative model for describing 
and approximating how the persuadee should estimate the persuasiveness of an act of 
persuasion given her probabilistic estimations of the strength of the content and the 
credibility of the source, a central finding of the literature review is concerned with the 
influence of social, interactive, and contextual factors on beliefs and behaviour.  
 The influence stems from the directedness of the intentionality in the 
situation and the presence of the evidence (on intentionality and presence, see 6.1 and 
6.3 respectively). It seems that the influence of other humans is both profound and far-
reaching in terms of the constructing of beliefs and the planning of behaviour. That is, 
the estimation of the content strength is probabilistic and subjective, but the subjectivity 
is lodged in the social rather than the solipsistic. This is a powerful reminder that the act 
of persuasion and our predictions of how the persuadee should react given a specific 
persuasive attempt can never be dislodged from the situation in which it occurs. From a 
cultural critical point, this is in no way novel, but traditional argumentation theory tends 
to look at the argument in isolation to test the validity of the conclusions. As already 
mentioned, this entails a different normativity than the one describing the psychological 
mechanisms involved when humans process arguments and acts of persuasion. Given 
this epistemic involvement, the distinction between argumentation theory and 
persuasion theory becomes even clearer, given that the former is concerned with the 
validity of certain chains of reasoning whereas the latter is concerned with the 
psychological mechanisms involved in the social, interactive, and immersed situation 
when processing said act of persuasion. That is, the aim of the descriptions is 
fundamentally different, which may account for some of the discrepancies between 
theories of argumentation and moral codes of argumentative conduct such as expressed 
in the pragma-dialectical approach (Eemeren & Grotendoorst, 2004) and the Bayesian 
argumentation approach, which investigates the psychology of reasoning (e.g. Oaksford 
& Hahn, 2006a; 2006b). On a fundamental level, then, the epistemic probabilistic 
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estimation of the likelihood of a proposed belief is inherently interactive and socially 
mandated, which shapes the conceptualisation of subjectivity, as it should be 
understood in the proposed model of persuasion processing.  
Alongside the epistemic interactivity, communication is inherently 
interactive and is based on subjective assumptions and approximations of common 
ground rather than on metarepresentational estimations (Madsen et al., submitted). That 
is, rather than a transmission of mental states and propositionally expressible beliefs, the 
communicative stance taken in the thesis argues that interlocutors manage common 
ground and make use of conversational conventions that arise both from a 2nd order 
language perspective, but also conventions that might arise in the specific situation. As 
such, 1st order languaging (Thibault, 2011) relies on 2nd order conventions, assumptions 
of common ground, and coordination. In this view, the persuader addresses common 
ground assumptions and attempts to manipulate the conception of the epistemic through 
the communicative in a performative manner. As speech act theorists (Austin, 1961; 
Searle, 1969) rightly notice, communication is more than simply assertions, but also 
acts performatively. Of particular interest to the present focus, some empirical findings 
support the view that interaction and the use of the interactivity may function 
persuasively in the situation. For instance, Wells & Petty (1980) found that nodding 
whilst listening to persuasive message led to participants giving more positive feedback 
and attitudes towards the message as opposed to shaking sideways, and Chen et al 
(2010) report that subjects were more open to having a conversation (and thus 
potentially engage in a persuasive situation) as well as to rate the argument more 
favourably if the persuader express an interest in the interlocutor by asking a elaboration 
question. Finally, Rodriguez (2012) lend further support to the trend set out in these 
papers by arguing that it is easier to influence people if the persuader also shows 
qualities as a listener. For the SPIMP, Rodriguez’ results are particularly interesting, as 
they indicate the integration of source credibility with the persuasiveness of the attempt 
(an integration not specified by the ELM and HSM, as these belong to two different 
systems, see O’Keefe, 2008 for a discussion on interaction in the ELM). On a general 
note, the assumption of communication as inherently performative and not simply as 
transmission (Searl, 1969) feature alongside the SPIMP, but does not directly relate to 
the central elements of content strength and source credibility, as these are concerned 
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with describing how the persuadee processes uncertain information from an uncertain 
source in a persuasive situation.   
For persuasion processing, the interactive approach helps define the social 
situation in which the estimations that feed the SPIMP unfold. Rather than approaching 
belief construction as a solipsistic construction, reasoning, communication, and, as a 
consequence, persuasion are inherently social and interactive, which warrants the 
‘interactive’ component in the SPIMP (as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter). 
From an epistemic perspective, evidence suggests that beliefs about the value of an 
object or the likelihood of an occurrence is shaped and influenced by the actions and 
thoughts of people around the persuadee. The social psychological evidence strongly 
suggests this to be the case, as numerous studies have shown the profound influence of 
others when individuals make choices and plan their behaviour. The subjective 
estimations inherently assumed in the Bayesian framework, then, should be considered 
in this light of social influence, which further suggests the importance of the general 
trajectory of belief development throughout the life of the individual (Hood, 2012). 
From a communicative perspective, persuasion is concerned with the mutual alignment 
of assumed and negotiated common ground rather than the concrete alignment of beliefs 
in an epistemic manner. As such, the present framework departs from the traditional 
assumption of beliefs transmitted from one mind to another and argues that persuasion 
is concerned with the social and the commonly assumed first, which in turn might affect 
changes in beliefs in the persuadee. Whether the change occurs depends on a range of 
factors such as the persuasive aptitude and strategies of the persuader, the coping 
mechanisms and epistemic vigilance of the persuadee, the level of cognitive effort 
asserted, and other such factors discussed in 7.4.  
On a philosophical note, it is not clear how the persuadee interacts with 
the interactive and social milieu. The phenomenological tradition, however, lends a 
terminological hand in order to describe the intentional stance taken by the persuadee 
towards the persuasive situation. The subsequent chapter discusses this stance, 
including how the persuadee immerses herself in the social context, the notion of 
subjectivity, and the temporal influences on persuasion in terms of the development of 
beliefs, the epistemological aspects of persuasion, and the potential for behaviour.  
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Chapter 6: Immersing the subjective in the 
contextual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The body is our general medium for having a world 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
 
We must listen to poets 
Gaston Bachelard 
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Conceptually, the thesis revolves around themes concerning beliefs, interaction, and the 
contextual and socio-cultural influence on the perception of persuasive attempts. 
Common to these themes is the fact that the interpretation and engagement with these 
elements stem from a subjective point of view in which the persuadee is immersed as a 
subject in the world. This is a complex relationship in many ways, for instance the 
dynamic relationship between persuader and persuadee unfolds over the time course of 
the persuasive attempt, as does the way in which the persuadee may make use of the 
context to drive her interpretations, her attention, and her beliefs188. In the framework 
presented here, the probabilistic estimations of content strength and source credibility 
are inherently subjective, interactive, and contextually influenced. Indeed, the thesis 
assumes that all information is subjectively approached and that no knowledge can be 
completely certain 189. However, so far the concept of subjectivity and how the 
persuadee is immersed within the social and contextual has been explored relatively 
little. However, the tradition of phenomenological theory provides a rich tapestry of 
considerations concerning how humans engage with the world on a subjective level.  
 Subjective approaches to persuasion, communication, and reasoning are 
relatively novel and recent in British psychological research, as much previous work has 
tended to focus on the propositional character of utterances, the cognising and 
mentalizing to form impressions of the minds of others, the de-contextualised logical 
approach to reasoning and so forth. However, the phenomenological philosophical 
tradition offers in-depth discussion on some of the fundamental concepts regarding 
subjectivity. As such, by exploring the phenomenological concept of intentionality as 
well as related concepts from rhetoric and developments psychology such as presence 
and the temporal the purpose of the present chapter is to sketch the subjective immerses 
in the contextual since this is essential and central to the SPIMP framework. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 The notion that persuasion predominantly is concerned with beliefs is not entirely uncontroversial, as 
some argue for persuasion to extend beyond beliefs such that the concept also includes behaviour change 
(e.g. Cialdini, 2007, see 1.2 for a discussion why this might encompass more than persuasion to include 
influence of behaviour). Also, some models of persuasion have been generated as de-contextualised 
mathematical equations pertaining to optimal rational information updating (Kamenica & Gentzkow, 
2009). However, most accounts of persuasion (including the ELM and the HSM) acknowledge the 
importance of context and beliefs.  
189 Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that this holds true even for well-formed and internally 
consistent systems such as mathematics.  
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Furthermore, the chapter as a whole argues for a conceptual connection between the 
phenomenological tradition and cognitive sciences190.  
 The phenomenological position explores the human as it immerses and 
interacts with the world from a subjective, bodily position that takes an interpreting, 
rather than an objectifying stance such that the impressions given are subject to 
interpretation and uncertainty. This means that, in line with previous assumptions, 
information cannot be objectively ascertained, but rather that information is mediated 
through the world. As such, the general position is in line with the experimental and 
theoretical evidence and concepts discussed throughout the thesis. In a 
phenomenological position beliefs are not necessarily propositionally expressible. This 
is in line with the definition offered in 1.2 where beliefs might be expressed 
propositionally, but that these are not necessarily propositional fundamentally. Taking 
inspiration from Heidegger’s Dasein, the development, management, and interactivity 
of subjective beliefs is approached from a similar approach as Mitsein, the 
subjectivising position between interlocutors in carving out utterances to further the 
persuasive situation. This will be explored at length in 6.3 and provides the conceptual 
background for the theoretical stance towards the complexity of the act of persuasion 
developed in the thesis.  
 The chapter thus focuses on several important philosophical aspects of the 
concepts and themes already presented previously. Specifically, the chapter explores the 
phenomenological tradition and its possible contribution to the concepts relevant for 
developing the SPIMP approach. Building primarily on Drummond (2007; 2008), 
Gallagher (see Gallagher & Varela, 2003), and Zahavi (2003; 2007), chapter 6.1  
acknowledges the contributions of explanatory psychology as well as descriptive 
phenomenology. Based on these insights 6.2 revisits the concept of subjectivity as it is 
applied in the SPIMP approach such that the phenomenological notion of intentionality 
is used to further the conceptualisation of subjectivity. That is, the phenomenological 
qualifies and frames the psychological contribution. This will be discussed further in 7.3 
when presenting the SPIMP model as a whole. The present chapter continues in 6.3 by 
relating intentionality to the rhetorical concept of presence to explore how the persuadee 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 An actual exploration of the potential theoretical benefits concerning conceptual definitions and 
underlying assumptions is well beyond the scope of the present thesis and as such the general argument of 
connection is sketchy rather than followed through.  
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relates herself to persuasive attempts in a certain situational context. Finally 6.4 
discusses how subjectivity is contextual and interactive, not only in a particular 
situation, but also in a temporal aspect. As a whole the chapter enriches the 
conceptualisation and understanding of how subjectivity as well as interactivity and 
context have an impact in the persuasive processes. 
One caveat remains to be noted for the chapter. The phenomenological 
tradition invoked here is vast and incredibly complex with a multifaceted and intricate 
terminology concerning being-in-the-worldness, das Dasein, intersubjectivity, and the 
subject-object divide. Therefore, the chapter merely presents selected parts of the 
tradition that bears specific relevance to persuasion studies, and the chapter contributes 
to a much needed more in-depth discussion of phenomenology and the psychology of 
persuasion, which falls in line with recent contributions linking cognitive sciences and 
phenomenology (see e.g. Gallagher & Varela, 2003). Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier 
recent findings in psychology concerning reasoning, memory, perception and other 
important persuasion qualities indicate the importance of interactivity (as discussed in 
chapter 5) and context, which has been explored thoroughly in the phenomenological 
tradition. Thus, rather than an in-depth phenomenological investigation of the 
intersubjectivity of the act of persuasion, the main benefit resides in the development of 
a terminological apparatus that serves as a lens through which the psychological 
concept of persuasion may be developed.  
 
6.1. The phenomenological tradition: immersing the subject191 
As evident from the theoretical discussion throughout the thesis, the SPIMP approach 
largely relies on a subjective element. The subjectivity in the Bayesian perspective (as 
applied here 192 ) can be taken to mean the opposed to objectivity. That is, the 
probabilistic estimation of the strength of a given statement can vary from person to 
person. However, the concept of subjectivity, understood in this way, deals with 
different matters than the notion of contextual immersion and that of the importance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 I’d like to thank Prof. John Drummond and Cille Varslev for many inspiring talks about the topic. 
Without them, this section would have suffered significantly.  
192 That is, how the theorem is conceptualised in the SPIMP since the theorem itself is a mathematical 
representation of manipulation of probabilities and as such is not subjective in the personal sense whereas 
the difference in estimation of the likelihood of an event is personal and thus subjective. It is in the 
applied sense that I speak of the present Bayesian approach.  
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interactivity. Thus, from a reasoning perspective, the probabilistic estimations are 
subjectively driven; the credibility (trustworthiness and expertise) of the source is 
subjectively estimated; the interpretational processes and pragmatic enrichment 
involved in communication are largely subjective. It has further been noticed that this 
subjectivity is not a solipsistic mental effort in which the persuadee estimates the factors 
in absentia of influences from others. On the contrary, evidence from social psychology, 
nudging, communication studies, developmental studies, decision-making theory, as 
well as the interactivity studies already cited all substantiate the claim that our 
perception, attention, and thoughts are mandated to some degree by the contextual 
environment, our upbringing, and our socio-cultural background. This poses the 
theoretical complexity of describing the inner state in relation to the outer influences. Of 
particular relevance to the present discussion, the phenomenological tradition classically 
explores how human beings immerse themselves within their immediate context and 
perceptual surroundings. As mentioned in the above, this provides us with a 
terminological apparatus for qualifying the underlying assumptions of the SPIMP 
approach. Of particular interest for the present discussion, the noumena-phenomena 
distinction will be presented followed by discussions on persuasive intentionality, the 
inner-outer divide, and the propositional stance taken in the persuasive situation. 
Collectively, these provide a framework for bringing the general discussion forward 
since they provide a terminological scope for discussing the subjective nature and 
intentional directedness in the persuasive situation. Before going into these, a brief 
history of the phenomenological tradition is in order as this tradition seldom is invoked 
in psychological research.  
Despite the fact that the initiation of phenomenology often is placed in the 
late 19th and early 20th century, Kant and Hegel193 made important contributions on the 
description of mind and context, mainly on the concepts presented in this section such 
as noumena-phenomena (Kant) and the inner-outer distinction (Hegel). Husserl (see 
Smith & Smith, 1995) and Brentano continued the phenomenological tradition by 
describing the importance of subjective intentionality when the person immerses herself 
into the context. For Brentano, the perception of physical phenomena existed 
intentionally as acts of consciousness in which the subject direct her attention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Especially in The Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, see Guyer, 1992) and Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Hegel, see Beiser, 1993) 
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intentionally toward the world (see Smith, 2011). From Brentano and Husserl, the 
Western phenomenological tradition emerged in which thinkers such as Heidegger 
(Zein und Seit, see Wrathall, 2013), Merleau-Ponty (2002), and Sartre (2003) develop 
on the concepts such as intentionality, being-in-the-worldness, and perception. Recent 
phenomenological research is particularly relevant for the present thesis, as these debate 
a more holistic approach to reasoning and perception by investigating 
phenomenological terminology as well as contributions from cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience (Zahavi, 2003; 2011; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, see 6.4) as well as 
discussing the theoretical differences and supplements of descriptive phenomenology 
and predictive psychology (see 6.6).  
The Eastern contribution to the phenomenological tradition should not be 
omitted from this section. Indeed, given the holistic focus of many Eastern cultures 
including concepts such as the Hindu Om (ॐ), Chinese Ying and Yang (阴阳), as well 
as Taoist and Zennist philosophy, it is hardly surprising that a notion of a holistic and 
subjective being-in-the-world permeates some of these philosophical traditions. Most 
clearly, Kakuzo (1906) develops the Teaist stance to the sensory-bodily immersion in 
the world through the practice of drinking tea. That is, through the sensory perceptions 
and the placement of the subject in the world and tradition, the tea drinker is able to 
experience the phenomenal approach or approximate the noumenal. This consideration 
of immersion relies heavily on an awareness of cultural influences from past 
philosophies, and thus places the immersion of the self in a complex time-scale in 
which the present and lived moment (or as Enfield, 2011; 2013, presumably would call 
it: enchrony) blends with the past. This is similar to the persuasive situation in which 
the persuadee is immersed in the interaction with the persuader both momentarily, but 
also from a more complex trajectory of memories, cultural and linguistic influences, 
personal experiences and so forth.  
Noumena-phenomena The Kantian (Guyer, 1992) distinction between 
noumena and phenomena is fundamental for immersing the persuadee in the context. 
Noumena is characterised as the properties the objects contain within themselves. For 
instance, the human voice is an immensely complex stimulus. A spectrogram, however, 
will reveal some of this complexity by a depiction of the use of a range of different Hz. 
This description, along other qualities, may be the noumena quality of the voice within 
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itself concerning the frequency of the pitch. Phenomena, on the other hand, are how 
human sensibility, understanding, and interpretation engages with the sensation and 
perception of a particular object. Invoking the same example, human beings are not able 
to pick up on the full range of these Hz properties. Thus, humans tend to be able to hear 
Hz from 12 Hz – 20 kHz. That is, our ears can only appreciate the phenomena of a 
particular range despite the fact that stimuli may have noumena qualities beyond human 
capability. From the distinction between phenomena and noumena, we may understand 
that there is a noumena world outside our bodies, but we do not have objective access to 
this world (which is in line with recent psychological experimental data that shows that 
judgements can be inaccurate, unstable, and malleable) as it has to be mediated through 
our senses, which limit and shape our perception of the experienced phenomenon. From 
the attention studies in 5.1 and the developmental studies in 6.2.2, this should hardly be 
surprising as we do not seem to simply process information about the world as they are, 
but rather as they are given to us by our contextual, socio-cultural, and interpersonal 
surroundings. The persuasive interaction between the persuader and the persuadee, then, 
is inherently phenomenal as the evidence is experienced and perceived through the lens 
of perception (i.e. how we estimate and perceive the proposed belief), intention (related 
to the persuasive intention described in chapter 1), and attention (which may be 
manipulated as described in 5.1).  
Intentionality One of the most foundational concepts in phenomenology is 
intentionality, as developed by Husserl in Logisches Untersuchen (see Smith & Smith, 
1995) in which intentionality is “…the directedness of experience toward things in the 
world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something” 
(Smith, 2011). As mentioned previously in the thesis and discussed further in 7.4, the 
level of consciousness and cognitive effort may vary, producing differences in the 
intentionality of the persuadee. For Husserl, our perception intends things such that the 
phenomena rather than the noumena are experienced via the intentionality directed 
towards them. Intentionality thus comes through thoughts, concepts, and ideas and may 
manifest in a variety of ways including, but not limited to, temporal and spatial 
awareness, awareness of one’s own body and position in the world, and social 
interaction. Importantly, for intentionality, the persuadee is in dialogue with the world 
and not merely a passive recipient since humans intend towards the world. As already 
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discussed, the estimations of beliefs may be influenced by a range of factors such as 
cultural background, social context, interaction with the persuader and so forth. Given 
the intention towards the world, the intentionality described here, then, is modified in 
accordance with the cited research concerning contextual and cultural influences.  
In the persuasive situation, the intention is one of mutual directedness 
towards the interaction such that the social act of persuasion includes the potential shift 
of beliefs in the persuadee and that the persuader may deploy strategic measurements in 
order to achieve his aim. As mentioned in 1.3, this is a necessary condition for 
persuasion to occur, as it is explored in the thesis. The intended directedness of the 
persuadee (that is, the manner by which the persuadee directs her persuasive intention), 
in other words, goes through the social and the interactive. This entails a dialogical 
intentionality in the persuasive situation. Firstly, the persuader and the persuadee 
mutually engage in a shared intention of an act of persuasion without which the 
interactions and psychological processes would not function in the way described in the 
thesis. This is the social intentionality, which transcends individuals in the situation and 
is mandated collectively between the interlocutors. Alongside this, both the persuadee 
and the persuader entertain intended stances toward the situation and the possible 
outcomes of this. As described in 1.4, the persuader is expected to strategically present 
both the evidence and himself in such a way that the persuadee adheres to the desired 
beliefs (which may or may not correspond with that the persuader actually believes) 
whilst the persuadee intends for the situation to bring about novel information such that 
she may update her beliefs if necessary. That is, she looks to potential new information, 
and, as mentioned, acts of persuasion in general have to yield a net gain for both 
interlocutors to keep the persuadee from simply opting out every time she recognises a 
persuasive intention (as noted by Sperber, 2001 and Mercier & Sperber, 2011, this 
general gain also holds true overall for communication and argumentation). The 
intentionality is thus split between and within interlocutors such that both the 
directedness intends both the personal and the mutual. The discrepancy and dialogue 
between intentionality points to and elaborates upon the discussion of alignment. In 1.5, 
I noted that the persuasive situation mandates differences in alignment such that a 
certain communicative and intentional alignment is necessary, but that the aim of 
persuasion is not necessarily alignment of mental states. With the distinction between 
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mutual and personal intentionality, this difference in alignment becomes clearer as the 
mutual and communicative intentionality mandates alignment whereas the personal 
intentionality does not.  
The directedness of the personal persuadee intentionality towards the 
phenomenal experience of the persuasive situation entails consequences for her 
attention. The persuadee, in the present framework, is directed towards vigilance against 
misinformation at the same time that she aims at updating potentially flawed beliefs. 
The attention, however, may be manipulated (as pointed out previously) causing 
disablement in intentionality in terms of the personal goals of the persuadee. In other 
words, the enabling factors (context, etc.) that we use to disambiguate and drive our 
intention-toward the phenomenal proposed belief may be turned against us and function 
in a disabling manner. That is, the arms race described by Sperber (2001) may well 
function such that skilled persuaders may employ cognitive overload or misdirection, 
which turns the attention of the persuadee towards his personal aim. Conversely, a 
critically minded persuadee may equally be skilled in discovering such persuasive ploys 
(for a discussion on coping mechanisms, see 7.4).   
 Given the fact that intentionality as a concept has been employed in a range 
of different manner (including psychology), it is essential to briefly compare the present 
use with the otherwise prevalent use in psychology. Malle and colleagues (Malle & 
Knobe, 1997; Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Malle & Holbrook, 2012) explore 
intentionality as a function of a range of underlying cognitive phenomena (illustrated in 
14a). In particular, their concept of intentionality relies on underlying beliefs and 
desires, which feed into an intention. For instance, the desire to eat an ice cream cone 
coupled with a range of beliefs concerning where to buy an ice cream, what it will taste 
like, etc. feeds into the intention of eating an ice cream. Given skills of fulfilling the 
intention and an awareness of how to do so, the overall intentionality (and plan of 
action) might come to fruition. In this view, then, intentionality is a psychological end-
product of underlying cognitive mechanisms that provide the foundation for action 
planning and behaviour. The authors have tested the model empirically and found this 
conceptualisation to be prevalent in intention judgements (e.g. Knobe, 2003).  
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Fig. 14a A Model of the folk concept of intentionality     14b:The present placement of intentionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figures show the difference between intentionality as used by Malle and colleagues and in 
the present framework 
 
The two figures indicate the different use of intentionality between the present use (as 
an aboutness or directedness towards the world) and how it is frequently used in 
psychology (as a specific intention to get or do something, e.g. ‘intention to get a 
coffee’). The way intentionality is understood in the thesis is Husserlian since it is 
concerned with fundamental traits of being concerning humans’ directedness towards 
the world through personal perception. In Malle’s folk psychological representation 
(14a), intentionality is the end-product of a range of cognitive processes such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. In this way, intentionality is the outcome of a process. In the 
present framework, however, intentionality is the underlying directedness towards the 
social and the contextual situation in which the persuadee is immersed. This 
directedness is intimately linked with vague aims regarding the situation (which is why 
persuasive intentionality as described in 1.3 is connected, for instance, to an aim of 
consistency). In this way, there are significant differences between the two concepts of 
intentionality as well as a difference between intentionality and intention (where the 
intention of action, in the present sense, is the potential outcome where behaviour 
change might occur). It is worth stressing that the intentionality of the persuadee is 
rooted in past experiences, cultural practices, etc., but that some of the key aims are 
thought to be similar (such as the aim of consistency within beliefs and the aim for the 
most believable beliefs). The concept of intentionality, in the present form, comes from 
Husserl (Smith & Smith, 1995). As mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, a 
general argument of the thesis is for the potentially beneficial connection between 
phenomenological concepts and psychology in order to discuss and inform underlying 
assumptions and concepts such as the self, intentionality, and immersion in the context. 
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In this way, the phenomenological literature lends a lens through which subjectivity can 
be conceptualised194.  
 Thus, ‘intentionality’ in the Husserlian sense differs significantly from 
Malle and colleagues’ use of the term (the present approach and placement of 
intentionality in relation to the present framework is coarsely illustrated in 14b, see 
Jacob, 2012 for a discussion of the intentionality concept from a phenomenological 
tradition)195. Here, intentionality refers to a general approach-to the world and a 
directedness of being. In the present framework, then, intentionality refers to the 
underlying directedness of the humans involved in the persuasive interaction. For the 
persuadee, persuasive intentionality is concerned with the general aims of the situation 
including, but not limited to, epistemic vigilance, relevance expectancies, and 
optimization of beliefs. Thus, the term ‘intentionality’, rather than the vernacular folk 
psychological way (as in ‘I intended to buy a car’), it is used in a manner that denotes 
the general stance the persuadee entertains when directed towards a situation, in this 
particular instance a persuasive situation. That is, a mode of being and engaging with 
the social situation.  
 Intentionality in the present use, then, is a fundamental aspect of how 
humans approach the persuasive situation, and it is geared towards beneficial aims such 
as optimization of relevance, acquiring as probable beliefs as possible, and epistemic 
vigilance. Compared with the output description of intentionality in the folk 
psychological manner (fig. 14a), this places intentionality as a foundational directedness 
towards the social rather than as a product of desires and beliefs. That is, intentionality 
resides before beliefs and desires, as shown in fig. 14b. This fundamental 
conceptualisation of intentionality as a directedness of being-with the context also 
highlights the difference between intentionality and attention such that the latter is the 
specific cognitive focus of the persuadee whereas the former is a more fundamental 
approach-to the situation. Thus, attention and awareness might be easily manipulated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 This illustrates the potential benefit of the link between traditions via subjectivity as an example. 
However, to link the traditions more intimately is beyond the scope of the thesis, as it would require a 
substantial review of literature (see Gallagher & Varela, 2003 for an argument of the potential benefits of 
exploring phenomena via phenomenology and cognitive sciences) 
195 Note that ’values’ are placed before ’beliefs’ and ’desires’. This is due to the assumption that 
underlying values (such as valuing human life) is more fundamental than beliefs. On the 
conceptualisation of beliefs offered in 1.2, fig. 3, however, values might be conceptualised as beliefs that 
are held very strongly and are more necessary than beliefs concerning for instance specific political 
policies. This philosophical discussion, however, is outside the scope of the thesis.  
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(as seen in social psychological literature), but intentionality as a stance is taken to be 
fundamental. The persuasive intentions (1.3) should be understood from the perspective 
of this definition.  
 Inner-outer distinction Central to the discussions in the thesis, the 
probabilistic estimations of content strength and source credibility are influenced by 
external factors such as cultural background, the physical context, and the interactions 
with the interlocutor. These may enable (or potentially disable) the intentionality of the 
attention as mentioned in the above, and they call into question the Cartesian dualism in 
which the mind, body, and environment are sharply divided. Ryle (1949) addresses this 
issue by labelling the Cartesian divide as a ‘category mistake’. For Ryle, the separation 
of the mind from the body that performs actions is nonsensical since in order to perform 
an act skilfully, the subject needs bodily expertise alongside the mental capacity to 
appreciate the actions. Thus, mental states cannot be separated from the physical coil in 
which they are embroiled. This reminisces Hegel (Beiser, 1992, for a discussion on 
Hegel and language, see Varslev, 2012), Wittgenstein (2001), and Searle’s (1969) 
notion that communication inherently is a performed activity that does not preside 
simply in the inner states of a person. This bears theoretical consequences for the 
definition of the subjective belief as discussed in 6.2.3.  
Propositional stance Lastly, the propositional stance of the persuasive 
incidence further complicates the epistemic stance the interlocutors have to entertain 
since these are not limited to assertive statements, but also includes predictions and 
counterfactuals196. In the act of persuasion, the persuader indicates, not to the state of 
the world, but to the claimed state of the world as well as the world-of-may-be 
(hypothetical) and potential counterfactual states. This propositional stance thus points 
in three directions from an uncertain foundation. These are readily present in many acts 
of persuasion such as Obama’s (2013b) speech on gun control. For instance, Obama 
mentions that “…more than 70 percent of the National Rifle Association’s members 
according to one survey” support background checks for gun purchases, which is an 
assertive statement. He proposes that “…if America worked harder to keep guns out of 
the hands of dangerous people, there would be fewer atrocities like the one that 
occurred in Newtown”, thus indicating that a possible counterfactual scenario might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 See Simons & Jones (2011) for a presentation of speech acts commonly found in acts of persuasion 
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have prevented or limited the incidence in Newtown. Simultaneously as being a 
speculative counterfactual statement, the previous quote also functions predictively as a 
measurement of the effectiveness of legislation in the future.  
In this way, the persuadee changes her relationship to the states in which 
the intentional stance engages dialogically between an epistemic and ontological state. 
However, findings indicate that reasoning with counterfactuals may be approximated 
probabilistically as well (McCoy et al., 2012). Temporally, the propositional stance 
points in different directions as well as the counterfactual is concerned with how things 
might have been, the assertive statements with how things presently are, and the 
predictive with how things might turn out (see 6.5 for a discussion on temporal nature 
of persuasion processing). Before turning the attention to how the phenomenological 
literature might inform the definition and description of the act of persuasion, a few 
remarks should be made to clarify what I meant by a phenomenological stance.  
 
6.1.1. Talking phenomenology 
In order to immerse the subject in the world, it is important to clarify the difference 
between differing accounts of phenomenology. One is Husserlian (Smith & Smith, 
1995, but see also Zahavi, 2007) involving intentionality as presented in the above 
where the subject reflectively may approach the phenomenon. The other developed by 
Dennett (1991; 1993; 2003) relies on the distinction between heterophenomenology and 
autophenomenology. Dennett’s development of these concepts stems from his critical 
assessment of classical phenomenology, which he describes as introspective mental 
gymnastics (Zahavi, 2007) such that it inherently lacks a stringent and reproducible 
methodology of enquiry. Compared with this, Dennett’s proposal is taken to be neutral, 
theoretical, and based on principles of explorations in cognitive sciences. In order to 
avoid speculative analysis, Dennett argues that subjects’ reports of their conscious 
experiences are the primary data. That is, “the reports are the data, they are not reports 
of data” (Dennett, 1993, p. 51). In other words, to avoid spurious speculations, the data 
should entail approximations about the conscious experiences of the subject from the 
reports of consciousness. This approach, it is thought, strives for neutrality since the 
investigator approaches the reported, rather than the potentially intrinsic and 
intentional. Cluster criticism (Foss, 2004, chapter 4) is an example of such analysis. 
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Here, the rhetorical critic defines the key terms of an act of persuasion and describes the 
cluster of terms associated with the key terms. The method, it is thought, is an attempt 
to reveal the worldview of the persuader and to provide a foundation from which the 
critic may analyse and evaluate. The present thesis assumes, like Dennett, that the 
reported evidence is the data and not representations of data. That is, when the 
persuader provides a cue for the persuadee in the form of evidence, the persuadee 
approaches the evidence rather than a report of the evidence. As such, the probabilistic 
estimations discussed in 2.3-2.4 are concerned with the estimations of the data, not of 
representations of the data. So far, then, Dennett’s position is in line with the present 
conceptualisation of beliefs and reports of data. However, Dennett’s argument that this 
goes against classical phenomenology might not be entirely convincing (as discussed 
below). Whether or not Dennett’s argument concerning classical phenomenology is 
correct or not (the latter argued by Zahavi, 2007), the notion that the reports are the data 
is assumed in the thesis, and the following brief argument against Dennett by Zahavi 
should be seen in the light of this overall agreement with Dennett’s position regarding 
the nature of the reports of the data.  
 Dennett’s heterophenomenological position is confronted with potential 
problems when considering psychological and persuasive literature (for a good 
philosophical assessment of the method, see Zahavi, 2007). For one thing, it does not 
distinguish between liars and truth tellers. Dennett acknowledges this noting that the 
analytical method does not distinguish whether a subject is a liar, a zombie, a computer, 
a dressed-up parrot, or a real conscious being (Dennett, 1991, p. 91). From a 
psychological point of view, whether the persuader is either of these, however, makes a 
big difference in terms of the potential relations between the interlocutors. Furthermore, 
Dennett’s proposal seems similar to conventional Conversational Analysis (CA, Sidnell 
& Stivers, 2012), which largely ignores pragmatic enrichments, body language, and the 
interactions between interlocutors and focuses on the spoken words exclusively. As 
noted by proponents of distributed language (e.g. Cowley, 2011; Pedersen, 2012; 
Steffensen, 2013) the communicative stance between humans is more complex than the 
words conveyed. Indeed, classical phenomenological literature makes use of a spectrum 
of the manner by which phenomena is given for the subject that goes beyond linguistic 
reports (Zahavi, 2007, p. 31). Therefore, it seems needlessly reductionistic to focus on 
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the reports made by subjects. Thirdly, as Zahavi (2007) points out, the 
heterophenomenological framework relies on a theory-theory of mind (see 3.2), which 
may not be intuitively accepted considering the potential limitations of mentalizing and 
propositional theory of mind as discussed previously. Fourthly, the neutrality of the 
heterophenomenological stance may be questioned as analysts bring with them a host of 
assumptions that may influence the interpretations. Finally, it misses the point brought 
up in classical phenomenological literature, namely that the experience of phenomena is 
inherently immersed, dialogical, and interactive whereas the analysis of the report of 
someone largely is one-directional. Given the literature on the interactivity of 
communication and the influence of social factors on reasoning and reports, it seems 
unlikely that a CA would offer profound insight into the phenomenal experiences of the 
subject. As a consequence, the phenomenological stance adopted here to qualify and 
describe the psychological notion of subjectivity and the process the persuadee goes 
through is largely taken from classical phenomenology such that the subject is 
immersed, interactive, and intentionally directed towards the social in a dialogical 
stance with the world. However, to reiterate, Dennett’s notion that the reports of the 
data are the data rather than representations of data is assumed.  
 
6.1.2. Approaching the phenomenal subject 
From the terminological review of phenomenological literature, some concrete terms 
emerge to qualify the notion of subjectivity as it is understood in the thesis, and 
consequently how it underlies the SPIMP approach. Firstly, the notion of 
phenomenology is understood as an intentional interaction between the persuadee, the 
persuader and the enabling circumstances. The intentionality is directed towards the 
persuasive situation such that three different types might be described, namely the 
mutual and the intentionality of the persuader and the persuadee197. This difference in 
the intentional stance may account for the fact that the persuasive situation at one time 
seeks alignment (on an interactive and mutual level) and does not entail alignment (on 
an individual level). Neither interlocutor may reap the benefits of the individual level, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Note that the intentionality considered here (and illustrated in 14b) is thought to be a fundamental 
directedness towards consistency and believability of beliefs. Indeed, it precedes beliefs and desires. 
Since both beliefs and desires can be unconscious (see discussion of this in chapter 1), intentionality need 
not be conscious. Rather, intentionality is the fundamental directedness of being towards and with the 
world, underlying beliefs and desires.  
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however, unless both engage with the mutual intentional directedness towards the 
persuasive situation. As such, intentionality throws conceptual light on the how the 
persuasive situation may simultaneously point towards alignment as well as 
disagreement since the interlocutors engage with one another from their individual 
perspectives (such that epistemic alignment is no necessary ain), but also how 
interlocutors need to engage with one another mutually (such that communication 
alignment is an aim). In this complex social situation, the intentional stance is 
epistemic. Further, the interactivity described in chapter 5 in combination with the 
influence of socio-cultural factors blur the distinction between inner and outer states 
such that the belief cannot be said to be a stable proposition in the mind of either 
interlocutor, but rather a culturally influenced, socially mediated, and epistemologically 
negotiated construct. This further puts pressure on classical models in which a code-like 
transition of mental states is assumed as the basis of argumentation and persuasion 
given the performative and shared nature of communication and persuasion. In sum, the 
phenomenological terminology helps frame the notion of subjectivity and beliefs, which 
will be explored further in the next section.  
 
6.2. Subjectivity of beliefs revisited 
From the empirical and theoretical literature reviewed and discussed throughout the 
thesis, the assumption has been made that humans are intentionally directed at the act of 
persuasion from a subjective point of view. In order to further qualify the description of 
the psychological mechanisms involved in processing persuasion and in order to 
terminologically conceptualise the belief of the persuadee in the situation, we need to 
briefly look at developmental and social elements as central factors in understanding 
why two equally intelligent individuals might differ in their estimations of likelihood 
and in the conclusions they draw from acts of persuasion.  
 
6.2.1. Developing beliefs and perception 
The SPIMP approach describes the central elements of the reasoning process humans go 
through when confronted with an act of persuasion. This description, importantly, is an 
approximation of what happens in the moment. In the SPIMP approach, this is modelled 
from a subjective probabilistic point of view. However, the ontogenesis of these beliefs 
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is in no way trivial. As discussed in greater detail in 6.4, any act of persuasion relies on 
temporal elements that reach beyond the moment in which the interlocutors engage. 
That is, the epistemological and ontological probabilistic truth-conditionals point into 
the future as well as being lodged in the present. In order to gain a perspective on the 
subjective approximation of these probabilistic estimations, however, we may turn to 
development evidence to show the importance of external factors such as interaction, 
cultural, and context.  
 Humans are inherently social creatures. Resembling the Greek concept of 
mimesis, new-borns are directed towards imitation of the adults in their immediate 
surroundings. For instance, infants imitate adults by mimicking when the adult sticks 
the tongue out (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Meltzoff et al., 2009), a trait also observed in 
our simian cousins, the rhesus macaques (Ferrari et al., 2006). Children have a 
remarkable ability to comprehend physical actions. In Gergely et al. (2002), a researcher 
would activate a switch with her head. If her arms were free, the child imitated the 
researcher and used its head to light the switch, but if the researcher’s hands were tied, 
the child happily made use of its own arms to activate the switch. This portrays a bodily 
and interactive sensitivity present in children in their appreciation of others and 
indicates a foundation from collaboration regarding our understanding of immediate 
surroundings. The imitation, though, is socially initiated such that babies do not tend to 
imitate adults who do not smile and get the baby’s attention at the beginning. 
Fascinatingly, this need to imitate others may be reproduced using robots as long as 
these robots take an active interest (i.e. looking at the infants) before producing the 
actions. If the robots look at the infant, it may imitate the robot, but if the robot does not 
gaze at the infant, the robot’s actions are largely ignored (Itakura et al., 2008, see also 
Hood, 2012, chapter 2).  
The instantiation of specific emotional cues may vary from culture to 
culture. However, Ekman following Darwin (2007) posits that some emotions at least to 
an extent are innate, basic, and humanly universal (Ekman et al., 1969, Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971, Scherer et al., 2001; Sauter et al., 2009, 2010). Happiness is one of these 
identified by Ekman and colleagues. Not only do babies imitate the adults around them, 
they also actively seek quality social contact in form of smiling (Fries et al., 2005) and 
eye gaze (Hoehl & Striano, 2009; 2010) in order to develop their appreciation for 
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emotions and manage social situations (Kraut & Johnston, 1979). Indeed, as Hood 
(2012, p. 28) observes: “Brain development requires more than mere exposure”, we also 
need the social interaction with other humans.  
The make-up of the environment of the upbringing, then, has direct 
implications of cognitive skills and perceptual abilities later in life as it literally affects 
how we can see and consequently process the world. For instance, children need stimuli 
from their immediate surroundings and interactions in order to process differences 
between faces. Thus, children who grow up in a mono-ethnic environment will have 
difficulty distinguishing between faces from a different ethnicity (Hood 2012, pp. 27-
28). In other words, poor stimuli in childhood directly influence the actual perceptual 
skills later in life. If these perceptual skills are taken to form the frame for subjective 
estimations, we should expect differences in probabilistic estimations if two people with 
different environmental upbringings are confronted with the same stimulus. Taken 
together, the need for interaction in form of eye contact, smiling, and gesturing further 
puts pressure on the sharp distinction between inner and outer states of being since the 
development of our understanding of the physical and mental environment depends so 
heavily on others and the immediate surroundings. That is, we seem unable to frame our 
internal mental life without the intended immersion in the external world as perceived 
phenomenologically. Further, the subjective probabilistic estimations underlying the 
SPIMP approach should be understood from the premise of such a precarious 
development of loose beliefs such that the estimations are grounded in and sprung from 
the developmental backdrop.  
 Mirror neurons have recently been suggested as a neural basis from which 
imitation and the drive towards the social has emerged (Fadiga et al., 1995; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Iacobini & Dapretto, 2006, see also Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008 for a 
philosophical discussion of the relationship between mirror neuron hypothesis and 
classical phenomenology). Mirror neurons are defined as a neural response 
“…discharged both when the monkey does a particular action and when it observes 
another individual (human or monkey) doing a similar action” (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). That is, the process mirrors what neurologically would have happened if the 
human were to perform said action. The neurons were first observed in monkeys (e.g. 
Ferrari et al., 2005, Palagi et al., 2009 and Paukner et al., 2009), and a few single cell 
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recordings have been conducted in humans (e.g. Mukamel et al., 2010). Proponents of 
the hypothesis argue that the activity is the basis for emulation and understanding action 
(such that the system understands an action by experiencing it). Given the scarcity of 
single cell recordings in humans, it is debatable how translatable mirror neurons are to 
humans (see e.g. Skipper et al., 2007 and Dick et al., 2009 for competing accounts of 
gestures). However, mirror-like activity, which produces action understanding (Kohler 
et al., 2002; Montgomery et al., 2007) and which may be involved in understanding and 
predicting the actions of others (Ramnani & Miall, 2004), does seem to exist in humans. 
Thus, mirror neurons provide a tentative approach to how human beings experience 
action and how, to a certain degree, humans embody action mentally (see e.g. Frith, 
2007; Frith & Frith, 2006; Gallese, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
That is, reasoning faculties can be said to make use of interactive, perceptual, and 
potentially mirrored experiential cues from their immediate surroundings in order to 
make sense of a given situation and of the evidence and information they encounter.  
 In sum, branching across studies in psychological development (e.g. Hood, 
2012), choice blindness (Hall et al., 2010), interactivity (see 5.1), and mirror neurons 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004, see also chapter 3), studies strongly suggest that humans 
make use of others as well as our own bodily reactions in order to direct perception, 
comprehend the environment, and reason. Put more strongly, humans need others in 
order to function optimally in terms of reasoning, communication, and epistemic 
insights. A review of solitary confinement studies supports this trend by showing that 
most inmates suffered adverse consequences in some form when isolated (Smith, 2006). 
This has direct bearings on how we might conceptualise the subjectivity of the 
probabilistic estimation in the act of persuasion. In other words, as Zahavi (2007, p. 32) 
puts it, lending conceptual support from Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
“According to the findings of phenomenology, the world of experience, the 
phenomenal field, is not some “inner world,” nor is the phenomenon a 
“state of consciousness” or a “mental fact” the experience of which requires 
a special act of introspection. Rather, we should realize that consciousness 
is not something that is visible to one person only, and invisible to 
everybody else. Consciousness is not something exclusively inner, 
something cut off from the body and the surrounding world, as if the life of 
the mind could remain precisely the same even if it had no bodily and 
linguistic expressions. Gestures, expressions, and actions are more than 
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brute external data whose psychological meaning is to be sought elsewhere, 
namely in some superimposed inner experience; rather the intentional 
behavior constitutes a whole charged with meaning198” 
This shapes the appreciation of the manner by which the persuadee is intentionally 
directed (both in terms of the persuasive intention and the mutual intention of 
interaction) since the boundary between the inner and the outer becomes blurred. That 
is, the directedness, though individual, is also social and interactive. As such, the 
phenomenological stance is in line with the developmental and belief literature invoked 
in the thesis that argues for a contextual and social manifestation of the subjective 
estimation of probabilistic content concerning source credibility and content strength.  
 
6.2.2. The subjective belief in the persuasive incident 
The developmental trajectory leading to the potential of perceptive estimations play an 
important conceptual part in discussing how the SPIMP approach form a Bayesian is 
informed, and sheds light on the normativity and predictions of the model. In 
psychology, it is well established that humans tend to conform to preconceived beliefs, 
thus exhibiting a confirmation bias (see Haidt, 2012, chapter 4). As Mercier & Sperber 
(2011) describe, “Skilled arguers… are not after the truth but after arguments 
supporting their views” (p. 57). This is perhaps not surprising as changing beliefs entail 
cognitive restructuring, consideration, and potential changes in habitual behaviour. If 
we, as previously, assume that humans are finite beings with limited cognitive energy 
they may employ, changes and restructuring comes with a mental cost. As a 
consequence of this, we should expect people to be static first and dynamic only when 
necessary. Drawing analogously on Newton’s law of motion, it requires force to move 
an object, which in this case is the belief of the persuadee. However, refraining from 
updating might also come at a cost as described in the aims of the interlocutors. The 
cognitive assumption in the thesis, therefore, is that humans will be preserving as a 
baseline, that they strive for updating whenever beneficial, but that they will exert as 
little cognitive effort in doing so as possible.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 It is unclear what Zahavi means by ’meaning’ in the framework. Indeed, in the same way that 
phenomenology arguably could enrich cognitive sciences, models from cognitive sciences (such as the 
Bayesian approach to reasoning) could enrich the phenomenological literature.  
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 In this lethargic cognitive view, the background becomes pivotal as this 
provides the canvas on which the persuasive situation may unfold. The lethargic 
subjective estimations of the probabilities of a given proposition take the background 
habitual response as a baseline. Studies from political psychology conform to this view. 
Haidt (2012) argues that humans not only process evidence from a reasoning 
perspective, but also from a moral perspective. The present view agrees with the 
findings that conservative Americans have a different worldview, outlook, and 
consequently reasoning field than liberal Americans, but rather than conceptualising 
reasoning and moral background as two separate entities, the present framework argues 
that the moral upbringing (like other background influences) provide the lens through 
which the initial subjective estimation might arise199. Testing 1000s of subjects, Haidt 
and colleagues describe the moral lens of Americans and provide a compelling 
argument for the fact that humans approach the same piece of evidence radically 
different depending on their initial outlook (see fig. 15; Graham et al., 2009, see also 
Haidt, 2012, pp. 170-176 for an extension of the model to include ‘liberty’). 
Importantly, the description of the moral tapestry of the subjects is given on gradient 
scales of how essential a given element is to the particular person.  
Fig. 15: Radar diagram of moral differences between liberals and conservatives200 
                    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 This is a subtle distinction, and the relationship between reasoning and the background of the 
persuadee should be investigated more thoroughly to gain a more in-depth understanding of the 
probabilistic estimations.  
200 Note that the figure is an approximation of the data presented in Graham et al. (2009) and Haidt (2012) 
rather than a re-production, as the radar diagram offers an easy visual illustration of the moral differences. 
Note also that the notion of ‘authority’ is understood differently than in the present framework. In 
Graham et al (2009) it is closer to the cultural authority as discussed in chapter 3.  
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From the model developed by Haidt and colleagues (the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire, MFQ), the great differences in the desirability of certain policies and 
acts of persuasion become less opaque as the people evaluate the propositions from 
different mind-sets. The MFQ provides a good theoretical background for the Bayesian 
assumption that two humans who arrive at different conclusions and may still both be 
rational given their differences in estimation, perception, and evaluation. Indeed, the 
incommensurability hypothesis mentioned previously argues similarly that different 
ideas may not be directly comparable. Returning to logical enquiries, this puts further 
strain on a logicist account of reasoning since it becomes opaque how to determine 
between moral backgrounds, incommensurable values etc. in the specific act of 
persuasion as these rely on baseline assumptions and worldviews typically not 
expressed in the situation201. In other words, in the concrete evaluation of an act of 
persuasion our beliefs are lethargically drawn from our sense of belonging and how we 
have done in the past (Haidt, 2012, p. 251). This assumption is drawn from 
developmental literature (e.g. from Haidt, but also Hood, 2012), which argues the 
importance of the trajectory of belief throughout the life of the individual such that this 
particular frame of reference makes possible the manner by which the individual can 
conceptualise his or her surroundings. As such, the probabilistic estimations of beliefs 
not only depend on the immediate situation, but on a complex interaction between 
belonging, immediate beliefs, and the act of doing (illustrated in fig. 16).  
Fig. 16: Aspects of beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 illustrates the relational nature of beliefs regarding the act of 
doing and belonging to something 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 For instance, despite allusions to fairness and care, it is not often that policies are debated on the 
grounds from which they sprung, but rather they are discussed as they are presented. In other words, 
much persuasion takes place in the realm of conclusions post assumptions rather than fundamental 
discussions about assumptions (for good reason as well as constant deliberation concerning the founding 
principles would turn every politician and arguer into a philosopher, which might cause some practical 
problems in the day-to-day business) 
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The elements in the figure portray the complex nature of the ontogenesis and 
management of beliefs. As already mentioned in 1.2, beliefs have different qualities 
regarding strength, necessity, and consciousness of belief, all of which exist on a 
continuous, rather than dichotomous scale. Alongside the different qualities of beliefs, 
5.1 presented empirical and theoretical reasons to assume that beliefs are social, 
contextual, and cultural rather than solipsistic. That is, no belief is formed in isolation, 
and when beliefs are called into question in the social sphere (such as is the case with 
persuasive attempts), the framing and contextuality of the manner by which they emerge 
influence how the persuadee thinks of the beliefs. So far, then, beliefs have been 
identified as complex entities with at least three qualities and as entities that emerge 
socially, contextually, and interactively in phenomenal a dialogue with the world and 
the other interlocutor202. The illustration in fig. 16 adds another layer to the complexity 
of the emergence of beliefs. The figure argues that beliefs are not merely mental 
entities, but that they are intrinsically tied to the act of doing and the sense of belonging 
in a bi-directional manner. In figure 14b, beliefs and desires are presented as 
foundational for the intention (and carrying out) of action. However, the action can 
influence the other way as well (although in a qualitatively different way since beliefs 
and actions are different phenomena). Consider, for instance, someone experiences 
computer problems. He has no belief as to how to solve the problem and consequently, 
he messes around with his computer (given a belief that something might fortuitously 
turn up). If he solves the problem in this way, his beliefs might be altered regarding the 
function of computers given his actions and as such, actions has influenced his beliefs. I 
take the sense of belonging mentioned by Haidt (2012) to be an instantiation of the 
importance of the socio-cultural background coupled with personal experiences. As 
such, the notion of belonging is in line with previously discussed influenced on beliefs 
from surroundings. However, similarly to the bi-directional influence on the act of 
doing, beliefs can both influence how humans think of their socio-cultural surroundings, 
but as previously shown, the socio-cultural exert an influence on the emergence of 
beliefs. The figure, then, shows the different aspects of influence on beliefs and how 
beliefs are not solipsistic in their emergence, nor merely influenced by the mental, as 
the act of doing and the sense of belonging might influence beliefs as well.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 I mention one interlocutor here because the focus of the thesis is persuasion between two and only two 
interlocutors (the persuader and the persuadee).  
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6.2.3. Defining beliefs and subjectivity in acts of persuasion203 
From the phenomenological terminology, the developmental evidence, and the socio-
contextual influences on our perception, we may now approach a more precise 
definition of beliefs, as the concept is understood in the SPIMP approach. Firstly, rather 
than a stable catalogue stemming from a kernel of self, the approach assumes that 
humans manage and make up a belief online when required to do so by the situation. 
That is, in the persuasive situation, beliefs are called into existence ontogenetically in a 
constructed manner. It seems empirically and theoretically warranted to assume that 
humans approximate their beliefs as they go along in their lives without a core self from 
which they retrieve these beliefs. This does not, however, exclude consistency that 
make the individual seem stable in her beliefs. Due to the fact that we remember what 
we did in similar or comparable situations, we may fully expect that the subject is 
consistent with prior actions204. If this hypothesis of beliefs and the self is true, we 
should expect serious changes in personality when memories are degraded due to illness 
or old age, and indeed findings seem to support this notion.  
 Mirroring Joyce’s description of appreciation of the aesthetic, the approach 
to the proposed belief in the persuasive situation may be thought of in a similar fashion. 
Joyce writes “…the synthesis of immediate perception is followed by the analysis of 
apprehension” (1996; pp. 241-242). That is, the persuadee is presented with immediate 
sensory and cognitive stimuli, which may be fragmented and appreciated (e.g. the 
content strength of the evidence, the credibility of the source etc.), but this array of 
stimuli is only processed via synthesis and integration, which makes up the complexity 
of the manner by which the persuadee approaches the persuasive incident. This entails 
that “the whole can always dominate the part” (Kakuzo, 1906, p. 27) such that single 
elements may be identified and investigated in vacuum from the phenomenal, but the 
persuasive situation is first and foremost a whole-bodied and contextual phenomenon. 
This points to the contribution of the thesis as discussed in 6.5. In this way, rather than 
walking around with a fixed set of beliefs, the subjects shape and construct their local 
beliefs as they move in the world. This on-the-spot creation of the belief in the situation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 I want to emphasise that the definition offered is not conclusive and is not meant to substitute 
definitions of beliefs in other theories. The definition is merely a theoretical consideration how ’belief’ 
should be understood in the framework of the SPIMP approach.  
204 This stance may be described as a situation in which the subject would, consciously or unconsciously, 
think ’I’m the type of person who would…’ and act and think accordingly.  
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is predominantly local rather than global. Given the potential of incommensurability, 
this is not theoretically surprising as a given person may entertain mutually 
contradictory beliefs on a global level, whereas the primary aim of the persuadee in the 
act of persuasion is consistency on a local level205. This consistency is a driving factor 
for the intentionality and aims of the persuadee when processing the act of persuasion, 
namely to update potentially flawed beliefs and thus be able to act more efficiently in 
the future. The directedness of the intentionality in the act of persuasion is divided 
amongst the aims of the persuader and the persuadee as well as the mutual intentional 
stance of engaging in an act of persuasion. The latter is crucial since the persuasive 
incidence could not function in the same way epistemologically, ontogenetically, and 
communicatively without the common engagement. This, too, highlights the inherent 
importance of the interacted and the social in persuasion.  
 Alongside the social lodging of beliefs, the potential propositional character 
of the persuasive belief is complex and multi-facetted. Firstly, the propositional stance 
is not restricted to assertive statements. Consider the following 
 13) We should adopt policy X 
 13a) [I believe] we should adopt policy X 
 13b) [I desire that you believe] we should adopt policy X 
In this case, 14a is epistemic as it refers to the concrete mental states as the presently 
exist for the persuader. However, 13b clearly does not express the mental state of the 
persuader in the same assertive manner. Rather, 13b is ontogenetic and indicative 
towards potential rather than a report of present state and mental states. As such, the 
propositionality of the act of persuasion cannot be limited to assertions, but has to take 
into account a broader range of truth-conditional potentials. Common to these, however, 
is that the SPIMP approach conceptualises all these potentials as uncertain and 
probabilistic, even factual assertions as information may conflict with the assertions 
(e.g. culturally held truisms such as the heliocentric worldview is so likely that in 
practice, we can take it for granted, but such assertions can still be overturned by novel 
evidence and new investigations206). Further, although a belief is propositionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 That is, the belief is local, but it is drawn from a whole-body position in the interactive context. In 
other words, ’local’ refers to the probabilistic estimation and drive towards consistency on the level of 
beliefs rather than to the manner by which the belief manifests itself in the situation.  
206  Indeed, the hallmark of science and scholarly pursuit compared to religious pursuits is the 
acknowledgement that all beliefs are negotiable in light of new evidence.  
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expressible, it remains an open question whether beliefs cognitively are propositions, or 
whether these are simply constructs called into existence when we contemplate the 
world and are asked about our opinions on certain topics. Finally, the local-global 
distinction is strengthened by the existence of incommensurability. Incommensurable 
beliefs are incompatible and the conclusions drawn from the premises of these may be 
contradictory. In a globally consistent system, such inconsistencies should be 
eradicated. However, in a local system that constructs entities on the fly, global 
contradictions are unproblematic since there is no stable catalogue of the self. In this 
way, incommensurability does not pose a theoretical conundrum for the definition 
offered here.  
 As stressed in this and preceding chapters, persuasion, reasoning, and 
communication are inherently social phenomena. As such, the belief is developed 
temporally throughout the life of the individual from a social, cultural, and interactive 
stance, but it is also idiosyncratic in the sense that the individual holds the belief in the 
specific instance. As Kakuzo (1906) points out, “our particular idiosyncrasies dictate the 
mode of our perceptions” (p. 50), which I take to resemble the phenomenological notion 
of intentionality that is individual, but socially and interactively influenced and guided. 
The development and management of these idiosyncrasies, then, is inherently social in 
such a way that they may be manipulated (as in the case of choice blindness, Hall et al., 
2010). In this case, the manipulation alters our directed intentionality such that our 
attention and consequently our presence and perception is shifted.  
 In general, beliefs are an immensely important psychological ability since 
without these, we would not be able to retain information, learn from experience, and 
pass on knowledge to future generations as well as other traits important for the 
individual and the communal. In this way, beliefs are central to our capabilities as 
human beings and as social animals. However, the SPIMP approach fully acknowledges 
that changes in behaviour (action) depends on more than changes in beliefs 
(persuasion). As mentioned in chapter 1, persuasion does not have to translate into 
action. Indeed, given the incommensurability, the social influences, potential 
motivations to not act, and other factors, a richer account is needed to describe what 
drives people to act rather than to believe. The present framework, then, presents a piece 
of the kaleidoscopic discussion by investigating how changes in the belief system 
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occurs psychologically, but does not constitute a theory of change in behaviour. 
Furthermore, as a baseline assumption, the belief system is lethargic and conservative in 
the way that it takes cognitive effort to replace, update, and subsequently act differently 
than what is habitually done previously. Therefore, the persuader has to move the 
persuadee and provide reasons and evidence for this movement. Otherwise, the 
persuadee remains static in her preconceived belief system. The persuasive interaction 
can thus result in three outcomes. One, no belief change (which is the definition of an 
unsuccessful persuasive attempt), two, belief change, but no action change (which is the 
definition of a successful persuasive attempt, but not an unsuccessful attempt of 
influence), and finally three, belief change and action change (which is the definition of 
successful influence, but goes beyond the persuasive, as action change might be 
obtained through other means, e.g. changing the choice architecture, Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008).  
 Given the immediacy and online nature of the construction of beliefs from a 
social and interactive point of view, the directedness of our attention, and consequently 
the remits of our perception, what becomes pivotal to the act of processing persuasion. 
In modern rhetorical theory, Perelman & Olbrecth-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric (1969) 
discusses the persuasive importance of the presence of the persuasive. By exploring the 
concept of presence, the important concept of attention can be further expanded. In the 
SPIMP framework, attention is central to coping mechanisms, and given the importance 
of presence in attention, the concept helps construct the theoretical framework 
surrounding the SPIMP.  
 
6.3. Presence 
As already noticed previously, cognitive effort and attention are finite and from a 
phenomenological perspective, they are intentionally directed towards the persuasive 
situation. That is, in the event of a persuasive attempt the intentionality of the persuadee 
is directed towards the situation in a manner that fits with her general aims as identified 
previously, namely belief updating and consistency such that her beliefs might be as 
relevant and probable as possible since this facilitates the potential for better and more 
beneficial action. From this intentional point of view, the persuadee is in charge of the 
directedness of her attention, perception and reasoning faculties. In other words, the 
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persuadee directs the intentionality. However, as Sperber (2000) notes, public 
representations, and hereby acts of persuasion, may be “…more or less attention-
grabbing…” such that the acts of persuasion and the gestural and communicative 
appeals made of the persuader may direct our attention and thus refocus the persuadee’s 
intentionality. That is, the agency of directedness of intentionality is called into question 
where the persuader may also exert communicative power over the situation and focus 
her intentionality and thus the attention. From a rhetorical perspective, this raises the 
issue of agency in the rhetorical situation (cf. Benoit, 1994; Bitzer, 1998; Vatz, 1998). 
That is, the situation somewhat constrains the persuader’s ability to direct intentionality, 
but he also enjoys active and strategic agency. However, it should be noted that the 
agency and the constraints on agency is not limited to the persuader. Rather, the 
persuadee also has agency to direct her intentionality to better fit her aims. This mirrors 
the communicative arms race described by Sperber (2000).   
 Evidence to support the hypothesis of intentionality shift comes from varied 
findings from communication and reasoning literature. The aforementioned interaction 
in communication from the common ground (see 4.3-4.5 as well as 5.2) indicated the 
necessity of the joint roles of interlocutors in acts of interpersonal persuasion. That is, as 
mentioned, the communicative act is not one-directional, but rather synergetic. Further, 
choice blindness (Hall et al., 2010) provides a strong indication for the malleability of 
beliefs and supports the notion that we construct and make up our convictions on-the-
spot rather than refer to a catalogue of a stable self. This assumption is support by a 
range of studies that show the importance of framing (e.g. McKenzie, 2004). If humans 
were able to circumvent and go beyond the specific direction of attention, framing 
should be less effective. However, from experimental work, we know that framing is a 
consistent and powerful force. That is, throughout the thesis it is assumed that humans 
are finite beings with limited cognitive potential. Therefore, given the vast amount of 
information that humans could pay attention to, there has to be a selection process in 
which some information takes to the foreground of the attention whilst other 
information is largely ignored (such as ignoring a range of potential input when 
concentrating at a lecture). Therefore, the framing of the limited attention makes a 
potential difference in how we process information, potentially how we subjectively 
estimate the likelihood of the information, and how we subsequently evaluate the 
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persuasiveness of the information. Presence plays a central role here, as the concept is 
concerned with the manner by which something takes presence and beckons the 
attention of the received. As such, the persuader might try to infuse certain persuasive 
elements with a higher presence such that it receives higher attention. Combined with 
the effects reported in the framing studies, this indicates the strategic potential of the 
persuader and shines a light towards the struggle between persuader and persuadee in 
terms of aims, strategies, and coping mechanisms. That is, the persuasive can be framed 
in a particular manner, but it can also be endowed with a particular presence to make the 
persuadee pay more attention to one part of the persuasive attempt. In sum, the 
persuader may direct the persuadee’s intentionality and consequently attention and 
perception such that she approaches the evidence in a manner better suited for the 
strategic potential of the presentation of evidence in favour of the persuader. That is, 
given the direction of presence and cognitive attention, this may persuasively entail that 
the persuadee does not engage with other pertinent aspects of the belief in hand, despite 
the fact that these might be relevant for critically evaluating the act of persuasion. The 
persuadee, however, may also resist the directedness suggested, which creates tension 
between the interlocutors. The directedness of the attention, in other words, is a meta-
argumentative battleground for the interlocutors since it transcends the actual evidence 
by competing for the lens and focus through which the act of persuasion is constituted.  
 The preceding sections highlight the importance of the intersubjective 
relation as well as the phenomenal immersion in the contextual as a fundamental aspect 
of how humans engage and deal with an act of persuasion. It seems theoretically clear, 
then, that the intentionality is directed, and that humans have a limited cognitive 
performance capability where the attention of the subject plays an important role in 
terms of her perceptions and beliefs. Extending the conceptual discussion from this and 
initiating modern rhetorical theory (alongside Kenneth Burke), Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969) describe the importance of presence in persuasion. Presence is the sense 
by which something appears in the foreground whilst other things do not. For instance, 
in an argumentative situation, an interlocutor can create presence by invoking certain 
topics. This is highly connected to strategic choices. For instance, much political 
rhetoric is concerned with bringing topics to the foreground that would be beneficial for 
your preferred candidate whilst being detrimental for the opponent. That is, by shaping 
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the communicative frame, the estimation of a particular claim may change given the 
fact that it is placed at the foreground rather than in the back.  
 The persuasiveness of a statement, then, is multi-layered. At the basic 
processing level (which is described by the SPIMP), the persuadee evaluates the act of 
persuasion from subjective probabilistic estimations concerning source credibility and 
content strength. These estimations, however, are necessarily subjective and influenced 
by a range of factors such as contextual factors, socio-cultural background, emotion 
states, and so forth. That is, the same argument may be estimated and consequently 
evaluated differently by the same person depending on fluctuating circumstances in the 
situation. The subjectivity of the nature of processing, then, influences the evaluation of 
source credibility and content strength. However, subjectivity is also influenced by the 
directedness of intentionality and – by extrapolation – attention. The persuasive 
intentionality is directed towards the persuasive situation from the perspective of the 
persuadee, and this influences the scope of the perception and subsequently beliefs 
potentially invoked and constructed in the situation. The persuader, however, may 
manipulate the directedness of intentionality by creating a sense of presence (or, as 
Sperber, 2000, describes is ‘attention-grabbing’). This is a different layer that provides 
the screen against which the SPIMP approach can describe and predict the reaction to 
the persuasiveness. As such, any act of persuasion, given its strategic nature, is 
essentially multi-layered in that the basic level is influenced by immediate factors as 
well as the directedness of the intentionality. The phenomenological terminology thus 
helps to account for an inherently complex interaction between the interlocutors, and 
presence thus becomes a central element of persuasion processing due to the fact that it 
represents manipulations of the directedness of intentionality as well as strategic designs 
of effective communication.  
 The concepts of presence and directedness of intentionality might also 
provide a theoretical element in accounting for the reasoning paradox seemingly 
invoked by persuasion (Madsen & Chater, in prep.) since it shows that persuasion goes 
beyond mere information transmission, but also includes the strategic (and the 
epistemically vigilant). Indeed, if we assume the role of persuadee and persuader are 
interchangeable given the fact that sometimes we persuade and other times we are at the 
sticky end of an act of persuasion, both interlocutors should know the praxis of the 
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strategic attempts. From a pure reasoning perspective, given the uncertain nature of the 
information in persuasive attempts as well as the discrepancy between aims, the 
persuadee should readily opt to refrain from engaging in persuasive situations. 
However, given the fact that pure rejection also entails that one’s beliefs are never 
updated in other situations than what oneself can derive, I follow Sperber (2000) in 
claiming that changes in beliefs from persuasion has to be more than a zero-sum game. 
It has to be overall beneficial enough to warrant the risk of manipulation and deception. 
That is, persuaders might succeed in directing intentionality such that the framing of the 
social situation becomes more beneficial to their aims whereas a critical listener might 
be aware of such attempts. In this way, intentionality provides the meta-frame for the 
specific attempt and functions as the screen against which the evaluation occurs. I 
discuss coping and the strategy of the social situation in more detail in 7.4.  
 
6.4. The temporal: a flash in a flux207 
An important modelling limitation to the SPIMP approach is that the model describes 
the process of evaluating an act of persuasion in the moment. That is, given the 
subjectively estimated priors and likelihood ratios in the persuasion situation, the model 
provides concrete predictions as to how the persuadee should respond to the proposed 
beliefs, and how she reasonably should update her beliefs despite the fact that the 
attempts are from uncertain evidence from an uncertain source. In other words, the 
model describes a short temporal window, here called a ‘flash’ in a very time-bound 
perspective. Indeed, given the subjective nature of probabilistic estimations, the same 
persuasive attempt might be processed differently by the same persuadee in another 
moment given other emotion states and a different directedness of intentionality (as 
mentioned in the section on presence). In this way, the persuadee makes up her mind in 
the moment. However, humans are generally pretty stable in their beliefs and actions 
(people who have a high probabilistic estimation of one belief one day and a very 
different one the next would be considered inconsistent, e.g. a strong belief in the 
heliocentric worldview one day and a strong belief in a geocentric the next). This 
stability may be described as a catalogue of stable beliefs that make up the internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Papers from a special issue of Cybernetics & Human Knowledge coming out (edited by Stephen 
Cowley and myself) influence the section, see Madsen (submitted) 
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belief system of an individual. However, as argued previously – and more extensively in 
Hood (2012) – the fact that humans are stable does not entail that there is a stable self 
from which this is drawn. Rather, our personal experiences and memories (constructed, 
false, and true), the socio-economic background, our upbringing, and so forth provide a 
framework through which our intentionality and thus attention and perception may be 
directed. In other words, the habitual and the recalled become central to stability, which 
presents itself as a stable self. Given the importance of development, socio-cultural 
background, and memory, the temporal aspect becomes central to how the flash of the 
SPIMP fits in with a temporally more extended flux of a lifetime leading up to the 
evaluation of a particular persuasive attempt described by the model. Alongside the 
stability and management of beliefs, the epistemic qualities of temporal aspects are 
significant in influencing and complicating how persuadees approach the proposed 
belief. By introducing a temporal focus as a framework for the model, the theoretical 
picture becomes dynamic and relational, which provides part of the background for the 
development and management of priors and likelihood estimations.  
 In the concrete persuasive situation, then, we can expect a host of variables 
to intervene such that the frame of belief reference is set, not by the persuader nor by 
the persuadee, but by a developmental and fluctuating trajectory in which both 
interlocutors are immersed. This does not entail, however, that there is no scope for 
influencing the persuasive setting. Indeed, the notion of presence presented in 6.3 is 
only possible insofar that it is possible for the persuader to manage the situation by 
bringing chosen elements of his argument to the foreground. However, this active 
steering cannot be seen in isolation from the more complex psychological and socio-
cultural background that permeates the situation for both. As Benoit (1994) rightly 
observes, the persuader has some but not complete agency since the situation also 
warrants responses and provides a frame within which the persuasive event might take 
place. The persuadee, however, is directed towards her intentional stance expressed in 
the aims of the persuadee as well as the mutual aims. She does so in a way that best 
fulfils her present and future aims (obtaining as probable beliefs as possible). Enfield 
(2011) describes this as an enchronic movement, which is defined as a “…forward-
feeding temporal, causal-conditional trajectory of relevance relations… (p. 287, see also 
Enfield & Sidnell, in press).  
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 The contribution of the SPIMP is seen in the light of this developmental and 
fluctuating frame. In the estimation of content strength and source credibility, given by 
the subjective estimations tied with the psychological framework, the SPIMP 
normatively describes how persuasive a given act of persuasion should be to the 
persuadee. That is, a flash of an estimation in a continuous socio-cultural flux of events. 
As such, the present framework provides a initial sketch of a temporal psychological 
outline against which the SPIMP can describe and predict how the persuadee processes 
persuasive attempts. 
 Alongside the socio-economic, cultural, and developmental aspects of the 
temporal influences on the common knowledge and beliefs, which outlines the 
communicative interaction and provides the frame for the belief construction, the 
temporal aspects also bear influence on the epistemic qualities under consideration in 
the persuasive incident208. Indeed, the psychological and communicative framework of 
the persuasive incident is influenced by events that lead up to the event in question. This 
past influence is both personal and meta-personal since the influences are comprised of 
personal experiences and memories, but also of influences that reaches beyond the 
lifetime of the persuadee such as the development of communicative conventions, ways 
of presenting arguments and persuasive appeals, socio-cultural aspects concerning 
codes of conducts, and so forth. Alongside the influence of the past, persuasion is 
staunchly looking ahead. If we assume that changes in beliefs may influence changes in 
behaviour (e.g. learning that smoking causes cancer might persuade some smokers to 
quit), the single persuasive event has potential ramifications and implication for the 
persuadee in terms of how she can act and her potential future belief framework. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, persuasion comes with risk of deception, which warrants the 
inclusion of epistemic vigilance toward misinformation. As a consequence of this, the 
temporal influences tentatively described previously showcase the complexity of the 
immersion of the persuadee in the persuasive event where p, present, and future play an 
important role. Given this temporal stance, the directedness of the intentional stance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 In order to further explore the temporal and socio-cultural influences on the emergence of beliefs as 
well as how these are managed in the persuasive situation, it is necessary to impose order onto these 
variables to describe how they relate to one another and how they can be factored out and tested 
empirically. However, such an exploration of the temporal is beyond the scope of the thesis, as it deals 
with the processing of uncertain information from an uncertain source in a persuasive situation between 
two and only two people.  
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from the persaudee’s perspective is concerned with an epistemically more complex 
situation than the evaluation of assertion and factual statements since the epistemic 
quality not only involves assertions, but also counterfactuals, the persuader’s reports 
about himself, and predictions of future outcomes. This epistemic situation further puts 
pressure on the formal logicist account if it is tied to a truth-conditionally dichotomous 
estimation rather than a gradient and subjective probabilistic estimation, which may 
readily capture the various epistemic manifestations.  
 Branching over the theoretical considerations from the present chapter, the 
position of the persuadee and the intricacies of the persuasive situation become clearer. 
Intentionality is central to how the persuadee approaches the act of persuasion since this 
describes an intentional stance towards the optimisation of beliefs such that she might 
ascertain as probable and relevant beliefs as possible. This intentional stance, however, 
is lodged within the social and interactive context of the communicative sphere in which 
both interlocutors try to optimise their own position. From the point of view of the 
persuader, this is concerned with strategic choices on how to make the evidence as 
probable as possible for the persuadee, how to create presence of relevant information, 
and how to frame the persuasive situation. The persuadee, on the other hand, intends to 
scrutinise the proposed belief from an epistemically vigilant positions such that she 
minimises deception. As discussed in 7.4, this potentially combative relationship 
(because the persuasive relationship can also be beneficial and mutually helpful) is akin 
to the argumentative arms race described in Sperber (2000), such that strategies might 
develop to persuade and to direct the intentionality of the persuadee and vigilant 
strategies and coping mechanisms might develop to uncover and critically relate to such 
persuasive schemes. The success of each interlocutor, however, relies on a complex 
relation between socio-economic cultural upbringing, the intelligence of both, the level 
of cognitive effort invested in either creating or evaluating the act, and so forth.  
 As such, the proposed belief resides in a multifaceted social sphere. As 
understood in the present framework, the belief is constructed and managed in the 
specific flash of a moment in a fluctuating and continuous temporal path. It is not 
necessarily propositional in nature, although it may certainly be expressed as such. 
Beliefs, however, are malleable and subjected to influences from outside the persuadee. 
The psychological framework described in 7.2, the immediate interaction with the 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   263 
persuader and the contextual as presented in 5.1, and the developmental aspect all 
contribute to outline how the belief might be managed in the situation. Indeed, as shown 
by the MFQ, humans develop their concept of morals from a social rather than a 
solipsistic perspective. Given this background the persuadee subjectively estimates the 
probabilistic likelihood of content strength and source credibility, which in turn is 
described normatively in the SPIMP.  
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Chapter 7: On persuasion processing via the 
SPIMP: Psychological framework, core model, 
and integrated approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting 
Sun Tzu 
 
 
At the end of reasons comes persuasion 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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The preceding chapters presented elements of an integrated model of persuasion, 
specifically the core elements of content strength and source credibility. These elements 
aim to describe and provide a basis for quantitatively to approximate the cognitive 
process through which the persuadee undergoes when faced with a persuasive attempt. 
However, it is important to note that the elements in and of themselves do not constitute 
a theory of persuasion. As shown alongside the presentation of each element, important 
psychological details would be amiss if the model was hoisted to account for persuasion 
without the theoretical inclusion of other elements such as communication, emotion 
states, and cultural theory. Reasoning theories cannot account for the persuasive process 
without invoking interactivity, communication, common ground, intentionality and so 
forth nor can any of the other elements stand alone. That is, in an integrated and holistic 
theory and model of persuasion processing, each element contributes a central tenant of 
persuasion processing. This chapter draws together the arguments of the preceding 
chapters and binds them together in a first attempt to formulate a novel integrated 
approach to persuasion209.  
The chapter summarises the main theoretical, empirical, and analytical 
arguments drawn throughout the thesis (7.1). This offers initially a psychological 
framework (7.2), which represents the fundamental theoretical background for the 
SPIMP core model, which is presented next (7.3). These sections embody the main 
novel contributions of the thesis in combination with 7.4 in which the integrated SPIMP 
approach is developed including a discussion of how the persuadee might cope with acts 
of persuasion, assuming there is a discrepancy between humans in terms of their 
abilities to assert epistemic vigilance and avoid deception and manipulation. Finally, 7.5 
briefly considers the main differences between the integrated SPIMP model and 
previous influential models of persuasion.  
 
7.1. A brief reiteration of arguments and findings 
The arguments and findings summarised below are extrapolated from the literature 
reviews, conceptual discussions, and empirical findings cited and carried out throughout 
the thesis. Overall, the arguments and findings are presented as either challenging or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Again, it should be stressed that the current theory and model of persuasion is a prolegomena at best. 
That is, the thesis does not convey a finalised chapter on a theory of persuasion, but presents a speck of 
the complexity necessary for a more profound conceptualisation of persuasion and, ultimately, influence.  
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supportive depending on whether they challenge previous models (such as the ELM and 
the HSM) or contribute to shaping the current model (SPIMP). That is, challenging 
findings are concerned with theoretical and empirical evidence that cast doubt on or 
challenge assumptions and analyses of previous models of persuasion. The challenging 
findings are especially concerned with the plausibility of a logicist approach for 
describing the psychology of persuasion processing as well as some concrete challenges 
for the previous models (e.g. concerning specification of reasoning principle, how 
integration does or does not happen between systems). In other words, challenging 
findings represent the theoretical arguments for the need for developing a novel model 
of persuasion processing. Compared to challenging this, the supportive arguments and 
findings actively contribute to the SPIMP approach proposed in this thesis. These 
present a theoretical foundation for modelling how humans deal with uncertain 
information from an uncertain source in a potentially antagonistic situation where the 
persuadee on the one hand needs epistemic vigilance, but on the other hand cannot 
simply dismiss persuasive attempts given their potential benefits. That is, the supportive 
arguments and findings represent notions contributing to the validation of the 
underlying assumptions of the SPIMP approach.   
Challenging findings The challenging findings revolve around the 
empirical and theoretical challenge to logicist approaches (such as the criticism in 
Oaksford & Chater, 1991). From an argumentative perspective, Bayesian reasoning has 
made great strides in showing the descriptive and predictive limitations of formal 
logicist models of reasoning. In their seminal work on logical fallacies, Oaksford, Hahn 
and colleagues (see 2.4.3 for references) have shown support for the notion that subjects 
conform to a gradient scalar reasoning approximated by a Bayesian framework rather 
than the structural evaluation derived from logical predictions. This calls into question 
the theoretical framework of truth-preserving logic (i.e. reasoning from certainty) to 
deal with practical reasoning concerning uncertain information from uncertain sources. 
These findings have been supported both in terms of content strength (e.g. Harris et al., 
2012) and source credibility (e.g. Harris et al., submitted), thus encompassing the two 
central elements of the SPIMP core model (see 7.3). Communicatively, logicist 
approaches are further challenged by work on probabilistic models of language 
acquisition and use (e.g. Hsu & Chater, 2010), the need for others to facilitate effective 
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communication (e.g. Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Healey et al., 2007), as well as the 
identification of the importance of context and others from a distributed point of view 
(e.g. Cowley, 2010). Collectively, the studies on language suggest that communication 
is formed and managed between individuals where common knowledge is constructed, 
managed, and negotiated rather than a classical transmission of mental states and 
thoughts. This view on communication is difficult to reconcile with a logicist account 
that focuses on the linguistic content. That is, both from a reasoning and a 
communicative perspective, logicist accounts is challenged in terms of dealing with the 
lose structures of uncertain evidence and fragmented, collaborative, and subjective 
interpretive processes of communication.  
Alongside the general case against a logicist perspective on persuasion 
processing (for a more in-depth discussion on the case, see Oaksford & Chater, 2007), 
the thesis presents some inherent limitations with previous models of persuasion 
processing from a psychological point of view, namely the ELM and the HSM. The 
main problems for both of the previous models are concerned with conceptual precision, 
predictive power derived from normative stances, and the potential integration of 
systems (see O’Keefe, 2008 for an exploration of the ELM, whilst the same argument 
holds mutatis mutandis for the HSM. Concerning the conceptual precision, it is not 
immediately clear from the description of the two models how the normative stance in 
system 1 is to be defined (see 1.7 for a presentation of dual-process systems). It would 
seem that the models rely on a formal logicist approach to reasoning (despite the 
inherent limitations to such an approach as pointed out earlier). Indeed, if the models do 
rely on the normative stance of formal logic, it opens them up to a host of potential 
challenges concerning the applicability of such a stance. Further, a seeming reliance on 
formal logic brings with it a range of challenges mentioned in the above.  
Further, without a clearly defined normative stance, normative predictions 
for how the persuadee should react to a given persuasive attempt become less clear 
(other than general predictions on the direction of various cues, e.g. that evidence 
processed via system 1 should be more solid that persuasion obtained via system 2, for a 
discussion of predictive potential, see the comparison of the ELM, the HSM, and the 
SPIMP in 7.5). The predictive contribution the ELM and the HSM is indicative of belief 
direction (that is, how it should be treated depending on whether it is processed in 
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system 1 or 2) rather than quantitatively predictive in terms of management of uncertain 
evidence in an uncertain situation (as is the SPIMP). The limitation of the SPIMP, 
however, comes from the fact that subjective probabilistic estimations cannot be 
directly measured and as such, the input in the model comes from either eliciting 
estimations from the persuadee (as in Harris et al., 2012; submitted) or from 
guesstimating estimations and fitting them with the model. In the former, self-reports 
cannot be thought of as entirely reliable, and the latter relies on guesstimations rather 
than observations or measurements. In this way, the SPIMP does provide a normative 
account of how persuasive a given act of persuasion should be (given subjective 
probabilistic estimations), but it offers no clean way of providing the data from which 
the predictions are made. Thus, the normative stance towards persuasiveness is 
theoretical and holds true in the model, but it remains an open question how the model 
is applied and how initial data can be extracted (if at all possible).  
 O’Keefe (2008) rightly points out that the ELM (his argument may be 
raised against the HSM as well, mutatis mutandis) suffers from the description of the 
potential integration and interaction between the two modes of thinking (system 1 and 
system 2). If there is integration, it calls into question whether the two modules in fact 
are separate and distinct or whether they are aspects of a more complex and integrated 
reasoning mechanism through which persuasion is processed. O’Keefe additionally 
points to the fact that some elements (such as beauty) may be considered a cue for 
system 1 in one case and system 2 in another. In other words, cues seem to be malleable 
to different labels given different situations, a description which further calls into 
question the rigour of the conceptual precision as mentioned previously. This 
conceptual plasticity, however, indicates that the distinction of relevance and 
importance is largely circumstantial and contextual rather than cognitive and 
categorical. As such, it raises the important question whether the development of a 
model that encompasses the elements in a uni-modal description should? be obtained 
since this conceptually would entail greater stability in the description of the model and 
less malleability and changeability of concepts. This leaves the two models with an 
apparent paradox. If there is interaction between systems, it would certainly indicate 
that two sub-systems were present, but it would also indicate also that an integrated 
theory would be needed to account for the cognitive mechanisms of managing both 
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systems in interaction. As O’Keefe (2008) argues, the ELM does not provide an 
adequate account of how the systems interact. The SPIMP, however, describes how 
source credibility and content strength might interact in the same system. This, though, 
remains to be explored further. If there is no interaction, however, the ELM and the 
HSM need to account for the seeming interaction between source credibility and content 
strength reported in Harris et al (submitted). It may well be that a reply may be phrased 
for this, and both models need to account for such interaction in order to retain 
theoretical validity and purpose. In sum, both the ELM and the HSM may be challenged 
on fundamental assumptions concerning the conceptual definitions, the normative issue, 
predictive power, and integration. The development of the SPIMP approach is an 
attempt to present a model of persuasion processing that takes (at least some of) these 
problems into account.  
Supportive theoretical and empirical findings The challenging findings of 
the thesis help in two fundamental ways. Firstly, they indicate the potential problems 
with previous accounts, which in turn informs the areas of modelling that need to be 
addressed (e.g. conceptual clarity and integration as well as predictive potential) and 
secondly, they set the general scene for a the later theoretical presentation of the current 
proposal. Amalgamating the theoretical framework, the underlying psychological 
assumptions feeding the SPIMP may be grouped into four categories: scope of 
cognition, the framework for cognition, and modifying influences (internal and 
external), which will be expanded upon in 7.2.1 (the four categories are illustrated in 
table 7 below). The scope of cognition refers to the directedness of intentionality and 
the presence of the particular act of persuasion. As discussed in 6.1, humans are 
intentionally directed towards the persuasive attempt in a manner reflected by the 
general aims of the persuadee210. That is, humans need directed intentionality in order to 
acknowledge the existence of the act of persuasion. This scope can be manipulated 
(likewise the sense of presence, see 6.3). The framework of cognition refers to the 
background of the persuadee that informs how she develops her priors and likelihood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Note that the general aims of the persuadee concerning consistency and believable beliefs (see 1.3) are 
not specifically tied to phenomenological assumptions, but the notion of intentionality is enriched by the 
phenomenological discussion. Note also the distinction between having an intention of action is 
conceptually different from the more fundamental notion of intentionality (see fig. 15b).  
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   271 
estimations211. Temporally, the framework extends beyond the specific situation in that 
it reflects the socio-economic and cultural upbringing, the memories, and the personal 
experiences of the persuadee. The developmental studies cited in the thesis support the 
notion that beliefs inherently are constructed and managed throughout the life of the 
individual. These influences are social par excellence, which has led researchers like 
Hood (2012) to suggest that there is no such thing as a stable self containing a firm 
catalogue of beliefs The framework of cognition thus informs the persuadee of her 
beliefs when she constructs her estimations in the social situation of the persuasive 
incident whilst the scope of cognition shapes the directedness of intentionality and 
presence and consequently focuses the lens through which the act of persuasion is 
perceived. Finally, the internal (e.g. emotion states) and external influences (e.g. the 
physical context) might potentially modify the probabilistic estimations of the strength 
of the content and credibility of the source. Taken together, it is clear that the subjective 
element of the SPIMP does not refer to a solipsistic subjective estimation, but rather a 
socio-culturally, interactively, and developmentally shaped subjective estimation that is 
further influenced by immediate internal and external factors. In other words, the 
conceptualisation of persuasion in the present model cannot be accounted for without 
the engagement of the other in an inherently interactive manner. Finally, as discussed in 
chapters 4-5, the communicative stance adopted in the thesis is in line with the 
probabilistic and interactive approaches rather than the mental state transmission 
approaches.  
 A novel model and its analytical implications Alongside the theoretical 
and empirical findings that make up the conceptual framework of the present theory, the 
main novel contribution of the thesis is the development of a model of persuasion 
processing that responds to the issues raised by the challenging findings. Drawing on 
Bayesian reasoning and the interactivity of communication from common ground, the 
model is labelled as The Subjective-Probabilistic Interactive Model of Persuasion 
(SPIMP). The model is discussed in more detail in 7.3, so for now a few general 
remarks will suffice. Firstly, the normative stance in the model is predictive given the 
priors and likelihood ratios. From a Bayesian perspective, then, SPIMP provides clear 
predictions concerning the persuasiveness of an act of persuasion. As such, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 The development of priors and the transition from prior to posterior remain interesting points of 
discussion for proponents of Bayesian reasoning, as these issues are by no way trivial.  
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normative stance is clearly defined, and the normative predictions follow 
mathematically. Secondly, SPIMP integrates elements considered to belong to different 
systems, namely content strength (belonging to system 1 reasoning in the ELM and the 
HSM) and source credibility (belonging to system 2). The findings from Harris et al. 
(submitted, see also 3.3) support this conceptual integration since source credibility 
(usually considered a peripheral cue) integrates with content strength (usually 
considered a central cue). The ELM and the HSM need to theoretically account for the 
potential integration of the two systems in order to account for results such as these.  
The focus of the thesis is concerned with the theory and model 
development and little with analysis. However, from an analytical perspective, the 
subjectivity and interactivity of the SPIMP approach has the greatest implications, as 
these show the theoretical boundaries of potential analyses. Specifically, these concepts 
show that, from a psychological point of view, it makes little sense to look at the 
persuasive artefact in absentia from the context and interaction in which it is produced. 
Speech analyses may well provide interesting perspectives on argumentative traits and 
structures, but a holistic description of the psychology of persuasion needs to take into 
account the receiver’s subjective probabilistic estimations as well as the interactive 
relationship between the interlocutors. Subjectivity and interactivity can account for 
why it is that one size does not fit all since the techniques might invoke unpleasant 
connotations and thus low probabilistic estimations concerning content strength and 
source credibility given a particular persuadee’s personal, experiential, and cultural 
background. Analytically, then, the SPIMP approach strongly suggests that 
understanding of the background and characteristics of the audience and the interaction 
is needed in order to provide a more in-depth analysis of persuasion. This type of 
theoretical background for SPIMP is sketched in 7.2. 
 
7.2. SPIMP: The psychological framework 
In establishing a theory of persuasion, the present section initially discusses the 
psychological framework for the theory. The subsequent sections consider conflicting 
aims in persuasion processes, the fluctuating temporal nature of persuasion, and the 
communicative stance as being coordinated and distributed. The integration of these 
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theoretical approaches makes up the psychological and theoretical foundation for the 
estimations that feed into the SPIMP model to be presented in 7.3  
 
7.2.1. The elements of the psychological framework  
The development of the SPIMP builds on the psychological framework briefly 
mentioned in 7.1 and illustrated in table 7. The four categories are not meant to be 
independent. For instance, the directedness of intentionality influences attention, and 
nudging might create presence whilst the emotion states might influence how we make 
use of memories.  The specific relationship between the elements is an area yet to be 
explored and presents a fascinating challenge in order to create a more well-defined and 
thorough holistic theory of persuasion. In other words, the distinction is sketchy rather 
than definite. 
Table 7: The psychological framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table illustrates the theoretical background against which the central elements of the 
SPIMP core model should be considered. As such, the table points to a broader 
conceptual discussion regarding the complex nature of persuasion processing, which 
reaches into the socio-cultural, the emotional, and the contextual.  
 
The following discusses the relationship between the elements in order to provide a 
theoretical picture of how the foundation for persuasion processing is understood in the 
current approach. One of the essential theoretical entailments of the underlying outline 
is that the SPIMP is appropriate only given descriptive analyses of influencing 
elements. Otherwise, the subjectivity of the model (which is an absolutely inherent 
assumption) makes little sense. In this way, the current approach relies both on 
qualitative and descriptive analyses and critical assessments as well as on quantitative 
and normative predictions from the model. The qualitative, psychological framework, in 
a manner of speaking, feeds the nodes of the quantitative predictions in the SPIMP 
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(including the limitations of eliciting the probabilistic estimations as discussed 
previously in 7.1).  
 
Framework for cognition  
The framework for cognition denotes the general frame of reference that is developed 
through the life of the persuadee212. That is, throughout her life, her beliefs have been 
shaped, modified and moulded by a number of factors, all of which contribute to the 
potential range of thoughts and reactions possible for her in the concrete situation where 
she evaluates the act of persuasion. As described in Hood (2012), the development of 
the belief is dependent on a variety of factors including our socio-economic and cultural 
background, our personal experiences, the stimuli to which we are exposed, and our 
memories. In terms of memory, rather than metaphorically construing the phenomenon 
as a film that may be engaged internally, Randall (2007) argues that we should more 
accurately describe memories as a compost heap in a state of constant reorganisation 
(see also, Hood, 2012, pp. 59-61). In other words, rather than imagining memories as 
something that may be recalled in front of the inner screen, memories are inherently 
constructed and restructured according to whatever situation the human is in. This view 
is supported by the false memories (see Hood, 2012, pp. 58-60). Throughout her life, 
then, the persuadee has been in numerous socio-economic and cultural situations in 
which she has experienced certain stimuli. Collectively, these experiences (that may be 
debated with others such as friends and family and reconsidered later on) shape her 
general transient belief system in a habitual manner such that she refers to what she has 
learned and experienced throughout her life in novel situations. Developmentally and 
cognitively, such a strategy would additionally be efficient since she refrains from 
reconsidering her entire conception of the world-of-affairs with each new situation 
because doing so would require an enormous cognitive load and would thus be 
cognitively inefficient and wasteful.  
 This developmental aspect provides the general frame through which a 
novel situation is initially approached since she relies on past experiences, memories of 
similar situations, and her general knowledge of the world-of-affairs. This frame, 
importantly, is subjective, but it is formed in a deeply social and interactive manner, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Note that ’developed’ here refers not exclusively to development during childhood, but rather to the 
general trajectory throughout the life of the persuadee.  
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she has interacted with other humans and her surrounding world in order to ascertain 
this frame. The frame is the platform from which the persuadee approaches the 
persuasive situation in which the scope of cognition and internal/external modifying 
factors influence her priors and likelihood estimates.  
 
Scope of cognition  
The scope of cognition refers to the intentional stance as well as the presence of the 
attempt in question. Intentionality, understood from the Husserlian perspective, refers to 
a mode of approaching the givenness of the world-of-affairs. From the perspective of 
persuasion theory as it is conceptualised here, intentionality is tied up with the general 
aims of the persuadee as well as the social contract of the persuasive situation 
(forgetting about the aims of the persuader for a moment). For the persuadee, the 
intentional stance is towards coherence and avoidance of deception such that in the 
future she can act in accordance with more probable beliefs. Further, given the fact that 
human cognition is finite, different aspects of a persuasive situation can obtain different 
presence, or foreground. For instance, in the 2013 council elections, Ukip may have 
gained support from the fact that criticism of the European Central Bank and the 
potential immigration from Rumania and Bulgaria were topics of discussion. Had the 
issue of immigration and the UK’s belonging to the EU had less presence in the council 
elections, the results might have been different. Presence accounts for the fierce 
competition between persuaders to frame the debate and set the topic of discussion. 
Collectively, the framework for and scope of cognition sets the scene for how the 
persuadee may interact with the interlocutor and with the persuasive content and 
consequently set the frame for the subsequent evaluation.  
 
External influences  
The act of persuasion, however, is characterised by two important modifying factors, 
namely the fact that the persuader may be strategic, and the fact that external factors 
such as social cues and the behaviour of others shape how we think in the situation. 
That is, given the general framework and scope, our beliefs may be manipulated, e.g. if 
the persuader invokes presence of certain aspects of the persuasive attempt or 
manipulates the directedness of her intentionality. Indeed, the richness of evidence from 
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various social psychological studies cited throughout the thesis (not to mention the vast 
amount of additional literature I did not review in this thesis, see e.g. 5.1) increasingly 
support the claim that beliefs arise in a socially mediated and interactive manner where 
humans take cues from others in order to form their beliefs about the given situation. 
Similarly, the current approach acknowledges this interactive influence by others such 
that the probabilistic estimations should always be seen in the modifying light of the 
social and contextual. The evidence from social psychology (e.g. Cialdini, 2007) and 
nudging theory (Sunstein & Thaler, 2008) lend credence to the social influence in the 
persuasive situation (see 5.1).  
 
Internal influences  
Alongside the external modifying factors, the prior probabilities and the likelihood 
ratios may be influenced by internal factors, namely emotion states (tentatively 
understood here as fear, anger, joy, and other such emotion states) the level of cognitive 
effort asserted when evaluating the act of persuasion213. Despite the fact that emotional 
appeals, especially throughout the history of persuasion theories, especially pathos and 
ethos, have entertained a prominent role (in which the use of emotions were either 
applauded such as Aristotelian rhetoric or deplored in Descartes), they have been 
discussed very little in recent literature.  Despite going beyond the scope of the thesis, 
emotions are thought to be an important factor in persuasion processing since they 
influence the way probabilistic estimations are made. Rather than being featured as an 
element in the model, however, emotion states are thought of as highly influential 
modifying factors on probabilistic estimations214. For instance, if the persuadee is angry, 
she might be more critical towards the likelihood of a proposed belief towards which 
she would have been sceptical even in a better mood. In other words, in the 
psychological framework of the thesis, emotion states (in whatever way they are 
culturally manifested and expressed) modify the estimations in the situation that these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 As shall be argued later, the level of cognitive effort provides a conceptual account for the data 
supporting the ELM and the HSM  
214 As mentioned in the concluding remarks, the role of emotions in the psychology of persuasion and 
probabilistic reasoning is a very interesting field of future studies.  
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estimations are constructed and developed. As such, the persuasiveness of pathos 
becomes clearer in re appeals dominated more by evidence-based reasoning215.  
In sum, the mechanisms underpinning the process of evaluating an act of 
persuasion are multi-facetted and complex. The backdrop of probabilistic estimations is 
the socio-economic and cultural upbringing as well as the persuadee’s personal 
experiences and the memories. When in the persuasive situation, both interlocutors 
attempt to steer the directedness of intentionality towards the attempt in such a manner 
that is most befitting to the persuasive aims of each. A skilled persuader may 
manipulate the intentionality and presence, which in turns shapes the scope and lens 
through which the persuadee can think, whereas a skilled persuadee may investigate the 
proposed beliefs in a more coherent and critical manner. In situ, the probabilistic 
estimations are social and influenced both by external and internal factors, which colour 
the perception of her beliefs. The persuadee, in other words, is inherently subjective, but 
not solipsistic, instead relying upon habitual thinking, contextual cues, and the 
behaviour of others to inform her reactions and estimations of proposed beliefs. As 
Hood (2012) states, “it may feel like you have reached your decision in the open 
courtroom of your mind but, in fact, most of the important stuff has been going on 
behind closed doors” (p. 114). As clear from the various evidence cited throughout the 
thesis concerning the influences on beliefs from development, cultural background, etc., 
the thesis supports this view that the grounds have been prepared for an evaluation 
made in ‘the open courtroom of your mind’. That is, it is assumed that much of the 
framework for the estimation of content strength and source credibility is implicit and 
unconscious. These implicit elements might be called into question and become 
conscious, but for most of the time, the persuadee’s approach to various contextual cues 
is implicit and unconscious. The psychological framework described in the above is 
exactly a description of this process behind open doors, whereas the SPIMP represents 
the final evaluation made from these pre-deliberative processes and in the specific 
situation. Importantly, none of the elements mentioned here are taken to be atomistic 
and self-contained. For instance, the manner by which a physical nudge might be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Note, however, that the distinction between logos, ethos, and pathos is theoretical, not practical. 
Indeed, in real-life arguments, most arguments (except perhaps mathematical proofs) tend to include each 
element in a more or less prominent manner. The interaction is captured in the psychological framework 
since emotion states influence the perception of probabilistic estimations and thus affect reasoning in 
general.  
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effective is closely tied with the cultural context in which it appears. Even emotion 
states are contextual. For instance, the perception of pain (Vlaev et al., 2009; Kurniawan 
et al., 2010) and the perception of emotions of others (Barrett et al., 2011) are 
contextually modified. Thus, the elements in the general psychological framework may 
be divided into categories for the sake of simplicity and to provide an overview, but 
they are taken to be integrated and mutually influential in facilitating the backdrop 
against which the persuasive attempt is evaluated.  
The local-global consistency issue is a notable assumption of the SPIMP. 
Given the assumption that humans are cognitively finite beings localised in the 
situation, it is assumed that humans’ first approach a proposed belief from a local 
perspective before (if ever) considering the global perspectives. The concept of 
presence further supports this assumption. If humans considered beliefs globally, 
presence should matter little, as the system would consider the proposed belief in re the 
entire system. However, presence specifically denotes the cognitive worth and 
persuasive potential of the attentional foreground, that is the frame and focus of a finite 
cognitive mechanism directed towards the local first and the global second. The 
consistency issue, then, resides on a gradient and continuous scale in which local 
consistency is considered first, then closely associated beliefs, and finally more 
fundamental and global consistency. The local focus, then, depends on the directedness 
of the intentional stance and the presence of evidence. Given manipulation of these, the 
attention of the persuadee may be directed in a manner that fits with the persuader’s 
aim.  
From this theoretical vantage point, the main elements of the SPIMP 
become conceptually clearer. Firstly, reasoning in persuasion evaluation is taken to be 
probabilistic rather than logicist. This is entirely in line with much recent research in 
decision-making theory (such as Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). 
Given the immediate influences on the estimation of probabilities (e.g. the 
developmental framework of beliefs, cultural aspects, and internal/external modifying 
influences), these are inherently subjective. However, the subjective-probabilistic 
approach is not taken to be solipsistic. Rather, the strong plausibility that 
communication is coordinated and interactive as well as the external influences on 
reasoning, the estimations are inherently interactive, as they are formed in the social and 
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given sense-saturated coordination. In this manner, the theory underlying the current 
model of persuasion is innately subjective, probabilistic and interactive.  
 
7.2.2. The conflicting aims of persuasion and temporal aspects 
The preceding describes the complex environment in which acts of persuasion take 
place. The antagonistic nature of persuasion further complicates the picture, as the aims 
of interlocutors may differ significantly. Indeed, as it has emerged throughout the 
discussion in the thesis, persuasion represents a delicate and rather complex social 
situation in which various psychological and phenomenal mechanisms may pull the 
persuadee in different directions at the same time. Given the fact that the position of 
persuader and persuadee is interchangeable across time, both interlocutors are thought 
to have insight into the general aims and objectives the other.  
As described in chapter 1, a persuasive situation entails three distinct 
intentions tied to the different aims of the interlocutors, namely the intention of the 
persuadee, the persuader, and the mutual intention. The persuadee is directed towards 
the evaluation such that she updates or maintains her beliefs in a manner that is most 
suited to her future actions in the way of optimization, not maximization. That is, given 
the fact that evaluation of beliefs requires cognitive effort (more or less depending on 
the amount of investment), the aim is to increase internal coherence and obtain beliefs 
that are as probable as possible. In terms of the beliefs, the truth-conditional assumption 
of the current approach remains that certain truth cannot be obtained in a dichotomous 
manner, but rather in a gradient probabilistic way. Practically, some beliefs may 
approach 1 (such as zealously religious humans who have absolutely no doubt that their 
particular religious beliefs are correct), but in general most beliefs are found on 
intermediate steps between 0 and 1. The persuader aims to alter the persuadee’s beliefs 
in a manner that best fits with his intention. That is, the persuader does not necessarily 
aim for adherence or belief alignment, but may wish to persuade the persuadee of a 
belief that he himself may not believe (this, for instance, is the case of deceptive 
persuasion). In order to engage in a social contract in which the persuader and the 
persuadee tacitly both acknowledge an act of persuasion, the mutual aim of the situation 
involves comprehension of the communicated belief. Even in deceptive instances, he 
has to make sure that she understands him in a desirable manner (consider, for instance, 
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Clinton’s handling of the Lewinsky case in which he need the audience to understand 
him in order for the deceptive use of ‘sexual relationship’ to be successful, see Clinton, 
1998a; 1998b; 1998c). Persuasion, however, has to be beneficial for both interlocutors 
(as mentioned in the case of communication in general, see Sperber, 2000). If this was 
not the case, the persuadee should opt out of the persuasive situation every time she 
perceived someone was trying to alter her beliefs, both beneficially and deceptively. 
Clearly, this is not the case, as most humans engage with others even when they 
recognise that the interlocutor tries to alter their beliefs (for instance, teachers, 
politicians, sales people, good friends arguing, and so forth all constitute situations 
where the persuadee happily lingers round).  
As Mercier & Sperber (2011) argue, reasoning functions best 
argumentatively. To this could be added that reasoning functions best socially and 
interactively. This claim readily supports the underlying assumption of the directedness 
of the persuadee’s intentionality since she will engage with the persuasive attempt 
argumentatively (i.e. by evaluating the evidence presented) in order to reason and 
evaluate the persuasiveness (i.e. how much she believes the proposed belief). 
Argumentation, as pointed out previously, however, is not synonymous with persuasion, 
as the latter involves a broader range of phenomena (described as the psychological 
framework). From this argumentative and intentional stance, the persuadee is 
epistemically vigilant, meaning that she shuns away from deception and attempts to 
avoid less probable beliefs. The contested nature of persuasion, however, entails an 
antagonistic relationship between the interlocutors given their difference in aims. 
Therefore, the persuader may well attempt to manipulate the directedness of the 
persuadee’s intentionality and to create presence for elements that facilitate persuasion 
more than other elements of the situation. The persuadee, in the other hand, remains 
epistemically vigilant and invokes critical reasoning to evaluate the persuasiveness of a 
proposed belief (see 7.4).  
As discussed in 6.4, persuasion occurs in an interesting temporal frame, 
both developmentally and epistemologically. Despite the assumption that beliefs are 
constructed and managed within a relatively brief period of time in the persuasive 
situation and is managed enchronically towards her general aim; the frame for how she 
constructs the given belief clearly reaches beyond the specific situation and points 
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towards habitual thinking, the socio-economic and cultural background, and her 
personal experiences and memories. For the persuadee, then, what leads up to the 
incident sets the scene of her evaluation. Alongside the personal development and 
trajectory, the cultural and linguistic development (communicatively in shape of 2nd 
order language, see Thibault, 2011) reaches temporally beyond the instance of the 
situation in which conventions of language and arguments are used in the situation. The 
temporal flux further reaches beyond the scope of the confined situation given the fact 
that much persuasion is concerned with future actions. Consequently, the truth-
conditional probabilistic estimation is concerned with predictions rather than with 
assertions of whether or not something already existing is or is not likely. The future 
aspect of persuasion also enters given the assumption that changes in beliefs may lead 
to changes in behaviour. Thus, the persuadee is (consciously or unconsciously) aware of 
the fact that the given situation might bear entailments for her future selves. The flash of 
evaluation approximated by the SPIMP, then, describes how she manages the evaluation 
of the persuasiveness in the given enchronic temporal state, which nonetheless 
simultaneously points backwards and forward (although in different ways). The 
temporal nature of the development and management of beliefs in the persuasive setting 
is a fascinating topic only indicated in the thesis, and this should be explored on a more 
fundamental level in future research given the ontological and epistemic importance of 
this in the specific situation.  
 
7.2.3 A coordinated, distributed communicative stance 
So far, the theoretical picture provided describes the temporal and developmental 
aspects underlying the manner by which the persuadee might approach the evaluation, 
the factors influencing the persuadee in the specific conflicted situation, and the 
epistemic complexity of the proposed beliefs. Given the fact that the focus of the thesis 
is spoken persuasion between two interlocutors, the verbal and nonverbal conveyance of 
the proposed beliefs becomes central to the general conceptual background.  
 Rather than assuming a theory of communication in which mental states 
are transmitted between interlocutors, the current approach assumes interlocutors 
manage common ground in an interactive manner such that the persuader addresses and 
attempts to manipulate the common knowledge rather than transmit his mental states 
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and beliefs. This places the communicative contribution outside the mind of the 
persuader and the proposed beliefs become inherently social, collaborative, and joint. 
This does not entail, however, that the mentalizing interpretation mental states of the 
persuader are irrelevant for processing persuasion. However, such considerations are 
considered higher cognitive mechanisms. That is, the persuadee need not consider the 
mental states on a fundamental level to approach the communicated belief, but rather 
engages with the common knowledge.  
 The communicative stance adopted in the thesis is based on theories of 
language that agree with the essential assumptions of the SPIMP. Firstly, the approach 
assumes that humans are socially constructed and constituted rather than a catalogue of 
stable beliefs and mental states. That is, given the assumption that humans constitute 
their beliefs in the situation (strongly influenced by habitual thinking, the socio-
economic cultural background, and the personal experiences and memories), 
communication is taken to be interactive and socially constituted par excellence. 
Secondly, language is approximated by subjective interpretations in which the raw 
linguistic material is enriched pragmatically depending on the persuasive situation and 
the amount of cognitive effort invested in processing the proposed belief. Thirdly, 
communication is inherently interactive and interpersonally influenced (as shown in 
Pedersen, 2012). That is, it exists between interlocutors rather than the code-like 
approach (see fig. 10 in 4.1) in which belief A is transmitted and decoded by the 
listener. In the present approach, the persuadee actively engages with the 
communicative act. Note, though, that the main contribution of the thesis is the 
description of the psychological outline as well as the development of the SPIMP 
approach, which is informed by the outline in 7.2. Thus, the SPIMP and the theoretical 
framework do not necessarily conform to the present description of communication. If 
other theories of communication should be proposed, however, it is theoretically 
necessary that these agree with the some of the underlying assumptions concerning 
subjectivity, probabilistic reasoning, and interactivity since these are fundamental to the 
SPIMP approach.  
I have conveyed the complexity and integrated nature of the act of 
persuasion and how the persuadee can approach and evaluate the attempt. The 
psychological and communicative frameworks invoked are inherently social and assume 
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a human subject whose beliefs are mouldable by the immediate context and a situation 
in which the interlocutors are interactively coordinated in order to manage the complex 
social situation of the act of persuasion. In this complex situation mediated and 
influenced by a number of factors, the persuadee eventually has to evaluate the 
perceived strength of the fact of persuasion. The SPIMP core model, described in 7.3, 
attempts to approximate this given the psychological framework presented in this 
section.  
 
7.3. SPIMP: The core model  
7.2. outlined the theoretical foundation and psychological framework for the current 
model (SPIMP, see table 7 in the above). The core model of SPIMP is a Causal Bayes 
Network (CBN, see 3.4) model that integrates the probabilistic estimations of two 
central elements, namely content strength and source credibility, in order to 
quantitatively approximate how persuasive a given act of persuasion is given the 
persuadee’s subjective priors and likelihood estimations, the development of which are 
described in the psychological framework and the theory of persuasion outlined in 7.2.  
 
7.3.1. Content strength 
The first element of the SPIMP core model is content strength. It denotes the 
persuadee’s subjective estimation of the validity of a proposed belief. In accordance 
with probabilistic reasoning theories, the estimation is between 0 and 1 rather than the 
dichotomous distinction of 0 or 1. From a reasoning perspective, the normative stance 
taken differs significantly from logicist accounts given the fact that the probabilistic 
estimations are gradient rather than dichotomous, that estimations are subjective and 
mouldable rather than objective, and that the focus of normativity is concerned with 
whether or not the subject is conforms to the predictions given by the priors and 
likelihood estimations rather than whether or not she follows mathematically defined 
structural rules. The latter is the main analytical difference since fallacies (such as the 
ad hominem, the slippery slope, etc.) in formal logic are considered bad argumentation 
that should be discarded. Compared to this, the Bayesian focus on content argues that 
humans firstly approach the likelihood of the evidence and that the technical 
presentation of the evidence may play a role, but does not form a definitive estimation. 
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For instance, within a slippery slope structure, some arguments may be more persuasive 
than others given the likelihood of the argument (e.g. the difference between arguing 
that allowing gay marriage might lead to marriage between humans and other animals 
such as cats and sheep versus arguing that introducing voluntary identification cards 
might lead to mandatory identification cards. Here, the latter is a more likely outcome 
than the former). That is, logical fallacies are not discarded par excellence, but are 
considered another manifestation of argumentation. Formally, the probabilistic 
approach relies on Bayes’ theorem.  
)(
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The above is the basic Bayes’ theorem, which can be expanded with the likelihood ratio 
(as described in detail in 2.4). The following equation describes the normative 
approximation of how the persuadee relates to content strength.  
)|()()|()(
)|()()|(
HePHPHePHP
HePHPeHP
¬¬+
=  
As presented in 2.4, the equation describes the probabilistic calculus from the priors and 
likelihood ratios to posterior rating of content strength. Thus, given a low prior, but a 
high likelihood ratio, the subsequent posterior rating should increase and vice versa.  
 
7.3.2 Source credibility 
Alongside content strength, source credibility is the second element of the SPIMP core 
model. As described in 3.3 and argued in detail in Harris et al. (submitted), source 
credibility depends on trustworthiness (i.e. how truthful is the source?) and expertise 
(i.e. how knowledgeable is the source?). In the framework, expertise is a limited notion 
of expertise, namely epistemic authority as opposed to administrative and cultural 
authority. Epistemic authority denotes an expert who has relevant knowledge pertaining 
to the question in hand. This could be a GP providing information on medicine. The 
relevance of expertise is shown by the fact that an investment banker (also an expert) 
providing information on medicine is not considered an epistemic authority in the field 
of medicine. Thus, the expert has to have expertise in the specific area rather than being 
an expert in any area. Compared to this, the administrative authority is a person who has 
authority, but administrative rather than epistemic. An example of this is a policeman 
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who enforces the law without necessarily having expert knowledge of legal matters. 
Rather, citizens are supposed to adhere to the policeman not from a position of 
knowledge, but from a position of a social contract, which endows the policeman with 
certain authority. Finally, cultural authority denotes a person who has obtained 
importance in the social world without possessing neither epistemic nor administrative 
authority. An example of this could be Paris Hilton who might propagate ideas without 
having expert knowledge on the topic (such as nutrition and diets) or a socially and 
legally mandated power to exert authority on such matters. The distinction between 
epistemic, administrative, and cultural authorities ensures that the reliance on 
trustworthiness and expertise does not describe an ad verecundiam fallacy. Ad 
verecundiam, in the present framework, is taken to be an extraneous variable (on par 
with charisma and attractiveness) rather than an element of the SPIMP.  
As noted in Hahn et al. (2009) and Harris et al. (submitted), the 
mathematical effects of both expertise and trustworthiness can be described in a one 
single likelihood ratio of P(Hrep|evidence) where Hrep represents subjectively perceived 
persuasiveness of the proposed belief given the content strength evidence and the source 
credibility. That is, given the subjective probabilistic estimations concerning the two 
central elements, the model describes and quantitatively predicts how the persuadee 
should relate to the persuasiveness of the attempt.  Formally, P(Hrep|H) can be obtained 
by marginalizing out the conditional probabilities that depend on the evidence. This 
makes use of the formula for marginalization and the chain rule for joint probabilities 
and entails the following formula 
P(Hrep |H ) =
P(Hrep,H )
P(H ) =
P(Hrep,evidence,H )
evidence
∑
P(H ) =
P(Hrep | evidence,H )P(evidence |H )P(H )
evidence
∑
P(H )
	  	  
7.3.3 The core model 
Collectively, content strength evidence and source credibility make up the central 
elements of persuasion processing and present a concrete model that differs from the 
ELM and the HSM in terms of predictions and assumptions (see 7.5). The SPIMP can 
be illustrated as a Causal Bayes’ Network (CBN, Pearl, 2000). Fig. 17 is an illustration 
of such a network in which the elements are described in relation to the proposed belief. 
In the figure, persuasiveness (the Hrep) represents how persuasive a given persuasive 
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attempt normatively should be given probabilistic estimations concerning content 
strength and source credibility. That is, it portrays the persuasiveness of a verbal 
persuasive attempt uttered verbally by the persuader. As mentioned in 6.1.1, the act of 
communication is the data (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, this data is multifaceted, as 
the act of communication includes the linguistic content, pragmatic inferences). That is, 
it is not a representation of data, but the data itself216.  
Fig. 17: The SPIMP Core Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Causal Bayesian Network representation of the SPIMP core model and the relations between elements 
 
It is important to note that the SPIMP assumes independence between content strength 
and source credibility. That is, the content strength of the evidence (e.g. ‘this flat is in a 
very good area’) is independent from the credibility of the source of the message (e.g. a 
real estate agent or a friend looking at the flat). The assumption of independence in the 
model entails that the model does not cover all instances of persuasion. For instance, if 
the persuader produces reports about himself (e.g. ‘I am a very good driver because I 
passed my driver’s license’), it might be difficult to maintain the assumption that the 
content strength is independent from the source credibility. For such situations a model 
should be developed in which there is a possibility for dependency between source 
credibility and content strength. The current model, however, assumes independence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 In other words, as the basic level the data does not represent a mental state or thought, which is 
transmitted from one individual to another. In this way, the persuasiveness is not concerned with thought 
transmission, but rather than the manner by which uncertain data provided by an uncertain source is 
processed in a situation in which the persuadee is aware of the fact that the persuader might be dishonest 
or deceptive.  
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and further studies are needed to further develop the model illustrated in fig. 17 so that 
it might apply to persuasive cases where there may to be dependency between content 
strength and source credibility or to tell if another model needs to be developed to 
account for those cases of persuasion.  
The model depicted in fig. 17 conforms to Bayesian probabilistic calculus 
presented in 2.4. From this, specific quantitative predictions can be calculated given the 
priors and likelihood estimations of content strength and source credibility such that 
Hrep = persuasiveness, S = evidence strength, and C = source credibility217 . The 
mathematical equation approximating the persuasiveness is 
Hrep = 
!"!"! !!! !!!  
Thus, in an instance where the subjective estimations are S = 0,8 and C = 0,4 then  
      Hrep = 
!,!∗!,!!,!∗!,!! !!!,! ∗ !!!,!  = 0.73 
This indicates the persuasiveness of the proposed belief from an amalgamation of 
source credibility and content strength, which, with the prior estimation, yields 
quantitative predictions that are directly empirically testable, in the same way that is the 
case for the Bayesian approach to argumentation developed by Oaksford, Hahn, Harris 
and colleagues (see 2.4). That is, the SPIMP provides a clearer prediction for the 
persuasiveness of an attempt compared to the ELM and the HSM (see 7.5) given the 
knowledge of the presuadee’s priors and likelihood estimations of content strength and 
source credibility. Importantly, the CBN and, more specifically, the mathematical 
extrapolations from probabilistic calculus provide the specific testable content of the 
SPIMP. Applying the model makes it possible to manipulate source trustworthiness and 
expertise as well as the evidence content and thus test whether there are any effects on 
the persuasiveness in relation to specific persuadees. 
 
7.4 SPIMP: The integrated approach 
As mentioned throughout the thesis, SPIMP is a limited contribution to a more complex 
theory of persuasion. The theoretical background outlined in 7.2 provides a richer 
conceptual appreciation of the process of persuasion evaluation. That is, the quantitative 
predictions and approximations described in the SPIMP core model (in 7.3) only make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Note that these likelihood estimations are treated as probabilistic estimations in the Bayesian way 
(described in 2.4) 
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epistemological sense in light of a larger psychological framework, which informs the 
priors and the likelihood ratio. As mentioned in chapter 6, the SPIMP is a description of 
a speck of a larger kaleidoscope such that the qualitative and descriptive (cultural 
analyses, the development of the beliefs, etc.) sets the framework for the evaluation 
described in the SPIMP. Fig. 18 depicts the integrated psychological and modelling 
approach to persuasion in which the SPIMP core model is embedded in the 
psychological framework described in 7.2.   
Fig. 18: The SPIMP approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration of the conceptual relationship between the SPIMP core model and the psychological 
framework 
 
Fig. 18 is thus a simple illustration of the complex interaction between the central 
elements of the core model (content strength and source credibility from 7.3.1) and the 
theoretical apparatus assumed to frame the model (presented in 7.2) in the sense that 
these psychological factors influence how the persuadee perceives source credibility 
and content strength and thus how subjective probabilistic estimations can emerge in the 
persuasive situation in interaction with the socio-cultural context. As such, the figure 
illustrates the difference between the SPIMP as a core model (the central elements 
described in chapters 2-3) and the SPIMP approach (that includes the broader 
theoretical and psychological framework). For this reason, the SPIMP core model 
resides within the conceptual context of the larger psychological picture.  
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 The SPIMP approach (that is, both the core model as well as the 
psychological framework described in 7.2) provides a novel contribution to the 
conceptualisation of persuasion processing. However, as will become clear in the 
following, there are some inherent issues that need to be addressed and clarified in 
future research. Among the issues to be clarified in the future I will focus on two issues 
pertaining to the application of the model. These issues are related to the conceptual 
relationship between the elements of the core model as well as the potential cultural 
differences, which might yield different weighting to specific elements. Taken together, 
these two issues indicate the importance of conceptually qualifying the model and the 
potential of different weighting in practical applications of the model. In 7.4.3 I will 
discuss another issue with clear implication for the applicability of the approach, 
namely how persuadees with different characteristics may be able to cope with 
persuasive attempts.  
 
7.4.1.Relative importance of elements in core model 
Mathematically, the two elements of the SPIMP are equally weighted. Thus, content 
strength and source credibility are considered equally important in eliciting the posterior 
rating for the persuasiveness of an act of persuasion. However, considering the elements 
qualitatively, not mathematically, the relation may not be so straightforward. For 
instance, source credibility is divided into trustworthiness and expertise. However, 
trustworthiness may entail different epistemic and analytical consequences compared to 
the expertise of the source. Consider the elements in turn. Content strength denotes the 
subjective estimation of the strength of a proposed belief. That is, content strength may 
be stronger or weaker depending on the subjective estimations of the persuadee. 
Epistemic expertise, then, describes how likely it is that the source has relevant 
knowledge on the topic in hand. For instance, the relevant expertise of a rock singer and 
a GP will be different in discussing medical advice. Trustworthiness denotes how likely 
the persuader is to lie or actively deceive the persuadee. When considering low 
instances of trustworthiness, it becomes clear that this element holds a special position 
from an epistemic perspective.  
Consider the following. If trustworthiness borderlines 0, the rest of the 
elements (no matter how highly they are estimated to be) take on a radically different 
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epistemic light since the information presented is untrustworthy as compared to non-
experts where the information might be trusted, but might not be correct. Considering 
epistemic vigilance as a central element of persuasion processing, this is an important 
qualitative difference in how the content strength subsequently is evaluated. Indeed, if 
the persuader is deemed untrustworthy, we should expect that he would have to produce 
evidence that is very strong or present himself as a leading expert within the relevant 
field. This is the case of the classic con man. A deceptive person would presumably try 
to persuade by presenting as strong a case as possible. Furthermore, if he is not bound 
by conveying what he believes, but can resort to deception (i.e. low trustworthiness) it 
would not be out of the question to infer that he makes up evidence. In other words, the 
compelling content strength of the presented evidence as well as the expertise become 
shallow if the persuadee does not trust that he is speaking from an honest and 
trustworthy position. In comparison, consider the situation in which expertise 
borderlines 0, but trustworthiness and content strength are high. Given similar 
estimations, the posterior rating should mathematically be the same as the case of low 
trustworthiness as, mutatis mutandis, since low expertise should influence the overall 
persuasiveness in a similar way as low trustworthiness. However, qualitatively, the 
epistemic entailments of a non-expert is not the same as a non-trustworthy person as the 
former can still be trusted to convey what he believes whereas the latter cannot218. In 
general, the difference in epistemic consequences for the two aspects of source 
credibility suggests a potential qualitative difference that should be investigated in more 
detail 
 
7.4.2. The impact of cultural differences  
Whereas the relative importance of the separate elements portrays differences in 
epistemic entailments, it is worth reiterating that the elements of the SPIMP are equally 
weighted, which may cause analytical problems for cultural reasoning. As frequently 
noted, cultural differences influence the manner in which we think about evidence, 
source credibility, and about descriptions of ourselves (see e.g. Pornpitakpan & Francis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Naturally, this depends on the conceptualisation of ’trust’. If trust = 0 denotes a deceptive persuader, 
the problem with the conceptual relations arise. If trust = 0, however, denotes someone who is a random 
truth-teller, the relational issues become different. In any case, the epistemic entailments of a 
untrustworthy persuader is difference from the epistemic consequences of a non-expert.  
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2001; Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007; Hornikx, 2011; Hood, 2012, pp. 154-159). The 
empirical evidence cited throughout the thesis has largely, but not exclusively, relied on 
subjects from Western cultures such as Europe, North America, and Australia. Given 
the fact that cultural differences have been explored in a range of topics, it would be 
folly to argue for the universality of the SPIMP in its present form. Nonetheless, issues 
like the probability of the content, and expertise of the source, and the trustworthiness 
of the source would seem to be elements that necessarily have to be featured in a model 
of persuasion regardless of the culture. How these elements manifest, and what the 
internal relationship and weighting of these elements is, however, is another matter. 
Thus, the current approach claims the universal existence of the elements in any act of 
persuasion processing, but the approach does not claim the universal instantiation of the 
elements. In other words, the former is fixed and necessarily involved, whereas the 
latter is transcendental and culturally mouldable. This is in logical continuation of the 
framework in which the SPIMP model is embedded as illustrated in figure 17. Culture 
will have an impact on framework for as well as scope of cognition, and also internal 
and external influences will differ across cultures.  
One potential way of solving this analytically is to introduce weighted 
probabilistic models (see Harris et al., submitted) to capture the formalisation of the 
cultural differences. Thus, the above element relationships may be probabilistically 
weighted such that219 
HrepWi = 
∑!"#"∑!"  
where w denotes the relative weight invested in the variable, x (here, the elements of the 
SPIMP). The indices in the equation mean the subscript. The brief equation expresses 
the potential that the SPIMP might be instantiated differently across cultures such that 
some elements might get differently weighted (for instance, one might expect a 
difference in weighting of the importance of authority from people of religious 
conviction as compared to people of a scientific conviction since the former involves a 
greater belief in authority whereas the latter, at least ideally, involves a greater belief in 
the evidence provided). The specific influence of cultural difference and its influence on 
the probabilistic weighting of the central elements (content strength and source 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Note that ∑w is assumed to equal 1 
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credibility) currently remains hypothetical. In order to empirically test the hypothesis, 
the same experimental design should be employed across cultures to explore whether 
differences in importance of elements emerge. That is, a particular cultural background 
might adhere more to the credibility and authority of the source rather than to the 
specific content. As such, the model needs to be able to account for such differences. 
An example of this follows the same estimations as in the above where S = 0,8 and C = 
0,4. These estimations, however, can be weighed such that that relative importance of S 
= 0,3 and C=0,7 respectively such that  
HrepW = 
!,!∗!,! ! !,!∗!,!!,!!!,!  = 0,52 
The weighting of the different elements naturally relies on an in-depth analysis of 
cultural differences such that empirical tests need to be carried out in order to ascertain 
any detailed notion of the cultural weighting. Indeed, one of the fertile areas of future 
research is concerned with the analytical application of the SPIMP outside of the 
occidental and Western culture220. That is, in order to alleviate the occidental bias in the 
present description, empirical research in places like Japan, Burundi, and other 
countries is needed. Such investigations would further highlight the malleability of 
cultural praxis concerning what constitutes a persuasive argument.  
In sum, the SPIMP provides a quantitatively predictive and qualitatively 
defined model of persuasion processing that relies on a complex and integrated 
psychological framework. The main elements of the model are content strength and 
source credibility, both of which are approached from a probabilistic rather than a 
logicist perspective. That is, the persuadee is thought to estimate and evaluate the 
content and the source rather than the structural formation of the act of persuasion. 
Inherently, the probabilistic estimations are subjective and intentionally directed 
towards the proposed belief. There are modifying factors, however, to consider. Two 
have already been discussed, namely the relative importance of the elements of the 
model and their respective epistemic entailments and the potential of different 
weightings from cultural differences. One of the main theoretical benefits of the model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 The notion of ’Western’ culture itself, however, is questionable, as there are significant differences 
between the various countries that fall under the traditional occidental label (see e.g. Hornikx, 2011 for 
the difference between Dutch and French subjects). Within countries, differences might occur as well. For 
instance academic reviews are ideally characterised by their focus on the content of the argument rather 
than the source that puts forth the argument (although, in praxis, this ideal is not always fulfilled).  
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is that, given an eliciting of priors from the complex psychological background, the 
model is predictive of how persuasive a given attempt should be. This prediction is 
concrete and directly empirically testable. Given differences, however, in cultural and 
individuals, how the persuadee may cope with and evaluate acts of persuasion can 
differ, as discussed in 7.4.  
 
7.4.3. Coping with persuasive attempts 
As mentioned in chapter 3, Friestad and Wright (1994) present the reader with a string 
of developmental studies, detailing the development of children’s ability to cope with 
increasingly complex social phenomena as they grow mentally more competent and 
become more aware of deception strategies (Peskin, 1992) and the causal processes 
involved in situations where communications influence behaviour (Chapman et al., 
1990). However, as humans grow older, no clear evidence exists as to describe how we 
concretely make use of persuasion knowledge at different ages (Boush et al., 1994). 
From the subjective perspective developed in the thesis, this is hardly surprising that 
differences exist if we take into account differences in upbringing, mental capabilities, 
education and so on described in the psychological framework in 7.1221. In general, 
there are differences between humans in terms of how well they reason critically (for an 
excellent discussion of potential reasons for this discrepancy, see Stanovich & West, 
2000; Oaksford & Sellen, 2000; Oberauer, 2000; Over & Evans, 2000 for suggestions 
from dual-processing as well as integrated models of cognition) as well as make use of 
working memory (Raghubar et al., 2010). The reason for individual differences is well 
beyond the scope of the thesis, but it may be hypothesised that the difference is 
potentially affected by differences in intelligence, the individual’s upbringing, working 
memory, her previous encounters (in this case with acts of persuasion and different 
persuasive strategies), and her education. Indeed, critical thinking is a skill that needs to 
be developed. For instance, explicit (as opposed to imbedded) instructions greatly 
improve critical thinking in adolescent subjects (Marin & Halpern, 2011), and various 
methods such as the visual assistance of argument maps further critical thinking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Please note that the following discussion is informed by a literature in developmental psychology, but 
that the particular hypothesis concerning persuasion learning presented is not. However, the discussion 
follows naturally from the literature cited throughout the thesis, links up with the overall theoretical 
conclusions as well as the model, but that this should be tested empirically in the future (see 7.6).  
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(Twardy, 2003). Learning literature, then, supports the notion that critical thinking is 
developed (more or less successfully) through education. Indeed, it is entirely possible 
that a greater understanding of the psychology of persuasion processing and 
argumentation from uncertain evidence might yield insights into how to further and 
strengthen courses in critical thinking from an educational perspective. This, however, 
is an area for future research to explore.  
 Given the multitude of potential influences on the individual’s potential 
for critical reasoning, it follows naturally that we should expect differences in different 
persuadees’ abilities to cope with acts of persuasion. Indeed, the SPIMP approach posits 
that the persuadee makes use of probabilistic estimations concerning content strength 
and source credibility in order to inform her overall evaluation of the persuasiveness of 
the attempt, which may differ according to the individual. Regardless of whether or not 
the persuadee is able to critically assess the act of persuasion, she still relies on the 
elements described in the SPIMP. However, the framework also stipulates that the 
estimations depend on the broad psychological outline from 7.1 and that the persuasive 
incident is influenced by the fact that there are differences in aims between the 
persuader and the persuadee. Indeed, given the difference in power and epistemic access 
as discussed in chapter 1, a skilled persuader might attempt to create presence and direct 
the intentionality of the persuadee in a manner that is fitting with his aims. As Peskin 
(1992) shows, the awareness of deceptive methods and strategies for coping with these 
methods increase as we grow older. We might say that humans become increasingly apt 
at exerting epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). In this way, there is a combative 
relation between the interlocutors given their difference in aims, much in the same way 
as described by Sperber (2000). This combative relationship indicates an interesting 
theoretical notion concerning fallacies, coping mechanisms, and heuristics.  
 From the evidence in the Friedstad & Wright (1994) review, it seems clear 
that humans increasingly, but not in parallel development, become better at exerting 
epistemic vigilance and coping with persuasive strategies. We might argue that this 
development depends on a number of factors such as personal experiences, individual 
cognitive differences in capability, socio-cultural upbringing etc. (see 7.2). That is, 
critical thinking is not an innate ability, but rather taught, maintained, and practiced 
throughout life. Such a cultural and social stance towards coping mechanisms is 
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supported by the developmental evidence in Hood (2012), which indicates the 
importance of others in developing thinking and a notion of the self in general. Critical 
thinking and coping mechanisms, like all cognitive functions, come with a cost. To 
consider complex arguments can be laborious, and consequently we should expect 
coping strategies to develop over time. One hypothesis could be that the existence of 
different heuristics (see e.g. Gigerener & Gassmaier, 2011) is an expression of a variety 
of cognitive mechanisms that are developed and maintained such that the human needs 
not invest the same amount of energy in processing the given situation. Indeed, as such 
heuristics are experienced-based techniques that reduce the amount of energy needed to 
process a situation, but which maintain the benefit from experience. For instance, 
students trained in philosophy of argumentation and logical reasoning might well be 
quick to identify formal structural fallacies and to reject these par excellence and 
without considering the content in greater detail. Such a heuristic, however, needs 
experience, learning, and maintenance in order to continuously function and function 
well. The development of the coping strategies, however, is inherently social, 
educational, and developmental. Indeed, the fact that a number of specific heuristics 
have been identified in experimental studies (such as anchoring and adjustment, 
availability, scarcity heuristics, etc.) is an indication that these are strategies that have 
developed to cope with particular cognitive tasks and challenges rather than an account 
of system of cognition where heuristics are the foundational aspect. That is, in the 
present framework, heuristics are seen as learnable coping mechanisms rather than as a 
fundamental cognitive system.  
If coping mechanisms require cognitive effort, and heuristics (understood 
as learnable strategies in re coping) reduce the effort given experience in dealing with 
similar acts of persuasion in the past, we should also expect a general effect of level of 
cognitive effort, as it is indeed shown in the ELM and HSM studies. As mentioned 
previously, by asserting high or low motivation in assessing an act of persuasion, it is 
hardly surprising that subjects react differently to different persuasive strategies and 
cues (such as reasoning versus the attractiveness of the persuader). However, the claim 
here remains that despite the fact that these differences have been found in the extremes 
(high versus low motivation), this does not entail dichotomy, but rather end-points on a 
gradient scale of motivation and ability. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 3, Sperber et 
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al. (2010) argue, “…if you happen to hear a comment on the radio about a competition 
in some sport you neither know nor care about, you are unlikely to invest any extra 
energy in deciding whether or not to believe what you hear” (p. 362). That is, the 
amount of epistemic vigilance asserted is concerned with the relevance and importance 
of the information.  
 If this stance is taken, it sheds light on the complexity of coping 
mechanisms since coping will be concerned with a multi-facetted range of variables 
including education, socio-economic and cultural background, intelligence, relevance 
and importance of information, heuristic strategies developed from experience and 
learning, and level of cognitive effort. The effort of the persuadee as well as the success 
of certain persuasive strategies has to be seen in this broader light in order to make 
sense in a social and critical perspective. As such, similarly to the argumentative arms 
race described in Sperber (2000), we should expect a strategic arms race between 
persuaders and persuadees with the development of different strategies on both sides to 
circumvent (persuader) or sharpen (persuadee) epistemic vigilance, both of which 
(especially the circumventing aspect) requires novel thinking as well as developed 
coping strategies. As such, both persuasion processing and persuasion production are 
inherently creative processes where nonetheless the learning of coping strategies 
expressed in the form of heuristic strategies are central to lower the cognitive effort 
required to obtain the maximal benefit in the given situation. That is, in coping 
strategies there is a constant give and take between cognitive expenditures and novel 
thinking in the one hand and the development of strategies (that may later be exploited 
if they become clichéd) in the other.  
 
7.5. The SPIMP approach compared with other models of persuasion 
Both the social psychological studies on the influence of others on behaviour and 
beliefs (e.g. Cialdini, 2007; Sunstein & Thaler, 2008) as well as the Persuasion 
Knowledge model (PKM, Friedstad & Wright, 1994, 1995) are descriptions of aspects 
of what shapes the persuasive incident socially and how subjects can cope with 
persuasive attempts. Both are valuable and necessary contributions to a richer 
understanding of persuasion as a human phenomenon. In terms of the present approach, 
both the social psychological outline and the coping mechanism in the PKM are 
Jens Koed Madsen          Prolegomena to a Theory of Spoken Persuasion    Collected document	  
	   297 
supplementary models and theories. Given the psychological framework described in 
7.1, social psychological studies describe aspects concerned with the context in which 
the persuadee is immersed and which may direct the intentionality and shape her 
immediate probabilistic belief estimations. Thus, social psychology is a necessary 
element of describing the persuasive context and, in particular, to provide descriptions 
of other forms of behaviour-inducing mechanisms. As recognised previously, 
persuasion needs not entail difference in behaviour, and there is a conceptual difference 
between persuasion and influence. Social psychology thus is instrumental in providing 
the psychological background. The PKM deals with how people cope with persuasive 
attempts given more knowledge about the strategy, source etc. Coping mechanisms may 
readily be integrated into the current model. For instance, the persuadee’s background 
knowledge as well as her level of cognitive effort may have an impact on how she 
estimates content strength and source credibility. PKM, then, can be considered a 
modifying and supplementary model since it specifically deals with how subjects make 
use of greater knowledge of persuasive strategies. That is, the PKM and the social 
psychological studies aim at different aspects of the persuasion processing process. In 
terms of comparability, the SPIMP is closer to the ELM and the HSM, as these are also 
cognitive models that describe and approximate how humans deal with processing 
persuasive attempts in terms of the uncertain evidence, the source credibility, and the 
extraneous variables. The differences between the SPIMP and previous models 
(especially the ELM and the HSM) described in table 1 (reinserted below) in the 
introduction are clearer following the discussion of the theoretical and empirical 
evidence throughout the thesis. These are concerned with the principles of reasoning 
assumed, the type of normativity, how source credibility is regarded, and the role of 
emotional content and other extraneous variables.  
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Table 1: Comparisons	  with	  ELM	  and	  HSM	  (from introduction)	  
 
As evident from table 1, a major distinction between the SPIMP and the ELM and HSM 
is whether or not the models are dual-process oriented or integrated. This distinction is 
mainly grounded in the general psychological framework described in 7.1. Evidence 
from studies about source credibility indicates that subjects seem to integrate the 
information about the source and content in the same process rather than dealing with 
source credibility in a different manner (see Hahn et al., 2009; Harris et al., submitted). 
In addition, support is found for the claim that extraneous variables always influence the 
persuasion processing, but that the influence of such variables may be less given more 
cognitive effort and coping strategies. Thus, Petty & Cacioppo (1984b) find differences 
between low, moderate, and high motivation and ability, suggesting that the moderate 
level functions as an intermediate level between the two extremes, which in turn lends 
credence to the hypothesis that the process may be gradient rather than distinct. The 
gradient issue in the SPIMP approach remains to be tested more systematically, though. 
An issue for further research in the ELM and the HSM is to define the integration of 
peripheral and central cues (O’Keefe, 2008) since it is not immediately clear whether 
the two processes are additive, interactive, or otherwise connected. This is a conceptual 
issue for the previous models that needs to be addressed.  
 
The normative stance 
On a concrete theoretical level, the SPIMP departs from the ELM and the HSM in terms 
of the principle of reasoning and the normative stance. The ELM and HSM do not 
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explore the reasoning principle in greater detail, but from reading the comments 
concerning the type of reasoning indicated, it seems safe to assume that the models refer 
to formal logic as the basis of reasoning and critical thinking. The logicist framework 
has been criticised in terms of its relevance as an approximation of psychological 
processes in general (e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 1991; 2007, but see chapter 2 as well) and 
argumentation in particular (Oaksford & Hahn, 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b). 
Compared with this principle of reasoning invoked in the ELM and HSM, the current 
model assumes a gradient, probabilistic principle of reasoning in which the estimations 
are subjectively driven. The reasoning difference points to the disparity in normative 
stances. Whereas logicist frameworks tend to focus on whether or not structural rules 
are obeyed, the probabilistic perspective normatively describes what people should do 
given their subjective estimations. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a normative 
difference between the desirable and the approximating. Both accounts are necessary in 
the broader sense since the former provides a set of normative guidelines against which 
performance can be measured, whereas the latter provides a normative prediction for 
how people psychologically do. In this sense, the pragma-dialectical rules of 
argumentation (Eemeren & Grotendorst, 2004) are important and very valid comments 
on the desirability of proper argumentation, but they do not constitute a psychological 
theory of argumentation, exactly because the normative framework is desirable in terms 
of structural issues and codes of conduct (which intrinsically bear a moral stance) rather 
than descriptive in terms of psychological processes (which does not).   
 
Source credibility 
Source credibility is another major distinction between the models. In the SPIMP source 
credibility (formalised via expertise and trustworthiness) is a central and integrated 
element of persuasion processing, whereas the ELM and HSM consider source distinct 
from evaluation of content and structure. Indeed, as Hahn et al (2009) note, “persuasion 
researchers have typically considered these factors [the convincingness of an argument 
and source credibility] as alternatives that are indicative of two separate cognitive routes 
to persuasion” (p. 359). That is, source credibility is not dismissed in the previous 
models, but rather is supposed to be processed via a different cognitive mechanism. The 
evidence from Hahn et al (2009) and Harris et al. (submitted), however, strongly 
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suggests that subjects integrate source credibility with the evidence on a gradient and 
continuous scale that may be approximated by a Bayesian approach. This harkens back 
to the distinction between dual-process and integrated perspectives of persuasion as well 
as the issue of normativity. In the ELM and the HSM, reasoning is seen as disparate and 
distinct from the peripheral cues, which take a different role. In the integrated SPIMP 
approach, however, the peripheral cues are processed via the same probabilistic 
mechanisms in which some (e.g. charisma of the persuader) are considered modifying 
factors in the situation whereas source credibility is directly integrated in the model. 
The separation of reasoning from other cognitive functions may stem from a normative 
perspective of the cleanliness of logic versus the alleged messy qualities of emotions 
and other cues not immediately integrated in a normative framework developed from 
formal logic. Given the reliance on uncertain, probabilistic reasoning, though, the 
present framework need not adopt such as normative stance (as already discussed in the 
introduction and throughout the thesis).  
 
Dual-processing and single-processing accounts 
Empirical data from the ELM and the HSM reliably show that humans respond 
differently to a persuasive attempt if they invest different amount of cognitive effort in 
processing the attempt. Given that the current core model is a single-process account of 
persuasion, the results of the previous models need to be accounted for. Indeed, as 
convincingly shown by the numerous studies concerning the ELM and the HSM, there 
is indeed an evaluation difference between what variables dominate and how firmly the 
persuasive attempts take hold (the central route yields the most permanent changes 
compared to the peripheral). In order to posit a novel model of persuasion processing, 
the SPIMP has to be able to account for the fact that dual-processing accounts (ELM 
and HSM) find significant differences when conditioning subjects to pay either great of 
less great attention to an act of persuasion. Indeed, both dual-processing accounts 
convincingly argue that given greater awareness and focus, different evaluations occur. 
Interestingly, Petty & Cacioppo (1984b) find three different patterns of evaluations 
depending on whether motivation and ability is high, moderate, or low. Specifically, 
when subjects were low in motivation and ability, they did not distinguish between 
strong and weak arguments, whereas the highly motivated clearly distinguished. The 
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moderately motivated did not differ much on their agreement with negative cues, but 
conformed to high motivated on positive cues. The interesting aspect of the 1984b study 
is the fact that an intermediate step between high and low could be identified with clear 
differences in agreement compared to both high and low. This is a challenge rather than 
support for a distinct dual-processing model since a clear dual-process would involve 
only two processes.  
Compared with this, the present approach assumes a continuous level of 
cognitive effort that would expect intermediate and gradient findings. That is, testing 
the outer extremes of cognitive effort (high and low), the results should indeed show 
two very different evaluations of the persuasiveness of an argument whereas 
intermediate levels of cognitive effort should produce intermediate evaluations. From a 
hypothetical perspective, differences in cognitive effort should have a variety of 
entailments in cognitive effect and critical thinking. Firstly, as shown in the studies of 
the ELM and HSM, higher cognitive effort and motivation should decrease the 
importance of extraneous variables such as the charisma of the persuader. Secondly, 
high cognitive effort should allow for more complex considerations to occur such as 
mentalizing and increased consistency (both local and global). Furthermore, high effort 
should allow for conceptual extrapolation and cross-comparisons. The central 
assumption, then, is that the ELM and HSM test the extremes of effort and motivation, 
which yield different evaluations. Compared with this, the current approach assumes 
that extraneous variables such as charisma always play a part, but that the influence of 
these can be decreased given more critical thinking and higher cognitive effort. The 
exact influence of extraneous variables should be investigated in more detail. However, 
the evidence from the peripheral routes in the ELM and the HSM seem to indicate 
differences in the weighting of cues. The difference between the SPIMP and the two 
previous models, in this specific regard, is the fact that extraneous variables are 
conceptualised as elements always present rather than elements of a separate system. 
Naturally, investing more effort comes at a cost since it is laborious. However, as 
discussed in 7.4, it is conceivable that humans can learn to cope with persuasive 
attempts by developing strategies when they are confronted with acts of persuasion. 
Thus, given training and education, the persuadee should spend less energy performing 
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the same critical evaluation compared to when she first encountered a particular 
persuasive strategy.  
The 1960 US presidential election provides compelling anecdotal 
evidence in support of the claim that supposedly peripheral cues always play some role, 
which can assert stronger or weaker influence depending on the level of cognitive 
effort. In order for this example to have any validity, it is necessary to assume that 
listeners of the debate on radio and viewers on television on average exerted the same 
amount of cognitive effort in processing the persuasive attempts such that viewers 
assign cues to either central or peripheral. Secondly, it is necessary to assume that 
viewers and listeners had a relatively high motivation to consider the debates. In the 
light of the cold war, the on-going Vietnam War, and other perilous issues at stake, it 
seems likely to assume that listeners and viewers were motivated to listen to the 
debates222. However, a poll conducted after the debate showed a discrepancy between 
the television audience and radio listeners where the former predominantly believed 
Kennedy won the debate whilst the latter believed Nixon to be the victor. The main 
cause of the difference is traditionally assigned to the fact that Nixon looked pale and 
sweaty compared to the tanned and handsomer Kennedy, i.e. a difference in visual 
charisma. If viewers had high motivation, the peripheral cue of Kennedy’s 
handsomeness should matter little, which would contradict the predictions of the ELM 
and HSM. If, however, we viewers had low motivation, the poll does indeed follow the 
predictions of the models. Thus, whether or not the predictions are met depends on 
whether viewers were motivated to consider the presidential election debate (that they 
themselves had tuned in to watch) or not. In any case, the current approach assumes that 
peripheral cues such as the handsomeness of the persuader always plays some role in 
that it is a factor in the general context. The influence of such factors, however, may be 
reduced by a higher cognitive effort and greater critical abilities. Nonetheless, the 
SPIMP approach assumes that the charisma of the speaker will assert some influence 
even when the persuadee invests heavily in considering the persuasive attempt. In this 
way, the SPIMP provides an account that seamlessly incorporates charisma as an 
important factor in a integrated cognitive system in which cues might be differently 
weighted depending on cognitive effort, capability, potential of critical thinking etc., but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Note that the disagreement between the two sets of listeners has been questioned (Vancil & Pendell, 
1987). The contribution of the example, therefore, is anecdotal rather than firm.  
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where the cues nonetheless are present even when exerting a significant amount of 
effort. This departs from the underlying assumptions of the ELM and HSM.  
 
Predictive potential 
Prediction for persuasion processing is a tricky issue for all models given the socio-
cultural, contextual, and reasoning-related complexities. Indeed, no current model 
enjoys high predictive power of persuasion as a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, 
given the complexity identified throughout the thesis in terms of influences on the two 
central elements of the SPIMP core model (content strength and source credibility) such 
as socio-cultural factors, actions of others, emotions, the contextual environment and so 
forth, it seems unlikely that any model would reliably be able to predict persuasion with 
great accuracy. That being said, the SPIMP differs from the ELM and the HSM in two 
central ways, namely in terms of predictions given the principles of reasoning and in 
terms of a dual-process compared with a single-process approach. In terms of the first 
issue, the ELM and the HSM seem to rely on formal logic as a principle of rationality 
and reasoning in persuasion processing. Given the focus on structural validity, the 
predictions from formal logical models would be concerned with the validity of the 
argument such that invalid arguments would be unpersuasive (given their structural 
insufficiency) whereas logically sound arguments should be persuasive. Thus, from the 
dichotomous truth-values of the statements, the ELM and the HSM should predict the 
persuadee to adhere to logical rules if the persuadee exerts greater cognitive effort such 
that she processes the attempt via the central route. For the peripheral route, however, 
neither the ELM nor the HSM are very concrete in terms of predictions. Conversely, the 
SPIMP relies on a Bayesian approach to reasoning (as discussed in 2.4). As mentioned 
in the previous presentation of the approach, this focuses the normative predictions on 
the subjective perception of the likelihood and strength of the content and the credibility 
of the source in an integrated manner (as indicated on the figure of the model, see 7.3). 
As such, given the knowledge of the subjective estimations, the SPIMP provides clear 
predictions as to the persuasiveness of the statement given the strength of the content 
and the credibility of the source. However, as discussed later in the section, a major 
limitation to this approach stems from the fact that we do not have a direct and reliable 
route to elicit these estimations, but rather have to rely on self-reports or guesstimations.  
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Situations in which the persuadee holds extreme beliefs provide a concrete 
example in which the ELM and the HSM predict different persuasiveness than the 
SPIMP223. An extreme belief could be political, which means that the person has 
invested a high degree of likelihood and strength to the validity of the belief. 
Furthermore, the example considered here is concerned with extreme beliefs that are 
very necessary to the persuadee (necessity was identified an element of beliefs in 1.2, 
figure 3). Such a belief could be a strong political or religious belief. Presumably, 
beliefs that are strongly held and appear central to the persuadee can be thought to be 
central and important to the individual. If we assume that the belief is important for the 
persuadee, we might reasonably assume that acts of persuasion concerning the extreme 
belief would receive equal importance for the persuadee, and consequently, in the ELM 
and the HSM, the persuadee should process any evidence via the central route, as this is 
the route activated when the persuadee pays great attention to the persuasive attempt. If 
this holds true, persuadee who hold extreme and necessary beliefs should respond more 
logically to evidence regarding these beliefs since evidence should be processed 
centrally. However, this does not seem to be in agreement with observations from 
political and religious discussions. Rather, extreme proponents seem to disregard 
evidence even when this evidence seems valid and logical in order to maintain their 
original belief (probably due to the fact that changes in very necessary beliefs yield 
greater ripple effects). As such, the ELM and the HSM intuitively seem to struggle in 
accounting for evidence from extreme beliefs that are centrally and necessarily held. In 
the other hand, the SPIMP approach does not offer the same assumption of central 
processing. Here, the subjective estimations of conflicting evidence might simply be 
attributed as not very believable (or the source as not very credible) since the SPIMP 
does not assume that the persuadee proceeds down a significantly different cognitive 
route when the issue in question is important to them. Thus, the predictions from 
extreme beliefs held as necessary beliefs differ from the ELM/HSM and the SPIMP. 
This provides a fertile ground for further testing the models against one another.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 In this context, ’extreme’ does not refer to the content of the belief, but rather than to strength by 
which a belief is believed (for instance, I have an strong belief in Newton’s mathematical description of 
the theory of gravitational pull even though such a theory, content-wise, cannot be considered extreme). 
This definition regarding extremity of belief in a given belief is important for developing the example.  
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Emotional content 
Finally, from a theoretical perspective yet to be explored empirically, emotional content 
is an integrated part of the reasoning process as an internal modifying factor in the 
current model224. That is, given a particular emotion state, it is expected that the 
probabilistic estimations of a proposed belief differ such that the same person might 
yield different estimations depending on the mood. This, however, is readily integrated 
in the reasoning process, as different probabilistic estimations simply should yield 
different outcomes in the evaluation of the persuasiveness of an act of persuasion. As 
mentioned in the concluding remarks, the role of emotional content in reasoning and 
decision-making in general, and persuasion processing in particular, remains an open 
issue to be explored further empirically (for instance, by inducing emotion states such 
as anger or fear in participants and elicit their probabilistic estimations concerning 
different topics). Indeed, the Bayesian perspective on argumentation and reasoning has 
yet to develop a strong theoretical appendix in order to qualify emotion in reasoning. 
The link between emotion and reasoning has been suggested strongly in recent years by 
a string of findings that indicate that reasoning and emotions are not separate, but rather 
integrated (see e.g. Damasio, 2005).  
In sum, there are conceptual assumption differences between the SPIMP 
approach and previous psychological models of persuasion processing, namely the ELM 
and the HSM. The normative stances seem disparate in terms of structural logical 
assessments versus probabilistic reasoning, the role of emotion plays an integrated role 
in the SPIMP, and source credibility, and extraneous variables are integrated rather than 
separated as in a dual-process perspective. The SPIMP, then, offers a novel alternative, 
empirically testable model to persuasion research.  
In conclusion, the SPIMP approach offers an alternative to previous 
models of persuasion processing. The model quantitatively predicts how persuasive a 
given act of persuasion should be given the occurrence of the psychological framework 
as outlined in 7.1. In this way, the theoretical and modelling approach is quantitative, 
but heavily reliant on qualitative descriptions of aspects such as cultural and upbringing. 
In other words, in order to qualify and provide detailed accounts of the elements 
inherent in the model as well as the psychological background, an in-depth analysis is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Note that some rhetoricians have been sceptical towards the idea of empirically testing emotional 
appeals in persuasion (e.g. Gross, 2006) due to fears of simplification.  
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required. The model, however, may function on a more general level as an 
approximation of the persuasiveness. The reliance on the contextual, the cultural, and 
the qualitative acknowledges the fact that persuasion inherently is a creative process in 
which the persuader and the persuadee both attempt to gain maximal benefit from a 
socially difficult situation in which one person strategically (and potentially 
maliciously) intends to change the beliefs of the other. As such, the theoretical 
framework described throughout the thesis wholeheartedly agrees with Aristotle when 
he bequeaths rhetoric as the art of persuasion225. That is, neither the persuader nor the 
persuadee may safely rely on previous strategies, since the other might develop ways of 
seeing through or circumventing said strategy. Given the development of 
communicative technologies and the fact that the role of persuader and persuadee is not 
fixed, but rather interchangeable, this continuous arms race remains fluctuating and 
fascinating. Nonetheless, given this background, the SPIMP provides a concrete model 
for describing the normative processes underlying persuasion processing when faced 
with uncertain evidence from an uncertain source in an uncertain situation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Obviously, Aristotle meant this as a craft and a creative element since the Greek phrase is techne.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, this is not the end. It’s not even the beginning of the end 
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning  
Winston Churchill 
 
 
Ending, to be useful, must be inconclusive 
Samuel R. Delaney 
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The thesis has brought together a range of theoretical, conceptual, and empirical 
considerations and findings in order to present an integrated approach for how to 
understand and describe the processes the persuadee undergoes psychologically when 
she is confronted with an act of persuasion. As frequently mentioned throughout the 
thesis, the present approach is a prolegomena at best in that it does present a novel 
model for understanding persuasion processing, but it also invokes a string of 
interconnected theories and points of view that need to be developed much further in 
order to have a more stringent and coherent base. As such, the thesis represents a 
beginning of a research program in need of development, theoretically, conceptually, 
and empirically.  
The concluding remarks round off the thesis with a reiteration of the 
contributions of the thesis, supplemented with some thoughts on potential future 
research directly entailed from where the thesis left off, and some closing remarks.  
 
Main contributions of the thesis 
The contributions of the thesis reach into theoretical and analytical discussions and have 
already been presented in the introduction of the thesis. However, as this is the end of 
the thesis, it serves well to put in perspective the principal contributions in light of the 
discussions throughout. The thesis discussed the theoretical assumptions underlying 
previous models of persuasion (the ELM and the HSM) in order to ascertain the benefits 
and limitations of these. A discussion of these models as well as auxiliary literature 
from psychology, rhetoric, marketing and so forth show that they contain unidentified 
reasoning elements, and that there is a potential interaction of heuristic and reasoning 
elements. Further, the development of probabilistic reasoning models in recent years 
indicates the need for a novel model that incorporates the recent findings from social 
and cognitive psychology as well as communication studies. Table 2 (from the 
introduction) describes the main contributions of the thesis in general. 1 and 2 spring 
from the general literature review and discussion whereas 3 sums up the literatures into 
an integrated SPIMP approach.  
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Table	  2:	  main	  contributions	  of	  the	  thesis	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main novel contribution of the thesis is undoubtedly the development of a concrete 
model for describing how humans process acts of persuasion, namely the Subjective-
Probabilistic Interactive model of Persuasion (SPIMP). In a response to the 
development of a Bayesian normative framework for reasoning from uncertainty, the 
model fundamentally explores persuasion from a perspective of uncertain evidence 
from an uncertain source. In doing so, SPIMP differs significantly in terms of 
underlying assumptions and concrete predictions compared with previous models of 
persuasion processing such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) and the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM). The theoretical differences in terms of reasoning 
are at least three-fold. Firstly, neither the ELM nor the HSM describe the normative 
accounts of reasoning inherent in their models. Compared with this, the SPIMP 
approach offers a concrete normative standard, which is empirically testable and that 
entails concrete predictions such that given their priors, persuadees should respond in a 
predictable manner in terms of how they reason about the evidence provided in the act 
of persuasion. Secondly, the reasoning account offered in the current model integrates 
source credibility and content strength such that these both influence the predicted 
outcome in the model. This moves the model from a dual-processing to a single-
processing account of persuasion. Finally, the current model posits the importance of 
interactivity and dynamic relations between the interlocutors. Understood in this way, 
the subjective probabilistic estimations are inherently constructed and mouldable. This 
allows for a different normative account than the one found in truth-preserving 
frameworks such as formal logic (which, from reading the accounts, seems to be the 
normative standard invoked in the ELM and the HSM). Whereas the normative account 
in formal logic is concerned with describing flawed reasoning from a structural point, 
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the normative stance in the present model is concerned with a content-driven 
normativity in which it is perfectly reasonable that humans entertain different and 
potentially incommensurable beliefs. The normative predictions are concerned with 
how they manage these such that from their subjective estimations, the SPIMP describes 
how they should evaluate the persuasiveness of an act of persuasion. Whether or not 
their respective priors and probabilistic estimations are valid or reasonable is an entirely 
different question.  
With regard to the conceptual strengths of the model, the elements have 
been empirically tested, the underlying assumptions have been explored from a range of 
disciplines, which hopefully minimizes the risk of internal questionable assumptions, 
and the model provides clear empirically testable predictions given knowledge of priors 
and the likelihood ratio226. In other words, the SPIMP approach differs significantly 
from the ELM and the HSM in the underlying assumptions concerning reasoning and 
normativity. Given such differences in predictions, further tests to determine the 
theoretical validity of SPIMP, ELM, and HSM should be manageable, and as indicated 
later on in this section, this seems to be a fruitful area for future research.  
 
Six directions for future research 
As repeatedly mentioned throughout the thesis, the approach to persuasion presented is 
but a prolegomena given the amount of relevant topics not covered. On a general level, 
the approach requires more detailed formalisation such that the mathematics of the core 
model becomes clearer and more precise in terms of predictions. Furthermore, the 
integration of the central elements identified in the core model and the psychological 
framework described in 7.2 needs to be clearer. Finally, given the challenge of eliciting 
relevant probabilities (as discussed in 7.1), experimental tests are required to further the 
field of persuasion research in general so that a reliable and valid method might be 
developed. These future research endeavours follow directly from the discussions 
throughout the thesis. In addition, the thesis has briefly touched upon other issues that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 As mentioned in 7.1, the normative prediction of the model is practically marred by the fact that we 
cannot access people’s subjective probabilistic estimations unproblematically. Indeed, in order to elicit 
these estimations, at present we need to rely on self-reports or guesstimations (neither of which are 
reliable). Consequently, the model is predictive, but the input needed in order to make predictions are 
incredible elusive – indeed, this is a predicament of persuasion theory given the present definition of 
persuasion as changes in beliefs rather than measurable changes in behaviour (see 1.2).  
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need to be explored much more in depth in future research on persuasion. In the 
following I will discuss six important issues that demand examination in future research 
in order to qualify even more the SPIMP approach presented in the thesis. These are 
concerned with the influence of emotion states on subjective probabilistic estimations, 
the link from beliefs to behaviour, how communicative styles function persuasively, the 
temporal aspect of persuasion, the link from model to analysis, and finally strategies of 
coping with and producing acts of persuasion.  
 
1. Emotional influence on probabilistic estimations 
As far back as Ancient Greece, Aristotle (1995a) noticed the importance of emotional 
appeals in persuasion. Indeed, source credibility (ethos) is described as a long-lasting 
and mild emotional appeal whereas the short-lived and inflamed emotional appeal is 
labelled as pathos, and recent research attempts to integrate emotional appeals in 
political psychology (e.g. Shermer, 2006; Westen, 2007). Currently, emotional appeals 
are poorly integrated theoretically and model-wise in the SPIMP. Indeed, given the 
classical rhetorical triad of logos, ethos, and pathos, the model accounts for the two 
former (in form of content strength and source credibility), but neglects the latter. The 
question then becomes how emotional appeals may be integrated in the theoretical 
framework.  
One direction in which recent investigations have gone is to explore the 
connection between emotional states and subjective probabilistic estimations. Harris et 
al (2009) point to the fact that the potential cost of being wrong about a negative 
outcome is higher than being wrong about a positive (e.g. believing that you won’t win 
the lottery versus believing that you will get a tax return), which consequently skews the 
probabilistic estimations of the likelihood of these events happening (see also Harris & 
Hahn, 2011). Extending the theoretical picture, Vosgerau (2010) argues that subjective 
estimations of probabilities might be skewed due to arousal (negative or positive), 
which may occur in connection with emotions such as anger of happiness.  
If the framework presented in works on emotional states is to be taken 
seriously, it suggests that emotions may function as a modifying factor on probabilistic 
estimations. Intuitively, this seems to make sense, as humans tend to be less well 
disposed towards acts of persuasion when they are angry as compared to situations in 
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which they are happy. Given the ancient identification of persuasive appeals, the model 
containing content strength and source credibility should thus be able to integrate 
emotion states as a direct and influential factor in how humans construct their subjective 
probabilistic estimations in particular situation. Indeed, one of the assumptions 
underlying the present framework is that humans do not have a stable catalogue of pre-
set beliefs, but rather a changeable and local approximation in the situation. If this is 
true, changes in emotion states should have the potential to vary these estimations given 
their capricious nature. The effect may be direct (for instance influencing the subjective 
probabilistic estimation, independently of the credibility of the speaker or the strength 
of the content), or it may be modifying (for instance by influencing the positive or 
negative evaluation of content strength) or it may be mediating (for instance, be a 
medium through which the trustworthiness of the speaker is filtered so that the latter 
increases or decreases due to the emotional state of the persuadee). 
A greater insight into the connection between emotion states and 
probabilistic estimations of the likelihood of present and future states might further 
provide an important insight into some psychological disorders in which emotional 
states are inflated such as depression and manic disorders. Indeed, some tentative 
evidence for the linkage already exists, as evidence suggests that patients with 
depression suffer from impaired decision-making (Martin-Soelch, 2009) both in static 
and dynamic environments (Cella et al., 2010). Evidence from pathological studies, 
much in the same way as lesion studies in neuroscience, provides fascinating insight 
into the workings of reasoning and cognition in healthy humans. In other words, 
alongside an interest in the influence of emotion states in persuasion processing, 
subjective probabilistic reasoning might contribute to the understanding of the effects of 
some mental illnesses.  
 
2. The link from belief to behaviour 
The route from belief to behaviour is in no way straightforward. Whilst taking part in 
his life, we see in Ulysses (particularly in the ‘Sirens’ section) that Bloom may entertain 
certain beliefs about Boylan and Molly, but that he is incapable of acting upon them for 
a variety of reasons. Given the definition of persuasion as changes in beliefs via mutual 
acknowledged intentionality, reflection in behaviour change provides a good, but not 
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necessary gauge at the success of persuasion. In other words, an act of persuasion might 
conceivably be successful in changing the beliefs of the persuadee, but no different act 
is following. That is, we might end up labelling successful acts of persuasion as 
unsuccessful if we apply the paradigm of behaviour change. To further complicate the 
picture, changes in behaviour need not be a result of changes in beliefs. As testified by 
the numerous references social psychology throughout the thesis (e.g. Cialdini, 2007; 
Sunstein & Thaler, 2008), behaviour may be brought forth in a number of ways227. This 
fact points to the difference between persuasion (changes in beliefs) and influence 
(changes in behaviour). Despite the fact that there is no necessary link, some link 
between beliefs and behaviour naturally does exist since humans try to act in 
accordance with their beliefs about the world in general (e.g. crossing the street when 
there are no cars because you believe it would be a calamity to be hit by a car).  
As a consequence of this tenuous link, future research should look more in 
detail into how and when beliefs are transformed into behaviour and when they are not. 
A profound understanding of the relationship between persuasion and influence would 
also facilitate complex social analyses of campaign rhetoric, sales techniques (as 
mentioned frequently in Cialdini, 2007), and other interesting cases of social 
phenomena in which persuasion and influence are involved and intertwined with one 
another.  
 
3. Strategies for coping with acts of persuasion and cohabitation 
Haidt (2012) convincingly argues that people might disagree, not because they refuse to 
engage in political debate with others, but simply because their moral point of departure 
is so different from their interlocutor. In the present framework, the discrepancy is 
easily integrated, as the subjective likelihood estimations of content and source 
credibility is expected to vary, which fundamentally alters the outcomes and 
conclusions drawn from the same piece of evidence. Furthermore, the communicative 
connotations are also expected to differ from person to person given their cultural and 
social upbringing, what they are used to believe, and so forth. For instance, a speech 
given by Prime Minister David Cameron might yield entirely different conclusions from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Note that I do not include coercion in this list, as coercion holds different mechanisms in which free 
choice is eliminated. Thus, the subject is neither moved socially nor persuasively, but forcefully.  
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different persuadees who evaluate the speech and the persuasiveness of the arguments 
from entirely disparate points of view.  
 As mentioned in 7.4, it is entirely conceivable that different coping 
strategies develop to respond to different persuasive strategies. Given time and 
experience, these strategies might well become more automatic and thus resemble 
heuristics and base-line strategies of coping. A greater insight into the coping 
mechanisms would not only yield interest insight into the management of beliefs and 
the psychological aims of the persuadee, but would also shed light on the production of 
acts of persuasion. The automatisms, however, might also overshoot so that the 
persuadee automatically ignores of disbelieves an act of persuasion in situations where 
belief changes might actually produce beneficial results. A recent example of this is the 
political divide of the USA, which has seen more partisan attitudes develop in the last 
few decades (Haidt, 2012). Alongside a greater conceptual acumen, then, an 
understanding of how humans cope with and potentially reject acts of persuasion might 
provide a leeway into understanding partisan and fundamentalist rejection of persuasive 
attempts in situations where an open mind would be more beneficial for all involved. 
That is, situations where epistemic vigilance has gone beyond the boundaries of the 
socially desirable.  
 
4. Operationalization and extension of the SPIMP core model 
As emphasised throughout the thesis, the SPIMP approach provides a speck of a more 
complex kaleidoscopic view on persuasion, as alternative analyses are essential in order 
to gain a more critical awareness and look on different acts of persuasion. For instance, 
various forms of cultural analyses, rhetorical criticism, and so forth provide critical 
insight that the SPIMP model cannot respond to given the fact that the scope of the 
various contributions is significantly different.  If, as mentioned in the second 
suggestion concerning the link between persuasion and influence, the SPIMP approach 
is to be expanded to point towards critical analyses, a significant amount of conceptual 
and experimental work is needed. Because it should be made abundantly clear that the 
SPIMP approach in its current form is not a critically analytical tool, but rather a 
psychological approximation of the processes the persuadee undergoes when evaluating 
an act of persuasion. However, given the potential caustic nature of persuasive attempts 
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in which manipulation is obtained, it would be analytically fascinating to extend the use 
of the model to a more critical point. The question becomes whether it would be 
theoretically and analytically viable to sharpen rhetorical critical methods by invoking 
the insights gained from a psychological SPIMP description? In other words, the weight 
to rhetorical feminist criticism (see e.g. Foss, 2004, chapter 6), for example, might be 
sharpened if scholars could describe an approximation of perceived probabilistic 
estimations following rhetorical praxis on a more fundamental level that points to the 
psychological processes of evaluation, as this would yield interesting critical insight 
into the persuasiveness of a particular artefact. From such analyses, a more warranted 
critical assertion and discussion could follow – an assertion, which might be subject to 
experimental enquiry to further substantiate descriptive and qualitative methods. 
However, to operationalize the SPIMP core model into particular analytical methods 
would require a conceptual discussion on each method in re how the underlying 
assumptions of the present model would relate to the assumptions inherent in the 
particular analytical method.  
 Alongside the issue of applying the model to critical analyses of 
persuasive attempts and how the model relates to prevalent methods of analyses such as 
rhetorical criticism (Foss, 2004), the extension of the model to cover multiple 
persuaders is a fascinating issue. In real-life persuasion, the persuadee is often faced 
with more than one persuader (for instance, in a political debate between party leaders, 
there will be at least two persuaders and often many more). In this way, to describe the 
complexity of multiple persuaders, the model needs to be extended. However, as shown 
in Harris et al. (submitted), the Causal Bayesian Network illustrated in fig. 19 might be 
extendable to include more than one source (i.e. more than one persuader). Fig. 19 
illustrates how the model might be extended to capture the competitive persuasive 
potential of having multiple persuaders. Here, S2 and S3 indicate two other persuaders 
(note that these should also be endowed with nodes for trustworthiness and expertise, 
but for visual simplicity, these have not been added). The extension of the model to 
include multiple persuaders needs conceptual clarity in terms of formalisation as well as 
further empirical testing (such as the one in Harris et al., submitted). However, from the 
model, it is clear that the SPIMP might potentially account for cases with multiple 
persuaders.  
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Fig. 19: Complex Bayesian network of multiple persuaders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration of a Causal Bayesian Network including multiple persuaders 
 
5. The temporal influence on persuasion processing 
Going beyond a naïve impression of time, Einstein humorously remarked ‘put your 
hand on a stove for a minute, and it seems like an hour; Sit with a pretty girl for an hour, 
and it seems like a minute. That’s relativity”. We perceive time relatively, and the 
influence of development, memory, and time is an incredibly complex issue, not only 
for persuasion studies, but for all studies involving humans and social interactions since 
it affects relevant aspects such as epistemological potentials, our ability to perceive the 
present, and so forth. Some temporal aspects of persuasive attempts were briefly 
discussed in 6.4, but a more in-depth discussion of time and persuasion is necessary for 
a fundamental grounding of the influence of the latter on a conceptual basis228.  
 The main area of interest in re temporal aspects in persuasion for further 
exploration is two-fold. Firstly, a general empirical and theoretical interest in the 
influence of memory, past experiences, and individual socio-cultural development aims 
at exploring a central aspect of the foundation of probabilistic theories of reasoning, 
namely how priors are constructed and managed throughout a life and the influence they 
exert on the particular situation. This focus is influenced by research that indicates the 
influence of development, for instance in terms of moral foundations (Haidt, 2012). In 
order to have a richer probabilistic theory of reasoning, this is a conceptual bridge that 
needs to be crossed. Secondly, the temporal aspects of persuasion are of conceptual 
interest from an ontological and epistemological perspective since truth-conditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Given the fact that all events unfold in time, ’temporal’ might not be a good term. However, for the 
time being, it will suffice.  
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probabilities are not given exclusively as assertive statements, but rather as predictive 
claims. The fact that much persuasion is concerned with future events lends a critical 
temporal lens to how humans might evaluate persuasive attempts, as much is concerned 
not with assertions or with counter-factuals, but with predictives. The former two 
(assertions and counter-factuals) have been the focus of most reasoning research (e.g. 
Zultan et al., 2012), whilst the latter has been explored in less detail. Collectively, then, 
the temporal aspects of persuasion are of vital significance to develop a holistic theory 
of processing.  
 
6. Influence of style and culture 
Finally, as noted in the section on presence (6.3), stylistics and the adornment of 
communication is a central aspect of the effectiveness of acts of persuasion. The 
stylistic manner by which the persuader expresses his proposed belief communicatively 
may invoke the presence of the argument, which in turn directs the intentionality of the 
attention. Given the subjectivity of beliefs via the givenness of the perceived, a change 
in intentionality entails that the persuadee may arrive at very different probabilistic 
estimations compared to situations in which her persuasive intentionality was directed 
in a different manner. In this way, stylistics becomes much more than communicative 
adornment; it becomes the lens through which the argument is perceived and processed. 
In this way, stylistics functions cognitively in a similar way as framing effects. 
However, the link between style and reasoning is in no way trivial and is in need of 
methodological exploration in order to ascertain the role of style in persuasive attempts 
on a psychological scale (as stylistics have already been investigated thoroughly in 
literature studies, rhetorical elocutio, and so on). 
An element of style is concerned with the cultural environment in which it 
occurs. Throughout the history of Western oratory, different oratorical and stylistic 
ideals have permeated (for instance, the difference between the brevity of Lincoln’s 
rhetoric as compared to the adornment of the elocutionists of 18th century Britain). In 
the approach developed here, the socio-cultural background, and consequently cultural 
expectations, is central to how an act of persuasion is received. Dissimilar receptions of 
different stylistics due to varying cultural expectations and norms are a concrete 
example of a more general concern in re the theory and model presented in the thesis. 
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The conceptual background for the SPIMP approach is largely derived from empirical 
and theoretical investigations carried out in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
and the USA. That is, the subjects in the various experimental data are predominantly 
(although not exclusively) from Western cultural backgrounds. Therefore, the approach 
might reasonably be labelled a Western rather than a universal theory and model of 
persuasion. It would be arrogant to assume the model holds for other cultures without 
testing the model thoroughly outside the Western cultural boundaries. For instance, the 
use and reverence of authority might differ in different cultural settings (Hofstede, 
1983). If this is true, source credibility and content strength should be differently 
weighted probabilistically – and perhaps also differently conceptualized - if the SPIMP 
approach is to be applied to Japanese subjects. I would like to be very clear, then, that 
the theory and model developed in the thesis is constrained by this empirical and 
conceptual limitation. 
 
Final remarks 
In sum, the SPIMP approach sets out a prolegomena and a theoretical framework for 
understanding and describing the psychological mechanisms underlying persuasion 
processing. However, the approach suffers inherently from theoretical gaps to be 
explored in the future. Future direction 1 mentioned above is focussed on an conceptual 
expansion of the SPIMP approach by investigating the role of emotion states in 
persuasion, directions 2-4 are concerned with extending the approach into critical 
analyses, direction 5 indicates the need for further discussions on memory, 
development, and the temporal aspect, and finally direction 6 is concerned with the 
communicative and innovative quality of persuasion. Collectively, these elements point 
to several research questions where the approach might be tested, challenged, and 
improved upon. However, the general framework for a novel appreciation of persuasion 
is described in the thesis and as such, the thesis points towards additional research. In 
this way, the literature review and discussion carried out throughout the thesis functions 
as a platform from which more in-depth investigations, analyses, and models might 
spring. Alongside the issues presented here, a conceptual development to sharpen the 
theoretical distinctions and connections is warranted to further improve upon the 
SPIMP. Furthermore, it would be immensely interesting to apply the SPIMP approach 
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to real life cases of persuasion to gauge the analytical and descriptive potential of the 
model.  
 Persuasion is omnipresent in society and between humans. In particular, in 
a democratic state where direct and explicit coercion is the exception rather than the 
rule, we have to engage with one another in endlessly novel ways in order to manoeuvre 
the complexity of the social, the known, and the unknown. Persuasion is a profoundly 
beautiful expression of human ingenuity, trust, and sociality. If human beings did not 
possess these fundamental character traits, persuasion, and society, would be 
impossible. Further, persuasion is constantly evolving. In the same way that a literary 
cliché might get tired, so can a manner of persuasion live its life before it gets so 
commonplace that most audiences would be naturally vigilant towards it. As a direct 
consequence of this, persuasion is inherently creative, moving, and innovative. This 
playfulness should not be neglected in our appreciation of the persuasive act. As 
Kakuzo (1906) says, “We classify too much and enjoy too little” (pp. 51-52). If there is 
a clarion call of the thesis, it is that acts of persuasion can possess great power, but also 
fantastic beauty and aesthetic appeal, and that we should avoid tedious reductionist 
analyses of political speeches and advertisement simply because they fit in one single 
preconceived theoretical or analytical box. We must never get so bogged down in the 
technical descriptions of a persuasive incident that we forget the playful aspects, the 
subtle, and the contextually mandated. For this reason, we have to look beyond any one 
discipline in order to gain a richer understanding of any particular act of persuasion in 
any detailed way.  
The thesis presents a theoretical and analytical account as well as a 
concrete model of persuasion (SPIMP), which offer a kaleidoscopic fragment of a more 
complex picture. The same act of persuasion can, and should, be analysed from a 
myriad of perspectives that may draw different conclusions depending on their 
particular point of departure. What more, the kaleidoscopic picture is constantly moving 
given developments in society. We should constantly evaluate and re-evaluate certain 
acts of persuasion given newfound ideals, modes of criticism etc., which in turn sheds 
novel and interesting light on dusty speeches. This is why we need a marriage between 
different forms of analyses when investigating a persuasive incident. As argued in this 
thesis we need for instance rhetorical criticism, cultural studies, descriptive 
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phenomenology as well as social and cognitive psychology in order to gain a more in-
depth idea of a particular act of persuasion as it would be folly to believe that one 
approach could deplete and account for the complexity of the persuasive.  
 
To quote the ancient Roman orators, ‘Dixi’ 
 
Jens Koed Madsen 
 
 
University College London 
Cognitive Perceptual and Brain Sciences 
London, 25/9/2013 
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